Belkind, Ori (2018) In Defense of Newtonian Induction: Hume's Problem of Induction and the Universalization of Primary Qualities. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper aims to advance two claims. First, it aims to show that Hume's argument against the rationality of induction is sound. However, I claim that the conclusion does not follow merely from the self-defeating attempts to justify the rule of induction, unlike traditional readings of the argument. Rather, the skeptical conclusion must also take into account Hume's argument that the secret powers that are present in bodies and give rise to sensible qualities are unknowable. The paper's second aim is to show that Newtonian induction escapes Hume's secret powers argument, given that it includes a transductive inference, from observable phenomena to the powers present in the ultimate parts of matter. Consequently Hume's argument against the rationality of induction does not demonstrate the non-rational nature of Newtonian induction.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Belkind, Ori obelkind@tauex.tau.ac.il 0000-0002-2187-6066
Keywords:	Newton; Hume; Induction; Primary Qualities;
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Laws of Nature General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User:	Dr. Ori Belkind
Date Deposited:	13 Nov 2018 16:43
Last Modified:	13 Nov 2018 16:43
Item ID:	15326
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Laws of Nature General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date:	2018
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15326

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