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How to Be a Spacetime Substantivalist

Teitel, Trevor (2021) How to Be a Spacetime Substantivalist. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The consensus among spacetime substantivalists is to respond to Leibniz's classic shift arguments, and their contemporary incarnation in the form of the hole argument, by pruning the allegedly problematic metaphysical possibilities that generate these arguments. Some substantivalists do so by directly appealing to a modal doctrine akin to anti-haecceitism. Other substantivalists do so by appealing to an underlying hyperintensional doctrine that implies some such modal doctrine. My first aim in this paper is to pose a challenge for all extant forms of this consensus position. My second aim is to show what form substantivalism must take in order to uphold the consensus while addressing this challenge. The result is a novel "plenitudinous" substantivalist view, which predicts that certain modal facts about spacetime are vague or indeterminate. I then argue against this view on independent grounds, concluding that substantivalists should reject the consensus position. The paper also discusses the way forward for substantivalists in light of this conclusion.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Teitel, Trevortrevor.teitel@utoronto.ca
Additional Information: Forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy
Keywords: Spacetime; Haecceitism; Substantivalism; Relationism; Modality; Determinism; The Hole Argument; Structuralism; Plenitude; Vagueness
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Depositing User: Trevor Teitel
Date Deposited: 11 Sep 2021 15:19
Last Modified: 11 Sep 2021 15:19
Item ID: 19545
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Date: 2 September 2021
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19545

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