Park, Seungbae (2020) The Appearance and the Reality of a Scientific Theory. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 9 (11). pp. 59-69.

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Abstract

Scientific realists claim that the best of successful rival theories is (approximately) true. Relative realists object that we cannot make the absolute judgment that a theory is successful, and that we can only make the relative judgment that it is more successful than its competitor. I argue that this objection is undermined by the cases in which empirical equivalents are successful. Relative realists invoke the argument from a bad lot to undermine scientific realism and to support relative realism. In response, I construct the argument from double spaces. It is similar to the argument from a bad lot, but threatens many philosophical inferences, including relative realists’ inference from comparative success to comparative truth.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Park, Seungbae
Keywords:	Appearance and Reality, Argument from a Bad Lot, Argument from Double Spaces, Relative Realism, Scientific Realism, Success
Depositing User:	Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited:	01 Dec 2020 05:58
Last Modified:	01 Dec 2020 05:58
Item ID:	18463
Journal or Publication Title:	Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Publisher:	Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective
Official URL:	https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5×3
Date:	27 November 2020
Page Range:	pp. 59-69
Volume:	9
Number:	11
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18463

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