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Judgment aggregation: a short introduction

List, Christian (2008) Judgment aggregation: a short introduction. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to introduce the theory of judgment aggregation, a growing interdisciplinary research area. The theory addresses the following question: How can a group of individuals make consistent collective judgments on a given set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgments on them? I begin by explaining the observation that initially sparked the interest in judgment aggregation, the so-called "doctinal" and "discursive paradoxes". I then introduce the basic formal model of judgment aggregation, which allows me to present some illustrative variants of a generic impossibility result. I subsequently turn to the question of how this impossibility result can be avoided, going through several possible escape routes. Finally, I relate the theory of judgment aggregation to other branches of aggregation theory. Rather than offering a comprehensive survey of the theory of judgment aggregation, I hope to introduce the theory in a succinct and pedagogical way, providing an illustrative rather than exhaustive coverage of some of its key ideas and results.


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Item Type: Preprint
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List, Christian
Keywords: judgment aggregation, social choice, formal epistemology, discursive dilemma, doctrinal paradox
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Economics
Depositing User: Christian List
Date Deposited: 11 Nov 2008
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:17
Item ID: 4319
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Economics
Date: August 2008
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4319

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