Coelho Mollo, Dimitri (2015) Being Clear on Content: commentary on Hutto and Satne. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In the target article Hutto and Satne propose a new approach to studying mental content.
Although I believe there is much to commend in their proposal, I argue that it makes no space for a kind of
content that is of central importance to cognitive science, and which need not be involved in beliefs and
desires: what I call 'representational content'. Neglecting representational content leads to an undue limitation
of the contribution that the neo-Cartesian approach can offer to the naturalising content project. I claim that
neo-Cartesians can, on the one hand, help account for the nature of representational content and clarify what
makes representational states contentful. On the other, besides explaining the natural origins of Urintentionality,
neo-Cartesians should also take the role of accounting for the natural origins of contentful
states that fall short of beliefs and desires. Finally, I argue that the only alternative for the authors is to
embrace some form of non-representationalism, as Hutto elsewhere does. The success of the proposal
thereby turns on the fate of the radical non-representationalist position that it accompanies.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Coelho Mollo, Dimitri dimitricmollo@gmail.com 0000-0002-0464-3535
Additional Information:	Published in Philosophia (2015), vol.43(3)
Keywords:	Mental representation; Mental content; Naturalising intentionality; Origins of content; Enactivism
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Depositing User:	Dimitri Coelho Mollo
Date Deposited:	20 Aug 2019 13:52
Last Modified:	20 Aug 2019 13:52
Item ID:	16341
Official URL:	https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-0...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1007/s11406-015-9622-6
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Date:	2015
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16341

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