Deng, Natalja (2019) One thing after another: why the passage of time is not an illusion. pp. 3-15.

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Abstract

Does time seem to us to pass, even though it doesn’t, really? Many philosophers think the answer is ‘Yes’ – at least when ‘time’s (really) passing’ is understood in a particular way. They take time’s passing to be a process by which each time in turn acquires a special status, such as the status of being the only time that exists, or being the only time that is present (where that means more than just being simultaneous with oneself). This chapter suggests that on the contrary, all we perceive is temporal succession, one thing after another, a notion to which modern physics is not inhospitable. The contents of perception are best described in terms of ‘before’ and ‘after’, rather than ‘past’, ‘present, and ‘future’.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Deng, Natalja nmdeng@gmail.com 0000-0001-5668-9271
Keywords:	Time, Passage, Perception, Illusion
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Depositing User:	Prof. Natalja Deng
Date Deposited:	28 Jun 2021 04:27
Last Modified:	28 Jun 2021 04:27
Item ID:	19246
Publisher:	Palgrave Macmillan
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Date:	8 October 2019
Page Range:	pp. 3-15
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19246

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