Bruner, Justin (2020) Nash, bargaining and evolution. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Evolutionary accounts of morality tend to consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. For instance, evolutionary work on fairness focuses on the division of a windfall and, importantly, assumes the position of those involved are entirely symmetric. We consider more complicated strategic settings and find that there is a strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with the so-called Nash bargaining solution. We also uncover the evolutionary importance of comprehensiveness, an often-overlooked feature of division problems.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Game theory; evolution; evolutionary ethics | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory General Issues > Ethical Issues General Issues > Game Theory |
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| Depositing User: | Dr Justin Bruner | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 24 Jun 2020 01:54 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 24 Jun 2020 01:54 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 17366 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory General Issues > Ethical Issues General Issues > Game Theory |
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| Date: | 2020 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17366 |
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