LaCroix, Travis (2019) On Salience and Signalling in Sender-Receiver Games: Partial Pooling, Learning, and Focal Points. Synthese. ISSN 1573-0964
|
Text
tlacroix-2018-Salience-and-Signaling-Synthese.pdf Download (413kB) | Preview |
Abstract
I introduce an extension of the Lewis-Skyrms signaling game, analysed from a dynamical perspective via simple reinforcement learning. In David Lewis' (1969) conception of a signaling game, salience is offered as an explanation for how individuals may come to agree upon a linguistic convention. Brian Skyrms (2010) offers a dynamic explanation of how signaling conventions might arise presupposing no salience whatsoever. The extension of the atomic signaling game examined here—which I will refer to as a salience game—introduces a variable parameter into the atomic signaling game which allows for degrees of salience, thus filling in the continuum between Skyrms' and Lewis' models. The model does not presuppose any salience at the outset, but illustrates a process by which accidentally evolved salience is amplified, to the benefit of the players. It is shown that increasing degrees of salience allow populations to avoid sub-optimal pooling equilibria and to coordinate upon conventions more quickly.
| Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
| Social Networking: |
| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Creators: |
|
||||||
| Keywords: | Signaling Games; Salience and Focal Points; Communication Conventions | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Computer Simulation General Issues > Game Theory General Issues > Models and Idealization |
||||||
| Depositing User: | Dr. Travis LaCroix | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 31 Jul 2019 01:02 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 31 Jul 2019 01:02 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 16270 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Synthese | ||||||
| Publisher: | Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.) | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-0... | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1007/s11229-018-1766-z | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Computer Simulation General Issues > Game Theory General Issues > Models and Idealization |
||||||
| Date: | 13 March 2019 | ||||||
| ISSN: | 1573-0964 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16270 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Altmetric.com
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
![[feed]](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}