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There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)

Dellsén, Finnur (2016) There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events). [Preprint]

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Abstract

There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific expla- nations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Dellsén, Finnurfinnurd@gmail.com0000-0003-4989-4204
Additional Information: Published in Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User: Dr. Finnur Dellsén
Date Deposited: 02 Jan 2019 00:25
Last Modified: 02 Jan 2019 00:25
Item ID: 15541
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10838-0...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1007/s10838-016-9333-0
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Date: 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15541

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