Mohammadian, Mousa (2019) Beyond the Instinct-Inference Dichotomy: A Unified Interpretation of Peirce’s Theory of Abduction. [Preprint]
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Abstract
I examine and resolve an exegetical dichotomy between two main interpretations of Peirce’s theory of abduction, namely, the Generative Interpretation and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation. According to the former, abduction is the instinctive process of generating explanatory hypotheses through a mental faculty called insight. According to the latter, abduction is a rule-governed procedure for determining the relative pursuitworthiness of available hypotheses and adopting the worthiest one for further investigation—such as empirical tests—based on economic considerations. It is shown that the Generative Interpretation is inconsistent with a fundamental fact of logic for Peirce—i.e., abduction is a kind of inference—and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation is flawed and inconsistent with Peirce’s naturalistic explanation for the possibility of science and his view about the limitations of classical scientific method. Changing the exegetical locus classicus from the logical form of abduction to insight and economy of research, I argue for the Unified Interpretation according to which abduction includes both instinctive hypotheses-generation and rule-governed hypotheses-ranking. I show that the Unified Interpretation is immune to the objections raised successfully against the Generative and the Pursuitworthiness interpretations.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Abduction, Insight, Economy of Research, Explanation, Instinct, Inference, Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Explanation General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Depositing User: | Mousa Mohammadian | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 28 Dec 2020 05:21 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 28 Dec 2020 05:21 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 18544 | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirs... | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.55.2.03 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Explanation General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Date: | 2019 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18544 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Beyond the Instinct-Inference Dichotomy: A Unified Interpretation of Peirce’s Theory of Abduction. (deposited 21 Jul 2019 13:43)
- Beyond the Instinct-Inference Dichotomy: A Unified Interpretation of Peirce’s Theory of Abduction. (deposited 28 Dec 2020 05:21) [Currently Displayed]
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