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Perceiving Direction in Directionless Time

Farr, Matt (2021) Perceiving Direction in Directionless Time. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Modern physics has provided a range of motivations for holding time to be fundamentally undirected. But how does a temporally adirectional metaphysics, or ‘C-theory’ of time, fit with the time of experience? In this chapter, I look at what kind of problem human time poses for C-theories. First, I ask whether there is a ‘hard problem’ of human time: whether it is in principle impossible to have the kinds of experience we do in a temporally adirectional world. Second I consider the ‘easy problem’: how specific directed aspects of our temporal experience are to be explained by C-theorists. This leads to a greater issue: is there such a thing as an experience of time direction at all to even be explained? I show how the kinds of experience we have that we typically associate with the idea of time being directed can be accommodated within a directionless picture of time.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Farr, Mattmail@mattfarr.co.uk0000-0001-6238-7990
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Kasia M. Jaszczolt (ed.), Understanding Human Time, Oxford University Press.
Keywords: Direction of time C-theory Time perception B-theory A-theory Illusionism Perception Time
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Depositing User: Dr Matt Farr
Date Deposited: 24 Dec 2021 03:02
Last Modified: 24 Dec 2021 03:02
Item ID: 20044
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Date: 2021
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20044

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