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Explaining Epistemic Opacity

Alvarado, Ramón (2021) Explaining Epistemic Opacity. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Conventional accounts of epistemic opacity, particularly those that stem from the definitive work of Paul Humphreys, typically point to limitations on the part of epistemic agents to account for the distinct ways in which systems, such as computational methods and devices, are opaque. They point, for example, to the lack of technical skill on the part of an agent (Burrell, 2016; Kaminski, 2017), the failure to meet standards of best practice (Saam, 2017; Hubig, 2017), or even the nature of an agent (Humphreys, 2009) as reasons why epistemically relevant elements of a process may be inaccessible. In this paper I argue that there are certain instances of epistemic opacity— particularly in computational methods such a computer simulations and machine learning processes—that (1) do not arise from, (2) are not responsive to, and (3) are therefore not explained by the epistemic limitations of an agent. I call these instances agent-neutral and agent-independent instances of epistemic opacity respectively. As a result, I also argue that conventional accounts of epistemic opacity offer a limited understanding of the full spectrum of kinds and sources of epistemic opacity, particularly of the kind found in computational methods. In particular, as I will show below, the limitations of these accounts are reflected in the way they fail to provide satisfactory explanations when faced with certain instances of opacity.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Alvarado, Ramónralvarad@uoregon.edu0000-0002-0028-4192
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Science and Art of Simulation II ed. A. Kaminski and Resch.
Keywords: Software, Transparency, Opacity, Epistemology of Science
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Technology
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Dr. Ramón Alvarado
Date Deposited: 31 Jul 2021 12:36
Last Modified: 31 Jul 2021 12:36
Item ID: 19384
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Technology
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: 2021
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19384

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