Franklin, James (2016) Logical probability and the strength of mathematical conjectures. Mathematical Intelligencer, 38 (3). pp. 14-19. ISSN 1866-7414

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Abstract

Mathematicians often speak of the evidence for unproved conjectures, such as the Riemann Hypothesis. It is argued that such evidence should be seen in terms of logical probability in Keynes's sense: a strictly logical degree of partial implication. That is essentially the same as objective Bayesianism. Examples are given and explained in terms of the objective logical strength of evidence.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Franklin, James j.franklin@unsw.edu.au 0000-0002-4603-1406
Keywords:	Non-deductive logic; mathematical conjectures; Bayesianism
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Methodology Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Practice Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	James Franklin
Date Deposited:	20 Oct 2019 01:03
Last Modified:	20 Oct 2019 01:03
Item ID:	16562
Journal or Publication Title:	Mathematical Intelligencer
Publisher:	Springer
Official URL:	https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00283-0...
DOI or Unique Handle:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00283-015-9612-3
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Methodology Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Practice Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	2016
Page Range:	pp. 14-19
Volume:	38
Number:	3
ISSN:	1866-7414
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16562

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