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Explanatory Independence and Epistemic Interdependence: A Case Study of the Optimality Approach

Potochnik, Angela (2010) Explanatory Independence and Epistemic Interdependence: A Case Study of the Optimality Approach. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The value of optimality modeling has long been a source of contention amongst population biologists. Here I present a view of the optimality approach as at once playing a crucial explanatory role and yet also depending on external sources of confirmation. Optimality models are not alone in facing this tension between their explanatory value and their dependence on other approaches; I suspect that the scenario is quite common in science. This investigation of the optimality approach thus serves as a case study, on the basis of which I suggest that there is a widely felt tension in science between explanatory independence and broad epistemic interdependence, and that this tension influences scientific methodology.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Potochnik, Angela
Keywords: game theory, optimality modeling, explanation, idealization
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Angela Potochnik
Date Deposited: 12 May 2021 03:10
Last Modified: 12 May 2021 03:10
Item ID: 19018
Journal or Publication Title: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1093/bjps/axp022
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: 2010
Page Range: pp. 213-233
Volume: 61
Number: 1
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19018

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