2024-03-28T09:32:44Z
http:///cgi/oai2
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:227
2010-10-07T15:20:15Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:228
2022-10-17T13:52:34Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:726865746F7269632D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/228/
Have Orbitals Really Been Observed?
Scerri, Eric
Rhetoric of Science
The article disputes the recent claim featured in "Nature" magazine and many other science magazines to the effect that atomic orbitals have been observed for the first time. The claim is incorrect in view of the unconvincing nature of the evidence adduced and since atomic orbitals are deemed unobservable in principle by quantum mechanics. In addition, the possible educational drawbacks of this incorrect claim are discussed.
2000
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/228/1/Orbital_Observed.pdf
Scerri, Eric (2000) Have Orbitals Really Been Observed? UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:229
2010-10-07T15:10:14Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/229/
Secure Key Distribution via Pre- and Post-Selected Quantum States
Bub, Jeffrey
Quantum Mechanics
A quantum key distribution scheme whose security depends on the features of pre- and post-selected quantum states is described.
2001-02
Other
PeerReviewed
tex-latex
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/229/1/Keydistribution.tex
Bub, Jeffrey (2001) Secure Key Distribution via Pre- and Post-Selected Quantum States. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:248
2010-10-07T15:10:14Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:6669656C64732D616E642D7061727469636C6573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/248/
Space-time relationism in Newtonian and relativistic physics
Dieks, Dennis
Classical Physics
Fields and Particles
Relativity Theory
I argue that there is a natural relationist interpretation of Newtonian and relativistic non-quantum physics. Although relationist, this interpretation does not fall prey to the traditional objections based on the existence of inertial effects.
2000-01
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/248/1/SPACE.doc
Dieks, Dennis (2000) Space-time relationism in Newtonian and relativistic physics. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:308
2010-10-07T15:10:19Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/308/
Eliminativist Undercurrents in the New Wave Model of Psychoneural Reduction
Wright, Cory
Reductionism/Holism
Structure of Theories
Theory Change
"New wave" reductionism aims at advancing a kind of reduction that is stronger than unilateral dependency of the mental on the physical. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of degree, and can be laid out on a continuum between a "smooth" pole (theoretical identity) and a "bumpy" pole (extremely revisionary). It also entails that both higher and lower levels of the reductive relationship sustain some degree of explanatory autonomy. The new wave predicts that reductions of folk psychology to neuroscience will be located in the middle of this continuum; as neuroscientific evidence about mental states checks in, theoretical folk psychology will therefore be moderately revised. However, the model has conceptual problems which preclude its success in reviving reductionism, and its commitment to a syntactic approach wrecks its attempt to rescue folk psychology. Moreover, the architecture of the continuum operates on a category mistake that sneaks in an eliminativist conclusion. I argue that new wave reductionism therefore tends to be eliminativism in disguise.
2000
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/308/1/Journal_of_Mind_and_Behavior_Preprint%2C_Psychoneural_Elimination.doc
Wright, Cory (2000) Eliminativist Undercurrents in the New Wave Model of Psychoneural Reduction. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:414
2010-10-07T15:10:29Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/414/
Space-Time and Probability
Saunders, Simon
Probability/Statistics
Relativity Theory
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Quantum Mechanics
Special relativity is most naturally formulated as a theory of spacetime geometry, but within the spacetime framework probability appears to be a purely epistemic notion. It is possible that progress can be made with rather different approaches - covariant stochastic equations, in particular - but the results to date are not encouraging. However, it seems a non-epistemic notion of probability can be made out in Minkowski space on Everett's terms. I shall work throughout with the consistent histories formalism. I shall start with a conservative interpretation, and then go on to Everett's
2000
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/414/1/naples.pdf
Saunders, Simon (2000) Space-Time and Probability. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:463
2010-10-07T15:10:33Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/463/
Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Decoherence
Saunders, Simon
Relativity Theory
Quantum Mechanics
ABSTRACT. A variety of ideas arisi\U{fc}g in decoherence theory, and in the ongoing debate over Everett's relative-state theory, can be linked to issues in relativity theory and the philosophy of time, specifically the relational theory of tense and of identity over time. These have been systematically presented in companion papers (Saunders 1995, 1996a); in what follows we shall consider the same circle of ideas, but specifically in relation to the interpretation of probability, and its identification with relations in the Hilbert space norm. The familiar objection that Everett's approach yields probabilities different from quantum mechanics is easily dealt with. The more fundamental question is how to interpret these probabilities consistent with the relational theory of change, and the relational theory of identity over time. I shall show that the relational theory needs nothing more than the physical, minimal criterion of identity as defined by Everett's theory, and that this can be transparently interpreted in terms of the ordinary notion of the chance occurrence of an event, as witnessed in the present. It is in this sense that the theory has empirical content.
1994
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/463/1/part1.pdf
Saunders, Simon (1994) Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Decoherence. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:465
2010-10-07T15:10:33Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/465/
Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability
Saunders, Simon
Probability/Statistics
Quantum Mechanics
Relativity Theory
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics has repeatedly been criticized on the grounds that probabilty makes no sense on its terms. These criticisms are considered in detail, and found to be wanting. I conclude that on the contrary the Everett interpretation provides a clear account of probability, and that its most radical feature, that it abandons a 1:1 relationship of identity over time, already has to be dealt with in classical physics.
1997
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/465/1/Part3uj%28S%29.pdf
Saunders, Simon (1997) Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:584
2010-10-07T15:10:45Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/584/
Science: Freedom and Reason, Comments on Mara Beller's 'Quantum Dialogue'
Shenker, Orly R.
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Mara Beller's book Quantum Dialogue: The Making of a Revolution is a book in history and historiography, which invites a philosophical reading. The book offers a new and quite radical approach in the philosophy of science, which Beller calls dialogism, and it demonstrates the application of this approach by studying cases in the history of physics. This paper reconstructs of some of the book's theses, in a way which emphasises its philosophical insights, and goes on to shows how philosophically far dialogism can take us. The example on which the paper focuses is the demarcation between science and non-science.
2000-12
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/584/1/Shenker_Dialogism_.doc
Shenker, Orly R. (2000) Science: Freedom and Reason, Comments on Mara Beller's 'Quantum Dialogue'. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:649
2010-10-07T15:10:52Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:6669656C64732D616E642D7061727469636C6573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6669656C642D7468656F7279
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/649/
Reeh-Schlieder meets Newton-Wigner
Fleming, Gordon N.
Fields and Particles
Quantum Field Theory
The Reeh-Schlieder theorem asserts the vacuum and certain other states to be spacelike superentangled relative to local fields. This motivates an inquiry into the physical status of various concepts of localization. It is argued that a covariant generalization of Newton-Wigner localization is a physically illuminating concept. When analyzed in terms of nonlocally covariant quantum fields, creating and annihilating quanta in Newton-Wigner localized states, the vacuum is seen to not possess the spacelike superentanglement that the Reeh-Schlieder theorem displays relative to local fields, and to be locally empty as well as globally empty. Newton-Wigner localization is then shown to be physically interpretable in terms of a covariant generalization of the center of energy, the two localizations being identical if the system has no internal angular momentum. Finally, some of the counterintuitive features of Newton-Wigner localization are shown to have close analogues in classical special relativity.
1998
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/649/1/RS_meets_NW%2C_PDF.pdf
Fleming, Gordon N. (1998) Reeh-Schlieder meets Newton-Wigner. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:672
2010-10-07T15:10:55Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/672/
Towards a systemic research methodology in agriculture: Rethinking the role of values in science
Alrøe, Hugo Fjelsted
Kristensen, Erik Steen
Models and Idealization
Theory/Observation
Reductionism/Holism
This paper takes some steps towards developing a systemic research methodology – a general self-reflexive methodology that forms a basis for doing wholeness-oriented research and provides appropriate criteria of scientific quality. From a philosophy of research perspective, science is seen as an interactive learning process with both a cognitive and a social communicative aspect. This means, first of all, that science plays a role in the world that it studies. A science that influences its own subject area, such as agricultural science, is named a systemic science. From this perspective, there is a need to reconsider the role of values in science. Science is not objective in the sense of being value-free. Values play, and ought to play, an important role in science – not only in form of constitutive values such as the norms of good science, but also in the form of contextual values that enter into the very process of science. This goes against the traditional criterion of objectivity. Therefore, reflexive objectivity is suggested as a new criterion for doing good science, along with the criterion of relevance. Reflexive objectivity implies that the communication of science must include the cognitive context, which comprises the societal, intentional, and observational context. Taking reflexive objectivity as a demarcator of good science, an inclusive framework of science can be established. The framework does not take the established division between natural, social and human science as a primary distinction of science. The major distinction is made between the empirical and normative aspects of science, corresponding to two key cognitive interests.
2002-01
Preprint
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/672/1/Towards_a_systemic_research_methodology_preprint_11sep01.pdf
Alrøe, Hugo Fjelsted and Kristensen, Erik Steen (2002) Towards a systemic research methodology in agriculture: Rethinking the role of values in science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:888
2010-10-07T15:11:14Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/888/
Non-Representationalist Theories of Knowledge and Quantum Mechanics
Bitbol, Michel
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Quantum Mechanics
Realism/Anti-realism
Quantum Mechanics has imposed strain on traditional (dualist and representationalist) epistemological conceptions. An alternative was offered by Bohr and Heisenberg, according to whom natural science does not describe nature, but rather the interplay between nature and ourselves. But this was only a suggestion. In this paper, a systematic development of the Bohr-Heisenberg conception is outlined, by way of a comparison with the modern self-organizational theories of cognition. It is shown that a consistent non-representationalist (and/or relational) reading of quantum mechanics can be reached thus.
2001
Other
PeerReviewed
rtf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/888/1/Non-representationalism_SATS.doc
Bitbol, Michel (2001) Non-Representationalist Theories of Knowledge and Quantum Mechanics. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:889
2015-09-13T15:23:57Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/889/
Science as if situation mattered
Bitbol, Michel
Cognitive Science
Psychology
Quantum Mechanics
When he formulated the program of Neurophenomenology, Francisco Varela suggested a balanced methodological dissolution of the hard problem of the philosophy of mind. I show that his dissolution is a paradigm which imposes itself onto seemingly opposite views, including materialist approaches. I also point out that Varela's revolutionary epistemological ideas are gaining wider acceptance as a side effect of a recent controversy between hermeneutists and eliminativists. Finally, I emphasize a structural parallel between the science of consciousness and the distinctive features of quantum mechanics. This parallel, together with the former convergences, point towards the common origin of the main puzzles of both quantum mechanics and the philosophy of mind: neglect of the constitutive blindspot of objective knowledge.
2002
Other
PeerReviewed
rtf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/889/1/Science_situation_2.doc
Bitbol, Michel (2002) Science as if situation mattered. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1130
2010-10-07T21:38:21Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1196
2010-10-07T15:20:49Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1210
2010-10-07T15:11:51Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1210/
The Physics of Collective Consciousness
Grandpierre, Attila
Reductionism/Holism
Physics
ABSTRACT: It is pointed out that the organisation of an organism necessarily involves fields which are the only means to make an approximately simultaneous tuning of the different subsystems of the organism-as-a-whole. Nature uses the olfactory fields, the acoustic fields, the electromagnetic fields and quantum-vacuum fields. Fields with their ability to comprehend the whole organism are the natural basis of a global interaction between organisms and of collective consciousness. Evidences are presented that electromagnetic potential fields mediate the collective field of consciousness. This result offers for the first time experimental access to the study of collective consciousness by measuring the field-related information-carrying potentials and their derivatives, the electric and magnetic fields between different individuals. The electrodynamic interaction of different brains/minds generates induction and in this way excitement, enhancement in the baseline of the interacting brains? activity. A list of empirical evidences is presented here proving the existence of this ?interactive excitement? effect in the known phenomenon of collective consciousness. The fundamental phenomenon of the collective consciousness is known as ?social facilitation? or ?group effect?. The character and completion of consciousness are outlined in the frame of this picture, and the role of the ?group effect? or ?social facilitation? as a primary factor in developing consciousness is described. A quantum-physical model of a multi-layered consciousness is presented, where the layering is expressed by the subsequent subtlety of the masses of the material carriers of information. I show that as the mental levels get deeper and more sensitive the couplings are on more and more global scales of their environment. I point out that direct, immediate action in distance actually exists in the electromagnetic field, which is the coupling, mediator field between waves and particles. I show how the environmental, natural and cosmic fields are determinative sources of our consciousness. The results presented point out that the Collective Field of Consciousness is a significant physical factor of the biosphere. I show that the morphogenetic field has an electromagnetic (EM) nature. EM fields are vacuum fields. Different basic forms of vacuum fields exist, and all kinds of fields, including the particle-mediated fields as well, when overlapping each other, seem to be in a direct resonant coupling, and form a complex, merged biofield. The vacuum model of consciousness presented here points to the inductive generation of consciousness, and to its self-initiating nature. Individual and collective methods, as well as the experimental possibilities of a global healing and improving the consciousness field of mankind are suggested. Keywords: olfactory, acoustic, electromagnetic, vacuum fields, generation of consciousness, evolution of collective consciousness, social evolution, completion of consciousness, healing
1997
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1210/1/PCC.pdf
Grandpierre, Attila (1997) The Physics of Collective Consciousness. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1211
2010-10-07T15:11:51Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1211/
The Dynamics of Time and Timelessness: Philosophy, Physics and Prospects for our Life
Grandpierre, Attila
Biology
Laws of Nature
Causation
Reductionism/Holism
Science and Religion
Physics
Abstract. We point out that physical behavior is directed by the action principle (or Hamilton principle), while biological behavior is governed by the Bauer-principle which is directed against the action principle. Therefore, the ontological structure of reality have to be at least two-levelled. Consequently, we may escape from the paradoxes of endo-physics, since they arise from putting the observer into a physical context and compressing the ontological structure of reality into a one-levelled surface. We indicate that the concept of the Universe as-a-whole leads to the concept of a timelessness Universe. The internal time of the timelessness Universe is related to the three archi, the first principles of physical matter, living matter and conscious matter. We explore the existence of an ultimate time in which the timelessness evolve, what is related to the timelessness of logic and point out how the dynamics of finiteness and infinity is related to the ultimate realities of our lives. An interesting connection is found to the von Neumann's critical number of the elements for self-reproducible systems, the number of neurons in the human brain and self-consciousness. The need for an integral cosmology is emphasized which should include the Bauer-principle. The origin of the first principles of physics, biology and consciousness may be found in the logical principles. In that case material reality governed by the first principles may originate from the primordial logical reality. This result discover the existence of a Pythagorean Gap between the ontological principles and the realm of logic and may confirm the idea of Pythagoras that material reality originates from numbers.
2003-04
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1211/1/NATO_ARW2.pdf
Grandpierre, Attila (2003) The Dynamics of Time and Timelessness: Philosophy, Physics and Prospects for our Life. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1216
2019-05-25T17:46:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6172636861656F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1216/
Idealist Philosophy: What is Real ? Conscious Experience Seen as Basic to All Ontology. An Overview
Randrup, Axel Abraham
Anthropology
Archaeology
Science and Religion
Theory/Observation
Abstract The idealist attitude followed in this paper is based on the assumption that only conscious experience in the Now is real. Conscious experience in the Now is supposed to be known directly or intuitively, it can not be explained. I think it constitutes the basis of all ontology. Consciousness is conceived as the total of conscious experience in the Now, the ontology of consciousness is thus derived directly from the basis. The ontology of nature is derived more indirectly from the basis. Science is regarded as a catalog of selected conscious experiences (observations), acknowledged to be scientific and structured by means of concepts and theories (also regarded as conscious experiences). Material objects are regarded as heuristic concepts constru cted from the immediate experiences in the Now and useful for expressing observations within a certain domain with some of their mutual relations. History is also regarded as a construct from conscious experiences in the Now. Concepts of worlds without an ego are seen to be in harmony with immediate egoless experiences. Worlds including spirituality are conceived as based on immediate spiritual experiences together with other immediate experiences. Idealist or immaterial philosophies have been criticized for implying solipsism or "solipsism of the present moment". This critique is countered by emphasizing the importance of intersubjectivity for science and by introducing the more precise concepts of collective conscious experience and collective conscious experience across time. Comprehensive evidence supporting the heuristic value of these concepts is related. I conclude that the idealist approach leads to a coherent comprehension of natural science including mind-brain relations, while the mainstream ma terialist approach entails contradictions and other problems for a coherent understanding. The idealist approach and the notion of collective conscious experience also facilitates cross-cultural studies and the understanding of intersubjectivity. Key-wo rds : Idealist ontology; philosophy of science; cognition; reality; psychological Now; collective conscious experience;psychological Now; collective conscious experience; collective consciousness; egoless experience; egolessness; philosophy of mind; mind-brain relations; mind-matter relations; spirituality; shamanism; science and religion; God..ˇ
2003-01
Other
NonPeerReviewed
text/html
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1216/1/reality.html
Randrup, Axel Abraham (2003) Idealist Philosophy: What is Real ? Conscious Experience Seen as Basic to All Ontology. An Overview. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1217
2015-09-13T15:51:06Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1217/
Science and Spirituality Relations Between Two Modes of Cognition: Rational-Scientific and Intuitive-Spiritual
Randrup, Axel, Abraham
Theory/Observation
Cognitive Science
Science and Religion
Abstract Considerable evidence indicates that the human cognitive system comprises two subsystems, one rational-scientific and the other intuitive-spiritual. Differences as well as harmonies and interactions between the two subsystems are described. Th e advent of systems science has improved the understanding of the harmonies and interactions. Consideration of cultural differences is important for understanding spirituality and communicating about it. Key-words: Spirituality and cognition, systems science and spirituality, science and religion, spiritual experience, intuition, epistemology, idealist philosophy, cultural differences
2002-11
Other
NonPeerReviewed
text/html
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1217/1/spiritualitysystems.html
Randrup, Axel, Abraham (2002) Science and Spirituality Relations Between Two Modes of Cognition: Rational-Scientific and Intuitive-Spiritual. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1282
2010-10-07T15:11:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D70757465722D736369656E63652D6172746966696369616C2D696E74656C6C6967656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:746563686E6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:666F726D616C2D6C6561726E696E672D7468656F7279
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1282/
The Right Information… and Intelligent Nodes
Dawidowicz, Edward
Jackson, Vairzora
Bryant, Thomas E
Adams, Martin
Decision Theory
Artificial Intelligence
Technology
Complex Systems
Formal Learning Theory
The architecture and mechanism of Intelligent Nodes allows both the Network-centric and Warfighter-centric paradigms to merge. This paper describes a multidisciplinary methodology for developing intelligent software assistants. Such assistants will continue to evolve during the training, exercises and combat, to learn the informational needs of the individual warfighter and combat groups. This symbiotic aggregate of man and computer we call Intelligent Nodes
2003
Conference or Workshop Item
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1282/1/105.pdf
Dawidowicz, Edward and Jackson, Vairzora and Bryant, Thomas E and Adams, Martin (2003) The Right Information… and Intelligent Nodes. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1322
2010-10-07T15:11:58Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1322/
On the meaning of Lorentz covariance
Szabó, László E.
Classical Physics
Laws of Nature
Relativity Theory
In classical mechanics, the Galilean covariance and the principle of relativity are completely equivalent and hold for all possible dynamical processes. In relativistic physics, on the contrary, the situation is much more complex: It will be shown that Lorentz covariance and the principle of relativity are not equivalent. The reason is that the principle of relativity actually holds only for the equilibrium quantities characterizing the equilibrium state of dissipative systems. In the light of this fact it will be argued that Lorentz covariance should not be regarded as a fundamental symmetry of the laws of physics.
2003-08
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1322/1/covariance_preprint1.pdf
Szabó, László E. (2003) On the meaning of Lorentz covariance. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1342
2010-10-07T15:12:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1342/
Intentional Action in Folk Psychology
Knobe, Joshua
Cognitive Science
Intentional action is widely held to be an important element in a theory (often called 'folk psychology') whose function lies chiefly in the prediction and explanation of behavior. The author argues that, in fact, people's concept of intentional action has also been shaped in a fundamental way by a concern with specifically *moral* issues. Thus, the concept might be best understood as a kind of multi-purpose tool -- shaped by a concern with prediction and explanation but also by a concern with moral praise and blame.
2003-06
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1342/1/IntentionalAction.pdf
Knobe, Joshua (2003) Intentional Action in Folk Psychology. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1368
2010-10-07T15:12:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1368/
Refutability Revamped: How Quantum Mechanics Saves the Phenomena
Muller, F.A.
Structure of Theories
Models and Idealization
Quantum Mechanics
On the basis of the Suppes-Sneed structural view of sientific theories, we take a fresh look at the concept of refutability, which was famously proposed by K.R. Popper in 1934 as a criterion for the demarcation of scientific theories from non-scientific ones, e.g. pseudo-scientific and metaphysical theories.
2003
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1368/1/RefRev.PDF
Muller, F.A. (2003) Refutability Revamped: How Quantum Mechanics Saves the Phenomena. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1372
2010-10-07T15:12:02Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1372/
Sets, Classes and Categories
Muller, F.A.
Mathematics
Critique of set-theory as a founding theory of category-theory. Proposal of a theory of sets and classes as an adequate founding theory of mathematics and by implication of category-theory. This theory is a slight extension of Ackermann's theory of 1956.
2001-01
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1372/1/SetClassCat.PDF
Muller, F.A. (2001) Sets, Classes and Categories. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1571
2010-10-07T15:12:13Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1571/
Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism
Suárez, Mauricio
Structure of Theories
Models and Idealization
Realism/Anti-realism
I argue against theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or isomorphism. These reductive theories aim to radically naturalise the notion of representation, since they treat scientist’s purposes and intentions as non-essential to representation. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that similarity and isomorphism are common but not universal means of representation. I then present four other arguments to show that similarity and isomorphism can not be the constituents of scientific representation. I finish by looking at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim to radically naturalise scientific representation are likely to be successful.
2003-10
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1571/1/ISPS_paper_penultimate_draft.doc
Suárez, Mauricio (2003) Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1603
2022-10-17T13:55:02Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368656D6973747279
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1603/
Response to Vollmer's Review of "Of Minds and Molecules"
Scerri, Eric
Chemistry
A critique is given of Vollmer's book review of "Of Minds and Molecules". The critique deals mainly with Vollmer's view on the nature of the chemical elements as discussed by Mendeleev, Paneth and Scerri.
2003
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1603/1/Vollmer_crit.pdf
Scerri, Eric (2003) Response to Vollmer's Review of "Of Minds and Molecules". UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1620
2010-10-07T15:12:19Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1620/
How Set Theory Impinges on Logic
Mosterin, Jesus
Models and Idealization
Mathematics
Standard (classical) logic is not independent of set theory. Which formulas are valid in logic depends on which sets we assume to exist in our set-theoretical universe. Second-order logic is just set theory in disguise. The typically logical notions of validity and consequence are not well defined in second-order logic, at least as long as there are open issues in set theory. Such contentious issues in set theory as the axiom of choice, the continuum hypothesis or the existence of inaccessible cardinals, can be equivalently transformed into question about the logical validity of pure sentences of second-order logic, where “pure” means that they only contain logical symbols and bound variables. Even standard first-order logic depends on the acceptance on infinite sets in our set-theoretical universe. Should we choose to admit only finite sets, the number of logically valid pure first-order formulas would increase dramatically and first-order logic would not be recursively enumerable any longer.
2004-01
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1620/1/How_Set_Theory_Impinges_on_Logic.pdf
Mosterin, Jesus (2004) How Set Theory Impinges on Logic. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1643
2011-09-03T13:18:44Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1643/
Quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication
Gao, Shan
Cognitive Science
Relativity Theory
Quantum Mechanics
The relation between quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication is analyzed. As we know, quantum collapse, if exists, can result in the appearance of quantum nonlocality, and requires the existence of a pre- ferred Lorentz frame. This may permit the realization of quantum superluminal communication (QSC), which will no longer result in the usual causal loop in case of the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame. The possibility of the existence of QSC is further analyzed under the assumption that quantum collapse is a real process. We demonstrate that the combination of quantum collapse and the consciousness of the observer will permit the observer to distinguish nonorthogonal states in principle. This provides a possible way to realize QSC. Some implications of the existence of QSC are briefy discussed.
2004-03
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1643/1/qscfpl.pdf
Gao, Shan (2004) Quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1686
2010-10-07T15:12:24Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1686/
Karl Raimund Popper
Maxwell, Nicholas
Philosophers of Science
Karl Popper is the greatest philosopher of the 20th century. No other philosopher of the period has produced a body of work that is as significant. What is best in Popper's output is contained in his first four published books. These tackle fundamental problems with ferocious, exemplary integrity, clarity, simplicity and originality. They have widespread, fruitful implications, for science, for philosophy, for the social sciences, for education, for art, for politics and political philosophy. This article provides a critical survey of Popper’s work.
2002
Other
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1686/1/Karl_Raimund_Popper.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2002) Karl Raimund Popper. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1690
2010-10-07T15:12:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1690/
Explanations are like salted peanuts. Why you can't cut the route toward further reduction.
Cohnitz, Daniel
Explanation
This paper is a defense of an elaborated ideal explanatory text conception against criticism as put forward by Bob Batterman. It is argued that Batterman's critique of "philosophical" accounts of scientific explanation is inadequate.
Mentis
2002-01
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1690/1/6%20Wt03%20Cohnitz.pdf
Cohnitz, Daniel (2002) Explanations are like salted peanuts. Why you can't cut the route toward further reduction. Mentis.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1709
2010-10-07T15:12:26Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1709/
Can Humanity Learn to become Civilized? The Crisis of Science without Civilization
Maxwell, Nicholas
Science and Society
Sociology
Science and Policy
Two great problems of learning confront humanity: learning about the nature of the universe and our place in it, and learning how to become civilized. The first problem was solved, in essence, in the 17th century, with the creation of modern science. But the second problem has not yet been solved. Solving the first problem without also solving the second puts us in a situation of great danger. All our current global problems have arisen as a result. What we need to do, in response to this unprecedented crisis, is learn from our solution to the first problem how to solve the second. This was the basic idea of the 18th century Enlightenment. Unfortunately, in carrying out this programme, the Enlightenment made three blunders, and it is this defective version of the Enlightenment programme that we have institutionalized in 20th century academic inquiry. In order to solve the second great problem of learning we need to correct the three blunders of the traditional Enlightenment. This involves changing the nature of social inquiry, so that social science becomes social methodology or social philosophy, concerned to help us build into social life the progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented rationality, arrived at by generalizing the progress-achieving methods of science. It also involves, more generally, bringing about a revolution in the nature of academic inquiry as a whole, so that it takes up its proper task of helping humanity learn how to become wiser by increasingly cooperatively rational means. The scientific task of improving knowledge and understanding of nature becomes a part of the broader task of improving global wisdom.
2000
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1709/1/Can_Humanity_Learn_to_become_Civilized.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2000) Can Humanity Learn to become Civilized? The Crisis of Science without Civilization. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1830
2010-10-07T15:12:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1830/
An Application of Information Theory to the Problem of the Scientific Experiment
Badino, Massimiliano
Confirmation/Induction
There are two basic approaches to the problem of induction: the empirical one, which deems that the possibility of induction depends on how the world was made (and how it works) and the logical one, which considers the formation (and function) of language. The first is closer to being useful for induction, while the second is more rigorous and clearer. The purpose of this paper is to create an empirical approach to induction that contains the same formal exactitude as the logical approach. This requires: a) that the empirical conditions for the induction are enunciated and b) that the most important results already obtained from inductive logic are again demonstrated to be valid. Here we will be dealing only with induction by elimination, namely the analysis of the experimental confutation of a theory. The result will be a rule of refutation that takes into consideration all of the empirical aspect of the experiment and has each of the asymptotic properties which inductive logic has shown to be characteristic of induction.
2004-06
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1830/1/An_Application_of_Information_Theory.DOC
Badino, Massimiliano (2004) An Application of Information Theory to the Problem of the Scientific Experiment. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1875
2010-10-07T15:12:40Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:6669656C64732D616E642D7061727469636C6573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1875/
Quarticles and the Identity of Indiscernibles
Huggett, Nick
Fields and Particles
Quantum Mechanics
The principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII) states that if two systems are qualitatively identical then they are logically identical. French and Redhead (1988) and Butterfield (1993) have shown the sense in which bosons and fermions violate the PII, but did not investigate the issue for particles of other kinds of statistics: i.e., for the (p,q) particles -- or `quarticles' -- of Hartle, Stolt and Taylor (1970). This paper shows that for any type of indistinguishable quarticle the PII is violated but that for distinguishable quarticles there are states in which it is violated by any pair of particles, states in which it is violated only by some pairs of particles and states in which it is violated by no pairs of particles. The updated version corrects a minor statement of mathematical fact, and provides a short proof for a conjecture made in the original, showing that the identity of indiscernibles is equivalent to (anti)symmetrization.
Cambridge University Press
2003
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1875/1/quarticlesPII.pdf
Huggett, Nick (2003) Quarticles and the Identity of Indiscernibles. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1914
2010-10-07T15:12:46Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6669656C642D7468656F7279
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1914/
On the Emergence of Time in Quantum Gravity
Butterfield, Jeremy
Isham, Chris
Cosmology
Relativity Theory
Quantum Field Theory
We discuss from a philosophical perspective the way in which the normal concept of time might be said to `emerge' in a quantum theory of gravity. After an introduction, we briefly discuss the notion of emergence, without regard to time (Section 2). We then introduce the search for a quantum theory of gravity (Section 3); and review some general interpretative issues about space, time and matter (Section 4). We then discuss the emergence of time in simple quantum geometrodynamics, and in the Euclidean approach (Section 5). Section 6 concludes
1999
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1914/1/EmergTimeQG%3D9901024.pdf
Butterfield, Jeremy and Isham, Chris (1999) On the Emergence of Time in Quantum Gravity. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1915
2010-10-07T15:12:47Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6669656C642D7468656F7279
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1915/
Spacetime and the Philosophical Challenge of Quantum Gravity
Butterfield, Jeremy
Isham, Chris
Cosmology
Relativity Theory
Quantum Field Theory
We survey some philosophical aspects of the search for a quantum theory of gravity, emphasising how quantum gravity throws into doubt the treatment of spacetime common to the two `ingredient theories' (quantum theory and general relativity), as a 4-dimensional manifold equipped with a Lorentzian metric. After an introduction (Section 1), we briefly review the conceptual problems of the ingredient theories (Section 2) and introduce the enterprise of quantum gravity (Section 3). We then describe how three main research programmes in quantum gravity treat four topics of particular importance: the scope of standard quantum theory; the nature of spacetime; spacetime diffeomorphisms, and the so-called `problem of time' (Section 4). These programmes are the old particle-physics approach, superstring theory, and canonical quantum gravity. By and large, these programmes accept most of the ingredient theories' treatment of spacetime, albeit with a metric with some type of quantum nature; but they also suggest that the treatment has fundamental limitations. This prompts the idea of going further: either by quantizing structures other than the metric, such as the topology; or by regarding such structures as phenomenological. We discuss this in Section 5.
2001
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1915/1/SptPhilChallQG%3D9903072.pdf
Butterfield, Jeremy and Isham, Chris (2001) Spacetime and the Philosophical Challenge of Quantum Gravity. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1916
2010-10-07T15:12:47Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1916/
A Topos Perspective on the Kochen-Specker Theorem: I. Quantum States as Generalised Valuations
Isham, Chris
Butterfield, Jeremy
Quantum Mechanics
Any attempt to construct a realist interpretation of quantum theory founders on the Kochen-Specker theorem, which asserts the impossibility of assigning values to quantum quantities in a way that preserves functional relations between them. We construct a new type of valuation which is defined on all operators, and which respects an appropriate version of the functional composition principle. The truth-values assigned to propositions are (i) contextual; and (ii) multi-valued, where the space of contexts and the multi-valued logic for each context come naturally from the topos theory of presheaves. The first step in our theory is to demonstrate that the Kochen-Specker theorem is equivalent to the statement that a certain presheaf defined on the category of self-adjoint operators has no global elements. We then show how the use of ideas drawn from the theory of presheaves leads to the definition of a generalised valuation in quantum theory whose values are sieves of operators. In particular, we show how each quantum state leads to such a generalised valuation. A key ingredient throughout is the idea that, in a situation where no normal truth-value can be given to a proposition asserting that the value of a physical quantity A lies in a set D of real numbers , it is nevertheless possible to ascribe a partial truth-value which is determined by the set of all coarse-grained propositions that assert that some function f(A) lies in f(D), and that are true in a normal sense. The set of all such coarse-grainings forms a sieve on the category of self-adjoint operators, and is hence fundamentally related to the theory of presheave
1998
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1916/1/TKSPartI%3D9803055.pdf
Isham, Chris and Butterfield, Jeremy (1998) A Topos Perspective on the Kochen-Specker Theorem: I. Quantum States as Generalised Valuations. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1917
2010-10-07T15:12:47Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1917/
A Topos Perspective on the Kochen-Specker Theorem: II. Conceptual Aspects, and Classical Analogues
Butterfield, Jeremy
Isham, Chris
Classical Physics
Quantum Mechanics
In a previous paper, we have proposed assigning as the value of a physical quantity in quantum theory, a certain kind of set (a sieve) of quantities that are functions of the given quantity. The motivation was in part physical---such a valuation illuminates the Kochen-Specker theorem; and in part mathematical---the valuation arises naturally in the topos theory of presheaves. This paper discusses the conceptual aspects of this proposal. We also undertake two other tasks. First, we explain how the proposed valuations could arise much more generally than just in quantum physics; in particular, they arise as naturally in classical physics. Second, we give another motivation for such valuations (that applies equally to classical and quantum physics). This arises from applying to propositions about the values of physical quantities some general axioms governing partial truth for any kind of proposition.
1999
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1917/1/TKSPartII%3D9808067.pdf
Butterfield, Jeremy and Isham, Chris (1999) A Topos Perspective on the Kochen-Specker Theorem: II. Conceptual Aspects, and Classical Analogues. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1918
2010-10-07T15:12:47Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1918/
A Topos Perspective on the Kochen-Specker Theorem: III. Von Neumann Algebras as the Base Category
Hamilton, John
Isham, Chris
Butterfield, Jeremy
Quantum Mechanics
We extend the topos-theoretic treatment given in previous papers of assigning values to quantities in quantum theory, and of related issues such as the Kochen-Specker theorem. This extension has two main parts: the use of von Neumann algebras as a base category (Section 2); and the relation of our generalized valuations to (i) the assignment to quantities of intervals of real numbers, and (ii) the idea of a subobject of the coarse-graining presheaf (Section 3).
2000
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1918/1/TKSPartIII%3D9911020.pdf
Hamilton, John and Isham, Chris and Butterfield, Jeremy (2000) A Topos Perspective on the Kochen-Specker Theorem: III. Von Neumann Algebras as the Base Category. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1919
2010-10-07T15:12:48Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1919/
A Topos Perspective on the Kochen-Specker Theorem: IV. Interval Valuations
Butterfield, Jeremy
Isham, Chris
Quantum Mechanics
We extend the topos-theoretic treatment given in previous papers of assigning values to quantities in quantum theory. In those papers, the main idea was to assign a sieve as a partial and contextual truth-value to a proposition that the value of a quantity lies in a certain set D of real numbers. Here we relate such sieve-valued valuations to valuations that assign to quantities subsets, rather than single elements, of their spectrum (we call these interval valuations). There are two main results. First, there is a natural correspondence between these two kinds of valuation, which uses the notion of a state's support for a quantity (Section 3). Second, if one starts with a more general notion of interval valuation, one sees that our interval valuations based on the notion of support (and correspondingly, our sieve-valued valuations) are a simple way to secure certain natural properties of valuations, such as monotonicity (Section 4).
2002
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1919/1/TKSPartIV%3D0107123.pdf
Butterfield, Jeremy and Isham, Chris (2002) A Topos Perspective on the Kochen-Specker Theorem: IV. Interval Valuations. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1957
2010-10-07T15:12:52Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:64657465726D696E69736D2D696E64657465726D696E69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1957/
PERSPECTIVAL REALISM AND QUANTUM MECHANICS
Bitbol, Michel, Guy, Simon
Laws of Nature
Determinism/Indeterminism
Realism/Anti-realism
Quantum Mechanics
A complete reappraisal of the philosophical meaning of Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics is carried out, by analysing carefully the role of the concept of "observer" in physics. It is shown that Everett's interpretation is the limiting case of a series of conceptions of the measurement problem which leave less and less of the observer out of the quantum description of the measuring interaction. This limiting case, however, should not be considered as one wherein nothing is left outside the description. Something is still needed besides this description: pure cognitive capacity, the subject, or, in a very abstract sense: "mind". The set of branches which arise, according to Everett, from a measuring interaction, gain a renewed signification. They do not refer to distinct "worlds", but to the points of view "mind" can identify itself to. This idea is compared and contrasted with Squires' "selection" of a branch by the mind (without quotation marks). Finally, the notion of indeterminism in quantum mechanics gains an unexpected and new light from a strict application of the previous ideas.
1991
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1957/1/Perspective.doc.doc
Bitbol, Michel, Guy, Simon (1991) PERSPECTIVAL REALISM AND QUANTUM MECHANICS. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1978
2010-10-07T15:12:54Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1978/
SPACETIME OR QUANTUM PARTICLES: THE ONTOLOGY OF QUANTUM GRAVITY?
Riggs, Peter James
Quantum Mechanics
The domains of quantum theory and general relativity overlap in situations where quantum mechanical effects cannot be ignored. In order to deal with this overlap of theoretical domains, there has been a tendency to apply the rules of quantum field theory to the classical gravitational field equations and without much regard for the implications of the whole enterprise. The gravitational version of the asymmetric ageing of identical biological specimens shows that (geometrically interpreted) curved spacetime is not dispensable. This result is used to conclude that the particle-based interpretations of quantum gravity are not acceptable.
1996
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1978/1/OntologyofQuantumGravity.pdf
Riggs, Peter James (1996) SPACETIME OR QUANTUM PARTICLES: THE ONTOLOGY OF QUANTUM GRAVITY? UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2013
2019-03-12T15:21:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6669656C642D7468656F7279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2013/
Is the Zero-Point Energy Real?
Saunders, Simon
Cosmology
Realism/Anti-realism
Quantum Field Theory
I consider the arguments to show that the vacuum energy density should receive a large contribution from the zero-point energy. This is the cosmological constant problem, as it was originally framed. I suggest that the matter is interpretation-dependent, and that on certain approaches to foundations, notably Everett's, the problem is a formal one, rather than one based on physical principles.
2002-01
Preprint
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2013/1/vacuum7%28la%29_for_Pittsburgh.pdf
Saunders, Simon (2002) Is the Zero-Point Energy Real? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2096
2010-10-07T15:13:04Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:64657465726D696E69736D2D696E64657465726D696E69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2096/
SOME STEPS TOWARDS A TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS
Bitbol, Michel
Structure of Theories
Laws of Nature
Experimentation
Determinism/Indeterminism
Realism/Anti-realism
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Quantum Mechanics
The two major options on which the current debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics relies, namely realism and empiricism, are far from being exhaustive. There is at least one more position available, which is metaphysically as agnostic as empiricism, but which shares with realism a committment to considering the structure of theories as highly significant. The latter position has been named transcendentalism after Kant. In this paper, a generalized version of Kant's method is used. This yields a reasoning that one is entitled to call a transcendental deduction of some major formal features of quantum mechanics.
1998
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2096/1/Tr._deduction_of_QM%27_2.pdf
Bitbol, Michel (1998) SOME STEPS TOWARDS A TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2152
2010-10-07T15:13:08Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2152/
Forms of Quantum Nonseparability and Related Philosophical Consequences
Karakostas, Vassilios
Reductionism/Holism
Realism/Anti-realism
Quantum Mechanics
Abstract: Standard quantum mechanics unquestionably violates the separability principle that classical physics (be it point-like analytic, statistical, or field-theoretic) accustomed us to consider as valid. In this paper, quantum nonseparability is viewed as a consequence of the Hilbert-space quantum mechanical formalism, avoiding thus any direct recourse to the ramifications of Kochen-Specker’s argument or Bell’s inequality. Depending on the mode of assignment of states to physical systems Ύ unit state vectors versus non-idempotent density operators Ύ we distinguish between strong/relational and weak/deconstructional forms of quantum nonseparability. The origin of the latter is traced down and discussed at length, whereas its relation to the all important concept of potentiality in forming a coherent picture of the puzzling entangled interconnections among spatially separated systems is also considered. Finally, certain philosophical consequences of quantum nonseparability concerning the nature of quantum objects, the question of realism in quantum mechanics, and possible limitations in revealing the actual character of physical reality in its enirety are explored.
2005-01
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2152/1/V.E._KARAKOSTAS.doc
Karakostas, Vassilios (2005) Forms of Quantum Nonseparability and Related Philosophical Consequences. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2304
2010-10-07T15:13:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2304/
Why Mathematical Solutions of Zeno’s Paradoxes Miss The Point: Zeno’s One and Many Relation and Parmenides’ Prohibition.
Papa-Grimaldi, Alba
History of Philosophy of Science
Theory Change
Realism/Anti-realism
MATHEMATICAL RESOLUTIONS OF ZENO’s PARADOXES of motion have been offered on a regular basis since the paradoxes were first formulated. In this paper I will argue that such mathematical “solutions” miss, and always will miss, the point of Zeno’s arguments. I do not think that any mathematical solution can provide the much sought after answers to any of the paradoxes of Zeno. In fact all mathematical attempts to resolve these paradoxes share a common feature, a feature that makes them consistently miss the fundamental point which is Zeno’s concern for the one-many relation, or it would be better to say, lack of relation. This takes us back to the ancient dispute between the Eleatic school and the Pluralists. The first, following Parmenide’s teaching, claimed that only the One or identical can be thought and is therefore real, the second held that the Many of becoming is rational and real.1 I will show that these mathematical “solutions” do not actually touch Zeno’s argument and make no metaphysical contribution to the problem of understanding what is motion against immobility, or multiplicity against identity, which was Zeno’s challenge. I would like to point out at this stage that my contention
1996-12
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2304/1/zeno_maths_review_metaphysics_alba_papa_grimaldi.pdf
Papa-Grimaldi, Alba (1996) Why Mathematical Solutions of Zeno’s Paradoxes Miss The Point: Zeno’s One and Many Relation and Parmenides’ Prohibition. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2331
2010-10-07T15:13:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D73797374656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D66756E6374696F6E2D74656C656F6C6F6779
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2331/
Adaptive speciation: The role of natural selection in mechanisms of geographic and non-geographic speciation
Byron (formerly Baker), Jason M.
Evolutionary Theory
Systematics
Models and Idealization
Function/Teleology
Recent discussion of mechanism has suggested new approaches to several issues in the philosophy of science, including theory structure, causal explanation, and reductionism. Here, I apply what I take to be the fruits of the "new mechanical philosophy" to an analysis of a contemporary debate in evolutionary biology about the role of natural selection in speciation. Traditional accounts of that debate focus on the geographic context of genetic divergence--namely, whether divergence in the absence of geographic isolation is possible (or significant). Those accounts are at best incomplete, I argue, because they ignore the mechanisms producing divergence and miss what is at stake in the biological debate. I argue that the biological debate instead concerns the scope of particular speciation mechanisms which assign different roles to natural selection at various stages of divergence. The upshot is a new interpretation of the crux of that debate--namely, whether divergence with gene flow is possible (or significant) and whether the isolating mechanisms producing it are adaptive.
2005-06
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2331/1/baker-speciation-2005.pdf
Byron (formerly Baker), Jason M. (2005) Adaptive speciation: The role of natural selection in mechanisms of geographic and non-geographic speciation. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2386
2010-10-07T15:13:30Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2386/
Is Science Neurotic?
Maxwell, Nicholas
Science and Society
Values In Science
Science and Policy
Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer from. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B, represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C, and as a result fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic". Natural science is neurotic in this sense in so far as a basic aim of science is represented to be to improve knowledge of factual truth as such (aim C), when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth (aim B). Science does not suffer too much from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences, and of academic inquiry more generally. Freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far reaching, beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences.
2002-04
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2386/1/Is_Science_Neurotic.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2002) Is Science Neurotic? UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2449
2010-10-07T15:13:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2449/
The Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science
Maxwell, Nicholas
Theory Change
Explanation
Physics
There is a need to bring about a revolution in the philosophy of science, interpreted to be both the academic discipline, and the official view of the aims and methods of science upheld by the scientific community. At present both are dominated by the view that in science theories are chosen on the basis of empirical considerations alone, nothing being permanently accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Biasing choice of theory in the direction of simplicity, unity or explanatory power does not permanently commit science to the thesis that nature is simple or unified. This current "paradigm" is, I argue, untenable. We need a new paradigm, which acknowledges that science makes a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, theories being chosen partly on the basis of compatibility with these assumptions. Eleven arguments are given for favouring this new "paradigm" over the current one.
2002
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2449/1/Need_for_Revolution_in_Philosophy_Science.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2002) The Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2450
2010-10-07T15:13:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2450/
The Empirical Stance vs. The Critical Attitude
Rowbottom, Darrell Patrick
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory Change
Philosophers of Science
Van Fraassen has recently argued that empiricism can be construed as a stance, involving commitments, attitudes, values, and goals, in addition to beliefs and opinions. But this characterisation emerges from his recognition that to be an empiricist can not be to believe, or decide to commit to belief in, a foundational proposition, without removing any basis for a non-dogmatic empiricist critique of other philosophical approaches, such as materialism. However, noticeable by its absence in Van Fraassen's discussions is any mention of Bartley's ‘pancritical rationalism’, for Bartley offers a cohesive argument that genuine dogmatism lies precisely in the act of commitment to an idea. The consequence of denying this, he thinks, is an opening of the floodgates to irrationalism: if to rely on reasoned argument in decision-making is fundamentally an act of faith, then there is a tu quoque – “I simply have a different faith” – that may be employed by those who wish to shield their views from criticism. This raises the following question: why should it be any less dogmatic to adopt particular commitments, attitudes, values, and goals, rather than a particular belief or opinion, come what may? And if Bartley is right that there is only one non-dogmatic attitude – the critical attitude – then why might this not be adopted by an empiricist, a materialist, a metaphysician, or anyone else?
2005
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2450/1/Rowbottom.pdf
Rowbottom, Darrell Patrick (2005) The Empirical Stance vs. The Critical Attitude. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2524
2010-10-07T15:13:43Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2524/
Galileo vs Aristotle on Free Falling Bodies
Schrenk, Markus Andreas
Thought Experiments
This essay attempts to demonstrate that it is doubtful if Galileo's famous thought experiment concerning falling bodies in his 'Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences' (Galileo 1954: 61-64) actually does succeed in proving that Aristotle was wrong in claiming that "bodies of different weight […] move […] with different speeds which stand to one another in the same ratio as their weights," (Galileo 1954: 61). (Part I); and further that it is likewise doubtful that that argument does or even can establish Galileo's own famous 'Law of Falling Bodies,' viz., that regardless of their weight all bodies fall with the same speed. (Part II)
2004
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2524/1/Galileo_vs_Aristotle_on_Free_Falling_Bodies.pdf
Schrenk, Markus Andreas (2004) Galileo vs Aristotle on Free Falling Bodies. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2538
2010-10-07T15:13:45Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D7075746174696F6E2D696E666F726D6174696F6E:436C6173736963616C
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2538/
Informational Realism
Floridi, Luciano
Classical
What is the ultimate nature of reality? This paper defends an answer in terms of informational realism (IR). It does so in three stages. First, it is shown that, within the debate about structural realism (SR), epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are reconcilable by using the methodology of the levels of abstractions. It follows that OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that OSR is also plausible, because not all related objects are logically prior to all relational structures. The relation of difference is at least as fundamental as (because constitutive of) any relata. Third, it is suggested that an ontology of structural objects for OSR can reasonably be developed in terms of informational objects, and that Object Oriented Programming provides a flexible and powerful methodology with which to clarify and make precise the concept of “informational object”. The outcome is informational realism, the view that the world is the totality of informational objects dynamically interacting with each other.
2005-01
Preprint
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2538/1/ir.pdf
Floridi, Luciano (2005) Informational Realism. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2584
2010-10-07T15:13:51Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2584/
Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Aim-Oriented Empiricism
Maxwell, Nicholas
Confirmation/Induction
Theory Change
Philosophers of Science
In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere, is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve.
2001
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2584/1/Popper%2C_Kuhn%2C_Lakatos_and_AOE.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2001) Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2590
2010-10-07T15:13:51Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2590/
Possible physical universes
McCabe, Gordon
Cosmology
Mathematics
Relativity Theory
Physics
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the various types of physical universe which could exist according to modern mathematical physics. The paper begins with an introduction that approaches the question from the viewpoint of ontic structural realism. Section 2 takes the case of the `multiverse' of spatially homogeneous universes, and analyses the famous Collins-Hawking argument, which purports to show that our own universe is a very special member of this collection. Section 3 considers the multiverse of all solutions to the Einstein field equations, and continues the discussion of whether the notions of special and typical can be defined within such a collection.
2005
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2590/1/EinsteinMultiverse.pdf
McCabe, Gordon (2005) Possible physical universes. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8750
2011-09-03T13:18:44Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8750/
Quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication
Gao, Shan
Cognitive Science
Relativity Theory
Quantum Mechanics
The relation between quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication is analyzed. As we know, quantum collapse, if exists, can result in the appearance of quantum nonlocality, and requires the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame. This may permit the realization of quantum superluminal communication (QSC), which will no longer result in the usual causal loop in case of the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame. The possibility of the existence of QSC is further analyzed under the assumption that quantum collapse is a real process. We demonstrate that the combination of quantum collapse and the consciousness of the observer will permit the observer to distinguish nonorthogonal states in principle. This provides a possible way to realize QSC. Some implications of the existence of QSC are briefy discussed.
Springer
2004-03-09
Published Article or Volume
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8750/1/qscfpl.pdf
Gao, Shan (2004) Quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication. Foundations of Physics Letters, 17 (2). pp. 167-182.
http://www.springerlink.com/content/0894-9875/
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20509
2022-04-29T03:41:19Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D646576656C6F706D656E74616C
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
74797065733D626F6F6B
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20509/
Philosophy of Developmental Biology
Weber, Marcel
Developmental Biology
Causation
Experimentation
Explanation
Models and Idealization
Reductionism/Holism
The history of developmental biology is interwoven with debates as to whether mechanistic explanations of development are possible or whether alternative explanatory principles or even vital forces need to be assumed. In particular, the demonstrated ability of embryonic cells to tune their developmental fate precisely to their relative position and the overall size of the embryo was once thought to be inexplicable in mechanistic terms. Taking a causal perspective, this Element examines to what extent and how developmental biology, having turned molecular about four decades ago, has been able to meet the vitalist challenge. It focuses not only on the nature of explanations but also on the usefulness of causal knowledge – including the knowledge of classical experimental embryology – for further scientific discovery. It also shows how this causal perspective allows us to understand the nature and significance of some key concepts, including organizer, signal and morphogen. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Cambridge University Press
2022-03-16
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
Weber, Marcel (2022) Philosophy of Developmental Biology. Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Biology . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. ISBN 978-1-009-18415-1
https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/philosophy-of-developmental-biology/1FF8C95E7729594AAE863E2B29B16DF6
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108954181
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20538
2022-05-03T04:31:55Z
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74797065733D626F6F6B
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20538/
The Material Theory of Induction
Norton, John D.
Confirmation/Induction
History of Science Case Studies
The fundamental burden of a theory of inductive inference is to determine which are the good inductive inferences or relations of inductive support and why it is that they are so. The traditional approach is modeled on that taken in accounts of deductive inference. It seeks universally applicable schemas or rules or a single formal device, such as the probability calculus. After millennia of halting efforts, none of these approaches has been unequivocally successful and debates between approaches persist.
The Material Theory of Induction identifies the source of these enduring problems in the assumption taken at the outset: that inductive inference can be accommodated by a single formal account with universal applicability. Instead, it argues that that there is no single, universally applicable formal account. Rather, each domain has an inductive logic native to it. The content of that logic and where it can be applied are determined by the facts prevailing in that domain.
BSPS Open / University of Calgary Press
2021-11
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20538/1/Norton_Material_Theory_Induction_2021.pdf
Norton, John D. (2021) The Material Theory of Induction. BSPS Open Series (1). BSPS Open / University of Calgary Press, Calgary, Canada. ISBN ISBN 9781773852539 (softcover) | ISBN 9781773852751 (international hardcover) | ISBN 9781773852546 (open access PDF) | ISBN 9781773852553 (PDF) | ISBN 9781773852560 (EPUB)
https://press.ucalgary.ca/books/9781773852539/
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20669
2022-05-26T02:13:21Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20669/
Unity of Science
Tahko, Tuomas E.
Scientific Metaphysics
Biology
Chemistry
Laws of Nature
Natural Kinds
Physics
Realism/Anti-realism
Reductionism/Holism
Unity of science was once a very popular idea among both philosophers and scientists. But it has fallen out of fashion, largely because of its association with reductionism and the challenge from multiple realisation. Pluralism and the disunity of science are the new norm, and higher-level natural kinds and special science laws are considered to have an important role in scientific practice. What kind of reductionism does multiple realisability challenge? What does it take to reduce one phenomenon to another? How do we determine which kinds are natural? What is the ontological basis of unity? In this Element, Tuomas Tahko examines these questions from a contemporary perspective, after a historical overview. The upshot is that there is still value in the idea of a unity of science. We can combine a modest sense of unity with pluralism and give an ontological analysis of unity in terms of natural kind monism.
Cambridge University Press
2021-01-18
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20669/1/unity-of-science.pdf
Tahko, Tuomas E. (2021) Unity of Science. Elements in Philosophy of Science . Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781108581417
http://doi.org/10.1017/9781108581417
doi:10.1017/9781108581417
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20678
2022-05-28T14:58:31Z
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74797065733D626F6F6B
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20678/
Data Journeys in the Sciences
Leonelli, Sabina
Tempini, N
Data
Archaeology
Biology
Climate Science and Meteorology
Clinical Trials
Computer Science
Artificial Intelligence
Economics
Engineering
Epidemiology
Evidence
Experimentation
Historical Sciences
Models and Idealization
Physics
Science and Society
Social Epistemology of Science
Sociology
Theory/Observation
(Extract from preface) What conditions are required to identify data in the first place and to make them usable as evidence? And what implications does data processing carry not just for the content of the knowledge being produced but for the extent to which that knowledge can ground interventions in the world and inform political, scientific, social, economic debate? The contributions to this volume help readers to ponder these questions by guiding them into the thick web of entanglements involved in making data move across time, space and social context. Readers are asked to accompany data in their journeys from their material origin through human interactions with the world (which range from the collection of objects to the generation of traces and measurements)to their dissemination across various forms of aggregation (datasets, data series,indicators) and vehicles (databases, publications, archives) and ultimately to their
use as evidence for claims. During these journeys, data experience many different types of encounters – with other data, diverse groups of users, specific infrastructures and technologies and political, economic and cultural expectations – which affect and shape the data themselves and their prospective usability. Far from underestimating the politics and power of data, which so many contributors to the emerging field of critical data studies have so effectively highlighted, we seek to document how such politics is embedded, reified and/or revised in the technical and epistemic work that structures everyday research practices. Delving into stories of how data
travel involves seeing data as entities that can, and often do, change their properties in response to their environment and relations – and whose travels are often choreographed and regulated to achieve a variety of (sometimes incompatible) goals. What comes to be seen as datum at any one point in time is itself the result of a journey;
and far from being linear and well-organized, the journey is often full of detours and unpredictable changes, largely due to the diverse and complex social networks and contexts responsible for making data move.
Springer
Leonelli, Sabina
Tempini, N
2020
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20678/1/2020_Book_DataJourneysInTheSciences.pdf
Leonelli, Sabina and Tempini, N (2020) Data Journeys in the Sciences. Springer.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-37177-7
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20679
2022-05-28T14:58:57Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
74797065733D626F6F6B
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20679/
Model Organisms
Ankeny, Rachel
Leonelli, Sabina
Biology
Experimentation
Models and Idealization
Theory Change
This Element presents a philosophical exploration of the
concept of the ‘model organism’ in contemporary biology. Thinking about model organisms enables us to examine how living organisms have been brought into the laboratory and used to gain a better understanding of biology and to explore the research practices, commitments, and norms underlying this understanding. We contend that model organisms are key components of a distinctive way of doing research. We focus on what makes model organisms an important type of model and how the use of these models has shaped biological knowledge, including how model organisms represent, how they are used as tools for intervention, and how the representational commitments linked to their use as models affect the research practices associated with them.
Cambridge University Press
2020
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20679/1/model_organisms_2020.pdf
Ankeny, Rachel and Leonelli, Sabina (2020) Model Organisms. Elements in the Philosophy of Biology . Cambridge University Press.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/model-organisms/F895B26EAC0373BCA5A138835AC73AEA
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20683
2022-05-27T14:05:35Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
74797065733D626F6F6B
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20683/
Philosophy of Developmental Biology
Weber, Marcel
Developmental Biology
Causation
Experimentation
Explanation
Models and Idealization
Reductionism/Holism
The history of developmental biology is interwoven with debates as to whether mechanistic explanations of development are possible or whether alternative explanatory principles or even vital forces need to be assumed. In particular, the demonstrated ability of embryonic cells to tune their developmental fate precisely to their relative position and the overall size of the embryo was once thought to be inexplicable in mechanistic terms. Taking a causal perspective, this Element examines to what extent and how developmental biology, having turned molecular about four decades ago, has been able to meet the vitalist challenge. It focuses not only on the nature of explanations but also on the usefulness of causal knowledge – including the knowledge of classical experimental embryology – for further scientific discovery. It also shows how this causal perspective allows us to understand the nature and significance of some key concepts, including organizer, signal and morphogen. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Cambridge University Press
2022-03-16
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20683/1/philosophy-of-developmental-biology.pdf
Weber, Marcel (2022) Philosophy of Developmental Biology. Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Biology . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. ISBN 978-1-009-18415-1
https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/philosophy-of-developmental-biology/1FF8C95E7729594AAE863E2B29B16DF6
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108954181
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20684
2022-05-31T10:08:20Z
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74797065733D626F6F6B
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20684/
Knowledge from a Human Point of View
Crețu, Ana-Maria
Massimi, Michela
Evidence
Experimentation
Explanation
Realism/Anti-realism
Theory/Observation
This open access book – as the title suggests – explores some of the historical roots and epistemological ramifications of perspectivism. Perspectivism has recently emerged in philosophy of science as an interesting new position in the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. But there is a lot more to perspectivism than discussions in philosophy of science so far have suggested. Perspectivism is a much broader view that emphasizes how our knowledge (in particular our scientific knowledge of nature) is situated; it is always from a human vantage point (as opposed to some Nagelian "view from nowhere"). This edited collection brings together a diverse team of established and early career scholars across a variety of fields (from the history of philosophy to epistemology and philosophy of science). The resulting nine essays trace some of the seminal ideas of perspectivism back to Kant, Nietzsche, the American Pragmatists, and Putnam, while the second part of the book tackles issues concerning the relation between perspectivism, relativism, and standpoint theories, and the implications of perspectivism for epistemological debates about veritism, epistemic normativity and the foundations of human knowledge.
Springer Nature
Crețu, Ana-Maria
2020
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20684/1/2020_Book_KnowledgeFromAHumanPointOfView.pdf
Crețu, Ana-Maria and Massimi, Michela (2020) Knowledge from a Human Point of View. Synthese Library . Springer Nature. ISBN 978-3-030-27040-7
10.1007/978-3-030-27041-4
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20834
2022-07-01T19:59:38Z
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74797065733D626F6F6B
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20834/
Newton's Third Rule and the Experimental Argument for Universal Gravity
Domski, Mary
Astrophysics
Classical Physics
Experimentation
Explanation
History of Philosophy of Science
This book provides a reading of Newton’s argument for universal gravity that is focused on the evidence-based, “experimental” reason-ing that Newton associates with his program of experimental philoso-phy. It highlights the richness and complexity of the Principia and also draws important lessons about how to situate Newton in his natural philosophical context.
The book has two primary objectives. First, it defends a novel inter-pretation of the third of Newton’s four Rules for the Study of Natural Philosophy – what the author terms the Two-Set Reading of Rule 3. Second, it argues that this novel interpretation of Rule 3 sheds ad-ditional light on the differences between Newton’s experimental phi-losophy and Descartes’s “hypothetical philosophy,” and that it also illuminates how the practice of experimental philosophy allowed Newton to make a universal force of gravity the centerpiece of his explanation of the system of the world.
Newton’s Third Rule and the Experimental Argument for Universal Gravity will be of interest to researchers and advanced students work-ing on Newton’s natural philosophy, early modern philosophy, and the history of science.
Routledge
2022-07-01
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20834/1/Domski%20-%20Newton%27s%20Third%20Rule%20and%20the%20Experimental%20Argument%20%282021%29.pdf
Domski, Mary (2022) Newton's Third Rule and the Experimental Argument for Universal Gravity. Routledge Focus on Philosophy . Routledge, New York. ISBN 978-1-032-02036-5
10.4324/9781003184256
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21414
2022-12-18T23:08:06Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21414/
Preface to Diversity, Inclusion, Equity and the Threat to Academic Freedom
Lopez-Corredoira, Martin
Todd, Tom
Olsson, Erik J.
Ethical Issues
Feminist Approaches
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Values In Science
There can be no doubt that discrimination based on sex, race, ethnicity, religion or beliefs should not be tolerated in academia. Surprisingly, however, in recent years, policies of Diversity, Inclusion and Equity(DIE), officially introduced to counteract discrimination, have increasingly led to quite the opposite result: the exclusion of individuals who do not share a radical 'woke' ideology on identity politics (feminism, other gender activisms, critical race theory, etc.), and to the suppression of the academic freedom to discuss such dogmas. This subversion of academia ― disguised Trojan-horse style as universal human rights advocacy ― is unacceptable because academia must be politically neutral and protect freedom of speech, a cornerstone of professional scholarly activity without which universities as we know them will slowly but surely suffocate.
Our purpose here is to put together some particularly illustrative cases of such repression in a single book, testifying to a ubiquitous trend within western culture, irreducible to a few isolated complaints. The essays contained here illustrate the abuse of power, censorship and witch-hunts at many universities and research centres in the name of DIE.
List of coauthors in alphabetical order: Dorian Abbot, Tomonori Agoh, Gerhard Amendt, Ivar Arpi, David Benatar, Peter Boghossian, Civitas Research Team, David Díaz Pardo de Vera, Pedro Domingos, Janice Fiamengo, Étienne Forest, Jorge Gibert Galassi, Norman Goldstuck, José L. González Quirós, Lawrence M. Krauss, Patrick LaBelle, Martín López Corredoira, Heather Mac Donald, Martin Malmgren, Erik. J. Olsson, Jordan Peterson, Constantin Polychronakos, Philip C. Salzman, Alessandro Strumia, Tom Todd, Andrei Yafaev.
Imprint Academic
López-Corredoira, Martín
Todd, Tom
Olsson, Erik J.
2022-09-06
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21414/1/preface_final.pdf
Lopez-Corredoira, Martin and Todd, Tom and Olsson, Erik J. (2022) Preface to Diversity, Inclusion, Equity and the Threat to Academic Freedom.
http://books.imprint.co.uk/book/?gcoi=71157100101820
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21477
2022-11-28T03:33:18Z
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74797065733D626F6F6B
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21477/
Reversing the Arrow of Time
Roberts, Bryan W.
Scientific Metaphysics
Classical Physics
Cosmology
Fields and Particles
Laws of Nature
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Physics
Quantum Gravity
Quantum Field Theory
Quantum Mechanics
Relativity Theory
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Symmetries/Invariances
Theory/Observation
The arrow of time refers to the curious asymmetry that distinguishes the future from the past. Reversing the Arrow of Time argues that there is an intimate link between the symmetries of 'time itself' and time reversal symmetry in physical theories, which has wide-ranging implications for both physics and its philosophy. This link helps to clarify how we can learn about the symmetries of our world; how to understand the relationship between symmetries and what is real, and how to overcome pervasive illusions about the direction of time. Roberts explains the significance of time reversal in a way that intertwines physics and philosophy, to establish what the arrow of time means and how we can come to know it. This book is both mathematically and philosophically rigorous yet remains accessible to advanced undergraduates in physics and philosophy of physics.
Cambridge University Press
2022-11-24
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21477/1/roberts2022.pdf
Roberts, Bryan W. (2022) Reversing the Arrow of Time. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. ISBN 978-1-009-12332-7
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/reversing-the-arrow-of-time/D7E6FB349B290D1284A504AAD72DE174
doi.org/10.1017/9781009122139
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21488
2023-04-14T12:51:34Z
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2023-04-14T12:51:58Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21574
2023-04-14T12:52:22Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21608
2024-03-22T16:45:04Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21741
2023-02-09T18:47:08Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21741/
Towards Responsible Plant Data Linkage: Data Challenges for Agricultural Research and Development
Williamson, Hugh
Leonelli, Sabina
Data
Biology
Ethical Issues
Values In Science
2022
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21741/1/TowardsResponsiblePlantDataLinkage.pdf
Williamson, Hugh and Leonelli, Sabina (2022) Towards Responsible Plant Data Linkage: Data Challenges for Agricultural Research and Development. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21951
2023-03-30T17:25:38Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21952
2023-03-30T17:21:22Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E7363696F75736E657373
74797065733D626F6F6B
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21952/
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics
Khudairi, Hasen
Epistemology
Foundations
Logic
Ontology
Concepts and Representations
Consciousness
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I also develop a novel topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develop a novel dynamic epistemic two-dimensional hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional intensions of epistemic two-dimensional semantics solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory. The multi-hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapters \textbf{2} and \textbf{4} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, \textbf{11}, \textbf{12}, and \textbf{14}.}
2017
Open Access Book
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21952/1/E.pdf
Khudairi, Hasen (2017) Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics. UNSPECIFIED.
http://www.self.gutenberg.org/eBooks/WPLBN0100304258-Epistemic-Modality-and-Hyperintensionality-in-Mathematics-by-Khudairi-Hasen-Joseph.aspx?
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21961
2024-01-19T21:37:24Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6570697374656D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D666F756E646174696F6E73
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6C6F676963
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6F6E746F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E63657074732D616E642D726570726573656E746174696F6E73
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E7363696F75736E657373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21961/
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim)
Epistemology
Foundations
Logic
Ontology
Concepts and Representations
Consciousness
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I also develop a novel topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develop a novel dynamic epistemic two-dimensional hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional intensions of epistemic two-dimensional semantics solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory. The multi-hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapters \textbf{2} and \textbf{4} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, \textbf{11}, \textbf{12}, and \textbf{14}.}
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21961/1/E.pdf
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim) (2017) Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics. [Preprint]
https://www.amazon.com/Epistemic-Modality-Hyperintensionality-Mathematics-Timothy/dp/B0BZFPDKFF/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2988PRURUGGBR&keywords=timothy+alison+bowen&qid=1680306624&sprefix=%2Caps%2C61&sr=8-1
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22011
2024-01-19T21:36:48Z
7374617475733D707562
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7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D666F756E646174696F6E73
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6C6F676963
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6F6E746F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E63657074732D616E642D726570726573656E746174696F6E73
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E7363696F75736E657373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22011/
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim)
Epistemology
Foundations
Logic
Ontology
Concepts and Representations
Consciousness
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I also develop a novel topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develop a novel dynamic epistemic two-dimensional hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional intensions of epistemic two-dimensional semantics solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory. The multi-hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapters \textbf{2} and \textbf{4} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, \textbf{11}, \textbf{12}, and \textbf{14}.}
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22011/1/E.pdf
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim) (2017) Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics. [Preprint]
https://www.amazon.com/Epistemic-Modality-Hyperintensionality-Mathematics-Timothy/dp/B0BZFPDKFF/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2988PRURUGGBR&keywords=timothy+alison+bowen&qid=1680306624&sprefix=%2Caps%2C61&sr=8-1
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22028
2024-01-19T21:36:28Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6570697374656D6F6C6F6779
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7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6F6E746F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E63657074732D616E642D726570726573656E746174696F6E73
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E7363696F75736E657373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22028/
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim)
Epistemology
Foundations
Logic
Ontology
Concepts and Representations
Consciousness
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I also develop a novel topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develop a novel dynamic epistemic two-dimensional hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional intensions of epistemic two-dimensional semantics solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory. The multi-hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapters \textbf{2} and \textbf{4} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, \textbf{11}, \textbf{12}, and \textbf{14}.}
*Please know that the 5 axiom was meant rather than the B axiom in ch. 10.
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22028/1/E.pdf
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim) (2017) Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics. [Preprint]
https://www.amazon.com/Epistemic-Modality-Hyperintensionality-Mathematics-Timothy/dp/B0BZFPDKFF/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2988PRURUGGBR&keywords=timothy+alison+bowen&qid=1680306624&sprefix=%2Caps%2C61&sr=8-1
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22857
2024-02-14T14:45:46Z
7374617475733D707562
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7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22857/
Science and Moral Imagination: A New Ideal for Values in Science
Brown, Matthew J.
Ethical Issues
History of Philosophy of Science
Science and Society
Social Epistemology of Science
Values In Science
The idea that science is or should be value-free, and that values are or should be formed independently of science, has been under fire by philosophers of science for decades. Science and Moral Imagination directly challenges the idea that science and values cannot and should not influence each other. Matthew J. Brown argues that science and values mutually influence and implicate one another, that the influence of values on science is pervasive and must be responsibly managed, and that science can and should have an influence on our values. This interplay, he explains, must be guided by accounts of scientific inquiry and value judgment that are sensitive to the complexities of their interactions. Brown presents scientific inquiry and value judgment as types of problem-solving practices and provides a new framework for thinking about how we might ethically evaluate episodes and decisions in science, while offering guidance for scientific practitioners and institutions about how they can incorporate value judgments into their work. His framework, dubbed “the ideal of moral imagination,” emphasizes the role of imagination in value judgment and the positive role that value judgment plays in science.
University of Pittsburgh Press
2020
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22857/1/9780822946267.pdf
Brown, Matthew J. (2020) Science and Moral Imagination: A New Ideal for Values in Science. Science, Values, and the Public . University of Pittsburgh Press. ISBN 9780822946267
https://valuesinscience.com/
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22872
2024-02-14T14:46:15Z
7374617475733D707562
74797065733D626F6F6B
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22872/
Beyond the Meme: Development and Structure in Cultural Evolution
Beyond the Meme assembles interdisciplinary perspectives on cultural evolution, providing a nuanced understanding of it as a process in which dynamic structures interact on different scales of size and time. The volume demonstrates how a thick understanding of change in culture emerges from multiple disciplinary vantage points, each of which is required to understand cultural evolution in all its complexity.
University of Minnesota Press
Love, Alan C.
Wimsatt, William C.
2019-09-19
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22872/1/BeyondtheMeme.pdf
Love, Alan C. and Wimsatt, William C., eds. (2019) Beyond the Meme: Development and Structure in Cultural Evolution. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 22 . University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN. ISBN 9781452964690
https://manifold.umn.edu/projects/beyond-the-meme
https://doi.org/10.5749/9781452964690
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:23068
2024-02-14T14:46:33Z
7374617475733D707562
74797065733D626F6F6B
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/
From Biological Practice to Scientific Metaphysics
Numerous scholarly works focus solely on scientific metaphysics or biological practice, but few attempt to bridge the two subjects. This volume, the latest in the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science series, explores what a scientific metaphysics grounded in biological practices could look like and how it might impact the way we investigate the world around us.
"From Biological Practice to Scientific Metaphysics" examines how to reconcile the methods of biological practice with the methods of metaphysical cosmology, notably regarding the origins of life. The contributors take up a wide range of traditional metaphysics and philosophy of science topics, including natural kinds, medicine, ecology, genetics, scientific pluralism, reductionism, operationalism, mechanisms, the nature of information, and more. Many of the chapters represent the first philosophical treatments of significant biological practices.
From causality and complexity to niche constructions and inference, the contributors review and discuss long-held objections to metaphysics by natural scientists. They illuminate how, in order to learn about the world as it truly is, we must look not only at what scientists say but also what they do: for ontology cannot be read directly from scientific claims.
University of Minnesota Press
Baxter, Janella K
Bausman, William C
Lean, Oliver M
Love, Alan C.
2023-12-12
Open Access Book
PeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/1/000-bausman-fm.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/2/00-bausman-intro.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/3/01-bausman-ch01.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/4/02-bausman-ch02.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/5/03-bausman-ch03.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/6/04-bausman-ch04.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/7/05-bausman-ch05.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/8/06-bausman-ch06.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/9/07-bausman-ch07.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/10/08-bausman-ch08.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/11/09-bausman-ch09.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23068/12/10-bausman-bios.pdf
Baxter, Janella K and Bausman, William C and Lean, Oliver M and Love, Alan C., eds. (2023) From Biological Practice to Scientific Metaphysics. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 23 . University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN. ISBN 9781452970547
https://manifold.umn.edu/projects/biological-practice-to-scientific-metaphysics
https://doi.org/10.5749/9781452970561
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:23113
2024-03-22T16:44:13Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:23132
2024-02-24T03:26:37Z
7374617475733D707562
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7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6F6E746F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E63657074732D616E642D726570726573656E746174696F6E73
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74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23132/
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim)
Epistemology
Foundations
Logic
Ontology
Concepts and Representations
Consciousness
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality and hyperintensionality and their applications to the philosophy of mathematics. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality and hyperintensionality relate to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality and hyperintensionality; the types of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal and hyperintensional profiles of the logic of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a hyperintensional mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I also develop a novel topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develop a novel dynamic epistemic two-dimensional hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic (hyper-)intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). The fixed point operators in the modal $\mu$-calculus are rendered hyperintensional, which yields the first hyperintensional construal of the modal $\mu$-calculus in the literature and the first application of the calculus to the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent instead of the common knowledge of a group of agents. Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting.
Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional hyperintensions of hyperintensional, i.e. topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker, semantics, solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between my hyperintensional semantics and the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. These results yield inter alia the first hyperintensional Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis and hyperintensional epistemic set theories in the literature. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal and hyperintensional commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic hyperintensionality, epistemic utility theory, and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the philosophical significance of hyperintensional $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of hyperintensional epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction between the interpretational and objective modalities and truthmakers thereof. This yields the first hyperintensional category theory in the literature. I invent a new mathematical trick in which first order structures are treated as categories, and Vopenka's principle can be satisfied because of the elementary embeddings between the categories and generate Vopenka cardinals while bypassing the category of Set in category theory. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal and hyperintensional semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory.
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23132/1/E.pdf
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim) (2017) Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics. [Preprint]
https://www.amazon.com/Epistemic-Modality-Hyperintensionality-Mathematics-Timothy/dp/B0BZFPDKFF/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2988PRURUGGBR&keywords=timothy+alison+bowen&qid=1680306624&sprefix=%2Caps%2C61&sr=8-1
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:23146
2024-03-22T16:43:07Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:23179
2024-03-07T19:53:26Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23179/
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim)
Epistemology
Foundations
Logic
Ontology
Concepts and Representations
Consciousness
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality and hyperintensionality and their applications to the philosophy of mathematics. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality and hyperintensionality relate to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality and hyperintensionality; the types of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal and hyperintensional profiles of the logic of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a hyperintensional mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I also develop a novel topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develop a novel dynamic epistemic two-dimensional hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic (hyper-)intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). The fixed point operators in the modal $\mu$-calculus are rendered hyperintensional, which yields the first hyperintensional construal of the modal $\mu$-calculus in the literature and the first application of the calculus to the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent instead of the common knowledge of a group of agents. Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting.
Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional hyperintensions of hyperintensional, i.e. topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker, semantics, solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between my hyperintensional semantics and the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. These results yield inter alia the first hyperintensional Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis and hyperintensional epistemic set theories in the literature. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal and hyperintensional commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic hyperintensionality, epistemic utility theory, and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the philosophical significance of hyperintensional $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of hyperintensional epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction between the interpretational and objective modalities and truthmakers thereof. This yields the first hyperintensional category theory in the literature. I invent a new mathematical trick in which first order structures are treated as categories, and Vopenka's principle can be satisfied because of the elementary embeddings between the categories and generate Vopenka cardinals while bypassing the category of Set in category theory. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal and hyperintensional semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory.
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23179/1/E.pdf
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim) (2017) Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics. [Preprint]
https://www.amazon.com/Epistemic-Modality-Hyperintensionality-Mathematics-Timothy/dp/B0BZFPDKFF/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2988PRURUGGBR&keywords=timothy+alison+bowen&qid=1680306624&sprefix=%2Caps%2C61&sr=8-1
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:23186
2024-03-11T16:05:38Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6570697374656D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D666F756E646174696F6E73
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6C6F676963
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6F6E746F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E63657074732D616E642D726570726573656E746174696F6E73
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E7363696F75736E657373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23186/
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim)
Epistemology
Foundations
Logic
Ontology
Concepts and Representations
Consciousness
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality and hyperintensionality and their applications to the philosophy of mathematics. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality and hyperintensionality relate to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality and hyperintensionality; the types of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal and hyperintensional profiles of the logic of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a hyperintensional mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I also develop a novel topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develop a novel dynamic epistemic two-dimensional hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic (hyper-)intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). The fixed point operators in the modal $\mu$-calculus are rendered hyperintensional, which yields the first hyperintensional construal of the modal $\mu$-calculus in the literature and the first application of the calculus to the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent instead of the common knowledge of a group of agents. Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting.
Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional hyperintensions of hyperintensional, i.e. topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker, semantics, solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between my hyperintensional semantics and the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. These results yield inter alia the first hyperintensional Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis and hyperintensional epistemic set theories in the literature. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal and hyperintensional commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic hyperintensionality, epistemic utility theory, and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the philosophical significance of hyperintensional $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{11} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics.Chapter \textbf{12} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of hyperintensional epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction between the interpretational and objective modalities and truthmakers thereof. This yields the first hyperintensional category theory in the literature. I invent a new mathematical trick in which first order structures are treated as categories, and Vopenka's principle can be satisfied because of the elementary embeddings between the categories and generate Vopenka cardinals while bypassing the category of Set in category theory. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal and hyperintensional semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory.
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23186/1/E.pdf
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim) (2017) Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics. [Preprint]
https://www.amazon.com/Epistemic-Modality-Hyperintensionality-Mathematics-Timothy/dp/B0BZFPDKFF/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2988PRURUGGBR&keywords=timothy+alison+bowen&qid=1680306624&sprefix=%2Caps%2C61&sr=8-1
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:23212
2024-03-22T16:42:47Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6570697374656D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D666F756E646174696F6E73
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6C6F676963
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6F6E746F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E63657074732D616E642D726570726573656E746174696F6E73
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365:636F6E7363696F75736E657373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23212/
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim)
Epistemology
Foundations
Logic
Ontology
Concepts and Representations
Consciousness
This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality and hyperintensionality and their applications to the philosophy of mathematics. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality and hyperintensionality relate to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality and hyperintensionality; the types of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal and hyperintensional profiles of the logic of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a hyperintensional mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I also develop a novel topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develop a novel dynamic epistemic two-dimensional hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic (hyper-)intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). The fixed point operators in the modal $\mu$-calculus are rendered hyperintensional, which yields the first hyperintensional construal of the modal $\mu$-calculus in the literature and the first application of the calculus to the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent instead of the common knowledge of a group of agents. Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting.
Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional hyperintensions of hyperintensional, i.e. topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker, semantics, solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between my hyperintensional semantics and the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. These results yield inter alia the first hyperintensional Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis and hyperintensional epistemic set theories in the literature. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal and hyperintensional commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic hyperintensionality, epistemic utility theory, and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the philosophical significance of hyperintensional $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{11} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics.Chapter \textbf{12} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of hyperintensional epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction between the interpretational and objective modalities and truthmakers thereof. This yields the first hyperintensional category theory in the literature. I invent a new mathematical trick in which first order structures are treated as categories, and Vopenka's principle can be satisfied because of the elementary embeddings between the categories and generate Vopenka cardinals while bypassing the category of Set in category theory. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal and hyperintensional semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory.
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23212/1/E.pdf
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim) (2017) Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics. [Preprint]
https://www.amazon.com/Epistemic-Modality-Hyperintensionality-Mathematics-Timothy/dp/B0BZFPDKFF/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2988PRURUGGBR&keywords=timothy+alison+bowen&qid=1680306624&sprefix=%2Caps%2C61&sr=8-1