C. R. Martins, André (2005) Theoretical Omniscience: Old Evidence or New Theory. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I will show that, in the Problem of Old Evidence, unless a rational agent has a property I will call theoretical omniscience (a stronger version of logical omniscience), a problem with non-commutativity of the learning theories follows. Therefore, scientists, when trying to behave as close to rationality as possible, should behave in a way close to the counterfactual strategy. The concept of theoretical omniscience will be applied to the problem of Jeffrey conditionalization, as an example, and we will see that a more complete theoretical model can provide a classical conditionalization where you can learn that data was wrong and all you will not unlearn is your memory.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID C. R. Martins, André
Keywords:	Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Theoretical Omniscience, Rationality, Jeffrey Conditionalization
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User:	André Cavalcanti Rocha Martins
Date Deposited:	30 Sep 2005
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:13
Item ID:	2458
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date:	September 2005
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2458

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