Esfeld, Michael and Koestner, Guillaume (2022) Normative relations, mind points and social ontology. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The paper spells out an argument to the effect that rejecting what Sellars denounces as the “myth of the given” has a bearing not only on epistemology, but also on ontology: we get to recognizing persons as ontologically primitive. We spell that argument out by drawing on what is known as left-wing Sellarsianism, although our aim is not the exegesis of Sellars’s texts. Our aim is to show how one can get from this argument to a social ontology in the guise of a synoptic view that recognizes both persons and matter in motion as ontologically primitive and that employs the conceptual tools of ontic structural realism.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Esfeld, Michael michael.esfeld@unil.ch Koestner, Guillaume Guillaume.Kostner@unil.ch
Keywords:	holism; Kant; liberal naturalism; myth of the given; ontic structural realism; ontology of persons; Sellars; left-wing and right-wing Sellarsianism; social, normative theory of meaning; social ontology
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism Specific Sciences > Sociology
Depositing User:	Michael Esfeld
Date Deposited:	06 Sep 2022 02:59
Last Modified:	06 Sep 2022 02:59
Item ID:	21134
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism Specific Sciences > Sociology
Date:	September 2022
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21134

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