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Defending the Semantic View: What it takes

Le Bihan, Soazig (2008) Defending the Semantic View: What it takes. European Journal for Philosophy of Science.

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Abstract

In this paper, a modest version of the Semantic View is motivated as both tenable and potentially fruitful for philosophy of science. An analysis is proposed in which the Semantic View is given as characterized by three main claims. For each of these claims, a distinction is made between stronger and more modest interpretations. It is argued that the criticisms recently leveled against the Semantic View hold only under the stronger interpretations of these claims. However, if one only commits to the modest interpretation for all the claims, then the view obtained, which is called the Modest Semantic View, is tenable and fruitful.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Le Bihan, Soazig
Keywords: Semantic View, Scientific Theories, Scientific Models, Model Theory, Suppes, van Fraassen, Morrison
Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Dr. Soazig Le Bihan
Date Deposited: 10 May 2011 02:26
Last Modified: 10 May 2011 02:26
Item ID: 8599
Journal or Publication Title: European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Publisher: Springer
Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/a5rk85pg8401tv...
Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 2008
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8599

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