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Are Metaphysical Claims Testable?

Stergiou, Chrysovalantis (2020) Are Metaphysical Claims Testable? [Preprint]

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Abstract

To consider metaphysical claims a priori and devoid of empirical content, is a rather commonplace received opinion. This paper attempts an exploration of a contemporary philosophical heresy: it is possible to test metaphysical claims if they play an indispensable role in producing empirical success, i.e. novel predictions. To do so one, firstly, needs to express the metaphysical claims employed in the logico-mathematical language of a scientific theory, i.e. to explicate them. Secondly, they should have an understanding of what it is to test and to verify or to falsify a metaphysical claim. Finally, they also need to consider the philosophical practice of testing a metaphysical claim. These three aspects are introduced in this paper and they are illustrated by means of the metaphysical concept of common cause and the principle of the common cause.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Stergiou, Chrysovalantisvalstergiou@gmail.com
Keywords: Explication; Scientific Metaphysics; Testing Hypothesis
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Depositing User: Chrysovalantis Stergiou
Date Deposited: 05 Jun 2020 00:45
Last Modified: 05 Jun 2020 00:45
Item ID: 17283
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Date: June 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17283

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