PhilSci Archive

Eternalism and Perspectival Realism About the ‘Now’

Slavov, Matias (2020) Eternalism and Perspectival Realism About the ‘Now’. Foundations of Physics, 50. pp. 1398-1410. ISSN 1572-9516

[img]
Preview
Text
Eternalism_PerspectivalRealism.pdf

Download (774kB) | Preview

Abstract

Eternalism is the view that all times are equally real. The relativity of simultaneity in special relativity backs this up. There is no cosmically extended, self-existing ‘now.’ This leads to a tricky problem. What makes statements about the present true? I shall approach the problem along the lines of perspectival realism and argue that the choice of the perspective does. To corroborate this point, the Lorentz transformations of special relativity are compared to the structurally similar equations of the Doppler effect. The ‘now’ is perspectivally real in the same way as a particular electromagnetic spectrum frequency. I also argue that the ontology of time licensed by perspectival realism is more credible in this context than its current alternative, the fragmentalist interpretation of special relativity.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Slavov, Matiasmatias.slavov@tuni.fi0000-0001-8515-2449
Keywords: Philosophy of time; Eternalism; Special relativity; The now; Truthmaking; Perspectival realism; Fragmentalism
Depositing User: Dr. Matias Slavov
Date Deposited: 24 Nov 2020 23:56
Last Modified: 24 Nov 2020 23:56
Item ID: 18433
Journal or Publication Title: Foundations of Physics
Publisher: Springer
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10701-0...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1007/s10701-020-00385-x
Date: 24 September 2020
Page Range: pp. 1398-1410
Volume: 50
ISSN: 1572-9516
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18433

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Altmetric.com

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item