Ferrari, Francesco Maria (2021) An argument against Nominalism. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Nominalism in formal ontology is still the thesis that the only acceptable domain of quantification is the first-order domain of particulars. Nominalists may assert that second-order well-formed formulas can be fully and completely interpreted within the first-order domain, thereby avoiding any ontological commitment to second-order entities, by means of an appropriate semantics called ``substitutional". In this paper I argue that the success of this strategy depends on the ability of Nominalists to maintain that identity, and equivalence relations more in general, is first-order and invariant. Firstly, I explain why Nominalists are formally bound to this first-order concept of identity. Secondly, I show that the resources needed to justify identity, a certain conception of identity invariance, are out of the nominalist's reach.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Formal Ontology; Extensionality; Identity; Logicality; Nominalism. | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Francesco Maria Ferrari | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 31 Mar 2022 14:46 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 31 Mar 2022 14:46 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 20416 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology |
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| Date: | 19 November 2021 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20416 |
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An argument against Nominalism. (deposited 24 Nov 2021 19:14)
- An argument against Nominalism. (deposited 31 Mar 2022 14:46) [Currently Displayed]
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