Griffiths, Paul (2002) Is Emotion a Natural Kind? [Preprint]

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Abstract

In <i>What Emotions Really Are: The problem of psychological categories<i> I argued that it is unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that fall under the vernacular category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified scientific psychology of the emotions. In this paper I restate what I mean by natural kind and my argument for supposing that emotion is not a natural kind in this specific sense. In the following sections I discuss the two most promising proposals to reunify the emotion category: the revival of the Jamesian theory of emotion associated with the writings of Antonio Damasio and a philosophical approach to the content of emotional representations that draws on multi-level appraisal theory in psychology.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Griffiths, Paul
Keywords:	emotion natural kinds damasio somatic appraisal nussbaum appraisal theory
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Psychology > Evolutionary Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User:	Professor Paul Edmund Griffiths
Date Deposited:	19 Nov 2002
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2015 15:03
Item ID:	566
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Psychology > Evolutionary Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date:	November 2002
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/566

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