Reuter, Kevin (2022) Experimental Philosophy of Consciousness. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Experimental philosophy of consciousness seeks to investigate and explain our thinking about phenomenally conscious states. Based on empirical studies, researchers have argued (a) that there is no folk concept of consciousness, (b) that we do not think Microsoft feels regret, (c) that unfelt pains are widely accepted, and (d) that people do not believe that duplicated hamsters have phenomenally conscious states. In this paper, I review these and other fascinating claims about people’s understanding of phenomenal consciousness. In doing so, I also show why experimental philosophy of consciousness is hard, although perhaps not quite as hard as studying phenomenal consciousness itself.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Reuter, Kevin kevin.reuter@uzh.ch 0000-0003-2404-1619
Keywords:	experimental philosophy consciousness phenomenal states pains colors emotions folk concept
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User:	Dr. Kevin Reuter
Date Deposited:	07 Nov 2022 15:35
Last Modified:	07 Nov 2022 15:35
Item ID:	21370
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date:	7 November 2022
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21370

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