Mohammadian, Mousa
(2022)
An Armstrongian Defense of Dispositional Monist Accounts of Laws of Nature.
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An Armstrongian Defense of Dispositional Monist Accounts of Laws of Nature.pdf
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Abstract
Bird reveals an important problem at the heart of Armstrong’s theory of laws of nature: to explain how a law necessitates its corresponding regularity, Armstrong is committed to a vicious regress. In his very brief response, Armstrong gestures towards an argument that, as he admits, is more of a “speculation.” Later, Barker and Smart argue that a very similar problem threatens Bird’s dispositional monist theory of laws of nature and he is committed to a similar vicious regress. In this paper, first, I construct Armstrong’s would-be argument in response to Bird. Second, I argue that his response makes his account of laws and natural properties incompatible with science. Finally, I argue that Armstrong’s strategy to address Bird’s criticism can be used, quite ironically, to defuse Barker and Smart’s argument against Bird.
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An Armstrongian Defense of Dispositional Monist Accounts of Laws of Nature. (deposited 15 Jul 2022 13:13)
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