Rubin, Hannah (2015) Genetic Models in Evolutionary Game Theory: The Evolution of Altruism. Erkenntnis, 80 (6). pp. 1175-1189. ISSN 1572-8420

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Abstract

While prior models of the evolution of altruism have assumed that organisms reproduce asexually, this paper presents a model of the evolution of altruism for sexually reproducing organisms using Hardy-Weinberg dynamics. In this model, the presence of reciprocal altruists allows the population to evolve to a stable polymorphic population where the majority of organisms are altruistic. Further, adding stochasticity leads to even larger numbers of altruists, while adding stochasticity to an analogous asexual model leads to more selfish organisms. The contrast between these outcomes demonstrates why it may be important to pay attention to the underlying genetics of a population.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Rubin, Hannah hannahr@uci.edu
Keywords:	evolutionary game theory, philosophy of biology, altruism
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory General Issues > Game Theory General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User:	Dr Hannah Rubin
Date Deposited:	01 May 2019 13:36
Last Modified:	01 May 2019 13:36
Item ID:	15960
Journal or Publication Title:	Erkenntnis
Official URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9718-6
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory General Issues > Game Theory General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date:	December 2015
Page Range:	pp. 1175-1189
Volume:	80
Number:	6
ISSN:	1572-8420
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15960

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