Huber, Franz (2017) On the Justification of Deduction and Induction. [Preprint]
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Abstract
The thesis of this paper is that we can justify induction deductively relative to one end, and deduction inductively relative to a different end. I will begin by presenting a contemporary variant of Hume (1739; 1748)'s argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principle of induction. Then I will criticize the responses the resulting problem of induction has received by Carnap (1963; 1968) and Goodman (1954), as well as praise Reichenbach (1938; 1940)'s approach.
Some of these authors compare induction to deduction. Haack (1976) compares deduction to induction, and I will critically discuss her argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principles of deduction next. In concluding I will defend the thesis that we can justify induction deductively relative to one end, and deduction inductively relative to a different end, and that we can do so in a non-circular way. Along the way I will show how we can understand deductive and inductive logic as normative theories, and I will briefly sketch an argument to the effect that there are only hypothetical, but no categorical imperatives.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | justification of induction; Carnap, Goodman, Reichenbach; justification of deduction, Haack | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email franz.huber@utoronto.ca | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 25 Apr 2017 20:46 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 25 Apr 2017 20:46 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 13004 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Date: | 2017 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13004 |
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