LeBrun, Alex (2022) Putnam's Indispensability Argument. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Hilary Putnam (2012) boldly claimed that he never subscribed to the so-called Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. All the same, he did not state exactly what his indispensability argument was. This paper presents an interpretation of Putnam's indispensability argument that is consistent with both his recent and historical writings. Through the course of his argument, Putnam requires a view of ontological commitment that is of contemporary interest. I conclude with a brief defense of this view and an application of it to a metaphysical debate.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID LeBrun, Alex lebrun@ucsb.edu 0000-0002-4897-5611
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Depositing User:	Mr. Alex LeBrun
Date Deposited:	05 Jun 2022 03:25
Last Modified:	05 Jun 2022 03:25
Item ID:	20715
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Date:	2022
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20715

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