Dethier, Corey
(2022)
Against "Possibilist" Interpretations of Climate Models.
In: UNSPECIFIED.
Abstract
Climate scientists frequently employ (groups of) heavily idealized models. How should these models be interpreted? A number of philosophers have suggested that a possibilist interpretation might be preferable, where this entails interpreting climate models as standing in for possible scenarios that could occur, but not as providing any sort of information about how probable those scenarios are. The present paper argues that possibilism is (a) undermotivated by the philosophical and empirical arguments that have been advanced in the literature, (b) incompatible with successful practices in the science, and (c) liable to present a less accurate picture of the current state of research and/or uncertainty than probabilistic alternatives. There are good arguments to be had about how precisely to interpret climate models but our starting point should be that the models provide evidence relevant to the evaluation of hypotheses concerning the actual world in at least some cases.
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