2024-03-29T00:39:47Z
http:///cgi/oai2
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:288
2015-09-13T14:55:31Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
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74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/288/
The Most Measured Understanding of Spacetime
Catton, Philip
Classical Physics
Confirmation/Induction
Conventionalism
Experimentation
Explanation
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Physics
Realism/Anti-realism
Relativity Theory
Newton and Einstein each in his way showed us the following: an epistemologically responsible physicist adopts the most measured understanding possible of spacetime structure. The proper way to infer a doctrine of spacetime is by a kind of measuring inference -- a deduction from phenomena. Thus it was (I argue) by an out-and-out deduction from the phenomena of inertiality (as colligated by the three laws of motion) that Newton delineated the conceptual presuppositions concerning spacetime structure that are needed before we can actually think coherently about these phenomena. And Einstein (I argue) very much recapitulated this argument pattern, twice over in fact, recolligating the phenomena first so as to add something from the laws of electromagnetism, and then so as to add everything about gravitation, into what he understood by inertiality. Notably, to deduce one's theoretical conclusions from phenomena is both more cautious and more cogent than to "infer to the best explanation". And in the context of the development of a doctrine of spacetime, deductions from phenomena lay before us formal rather than causal understanding. Deductions from phenomena tell us, in this context, not what things or what causes there are, but rather what our concepts should be like. The more measured the inference is, however, the more definitively it tells us this. For these reasons the most measured understanding of spacetime lies on a line between conventionalism and realism, between relationalism and absolutism, and indeed (as I demonstrate) between empiricism and rationalism. Spacetime is understood as neither merely immanent in material goings-on, nor truly transcendent of them either. In order to explain this understanding as adequately as I can and in order to remark its excellences most fully, I consider some respects in which the tertium quid between metaphysical realism and strict empiricism about spacetime is wise in the sense of practical wisdom. The wisest understanding of spacetime illustrates, I argue, an original and fundamental connection that epistemology has with ethics.
2001-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/288/1/6MSTMEAS.DOC
Catton, Philip (2001) The Most Measured Understanding of Spacetime. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:311
2010-10-07T15:10:19Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/311/
Notes on Mayo's Notion of Severity
Uchii, Soshichi
Confirmation/Induction
Experimentation
Deborah Mayo propounded the epistemology of experiment in her Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge (1996), and the notion of severity plays an essential role in her epistemolgy. In the following two notes, I wish to point out a defect of her definition of severity, and to argue that she must revise this definition in conformity with what she actually does in her book (Note 1). The revision has some important consequence: in order to apply Mayo's severity consideration to experimental tests, we have to know all alternative hypotheses, in a given experimental situation, in advance. Mayo does not seem to recognize this, and her analysis of Perrin's experiment seems to be affected by this defect. I will present what I regard as the correct way to reconstruct Perrin's argument (Note 2).
2001-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text/html
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/311/1/severity.notes.html
Uchii, Soshichi (2001) Notes on Mayo's Notion of Severity. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:496
2010-10-07T15:20:22Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:625
2010-10-07T15:10:49Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/625/
Experiments and Thought Experiments in Natural Science
Atkinson, David
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
My theme is thought experiment in natural science, and its relation to real experiment. I shall defend the thesis that thought experiments that do not lead to theorizing and to a real experiment are generally of much less value that those that do so. To illustrate this thesis I refer to three examples, from three very different periods, and with three very different kinds of status. The first is the classic thought experiment in which Galileo imagined that he had, by pure thought, demolished Aristoteles' dogma that heavier bodies fall more quickly than light ones. I will show that he was mistaken. The second is the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper purporting to show that quantum mechanics must be incomplete in its domain of application. This thought experiment is a very good one, not because its conclusions are correct, but precisely because it was fruitful, leading to theory and, above all, to a real experiment. Finally I discuss the modern string theory of everything, which, while it is regarded as a physical theory by its instigators, shares some properties of the least successful sort of thought experiment.
2001-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
rtf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/625/1/Thought.rtf
Atkinson, David (2001) Experiments and Thought Experiments in Natural Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:626
2010-10-07T15:10:49Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/626/
The Dynamics of Thought Experiments - Comment to Atkinson
Stöltzner, Michael
Experimentation
History of Philosophy of Science
Quantum Mechanics
Commenting on Atkinson's paper I argue that leading to a successful real experiment is not the only scale on which a thought experiment's value is judged. Even the path from the original EPR thought experiment to Aspect's verification of the Bell inequalities was long-winded and involved considerable input from the sides of technology and mathematics. Von Neumann's construction of hidden variables was, moreover, a genuinely mathematical thought experiment that was successfully criticized by Bell. Such thought experiments are also possible in string theory, where any (non-trivial) empirical corroboration seems to be out of reach. Yet appraising mathematical thought experiments and their contribution to physical thought experiments requires a dynamical account which in the spirit of Mach and Lakatos attributes due weight to informal mathematical reasoning or empirical intuition.
2001-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/626/1/ATKINPAP3.doc
Stöltzner, Michael (2001) The Dynamics of Thought Experiments - Comment to Atkinson. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:724
2010-10-07T15:10:59Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/724/
How do we know? A scientist's view
Bertani, Giuseppe
Experimentation
A professional biologist outlines a non-metaphysical, Darwinian, conceptual framework within which knowledge, its acquisition and evolution could be visualized and studied. The scheme assumes personal uniqueness of concept-concept and concept-word relations, their modification through new experiences, interpersonal exchanges, or joint constructive efforts, and their confluence into larger networks ("concept clouds"). Knowledge expressible in words may be seen as organized in "public concept clouds". New sciences may be seen as accretion, branching or reshuffling of existing public concept clouds, or as new independent public concept clouds based on circular definitions. Reason, logic, mathematics are assumed to be products of biological evolution. The limits to social constructivism are briefly discussed. Continuity of science and philosophy is advocated. Annotations tentatively relate these views to past and current trends in philosophy.
2001
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/724/1/How_do_we_know__020419.doc
Bertani, Giuseppe (2001) How do we know? A scientist's view. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:813
2016-08-16T20:36:42Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:960
2015-09-13T15:27:43Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/960/
Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism
Norton, John D.
Confirmation/Induction
Experimentation
Models and Idealization
Thought experiments are ordinary argumentation disguised in a vivid pictorial or narrative form. This account of their nature will allow me to show that empiricism has nothing to fear from thought experiments. They perform no epistemic magic. In so far as they tell us about the world, thought experiments draw upon what we already know of it, either explicitly or tacitly; they then transform that knowledge by disguised argumentation. They can do nothing more epistemically than can argumentation. I defend my account of thought experiments in Section 3 by urging that the epistemic reach of thought experiments turns out to coincide with that of argumentation and that this coincidence is best explained by the simple view that thought experiments just are arguments. Thought experiments can err-a fact to be displayed by the thought experiment - anti thought experiment pairs of Section 2. Nonetheless thought experiments can be used reliably and, I urge in Section 4., this is only possible if they are governed by some very generalized logic. I will suggest on evolutionary considerations that their logics are most likely the familiar logics of induction and deduction, recovering the view that thought experiment is argumentation. Finally in Section 5 I defend this argument based epistemology of thought experiments against competing accounts. I suggest that these other accounts can offer a viable epistemology only insofar as they already incorporate the notion that thought experimentation is governed by a logic, possibly of very generalized form.
2002-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/960/1/Norton.doc
rtf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/960/2/Norton.rtf
Norton, John D. (2002) Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1158
2010-10-07T17:09:59Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1158/
The Roles of One Thought Experiment in Interpreting Quantum Mechanics. Werner Heisenberg meets Thomas Kuhn.
Van Dyck, Maarten
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
Recent years saw the rise of an interest in the roles and significance of thought experiments in different areas of human thinking. Heisenberg's gamma ray microscope is no doubt one of the most famous examples of a thought experiment in physics. Nevertheless, this particular thought experiment has not received much detailed attention in the philosophical literature on thought experiments up to date, maybe because of its often claimed inadequacies. In this paper, I try to do two things: to provide an interesting interpretation of the roles played by Heisenberg's gamma ray microscope in interpreting quantum mechanics - partly based on Thomas Kuhn's views on the function of thought experiments - and to contribute to the ongoing discussions on the roles and significance of thought experiments in physics.
2003-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1158/1/heis.pdf
Van Dyck, Maarten (2003) The Roles of One Thought Experiment in Interpreting Quantum Mechanics. Werner Heisenberg meets Thomas Kuhn. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1689
2010-10-07T15:12:24Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1689/
When are Discussions of Thought Experiments Poor Ones? A Comment on Peijnenburg and Atkinson
Cohnitz, Daniel
Experimentation
Models and Idealization
In their recent paper, "When are thought experiments poor ones?" (Peijnenburg/Atkinson 2003), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson present an argument to the conclusion that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are "poor" ones with "disastrous consequences" and that they share this property with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. The moral they draw is that the use of thought experiments in science is generally more successful than in philosophy (of mind). In this comment I shall briefly try to show that Peijnenburg's and Atkinson's view on thought experiments as it is presented in Peijnenburg/Atkinson 2003, but also in Atkinson/Peijnenburg [forthcoming], and Atkinson 2003, is based on an misleading characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a quite different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments.
2004-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1689/1/atpeij2.pdf
Cohnitz, Daniel (2004) When are Discussions of Thought Experiments Poor Ones? A Comment on Peijnenburg and Atkinson. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1892
2010-10-07T15:12:43Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1892/
Measurement Outside the Laboratory
Boumans, Marcel
Models and Idealization
Laws of Nature
Experimentation
The kinds of models discussed in this paper function as measuring instruments. We will concentrate on two necessary steps for measurement: (1) the search of a mathematical representation of the phenomenon; (2) this representation should cover an invariant relationship between the properties of the phenomenon to be measured and observable accociated attributes of a measuring instrument. Therefore, the measuring instrument should function as a nomological machine. However, invariant relationships are not necessarily ceteris paribus regularities, but could also occur when the influence of the environment is negligible. Then we are able to achieve accurate measurements outside the laboratory
2004
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1892/1/Measurement_outside_the_laboratory.doc
Boumans, Marcel (2004) Measurement Outside the Laboratory. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1961
2010-10-07T15:12:52Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1961/
The Paradox of Conceptual Novelty and Galileo’s Use of Experiments
Van Dyck, Maarten
History of Philosophy of Science
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Starting with a discussion of what I call Koyré’s paradox of conceptual novelty, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileo’s work. I then argue that although the view of Damerow et al. on the nature of Galileo’s conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo’s use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileo’s pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way Galileo’s experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.
2004
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1961/1/Galileo-paradox.doc
Van Dyck, Maarten (2004) The Paradox of Conceptual Novelty and Galileo’s Use of Experiments. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2045
2010-10-07T15:13:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2045/
Measurement outside the laboratory
Boumans, Marcel
Models and Idealization
Laws of Nature
Experimentation
The kinds of models discussed in this paper function as measuring instruments. We will concentrate on two necessary steps for measurement: (1) the search of a mathematical representation of the phenomenon; (2) this representation should cover an invariant relationship between the properties of the phenomenon to be measured and observable accociated attributes of a measuring instrument. Therefore, the measuring instrument should function as a nomological machine. However, invariant relationships are not necessarily ceteris paribus regularities, but could also occur when the influence of the environment is negligible. Then we are able to achieve accurate measurements outside the laboratory
2004
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2045/1/Measurement_outside_the_laboratory__2nd_version.doc
Boumans, Marcel (2004) Measurement outside the laboratory. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2062
2010-10-07T15:21:02Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2088
2010-10-07T15:13:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2088/
Models of Machines and Models of Phenomena
Sterrett, Susan
Experimentation
Experimental engineering models have been used both to model general phenomena, such as the onset of turbulence in fluid flow, as well as to predict the performance of machines of particular size and configuration in particular contexts, such as ships in canals, aeroplanes in the atmosphere, and buildings situated in various geographical areas. The question as to what sorts of knowledge are involved in the method -- logical consistency, general scientific principles, laws of specific sciences, and/or experience -- remains unanswered even after the method has been described. Adjectives such as ``mysterious'' have been used in describing a fundamental theorem about the method, and various accounts place different amounts of emphasis on the role of experience involved in applying it. I will discuss three different accounts of the foundations of the method of experimental engineering models (scale models), and examine how theory, practice, experience, and models of phenomena (as well as models of machines) are involved in employing the method to obtain practical results. copyright 2003 Susan G. Sterrett
2004
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2088/1/SterrettPSA2004forArchive.pdf
Sterrett, Susan (2004) Models of Machines and Models of Phenomena. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2096
2010-10-07T15:13:04Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:64657465726D696E69736D2D696E64657465726D696E69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2096/
SOME STEPS TOWARDS A TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS
Bitbol, Michel
Structure of Theories
Laws of Nature
Experimentation
Determinism/Indeterminism
Realism/Anti-realism
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Quantum Mechanics
The two major options on which the current debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics relies, namely realism and empiricism, are far from being exhaustive. There is at least one more position available, which is metaphysically as agnostic as empiricism, but which shares with realism a committment to considering the structure of theories as highly significant. The latter position has been named transcendentalism after Kant. In this paper, a generalized version of Kant's method is used. This yields a reasoning that one is entitled to call a transcendental deduction of some major formal features of quantum mechanics.
1998
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2096/1/Tr._deduction_of_QM%27_2.pdf
Bitbol, Michel (1998) SOME STEPS TOWARDS A TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2112
2010-10-07T15:13:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:746563686E6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2112/
Models in Fluid Dynamics
Heidelberger, Michael
Classical Physics
Technology
Models and Idealization
Experimentation
In this paper, I would like to show that considering technological models as they arise in engineering disciplines can greatly enrich the philosophical perspective on models. In fluid mechanics, (at least) three types of models are distinguished: mathematical, computer and physical models. Very often, the choice of a particular mathematical, computer or physical model highly affects the type of solutions and the computational time needed for it. Technological models not only aim at a correct description of the physical phenomena, but also for an efficient and accurate simulation. The problem arises how heterogeneous models of an engineering problem can be brought together and be compared to each other as regards their function and technological efficiency. There are two developments in the history of fluid mechanics that have greatly influenced the use of models in the field: The introduction of the concept of the boundary layer by Ludwig Prandtl in 1904 made it possible to apply ideal analytical solutions, which at the time were almost entirely based on Euler’s equations for inviscid fluids, to interesting real cases and to approximate the theoretical Navier-Stokes equations to practical engineering problems, i.e. to cases at high Reynolds numbers. This made it possible to link the empirical tradition of hydraulics with the theoretical tradition of analytical mechanics and therefore lead to a kind of equilibrium in the use of mathematical and physical models. In the 1970s the introduction of the computer has greatly pushed back the importance of both physical and mathematical (analytic) models alike without making them superfluous. There remain, however, three different ways to conceive of physical models in fluid mechanics, and thus of the experimental ingredient, depending on whether they are devised from an analytical, computational or measurement theoretical point of view. Yet even inside the tradition of computer simulation, different practices have formed according to the programming methods used. The choice of method either depends on considerations of efficiency in terms of costs and time, or on historically contingent factors, like availability of instruments and programming packages or the arbitrary choice of a forerunner. Seen from a technological point of view the factors that make models “autonomous agents” and thus (relatively) independent from theory depend on efficiency constraints. Models are means to solve problems in a certain practical perspective by the most efficient means available. To develop a model is a “fast and frugal way” to get to grips with a certain region of reality, whereas the theoretical approach stresses the importance of universal features.
2004
Conference or Workshop Item
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2112/1/Heidelberger_Models_in_Fluid_Dynamics_corrected.pdf
Heidelberger, Michael (2004) Models in Fluid Dynamics. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2116
2011-06-29T13:43:38Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2172
2010-10-07T15:13:10Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2172/
Evading the IRS
Bogen, James
Woodward, Jim
Confirmation/Induction
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
'IRS' is our term for the logical empiricist idea that the best way to understand the epistemic bearing of observational evidence on scientific theories is to model it in terms of Inferential Relations among Sentences representing the evidence, and sentences representing hypotheses the evidence is used to evaluate. Developing ideas from our earlier work, including 'Saving the Phenomena'(Phil Review 97, 1988, p.303-52 )we argue that the bearing of observational evidence on theory depends upon causal connections and error characteristics of the processes by which data is produced and used to detect features of phenomena. Neither of these depends upon, or is greatly illuminated by a consideration of, formal relations among observation and theoretical sentences or propositions. By taking causal structures and error characteristics, you too can evade the IRS. In doing so, you can gain insight into Hempel’s raven paradox, theory loading, and other issues from the standard philosophical literature on confirmation theory.
1993-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2172/1/evading.pdf
Bogen, James and Woodward, Jim (1993) Evading the IRS. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2299
2010-10-07T15:13:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2299/
On the Inherent Incompleteness of Scientific Theories
Mathen, Jolly
Theory/Observation
Explanation
Experimentation
We examine the question of whether scientific theories can ever be complete. For two closely related reasons, we will argue that they cannot. The first reason is the inability to determine what are "valid empirical observations", a result that is based on a self-reference Gödel/Tarski-like proof. The second reason is the existence of "meta-empirical" evidence of the inherent incompleteness of observations. These reasons, along with theoretical incompleteness, are intimately connected to the notion of belief and to theses within the philosophy of science: the Quine-Duhem (and underdetermination) thesis and the observational/theoretical distinction failure. Some puzzling aspects of the philosophical theses will become clearer in light of these connections. Other results that follow are: no absolute measure of the informational content of empirical data, no absolute measure of the entropy of physical systems, and no complete computer simulation of the natural world are possible. The connections with the mathematical theorems of Gödel and Tarski reveal the existence of other connections between scientific and mathematical incompleteness: computational irreducibility, complexity, infinity, arbitrariness and self-reference. Finally, suggestions will be offered of where a more rigorous (or formal) "proof" of scientific incompleteness can be found.
2005-05
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2299/1/UC586bf.pdf
Mathen, Jolly (2005) On the Inherent Incompleteness of Scientific Theories. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2397
2010-10-07T15:13:31Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2397/
Integrating research and development: the emergence of rational drug design in the pharmaceutical industry
Adam, Matthias
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Rational drug design is a method for developing new pharmaceuticals that typically involves the elucidation of fundamental physiological mechanisms. It thus combines the quest for a scientific understanding of natural phenomena with the design of useful technology and hence integrates epistemic and practical aims of research and development. Case studies of the rational design of the cardiovascular drugs propranolol, captopril and losartan provide insights into characteristics and conditions of this integration. Rational drug design became possible in the 1950s when theoretical knowledge of drug-target interaction and experimental drug testing could interlock in cycles of mutual advancement. The integration does not, however, diminish the importance of basic research for pharmaceutical development. Rather, it can be shown that still in the 1990s, linear processes of innovation and the close combination of practical and epistemic work were interdependent.
2005-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2397/1/Adam_rational_drug_design.pdf
Adam, Matthias (2005) Integrating research and development: the emergence of rational drug design in the pharmaceutical industry. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2401
2010-10-07T15:13:32Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2401/
Quantum Puzzles in the Metaworld of Heisenberg, Clauser, and Horne
Durham, Ian
Mathematics
Experimentation
Realism/Anti-realism
Quantum Mechanics
This paper follows up on a recent pre-print (Durham [2005]) by first deriving a set theoretic relationship between the generalized uncertainty relations and the Clauser-Horne inequalities. The physical, metaphysical, and metamathematical implications and problems are then explored. The discussion builds on previous work by Pitowsky [1994] and suggests that there is a fundamental problem in quantum correlation that could potentially lead to a paradox. It leaves open the question of whether the problem is in experiment, theory, or phenomena.
2005-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2401/1/SetIneq.pdf
Durham, Ian (2005) Quantum Puzzles in the Metaworld of Heisenberg, Clauser, and Horne. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2701
2010-10-07T15:14:01Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368656D6973747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2701/
JOAN BAPTISTA VAN HELMONT AND THE QUESTION OF EXPERIMENTAL MODERNISM
Ducheyne, Steffen
Chemistry
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper, I take up the question to what extent and in which sense we can conceive of Johannes Baptista Van Helmont’s (1579-1644) style of experimenting as “modern”. Connected to this question, I shall reflect upon what Van Helmont’s precise contribution to experimental practice was. I will argue - after analysing some of Van Helmont's experiments such as his tree-experiment, ice-experiment, and thermoscope experiment - that Van Helmont had a strong preference to locate experimental designs in places wherein variables can be more easily controlled (and in the limit, in relatively closed physical systems such as paradigmatically the vessel, globe or sphere (vas, globus, sphera)). After having reviewed some alternative candidates, I shall argue that Van Helmont’s usage of relatively isolated physical systems and a moderate degree of quantification, whereby mathematical procedures mainly refer to guaranteeing that quantities are conserved by roughly determining them, are the characteristics that best captures his contributions to “modern” experimentation.
2006-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2701/1/Van_Helmont.doc
Ducheyne, Steffen (2006) JOAN BAPTISTA VAN HELMONT AND THE QUESTION OF EXPERIMENTAL MODERNISM. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2705
2016-08-18T20:07:28Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2767
2010-10-07T15:14:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2767/
Simulations are not Models
Simpson, John
Models and Idealization
Experimentation
The aim of this paper is to argue that simulation is the activity of inferring future states. I argue that simulations instantiate models and that models are complexes of representations, so the inference in question makes use of the relations between the representations in a simulation's associated model. It follows that simulations should not be properly considered to be models in general, despite it being the case that they are commonly treated, or referred to, as being models, or even models of a special type, namely dynamic models. Further consequences of this position are also discussed.
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2767/1/SimsAreNotModelsRD7.pdf
Simpson, John (2006) Simulations are not Models. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2816
2010-10-07T15:14:12Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2816/
Projectible Predicates in Analogue and Simulated Systems
Mattingly, James
Warwick, Walter
Thought Experiments
Models and Idealization
Causation
Cosmology
Theory/Observation
Complex Systems
Experimentation
We investigate the relationship between two approaches to modeling physical systems. On the first approach, simplifying assumptions are made about the level of detail we choose to represent in a computational simulation with an eye toward tractability. On the second approach simpler, analogue physical systems are considered that have more or less well-defined connections to systems of interest that are themselves too difficult to probe experimentally. Our interest here is in the connections between the artifacts of modeling that appear in these two approaches. We begin by outlining an important respect in which the two are essentially dissimilar and then propose a method whereby overcoming that dissimilarity by hand results in usefully analogous behavior. We claim that progress can be made if we think of artifacts as clues to the projectible predicates proper to the models themselves. Our degree of control over the connection between interesting analogue physical systems and their targets arises from determining the projectible predicates in the analogue system through a combination of theory and experiment. To obtain a similar degree of control over the connection between large scale, distributed simulations of complex systems and their targets we must similarly determine the projectible predicates of the simulations themselves. In general theory will be too intractable to be of use, and so we advocate an experimental program for determining these predicates.
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2816/1/PPDS.doc
Mattingly, James and Warwick, Walter (2006) Projectible Predicates in Analogue and Simulated Systems. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2965
2010-10-07T15:14:28Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2965/
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Schwitzgebel, Eric
Psychology
Experimentation
We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. Examples highlighted in this paper include: emotional experience, peripheral vision, and the phenomenology of thought. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward.
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2965/1/Schwitzgebel060921.doc
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2006) The Unreliability of Naive Introspection. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3046
2010-10-07T15:14:38Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3046/
Duhem, Quine and the other dogma
Afriat, Alexander
Structure of Theories
Models and Idealization
Reductionism/Holism
Experimentation
By linking meaning and analyticity (through synonymy), Quine rejects both “dogmas of empiricism” together, as “two sides of a single dubious coin.” His rejection of the second (“reductionism”) has been associated with Duhem’s argument against crucial experiments — which relies on fundamental differences, brought up again and again, between mathematics and physics. The other dogma rejected by Quine is the “cleavage between analytic and synthetic truths”; but aren’t the truths of mathematics analytic, those of physics synthetic? Exploiting Quine’s association of essences, meaning, synonymy and analyticity, and appealing to a ‘model-theoretical’ notion of abstract test derived from Duhem and Quine — which can be used to overcome their holism by separating essences from accidents — I reconsider the ‘crucial experiment,’ the aforementioned “cleavage,” and the differences Duhem attributed to mathematics and physics; and propose a characterisation of the meaning and reference of sentences, which extends, in a natural way, the distinction as it applies to words.
2006-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3046/1/DQOD.pdf
Afriat, Alexander (2006) Duhem, Quine and the other dogma. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3109
2010-10-07T15:14:45Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3109/
On the True Method of Induction or Investigative Induction: Real But Invisible
Hattiangadi, Jagdish
Confirmation/Induction
Explanation
Experimentation
Scientists apply Bacon’s investigative induction by first cataloguing experimental discrepancies among apparent natures of things. Induction begins by multiplying discrepancies, thus creating a puzzle with multiple clues. Solved puzzles thus give us power to produce those unusual, discrepant effects. Bacon’s experimental method, however, is not empiricist. Grasping things empirically, like receiving impressions on a wax tablet, presupposes that our senses cannot deceive us whenever we are deceived: we err in our interpretations. Empiricism thus leaves no objective discrepancies to resolve, as deception resides in our interpretation. Scientific induction, for all its success, becomes invisible to modern empiricist methodologists
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3109/1/Ont_the_True_Method_of_Induction_%28Dec._24%29.doc
Hattiangadi, Jagdish (2006) On the True Method of Induction or Investigative Induction: Real But Invisible. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3461
2010-10-07T15:15:24Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3461/
The General Scholium: Some Notes on Newton's Published and Unpublished Endeavours
Ducheyne, Steffen
Classical Physics
History of Philosophy of Science
Causation
Theory/Observation
Explanation
Science and Religion
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Newton’s immensely famous, but tersely written, General Scholium is primarily known for its reference to the argument of design and Newton’s famous dictum “hypotheses non fingo”. In the essay at hand, I shall argue that this text served a variety of goals and try to add something new to our current knowledge of how Newton tried to accomplish them. The General Scholium highlights a cornucopia of features that were central to Newton’s natural philosophy in general: matters of experimentation, methodological issues, theological matters, matters related to the instauration of prisca sapientia, epistemological claims central to Newton’s empiricism, and, finally, metaphysical issues. For Newton these matters were closely interwoven. I shall address these matters based on a thorough study of the extant manuscript material.
2007-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3461/1/PDFGeneral_Scholium%5B1%5D.pdf
Ducheyne, Steffen (2007) The General Scholium: Some Notes on Newton's Published and Unpublished Endeavours. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3498
2019-09-30T13:04:45Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3498/
Gedankenexperiment und Erklärung / Thought Experiment and Scientific Explanation
Kuehne, Ulrich J.
Thought Experiments
Theory Change
Explanation
Experimentation
This essay evaluates the epistemic potential of the scientific method of 'thought experiments', i.e. how far one can progress in science by just thinking about experimental situations without doing real empirical research. The analysis of many episodes from the history of science suggests that thought experiments play an essential role in the formation of new conceptual and normative frames during phases of revolutionary theory change. Thought experiments do not tell us, how things are, but how they might be explained, thus allowing us to reflect the intentional components within scientific theories. The author later wrote a Dr.-phil.-thesis on this subject: "Die Methode des Gedankenexperiments. Untersuchung zur Rationalität naturwissenschaftlicher Theoriereformen." (Bremen University, submitted October 5th 2001, summa cum laude) an abridged version of which has been published in the book: Ulrich Kühne, Die Methode des Gedankenexperiments. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 2005. 410 pages, ISBN: 978-3-518-29342-3.
1997
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3498/1/UKuehne_1997_BremerPhilosophica.pdf
Kuehne, Ulrich J. (1997) Gedankenexperiment und Erklärung / Thought Experiment and Scientific Explanation. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3530
2010-10-07T15:15:35Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3530/
Emil Rupp, Albert Einstein and the canal ray experiments on wave-particle duality: Scientific fraud and theoretical bias
van Dongen, Jeroen
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
In 1926 Emil Rupp published a number of papers on the interference properties of light emitted by canal ray sources. These articles, particularly one paper that came into being in close collaboration with Albert Einstein, drew quite some attention as they probed the wave versus particle nature of light. They also significantly propelled Rupp’s career, even though that from the outset they were highly controversial. This article will review this episode, and in particular Rupp’s collaboration with Einstein. Evidence that Rupp forged his results is presented and their critical reception in the socially and politically divided German physics community is discussed. These divisions fail to explain the full dynamic; the latter is attempted by turning to the role that theoretical bias on occasion has in assessing experiment. Einstein’s responses in particular are analysed in this context.
2007-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3530/1/Rupp-final-2.pdf
van Dongen, Jeroen (2007) Emil Rupp, Albert Einstein and the canal ray experiments on wave-particle duality: Scientific fraud and theoretical bias. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3531
2010-10-07T15:15:35Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3531/
The interpretation of the Einstein-Rupp experiments and their influence on the history of quantum mechanics
van Dongen, Jeroen
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
The Einstein-Rupp experiments were proposed in 1926 by Albert Einstein to study the wave versus particle nature of light. Einstein presented a theoretical analysis of these experiments to the Berlin Academy together with results of Emil Rupp, who claimed to have successfully carried them out. However, as the preceding paper has shown, Rupp's success was the result of scientific fraud. This paper will argue, after exploring their interpretation, that the experiments were a relevant part of the background to such celebrated contributions to quantum mechanics as Born’s statistical interpretation of the wave function and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Yet, the Einstein-Rupp experiments have hardly received attention in the history of quantum mechanics literature. In part, this is a consequence of self-censorship in the physics community, enforced in the wake of the Rupp affair. Self-censorship among historians of physics may however also have played a role.
2007-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3531/1/Qm-Rupp-final-2.pdf
van Dongen, Jeroen (2007) The interpretation of the Einstein-Rupp experiments and their influence on the history of quantum mechanics. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3541
2010-10-07T15:15:36Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:746563686E6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3541/
Edison, Science and Artefacts
Wills, Ian
Technology
Experimentation
This paper contrasts the approach Thomas Edison used when dealing with his claim to have discovered a new force of nature, etheric force, to the approach he used to create successful inventions. It argues that he failed in this adventure into scientific theory making because an erroneous view of science led him to abandon techniques that made him America's most successful inventor. From this I develop an argument for viewing experimental science as an artefact creation process, like inventing, in which two of the artefacts created are theories and demonstration experiments that support the theories.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3541/1/Wills-EdisonScienceAndArtefacts.pdf
Wills, Ian (2007) Edison, Science and Artefacts. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3549
2010-10-07T15:15:36Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3549/
Galileo’s Experiments with Pendulums: Then and Now
Palmieri, Paolo
Experimentation
To explore Galileo’s innovative methodology, I have repeated most of his path-breaking experiments with pendulums; I have investigated the robustness of pendulum effects, otherwise difficult to capture, with computer simulations; and I have repeated crucial calculations done by Galileo. In this paper, I will relate the discoveries that I made, and emphasize their significance for our understanding of Galileo’s innovative methodology.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3549/1/Re-examining_Galileo%27s_pendulum_experiments.pdf
Palmieri, Paolo (2007) Galileo’s Experiments with Pendulums: Then and Now. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3572
2010-10-07T15:21:25Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3602
2010-10-07T15:15:45Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3602/
Newton’s Experimentum Crucis vs. Goethe’s Series of Experiments: Implications for the Underdetermination Thesis
Marcum, James
Experimentation
In the seventeenth century, Newton published his famous experimentum crucis, in which he claimed that light is heterogeneous and is composed of (colored) rays with different refrangibilities. Experiments, especially a crucial experiment, were important for justifying Newton’s theory of light, and eventually his theory of color. Goethe conducted a series of experiments on the nature of color, especially in contradistinction to Newton, and he defended his research with a methodological principle formulated in “Der Versuch als Vermittler.” Goethe’s principle included a series of experiments and resultant higher empirical evidence as mediator between the objective (natural phenomena) and the subjective (theory or hypothesis). Although the notion of experimentum crucis became popular among scientists, even until today, in reconstructing experimental research and for justifying theories, especially for rhetorical purposes, I propose that Newton’s justification of his theory of light and color is best reconstructed in terms of Goethe’s methodological principle. Finally, Goethe’s principle has important consequences for the contemporary philosophical underdetermination thesis.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3602/1/Marcum-%26hps_ms.doc
Marcum, James (2007) Newton’s Experimentum Crucis vs. Goethe’s Series of Experiments: Implications for the Underdetermination Thesis. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3626
2010-10-07T15:21:26Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3639
2010-10-07T15:15:48Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3639/
Hidden entities and experimental practice: towards a two-way traffic between history and philosophy of science
Arabatzis, Theodore
Experimentation
Realism/Anti-realism
In this paper I investigate the prospects of integrated history and philosophy of science, by examining how philosophical issues concerning experimental practice and scientific realism can enrich the historical investigation of the careers of "hidden entities", entities that are not accessible to unmediated observation. Conversely, I suggest that the history of those entities has important lessons to teach to the philosophy of science. My overall aim is to illustrate the possibility of a fruitful two-way traffic between history and philosophy of science.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3639/1/Arabatzis_-_Hidden_Entities_%26_HPS.pdf
Arabatzis, Theodore (2007) Hidden entities and experimental practice: towards a two-way traffic between history and philosophy of science. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3653
2010-10-08T12:53:25Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3674
2010-10-07T15:15:52Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3674/
Theory Construction and Experimentation in High Energy Particle Physics, Circa 1960-1970.
Karaca, Koray
Experimentation
In this paper, I address the issue of to what extent the theory-dominated view of scientific experimentation describes scientific practice. I rely on a time period from the history of High Energy Physics (HEP), which spans from early 1960s to early 1970s. I argue that theory-ladenness of experimentation (TLE), which grounds theory-dominated conception of experimentation is too coarse-grained inasmuch as it prevents us from seeing the correct relationship that exists between theorizing and experimenting in the scientific practice of HEP. I articulate that in order to be able to get a better understanding of scientific practice, a revision needs to be made in the general conception of TLE. I propose that such a revision is possible if we abandon the commitment that experimentation is always driven by theory. I consider what I call “theory-drivenness” of experimentation (TDE) as a form of theory-ladenness, which amounts to the claim that experiments, from their initial design up to their final stage, are carried out under the framework of a prevailing theory for the purpose of providing definite answers to specific questions already posed by the same theory. I argue that electron-proton inelastic scattering experiments in HEP were firstly carried out without having any recourse to a phenomenological model. From here, I claim that these experiments are not theory-laden in the sense implied by TDE. On the other hand, I argue, inelastic scattering experiments are theory-laden due to the fact that the scientists who perform them are committed to background theories of HEP. That is, I admit the validity of TLE as a philosophical claim, but I attribute a weaker status to it as opposed to its general conception. That is, I propose to differentiate TDE from TLE by claiming that TLE does not entail TDE.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3674/1/Karaca-experimentation.doc
Karaca, Koray (2007) Theory Construction and Experimentation in High Energy Particle Physics, Circa 1960-1970. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3681
2010-10-07T15:21:29Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3706
2010-10-07T15:15:55Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3706/
Making Contact with Observations
Votsis, Ioannis
Confirmation/Induction
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Realism/Anti-realism
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
A stalwart view in the philosophy of science holds that, even when broadly construed so as to include theoretical auxiliaries, theories cannot make direct contact with observations. This view owes much to Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) influential distinction between data and phenomena. According to them, data are typically the kind of things that are observable or measurable like "bubble chamber photographs, patterns of discharge in electronic particle detectors and records of reaction times and error rates in various psychological experiments" (p. 306). Phenomena are physical processes that are typically unobservable. Examples of the latter category include "weak neutral currents, the decay of the proton, and chunking and recency effects in human memory" (ibid.). Theories, in Bogen and Woodward’s view, are utilised to systematically explain, infer and predict phenomena, not data (pp. 305-306). The relationship between theories and data is rather indirect. Data count as evidence for phenomena and the latter in turn count as evidence for theories. This view is becoming increasingly influential (e.g. Prajit K. Basu (2003), Stathis Psillos (2004) and Mauricio Suárez (2005)). In this paper I argue contrary to this view that in various significant and well-known cases theories do make direct contact with the help of suitable auxiliaries.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3706/1/EPSA_Votsis.pdf
Votsis, Ioannis (2007) Making Contact with Observations. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3709
2010-10-07T15:15:56Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6E6575726F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D65646963696E65
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:64657465726D696E69736D2D696E64657465726D696E69736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3709/
Mechanisms and Downward Causation
Kistler, Max
Neuroscience
Psychology
Medicine
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Causation
Reductionism/Holism
Experimentation
Determinism/Indeterminism
To explain phenomenon R by showing how mechanism M yields output R each time it is triggered by circumstances C, is to give a causal explanation of R. This paper analyses what mechanistic analysis can contribute to our understanding of causation in general and of downward causation in particular. It is first shown, against Glennan (1996), that the concept of causation cannot be reduced to that of mechanism. Second it is suggested to correct Craver and Bechtel’s (2006) claim that the framework of mechanistic explanation dissolves the appearance of causal processes that « cut across levels ». Their analysis is inadequate for cases of « downward causation ». I suggest construing a decision's influence on molecules in muscle cells as a global constraint. Microscopic laws determine the detailed evolution of muscle cells and glucose molecules, but this evolution is constrained by the fact that it must be compatible with the action caused by the decision. The constraint the decision exercises on microscopic processes in muscle cells cannot be understood in terms of constitution because the decision doesn't constitute the microscopic processes
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3709/1/Madrid-2007-1.doc
Kistler, Max (2007) Mechanisms and Downward Causation. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3755
2010-10-07T15:16:01Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:666F726D616C2D6C6561726E696E672D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3755/
Is the Conjunction Fallacy tied to Probabilistic Confirmation?
Schupbach, Jonah N.
Probability/Statistics
Confirmation/Induction
Psychology
Cognitive Science
Formal Learning Theory
Experimentation
Crupi, Fitelson, and Tentori (CFT, forthcoming) offer three conditions that constitute an attempted confirmation-theoretic explanation of the conjunction fallacy. I present experimental results to show that CFT’s conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for the fallacy. There exist cases that do not meet their three conditions in which subjects still tend to commit the fallacy. Also, there exist cases that meet all three of CFT’s conditions in which subjects do not tend to commit the fallacy. In light of these experiments, CFT’s account of the conjunction fallacy cannot be right as it stands.
2008
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3755/1/onCFT_schupbach.pdf
Schupbach, Jonah N. (2008) Is the Conjunction Fallacy tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3834
2010-10-07T15:16:09Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3834/
Beyond Theoretical Reduction and Layer-Cake Antireduction: How DNA Retooled Genetics and Transformed Biological Practice
Waters, C. Kenneth
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Reductionism/Holism
Experimentation
Watson and Crick’s discovery of the structure of DNA led to developments that transformed many biological sciences. But what were the relevant developments and how did they transform biology? Much of the philosophical discussion concerning this question can be organized around two opposing views: theoretical reductionism and layer-cake antireductionism. Theoretical reductionist and their anti-reductionist foes hold two assumptions in common. First, both hold that biological knowledge is structured like a layer cake, with some biological sciences, such as molecular biology cast at lower levels of organization, and others, such as classical genetics, cast at higher levels. Second, both assume that scientific knowledge is structured by theory and that the productivity of scientific research depends on whether the underlying theory identifies the fundamentals upon which the phenomena to be explained and investigated depend. In the first part of this paper, I challenge these assumptions. In the second part, I show how recasting the basic theory of classical genetics made it possible to retool the methodologies of genetics. It was the investigative power of these retooled methodologies, and not the explanatory power of a gene-based theory, that transformed biology.
2008-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3834/1/WatersBeyondTR_Preprint.pdf
Waters, C. Kenneth (2008) Beyond Theoretical Reduction and Layer-Cake Antireduction: How DNA Retooled Genetics and Transformed Biological Practice. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3849
2010-10-07T15:16:11Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3849/
How Practical Know-how Contextualizes Theoretical Knowledge: Exporting Causal Knowledge from Laboratory to Nature
Waters, C. Kenneth
Molecular Biology/Genetics
History of Philosophy of Science
Experimentation
Leading philosophical accounts of classical genetics presume that Morgan’s transmission theory can be understood independently of experimental practices. Experimentation is taken to be relevant to confirming, rather than interpreting, the transmission theory. But the construction of Morgan’s theory went hand-in-hand with the reconstruction of the chief experimental object, the model organism, Drosophila melanogaster. This raises an important question about theoretical knowledge gained in laboratory settings: when a theory (such as the theory of classical genetics) is constructed to account for phenomena in a carefully controlled laboratory setting, what knowledge, if any, indicates the theory’s relevance or applicability to phenomena outside highly-controlled settings? The answer, I argue, is found within the procedural knowledge embedded within laboratory practice.
2006-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3849/1/WatersHowPKCTK_reprint.pdf
Waters, C. Kenneth (2006) How Practical Know-how Contextualizes Theoretical Knowledge: Exporting Causal Knowledge from Laboratory to Nature. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3878
2010-10-07T15:21:31Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3955
2010-10-07T15:16:24Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3955/
Against Semantic Multiculturalism
Marti, Genoveva
Experimentation
E. Machery, R. Mallon, S. Nichols and S. Stich, have argued that there is empirical evidence against Kripke’s claim that names are not descriptive. Their argument is based on an experiment that compares the intuitions about proper name use of a group of English speakers in Hong Kong with those of a group of non-Chinese American students. The results of the experiment suggest that in some cultures speakers use names descriptively. I argue that such a conclusion is incorrect, for the experiment does not prove what it is purported to prove.
2008-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3955/1/MMNS.pdf
Marti, Genoveva (2008) Against Semantic Multiculturalism. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3981
2010-10-07T15:16:29Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3981/
The Nature and Context of Exploratory Experimentation: An Introduction to Three Case Studies of Exploratory Research
Waters, C. Kenneth
Biology
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
Abstract: My aim in this article is to introduce readers to the topic of exploratory experimentation and briefly explain how the three articles that follow, by Richard Burian, Kevin Elliott, and Maureen O’Malley advance our understanding of the nature and significance of exploratory research. I suggest that the distinction between exploratory and theory-driven experimentation is multidimensional and that some of the dimensions are continuums. I point out that exploratory experiments are typically theory-informed even if they are not theory-driven. I also distinguish between research programs and experiments. Research programs that are largely exploratory, such as the ones discussed in these case studies, can involve both exploratory and theory-driven experimentation.
2007-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3981/1/WatersExplExp.Preprint.pdf
Waters, C. Kenneth (2007) The Nature and Context of Exploratory Experimentation: An Introduction to Three Case Studies of Exploratory Research. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3982
2010-10-07T15:16:29Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3982/
On microRNA and the Need for Exploratory Experimentation in Post-Genomic Molecular Biology
Burian, Richard M.
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Theory Change
Experimentation
This paper is devoted to an examination of the discovery, characterization, and analysis of the functions of microRNAs, which also serves as a vehicle for demonstrating the importance of exploratory experimentation in current (post-genomic) molecular biology. The material on microRNAs is important in its own right: it provides important insight into the extreme complexity of regulatory networks involving components made of DNA, RNA, and protein. These networks play a central role in regulating development of multicellular organisms and illustrate the importance of epigenetic as well as genetic systems in evolution and development. The examination of these matters yields principled arguments for the historicity of the functions of key biological molecules and for the indispensability of exploratory experimentation in contemporary molecular biology as well as some insight into the complex interplay between exploratory experimentation and hypothesis-driven science. This latter result is not only of importance for philosophy of science, but also of practical importance for the evaluation of grant proposals, although the elaboration of this latter claim must be left for another occasion.
2008-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3982/1/RBurian-ExplExperPreprint.pdf
Burian, Richard M. (2008) On microRNA and the Need for Exploratory Experimentation in Post-Genomic Molecular Biology. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3985
2010-10-07T15:16:30Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3985/
Exploratory experimentation and scientific practice: Metagenomics and the proteorhodopsin case
O'Malley, Maureen
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Exploratory experimentation and high-throughput molecular biology appear to have considerable affinity for each other. Included in the latter category is metagenomics, which is the DNA-based study of diverse microbial communities from a vast range of non-laboratory environments. Metagenomics has already made numerous discoveries and these have led to reinterpretations of fundamental concepts of microbial organization, evolution and ecology. The most outstanding success story of metagenomics to date involves the discovery of a rhodopsin gene, named proteorhodopsin, in marine bacteria that were never suspected to have any photobiological capacities. A discussion of this finding and its detailed investigation illuminates the relationship between exploratory experimentation and metagenomics. Specifically, the proteorhodopsin story indicates that a dichotomous interpretation of theory-driven and exploratory experimentation is insufficient, and that an interactive understanding of these two types of experimentation can be usefully supplemented by another category, ‘natural history experimentation’. Further reflection on the context of metagenomics suggests the necessity of thinking more historically about exploratory and other forms of experimentation.
2008-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3985/1/EE_proteorhodopsin_preprint.pdf
O'Malley, Maureen (2008) Exploratory experimentation and scientific practice: Metagenomics and the proteorhodopsin case. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3988
2010-10-07T15:16:31Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3988/
Varieties of Exploratory Experimentation in Nanotoxicology
Elliott, Kevin
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
There has been relatively little effort to provide a systematic overview of different forms of exploratory experimentation (EE). The present paper examines the growing subdiscipline of nanotoxicology and suggests that it illustrates at least four ways that researchers can engage in EE: searching for regularities; developing new techniques, simulation models, and instrumentation; collecting and analyzing large swaths of data using new experimental strategies (e.g., computer-based simulation and “high-throughput” instrumentation); and structuring an entire disciplinary field around exploratory research agendas. In order to distinguish these and other activities more effectively, the paper proposes a taxonomy that includes three dimensions along which types of EE vary: (1) the aim of the experimental activity, (2) the role of theory in the activity, and (3) the methods or strategies employed for varying experimental parameters.
2008-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3988/1/HPLS_2007_Preprint.pdf
Elliott, Kevin (2008) Varieties of Exploratory Experimentation in Nanotoxicology. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4161
2016-10-13T13:47:20Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4161/
How to Discern a Physical Effect from Background Noise: The Discovery of Weak Neutral Currents
Schindler, Samuel
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
Physics
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper I try to shed some light on how one discerns a physical effect or phenomenon from experimental background ‘noise’. To this end I revisit the discovery of Weak Neutral Currents (WNC), which has been right at the centre of discussion of some of the most influential available literature on this issue. Bogen and Woodward (1988) have claimed that the phenomenon of WNC was inferred from the data without higher level physical theory explaining this phenomenon (here: the Weinberg-Salam model of electroweak interactions) being involved in this process. Mayo (1994, 1996), in a similar vein, holds that the discovery of WNC was made on the basis of some piecemeal statistical techniques—again without the Salam-Weinberg model (predicting and explaining WNC) being involved in the process. Both Bogen & Woodward and Mayo have tried to back up their claims by referring to the historical work about the discovery of WNC by Galison (1983, 1987). Galison’s presentation of the historical facts, which can be described as realist, has however been challenged by Pickering (1984, 1988, 1989), who has drawn sociological-relativist conclusions from this historical case. Pickering’s conclusions, in turn, have recently come under attack by Miller and Bullock (1994), who delivered a defence of Galison’s realist account. In this paper I consider all of these historical studies in order to evaluate the philosophical claims that have been made on the basis of them. I conclude that—contrary to Bogen & Woodward (1988) and Mayo (1994)—statistical methods and other experimental inference procedures from the “bottom-up” (i.e. from the data to the phenomena) were insufficient for discerning WNC from their background noise. I also challenge Galison’s notion of the “end of experiments” and shall take the wind out of the sail of Miller and Bullock’s attack on some of Pickering’s claims, whilst rejecting Pickering’s sociological-relativist conclusions. Instead, I claim that an epistemic warrant from the ‘top down’ in the form of a theoretical postulate of the Weinberg-Salam model was necessary for “ending the experiments”, i.e. for the acceptance of WNC as a genuine phenomenon in the scientific community.
2008-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4161/1/Physical_Effect_and_Background_Noise.pdf
Schindler, Samuel (2008) How to Discern a Physical Effect from Background Noise: The Discovery of Weak Neutral Currents. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4174
2010-10-07T15:21:35Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4191
2010-10-07T15:17:01Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4191/
Inquiry, Evidence, and Experiment: The ``Experimenter's Regress'' Dissolved
Brown, Matthew J.
Confirmation/Induction
Theory/Observation
Philosophers of Science
Experimentation
Contemporary ways of understanding of science, especially in the philosophy of science, are beset by overly abstract and formal models of evidence. In such models, the only interesting feature of evidence is that it has a one-way ``support'' relation to hypotheses, theories, causal claims, etc. These models create a variety of practical and philosophical problems, one prominent example being the experimenter's regress. According to the experimenter's regress, good evidence is produced by good techniques, but which techniques are good is only determined by whether they produce the evidence we expect. The best answer to this problem within the traditional approach relies on the concept of robust evidence, but this answer ultimately falls flat because it creates impossible requirements on good evidence. The problem can more easily be solved by rejecting abstract, formalistic models of evidence in favor of a model of inquiry which pays attention to the temporal complexity of the process of inquiry and the distinction between observational and experimental evidence.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4191/1/evidence-experiment.pdf
Brown, Matthew J. (2008) Inquiry, Evidence, and Experiment: The ``Experimenter's Regress'' Dissolved. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4205
2010-11-27T03:01:07Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4220
2010-10-07T15:17:06Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4220/
Are the Laws of Physics Inevitable?
Franklin, Allan
Theory Change
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Social constructionists believe that experimental evidence plays a minimal role in the production of scientific knowledge, while rationalists such as myself believe that experimental evidence is crucial in it. As one historical example in support of the rationalist position, I trace in some detail the theoretical and experimental research that led to our understanding of beta decay, from Enrico Fermi’s pioneering theory of 1934 to George Sudarshan and Robert Marshak’s and Richard Feynman and Murray Gell-Mann’s suggestion in 1957 and 1958, respectively, of the V–A theory of weak interactions. This is not a history of an unbroken string of successes, but one that includes incorrect experimental results, incorrect experiment-theory comparisons, and faulty theoretical analyses. Nevertheless, we shall see that the constraints that Nature imposed made the V–A theory an almost inevitable outcome of this theoretical and experimental research.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4220/1/Are_the_Laws_of_Physics_Inevitable%28Conference%29.doc
Franklin, Allan (2008) Are the Laws of Physics Inevitable? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4226
2010-10-07T15:21:35Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4233
2010-10-07T15:17:08Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4233/
How Did Kettlewell’s Experiment End?
Rudge, David
Experimentation
The past quarter century has seen an enormous growth of interest among scholars of science and technology in both particular experimental episodes and the process of experimentation. Among the most influential accounts have been those developed by Allan Franklin (1986, 1990), Deborah Mayo (1996) and Peter Galison (1987), each of which was developed primarily with reference to examples drawn from the history of physics. One useful way to access the generality of an account of experiment is to see how it fares with reference to examples drawn from disciplines far removed from the context within which it was developed. In previous essays I examined and compared the adequacy of Franklin and Mayo’s views on experiment with reference to an episode drawn from the history of evolutionary biology, H.B.D. Kettlewell's classic studies of the phenomenon of industrial melanism (Rudge 1998, 2001). The present essay reanalyzes Kettlewell’s work once more, this time as a test of Peter Galison’s provocative account of experimentation in the sciences. Kettlewell’s investigations can indeed be interpreted within Galison’s perspective, but this appears to reflect the vagueness of many key distinctions Galison makes more than any special insights his views provide on the nature of experimentation in evolutionary biology.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4233/1/Rudge.pdf
Rudge, David (2008) How Did Kettlewell’s Experiment End? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4429
2013-08-28T13:58:58Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4429/
To Save the Semantic View
Cunningham, Thomas
Structure of Theories
Models and Idealization
History of Philosophy of Science
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
Proponents of the semantic approach to scientific theories (e.g. Giere 1988, 2004; French and Ladyman 1999) cite a number of critical publications as the origins of their positions. While the semantic view experienced widespread adoption by philosophers of science in the decades leading up to the 1990s, over the last two decades opposition to the view has increased demonstrably (e.g. Downes 1992; Cartwright et al. 1995). This growing disaffection suggests a two-part question: What exactly are the objections to the semantic view of scientific theories, and does the view have the conceptual resources to combat its opposition? This essay seeks to answer this question by performing a careful analysis of the positions of both advocates and adversaries of the semantic view. In addition, it is argued that to save the semantic view it is necessary to locate the source of the position’s problems and to retool its conceptual foundations. To ensure that the semantic approach has the resources to meet objections to it, exegetical analysis is performed, which demonstrates that the source of the view’s present-day woes lies in a subtle conflation contained in one seminal articulation of the view, van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image. It is argued that supplanting central aspects of that work with ideas from Suppes is the remedy needed to provide the semantic view with the necessary resources for becoming wholly defensible against its oppositions.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4429/1/Cunningham_MS3_paper.pdf
Cunningham, Thomas (2008) To Save the Semantic View. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4440
2010-10-07T15:21:37Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4474
2010-10-07T15:17:39Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:73796D6D6574726965732D696E76617269616E636573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4474/
Similarity and Dimensional Analysis (forthcoming entry in Handbook of Philosophy of Science, Elsevier)
Sterrett, S. G.
Models and Idealization
Symmetries/Invariances
Experimentation
The topic of this Handbook entry is the relationship between similarity and dimensional analysis, and some of the philosophical issues involved in understanding and making use of that relationship. Discusses basics of the relationship between units, dimensions, and quantities. It explains the significance of dimensionless parameters, and explains that similarity of a physical systems is established by showing equality of a certain set of dimensionless parameters that characterizes the system behavior. Similarity is always relative -- to some system behavior. Other topics discussed: generalization of the notion of similarity, the difference between relative similarity and partial similarity; how the notion of similarity in science differs from similarity as it has been discussed in recent philosophy. Philosophers' views discussed: R. Giere, N. Goodman, P. Bridgman, and B. Ellis.
2009-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4474/1/SterrettSimilarity%26DimensionalAnalysis5January2009.pdf
Sterrett, S. G. (2009) Similarity and Dimensional Analysis (forthcoming entry in Handbook of Philosophy of Science, Elsevier). [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4481
2016-10-13T13:46:53Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:6669656C64732D616E642D7061727469636C6573
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4481/
Bogen and Woodward’s data-phenomena distinction, forms of theory-ladenness, and the reliability of data
Schindler, Samuel
Theory/Observation
Philosophers of Science
Fields and Particles
History of Science Case Studies
Experimentation
Some twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the received view, namely the theory-observation dichotomy and argued for the introduction of the further category of scientific phenomena. The latter, Bogen and Woodward stressed, are usually unobservable and inferred from what is indeed observable, namely scientific data. Crucially, Bogen and Woodward claim that theories, which we seek to test, predict and explain phenomena, not data. But then, of course, the thesis of theory-ladenness cannot apply. The idea that theory-ladenness does not occur in scientific practice is one of the claims I contest in this paper. More importantly, Bogen and Woodward held that the reliability of the data, which constitutes the first step towards an inference from the data to the phenomena, can be secured without the theory one seeks to test. Again, this appears not to be descriptive of actual scientific practice. In order to show this, I re-visit two case studies that have figured heavily in Bogen and Woodward’s publications and others: the discovery of weak neutral currents and the discovery of the zebra pattern of magnetic anomalies (Kaiser 1995). I show that, in the latter case, data can be ignored if they appear to be irrelevant from a particular theoretical perspective (TLI) and, in the former case, the tested theory can be critical for the assessment of the reliability of data (TLA). I argue that both TLI and TLA are much stronger senses of theory-ladenness than the classical thesis and that neither TLI nor TLA can be accommodated within Bogen and Woodward’s account.
2009-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4481/1/SSchindler_Phenomena.pdf
Schindler, Samuel (2009) Bogen and Woodward’s data-phenomena distinction, forms of theory-ladenness, and the reliability of data. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4555
2010-10-07T15:17:51Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D65646963696E65
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:746563686E6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4555/
Multi-level complexities in technological development: Competing strategies for drug discovery
Adam, Matthias
Medicine
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Technology
Complex Systems
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Drug development regularly has to deal with complex circumstances on two levels: the local level of pharmacological intervention on specific target proteins, and the systems level of the effects of pharmacological intervention on the organism. Different development strategies in the recent history of early drug development can be understood as competing attempts at coming to grips with these multi-level complexities. Both rational drug design and high-throughput screening concentrate on the local level, while traditional empirical search strategies as well as recent systems biology approaches focus on the systems level. The analysis of these strategies reveals serious obstacles to integrating the study of interventive and systems complexity in a systematic, methodical way. Due to some fairly general properties of biological networks and the available options for pharmaceutical intervention, drug development is captured in an obstinate methodological dilemma. It is argued that at least in typical cases, drug development therefore remains dependent on coincidence, serendipity or plain luck to bridge the gap between (empirical and/or rational) development methodology and actual therapeutic success.
2009-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4555/1/Adam_Multilevel_Complexities_Drug_Discovery.pdf
Adam, Matthias (2009) Multi-level complexities in technological development: Competing strategies for drug discovery. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4634
2010-10-07T15:21:39Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4702
2010-10-07T15:18:09Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4702/
Empirical Thought Experiments: A Trascendental-Operational View
Marco, Buzzoni
Thought Experiments
Experimentation
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
The operational perspective here defended permits a reflexive-transcendental point of view that sharply distinguishes the two concepts, while, at the same time, maintaining the connection between them. On the one hand, simply imagining that the experimental apparatus, counterfactually anticipated in a thought experiment, has really been constructed is sufficient to erase any difference between thought and real experiments. On the other hand, this very ‘imagining’, this capacity of the mind to assume every real entity as a possible entity, underpins the difference in principle – a properly transcendental difference – between thought and real experiments. This difference, however, implies the intimate association between experiment and thought experiment: All thought experiments must be thought of as translatable into real ones, and all real experiments as realisations of thought ones. What thought experiments have over and above real experiments is the mere fact that they exist in a purely hypothetical sphere; what real have over and above thought experiments is the mere fact that they overstep the sphere of the possible, in the experiment’s real execution.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4702/1/Empirical_Thought_Experiments._A_Trascendental-Operational_View.pdf
Marco, Buzzoni (2009) Empirical Thought Experiments: A Trascendental-Operational View. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4715
2010-10-07T15:18:10Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4715/
Computer experiments in harmonic analysis
Barany, Michael
Mathematics
Experimentation
It is conventionally understood that computers play a rather limited role in theoretical mathematics. While computation is indispensable in applied mathematics and the theory of computing and algorithms is rich and thriving, one does not, even today, expect to find computers in theoretical mathematics settings beyond the theory of computing. Where computers are used, by those studying combinatorics , algebra, number theory, or dynamical systems, the computer most often assumes the role of an automated and speedy theoretician, performing manipulations and checking cases in a way assumed to be possible for human theoreticians, if only they had the time, the memory, and the precision. Automated proofs have become standard tools in mathematical logic, and it is often expected that proofs be published in a computer-checkable format. It is not surprising, then, that most philosophical work on computers in theoretical mathematics has been on computers' roles as supplementary mathematicians. Donald MacKenzie's 2001 book Mechanizing Proof demonstrates the rich potential for social and historical studies to complement the substantial analytic debate in this area of philosophy. But what of computers in theoretical mathematics behaving as computers, and not as mere mechanized mathematicians? Very little role is commonly assumed for computers working as supplements to mathematicians, rather than as supplementary mathematicians themselves. Accordingly, very little philosophy has attempted to grapple with theoretical mathematics in which computers play an essential but essentially non-theoretical role. My presentation will draw on work I conducted as a researcher in harmonic analysis on fractals at Cornell University. I will analyze the explicit and implicit conceptual apparatus employed in my and my fellow researchers' use of computers in the theoretical study of second order differential equations, such as those for sound and heat flow, on various fractal analogues of the Sierpinski gasket. Such gaskets are easy to visualize in very crude approximation in a low number of dimensions. As one increases the complexity of the gasket or the refinement of one's analysis, visualization and precise computation become impossible, and soon computers are unable to produce even approximate data to model differential equations in these situations. We thus had to carefully choose analytic approaches and methods to make our theoretical mathematics amenable to computer simulation. In my case, studying the transformation of the gaskets as they are expanded into increasingly high dimensions, computer simulation eventually required that the problem be reimagined entirely in terms of interlinked systems of parameters. This computer-approximation-driven theoretical orientation shaped my mathematical intuitions toward the problem and guided my fellow researchers and me in both theoretical and computational directions. We discovered both that computer approximation could be incredibly powerful as an aid to intuition, and that it can be incredibly difficult to transfer computer-oriented mathematics back into the purely theoretical standards of our area of specialty. I will address the philosophical implications of computer-driven theoretical mathematics, asking how computer experiments can shape both the content and standards of theoretical sciences.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4715/1/SPSPtalk.pdf
Barany, Michael (2009) Computer experiments in harmonic analysis. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4746
2010-10-07T15:18:15Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4746/
Exemplars, Records, Tools: Organisms in Botanical Research, c. 1750-1850
Mueller-Wille, Staffan
Models and Idealization
Experimentation
In botany, garden and herbarium specimens have been used for purposes of systematic research since the mid-sixteenth century. The associated practices of collecting, exchanging and collating specimens were most influentially synthesized by Carl Linnaeus in the mid-eighteenth, although it should take roughly a century after Linnaeus’s death until they were formally canonized in international rules of nomenclature. The role of specimens and type-specimens in the history of natural history – a “metaphysics in action”, as Lorraine Daston calls it – has been discussed in a number of historical and philosophical studies in recent years. What has largely been overlooked, however, is the fact, that alongside the rise of the type specimen method, plants began to acquire another role in botanical research. In hybridization experiments, plants were increasingly used as tools to manipulate other plants, and the offspring resulting from these interventions as a kind of recording device to score the effects of hybridization. In my presentation I will look at select hybridisation experiments of the period to unravel the intricate relationship between natural historical and physiological concerns which governed this experimental practice.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4746/1/09_06_Minneapolis_SPSP.doc
Mueller-Wille, Staffan (2009) Exemplars, Records, Tools: Organisms in Botanical Research, c. 1750-1850. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4778
2010-10-07T15:18:19Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4778/
On the role of the Michelson-Morley experiment: Einstein in Chicago
van Dongen, Jeroen
Experimentation
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
This article discusses new material, published in Volume 12 of the Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, that addresses Einstein’s knowledge of the Michelson-Morley experiment prior to 1905: in a lecture in Chicago in 1921, Einstein referred to the experiment, mentioned when he came upon it, and hinted at its influence. Arguments are presented to explain the contrast with Einstein’s later pronouncements on the role of the experiment.
2009-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4778/1/Einstein_Chicago_Web2.pdf
van Dongen, Jeroen (2009) On the role of the Michelson-Morley experiment: Einstein in Chicago. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4782
2010-10-07T15:18:20Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4782/
Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science
Crupi, Vincenzo
Hartmann, Stephan
Probability/Statistics
Confirmation/Induction
Psychology
Cognitive Science
Experimentation
This essay addresses the methodology of philosophy of science and illustrates how formal and empirical methods can be fruitfully combined. Special emphasis is given to the application of experimental methods to confirmation theory and to recent work on the conjunction fallacy, a key topic in the rationality debate arising from research in cognitive psychology. Several other issue can be studied in this way. In the concluding section, a brief outline is provided of three further examples.
2009-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4782/1/CrupiHartmann_Methods.pdf
Crupi, Vincenzo and Hartmann, Stephan (2009) Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4791
2010-10-07T15:18:22Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368656D6973747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4791/
Theoretical technologies in an “experimental” setting: empirical modeling of proteinic objects and simulation of their dynamics within scientific collaborations around a supercomputer.
Wieber, Frederic
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Models and Idealization
Chemistry
Experimentation
This paper examines, as a case study, some modeling and simulating practices in protein chemistry. In this field, theorists try to grasp proteinic objects by constructing models of their structures and by simulating their dynamical properties. The kind of models they construct and the necessity of performing simulations are linked with the molecular complexity of proteins. Two main types of problems emerge from this complexity. First, experimental problems arise when scientists want to perform on (and to adapt to) proteins some physical experiments (X-rays crystallography, NMR, neutrons scatterings…) and try to interpret the experimental data thus produced. Secondly, theoretical problems of computational complexity arise with the application of quantum mechanics to these excessively large objects. If the first type of problems has historically called for the development of theoretical approaches (in order to refine experimental data and to have access to certain properties of proteins that were very difficult to obtain experimentally), the second type, which is common to chemistry as a whole, has led protein scientists to develop a special kind of models, the so-called “empirical models” (in contrast to “ab initio calculations”). They were aided by massive use of computers after 1960, to construct and extend the use of these models. In the 1970’s, these computerized models were incorporated into a simulation method termed “Molecular Dynamics” (MD) elaborated in statistical physics. This has led to greater insights about experimentally inaccessible dynamical properties of proteins. The computer, as a technological instrument, has influenced in a major way the form of the models that have been constructed. Its limited computational capacities have also influenced the way MD simulation method has been applied in the case of proteins. That’s why I refer to these modeling and simulating activities as “theoretical technologies”. The development of these theoretical technologies must be understood in an “experimental” setting. To show this, I will first analyze the nature of the models actually constructed, in order to emphasize the work of experimental data assembling and estimations (due to the empirical problems early mentioned) necessary in this modeling activity. I will then examine the adaptation of the MD simulation method to proteins. For this adaptation, specialists of the MD method (from statistical physics) collaborated with protein theorists, notably, in Europe, within a particular institution. This effective collaboration has been possible thanks to the computing facilities of this computing center. I will thus emphasize the way computer’s accessibility has led to practical collaboration among scientists, and the importance of the tacit dimensions of simulation’s production during this time of first developments. A parallel between experimental practices (around big instruments) and simulating practices (around supercomputers) can then be proposed. If these two main lines of analysis indicate the potential hybrid nature (between theory and experiment) of these modeling and simulating activities, they will also show how the technological nature of these practices has an effect on the status of the results they produced. Finally, the impact of these technologies on the nature and status of experimental results in protein chemistry will be mentioned.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4791/1/talk-SPSP-2009_Wieber.pdf
Wieber, Frederic (2009) Theoretical technologies in an “experimental” setting: empirical modeling of proteinic objects and simulation of their dynamics within scientific collaborations around a supercomputer. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4799
2010-10-07T15:18:23Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4799/
In Pursuit of Resistance: Pragmatic Recommendations for Doing Science within One’s Means
McLaughlin, Amy
Confirmation/Induction
History of Philosophy of Science
Philosophers of Science
Experimentation
Charles Peirce’s model of inquiry is supposed to demarcate appropriate methods of inquiry from specious ones. Cheryl Misak points out that Peirce’s explicit account fails, but can nevertheless be rescued by elements of his own system. While Misak’s criticism is a propos, her own attempt to fortify Peirce’s account does not succeed, as it falls prey to the same criticism she raises against Peirce’s explicit account. The account provided in this paper—the ‘open path’ alternative—draws from Peirce’s corollary to his “first rule of reason”, that one should not block the road to inquiry. The ‘open path’ account is able to withstand Misak’s objections, and when combined with other aspects of Peirce’s work, shows us why the optimal way to conduct inquiry is to follow the path of greatest resistance. Inquiry, however, is rarely (if ever) conducted in optimal conditions. Actual, constrained conditions of inquiry require a measure of economy in terms of what can be reasonably pursued and how. The question, then, is how to conduct our inquiries so that they are as nearly optimal as possible given actual constraints. As a working scientist, Peirce was acutely aware of the need to economize in research. Nicholas Rescher has recognized this issue’s significance for Peirce, and noted its neglect in discussions of Peirce’s work. One issue that has been largely neglected in the literature on Peirce is what specifically he recommends, based on considerations of economy, for how to go about gathering evidence. Kronz & McLaughlin (2005) points out that Peirce’s primary recommendation is that in gathering evidence relevant to a particular hypothesis we should test for empirical consequences that would not have been expected otherwise. The view that is developed in this paper is that economy in research, according to Peirce, follows the general line of his theory of inquiry. Peirce’s theory of inquiry implies that pursuit of truth requires maximizing resistance. I argue that his considerations about how to navigate within the constraints introduced in the context of actual research (in terms of time, funding, available experimental apparatus, etc.) are also best understood as recommendations for maximizing resistance.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4799/1/Pragmatic_Recommendations_for_Doing_Science_within_One%27s_Means.pdf
McLaughlin, Amy (2009) In Pursuit of Resistance: Pragmatic Recommendations for Doing Science within One’s Means. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4805
2010-10-07T15:18:24Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4805/
Modeling and Experimenting
Peschard, Isabelle
Models and Idealization
Experimentation
Experimental activity is traditionally identified with testing the empirical implications or numerical simulations of models against data. In critical reaction to the ‘tribunal view’ on experiments, this essay will show the constructive contribution of experimental activity to the processes of modeling and simulating. Based on the analysis of a case in fluid mechanics, it will focus specifically on two aspects. The first is the controversial specification of the conditions in which the data are to be obtained. The second is conceptual clarification, with a redefinition of concepts central to the understanding of the phenomenon and the conditions of its occurrence.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4805/1/Peschard-Modeling_and_Experimenting.pdf
Peschard, Isabelle (2009) Modeling and Experimenting. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4806
2010-10-07T15:18:25Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6E6575726F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4806/
The Proper Province of Philosophy: Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Investigation
Sytsma, Justin
Neuroscience
Experimentation
The practice of conceptual analysis has undergone a revival in recent years. Although the extent of its role in philosophy is controversial, many now accept that conceptual analysis has at least some role to play. Granting this, I consider the relevance of empirical investigation to conceptual analysis. I do so by contrasting an extreme position (anti-empirical conceptual analysis) with a more moderate position (non-empirical conceptual analysis). I argue that anti-empirical conceptual analysis is not a viable position because it has no means for resolving conceptual disputes that arise between seemingly competent speakers of the language. This is illustrated by considering one such dispute that has been pressed by a prominent advocate of anti-empirical conceptual analysis: Bennett and Hacker (2003) assert that psychological predicates only logically apply to whole living animals, but many scientists and philosophers use the terms more broadly. I argue that to resolve such disputes we need to empirically investigate the common understanding of the terms at issue. I then show how this can be done by presenting the results of three studies concerning the application of “calculates” to computers.
2009-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4806/1/The_Proper_Province.pdf
Sytsma, Justin (2009) The Proper Province of Philosophy: Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Investigation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4810
2010-10-07T15:18:26Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65636F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4810/
Experiments in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology
Wilson, Brad
Evolutionary Theory
Experimentation
Ecology/Conservation
Most of the philosophical work done on experimentation has focused on the physical sciences, i.e., physics and chemistry. I consider to what extent this work is relevant to experimentation in ecology and evolutionary biology, and will identify some important differences between laboratory experiments and experiments in nature. I focus on the ontological and epistemological aspects of experiments in the physical sciences and the life sciences and argue that experiments in ecology and evolutionary biology provide knowledge of particular systems from which it is difficult to generalize.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4810/1/Nature_as_Laboratory_for_SPSP.docx
Wilson, Brad (2009) Experiments in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4811
2013-01-26T13:30:12Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4812
2010-10-07T15:18:27Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4812/
Tacit Aspects of Experimental Practices: What Epistemological Consequences?
Soler, Léna
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
Realism/Anti-realism
Conventionalism
Among the new objects of interest emerged from the study of science in action, an important one is what has been categorized under the heading of the “tacit”: tacit knowledge, the tacit dimension of scientific practices. Harry Collins, in particular, insisted that irreducibly tacit presuppositions and corporal skills are inevitably involved in experimental practices, and that these tacit resources play an essential role in the stabilization of scientific achievements. The aim of this talk is to discuss some epistemological implications of what I will call ‘the opacity of experimental practices’, especially with respect to the principle of experimenters substitutability which is commonly viewed as a necessary feature of any good science.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4812/1/Soler-CONF-ANGL-Site-SPSP.doc
Soler, Léna (2009) Tacit Aspects of Experimental Practices: What Epistemological Consequences? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4888
2010-10-07T15:18:39Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4888/
Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience
Sytsma, Justin
Machery, Edouard
Cognitive Science
Experimentation
Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.
2009-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4888/1/Two_Conceptions_of_Subjective_Experience.pdf
Sytsma, Justin and Machery, Edouard (2009) Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4973
2020-10-15T02:35:22Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4987
2011-11-04T14:16:34Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5003
2010-10-07T15:18:57Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5003/
Producing a Robust Body of Data with a Single Technique
Gandenberger, Gregory
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Many techniques used in science produce raw data that requires interpretation. In many cases, it is impossible to discover or test by direct observation a method of interpreting raw data. It is natural to assume that in such cases the justification for a method of interpretation must come from a theory about the process that produces the raw data. Contrary to this view, scientists have many strategies for validating a method of raw-data interpretation. Those strategies can be used to produce multiple arguments in support of a single technique that may depend on largely independent sets of presuppositions. Thus, it is possible to produce a robust body of data with a single technique. I illustrate and support these claims with a case study of the introduction of the cathode-ray oscillograph into electrophysiology.
2009-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5003/1/Producing_a_Robust_Body_of_Data_with_a_Single_Technique_4.4.3_for_PhilSci_Archive.doc
Gandenberger, Gregory (2009) Producing a Robust Body of Data with a Single Technique. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5013
2016-08-18T22:48:35Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5013/
Fictions, Inference, and Realism
Suárez, Mauricio
Thought Experiments
Models and Idealization
History of Philosophy of Science
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
Realism/Anti-realism
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Abstract: It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is characterised, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I take to be the argument for the incompatibility of scientific realism with fictionalism. I argue that some of its premises are unwarranted, and are moreover questionable from a fictionalist perspective. The conclusion is that fictionalism is neutral in the realism-antirealism debate, pulling neither in favour nor against scientific realism.
2010-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5013/1/Fictions%2C_Inference%2C_and_Realism.pdf
Suárez, Mauricio (2010) Fictions, Inference, and Realism. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5015
2010-10-07T15:18:59Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5015/
Fictions, Inference, and Realism
Suárez, Mauricio
Thought Experiments
Models and Idealization
History of Philosophy of Science
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
Realism/Anti-realism
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is characterised, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I take to be the argument for the incompatibility of scientific realism with fictionalism. I argue that some of its premises are unwarranted, and are moreover questionable from a fictionalist perspective. The conclusion is that fictionalism is neutral in the realism-antirealism debate, pulling neither in favour nor against scientific realism.
2009-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5015/1/Fictions%2C_Inference%2C_and_Realism.pdf
Suárez, Mauricio (2009) Fictions, Inference, and Realism. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5110
2010-10-07T15:19:06Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5110/
Making Sense of Modeling: Beyond Representation
Peschard, Isabelle
Models and Idealization
Experimentation
It has recently been aptly emphasized that how models are used is essential to what scientific models are. But the explanations of why and how a model is used or why a model is scientifically valuable are still merely in terms of the relation between the model and its target, just as they were before the explicit mention of uses and users. To use a model is to perform an action, and as for any action, different accounts can be given depending on the perspective that is adopted. An account of use and users in terms of relations between the model and its target is close to the poorest we could get of the role of the users and the function of models. I will argue that models need to be regarded as elements of an epistemic space, a space of related models-of-phenomena and activities of modeling. On that view, whether a model-of-X is epistemically valuable or scientifically worthwhile depends on the difference it makes in this epistemic space with respect to the investigation of scientifically significant problems. I will focus on the most common way for a model to make a difference: to be used in the construction of other models.
2009
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5110/1/Making_Sense_of_Modeling.pdf
Peschard, Isabelle (2009) Making Sense of Modeling: Beyond Representation. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5111
2010-10-07T15:19:06Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5111/
Modeling and Experimenting
Peschard, Isabelle
Models and Idealization
Experimentation
Experimental activity is traditionally identified with testing the empirical implications or numerical simulations of models against data. In critical reaction to the ‘tribunal view’ on experiments, this essay will show the constructive contribution of experimental activity to the processes of modeling and simulating. Based on the analysis of a case in fluid mechanics, it will focus specifically on two aspects. The first is the controversial specification of the relevant parameters of phenomenon.. The second is conceptual innovation, with a redefinition of concepts central to the understanding of the phenomenon.
2009
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5111/1/Modeling_and_Experimenting-penul.pdf
Peschard, Isabelle (2009) Modeling and Experimenting. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5130
2010-10-07T15:19:08Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5130/
A New Perspective Concerning Experiments on Semantic Intuitions
Sytsma, Justin
Livengood, Jonathan
Thought Experiments
Psychology
Cognitive Science
Experimentation
In two fascinating articles, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich [2004, forthcoming] use experimental methods to raise a specter of doubt about reliance on intuitions in developing theories of reference which are then deployed in philosophical arguments outside the philosophy of language. Machery et al. ran a cross-cultural survey asking Western and East Asian participants about a famous case from the philosophical literature on reference (Kripke’s Gödel example). They interpret their results as indicating that there is significant variation in participants’ intuitions about semantic reference for that case. We argue that this interpretation is mistaken. We detail a type of ambiguity found in Machery et al.’s probe but not yet noted in the response literature. We argue that this epistemic ambiguity could have affected their results. We do not stop there, however: Rather than rest content with a possibility claim, we ran four studies to test the impact of this ambiguity on participants’ responses. We found that this accounts for much of the variation in Machery et al.’s original experiment. We conclude that in the light of our new data, their argument is no longer convincing.
2010-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5130/1/A_New_Perspective_Concerning_Experiments_on_Semantic_Intuitions.pdf
Sytsma, Justin and Livengood, Jonathan (2010) A New Perspective Concerning Experiments on Semantic Intuitions. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5180
2010-10-07T15:19:13Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5180/
Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness
Sytsma, Justin
Psychology
Cognitive Science
Experimentation
In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have mainly focused on how people conceive of non-experiential states such as beliefs and desires. As a result, we know very little about how non-philosophers (or the folk) understand the mental states that philosophers typically classify as being phenomenally conscious. In particular, it is not known whether the folk even tend to classify mental states in terms of their being or not being phenomenally conscious in the first place. Things have changed dramatically in the last few years, however, with a flurry of ground-breaking research by psychologists and experimental philosophers. In this article I will review this work, carefully distinguishing between two questions: First, are the ascriptions that the folk make with regard to the mental states that philosophers classify as phenomenally conscious related to their decisions about whether morally right or wrong action has been done to an entity? Second, do the folk tend to classify mental states in the way that philosophers do, distinguishing between mental states that are phenomenally conscious and mental states that are not phenomenally conscious?
2010-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5180/1/Folk_Psychology_and_Phenomenal_Consciousness.pdf
Sytsma, Justin (2010) Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5227
2010-10-07T15:19:21Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5227/
Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power
Schupbach, Jonah N.
Confirmation/Induction
Explanation
Experimentation
Recently, in attempting to account for explanatory reasoning in probabilistic terms, Bayesians have proposed several measures of the degree to which a hypothesis explains a given set of facts. These candidate measures of "explanatory power" are shown to have interesting normative interpretations and consequences. What has not yet been investigated, however, is whether any of these measures are also descriptive of people’s actual explanatory judgments. Here, I present my own experimental work investigating this question. I argue that one measure in particular is an accurate descriptor of explanatory judgments. Then, I discuss some interesting implications of this result for both the epistemology and the psychology of explanatory reasoning.
2010
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5227/1/Comparing_Measures_of_Explanatory_Power.pdf
Schupbach, Jonah N. (2010) Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5256
2011-11-04T14:16:33Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5517
2012-12-05T23:40:47Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5517/
Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation: A Challenge to Philosophy of Science (Pittsburgh; October 15-17, 2010)
Conference, Instructions
Experimentation
Conference instructions for [2010] Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation: A Challenge to Philosophy of Science (Pittsburgh; October 15-17, 2010)
2010
Other
NonPeerReviewed
text/html
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5517/1/index.html
Conference, Instructions (2010) Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation: A Challenge to Philosophy of Science (Pittsburgh; October 15-17, 2010). UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8329
2013-05-15T21:10:40Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8329/
Modeling and experimenting:
The combinatorial strategy in synthetic biology
Knuuttila, Tarja
Loettgers, Andrea
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Experimentation
Models and Idealization
In which respects do modeling and experimenting resemble or differ from each other? We explore this question through studying in detail the combinatorial strategy in synthetic biology whereby scientists triangulate experimentation on model organisms, mathematical modeling, and synthetic modeling. We argue that this combinatorial strategy is due to the characteristic constraints of the three epistemic activities. Moreover, our case study shows that in some cases materiality clearly matters, in fact it provides the very rationale of synthetic modeling. We will show how the materialities of the different kinds of models – biological components versus mathematical symbols – in combination with their different structures – the complexity of biological organisms versus the isolated network structure and its mathematical dynamics - define the spectrum of epistemic possibilities in synthetic biology. Furthermore, our case shows that from the perspective of scientific practice the question of whether or not simulations are like or unlike experiments is often beside the point, since they are used to accomplish different kinds of things.
2010-10-12
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8329/1/Modeling_and_experimenting_AL_TK.pdf
Knuuttila, Tarja and Loettgers, Andrea (2010) Modeling and experimenting: The combinatorial strategy in synthetic biology. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8348
2010-10-25T10:58:01Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8348/
Clifford Algebraic Computational Fluid Dynamics: A New Class of Experiments.
Kallfelz, William
Experimentation
Though some influentially critical objections have been raised during the ‘classical’ pre-computational simulation philosophy of science (PCSPS) tradition, suggesting a more nuanced methodological category for experiments , it safe to say such critical objections have greatly proliferated in philosophical studies dedicated to the role played by computational simulations in science. For instance, Eric Winsberg (1999-2003) suggests that computer simulations are methodologically unique in the development of a theory’s models suggesting new epistemic notions of application. This is also echoed in Jeffrey Ramsey’s (1995) notions of “transformation reduction,”—i.e., a notion of reduction of a more highly constructive variety. Computer simulations create a broadly continuous arena spanned by normative and descriptive aspects of theory-articulation, as entailed by the notion of transformation reductions occupying a continuous region demarcated by Ernest Nagel’s (1974) logical-explanatory “domain-combining reduction” on the one hand, and Thomas Nickels’ (1973) heuristic “domain-preserving reduction,” on the other.
I extend Winsberg’s and Ramsey’s points here, by arguing that in the field of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) as well as in other branches of applied physics, the computer plays a constitutively experimental role—supplanting in many cases the more traditional experimental methods such as flow-visualization, etc. In this case, however CFD algorithms act as substitutes, not supplements (as the notions “simulation” suggests) when it comes to experimental practices. I bring up the constructive example involving the Clifford-Algebraic algorithms for modeling singular phenomena (i.e., vortex formation, etc.) in CFD by Gerik Scheuermann (2000) and Steven Mann & Alyn Rockwood (2003) who demonstrate that their algorithms offer greater descriptive and explanatory scope than the standard Navier-Stokes approaches. The mathematical distinction between Navier-Stokes-based and Clifford-Algebraic based CFD (i.e., NSCFD and CACFD) has essentially to do with the regularization features (i.e., overcoming and conditioning singularities) exhibited to a far greater extent by the latter, than the former. Hence, CACFD indicate that the utilization of computational techniques can be based on principled reasons (i.e., the ability to characterize singular phenomena in ways that traditional experimental methodologies are too coarse-grained to meet the explanatory demands suggested by CFD), as opposed to merely practical (i.e., that such computational procedures better fit the bill-literally!-in terms of contingent resource allocation). CACFD hence exhibit a new generative role in the field of fluid mechanics, by offering categories of experimental evidence that are optimally descriptive and explanatory—i.e., pace Batterman (2005) can be both ontologically and epistemically fundamental.
2010-10-15
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8348/1/Kallfelz_Pitt_PhilExperiment_paper.pdf
Kallfelz, William (2010) Clifford Algebraic Computational Fluid Dynamics: A New Class of Experiments. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8396
2011-01-26T12:07:38Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8471
2011-01-26T12:07:38Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8471/
Testing Universal Gravitation in the Laboratory, or the Significance of Research on the mean Density of the Earth and Big G, 1798-1898: Changing Pursuits and long-term methodological-experimental Continuity
Ducheyne, Steffen
Classical Physics
Confirmation/Induction
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Theory/Observation
This paper seeks to provide a historically well-informed analysis of an important post-Newtonian area of research in experimental physics between 1798 and 1898, namely the determination of the mean density of the earth and, by the end of the nineteenth century, the gravitational constant. Traditionally, research on these matters is seen as a case of ‘puzzle solving.’ In this paper, I show that such focus does not do justice to the evidential significance of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century experimental research on the mean density of the earth and the gravitational constant. As Newton’s theory of universal gravitation was mainly based on astronomical observation, it remained to be shown that Newton’s law of universal gravitation did not break down at terrestrial distances. In this context, Cavendish’ experiment and related nineteenth-century experiments played a decisive role, for they provided converging and increasingly stronger evidence for the universality of Newton’s theory of gravitation. More precisely, I shall argue that, as the accuracy and precision of the experimental apparatuses and the procedures to eliminate external disturbances involved increasingly improved, the empirical support for the universality of Newton’s theory of gravitation improved correspondingly.
2010-11-15
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8471/4/DucheyneAHES2010.pdf
Ducheyne, Steffen (2010) Testing Universal Gravitation in the Laboratory, or the Significance of Research on the mean Density of the Earth and Big G, 1798-1898: Changing Pursuits and long-term methodological-experimental Continuity. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8552
2011-04-06T01:12:46Z
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74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8552/
Deep Trouble for the Deep Self
Rose, David
Livengood, Jonathan
Sytsma, Justin
Machery, Edouard
Cognitive Science
Experimentation
Probability/Statistics
Chandra Sripada's (forthcoming) Deep Self Concordance Account aims to explain various asymmetries in people's judgments of intentional action. On this account, people distinguish between an agent's active and deep self; attitude attributions to the agent's deep self are then presumed to play a causal role in people's intentionality ascriptions. Two judgments are supposed to play a role in these attributions — a judgment that specifies the attitude at issue and one that indicates that the attitude is robust (Sripada and Konrath, forthcoming). In this article, we show that the Deep Self Concordance Account, as it is currently articulated, is unacceptable.
2011-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8552/1/Deep_Trouble_for_the_Deep_Self.pdf
Rose, David and Livengood, Jonathan and Sytsma, Justin and Machery, Edouard (2011) Deep Trouble for the Deep Self. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8661
2011-06-10T11:21:43Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8661/
Can Many-Worlds Survive a Quantum Doomsday
Bevers, Brett
Confirmation/Induction
Decision Theory
Determinism/Indeterminism
Experimentation
Explanation
Models and Idealization
Probability/Statistics
Quantum Mechanics
Structure of Theories
Theory/Observation
Thought Experiments
A novel puzzle for the notion of probability in the Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is presented. The puzzle makes use of a thought experiment that some have claimed would provide empirical support for Many-Worlds over alternatives. It is argued that, if the predictions of Many-Worlds do indeed differ from other interpretations as claimed, then Born’s rule must generally be invalid in Many-Worlds. It is shown that the thought experiment provides a counter example for recent decision-theoretic arguments that purport to establish Born’s rule. Finally, it is shown that the puzzle can be grounded in general considerations regarding the nature of prediction in Many-Worlds.
2011-06-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8661/1/Quantum_Doomsday.pdf
Bevers, Brett (2011) Can Many-Worlds Survive a Quantum Doomsday. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8766
2014-07-07T13:16:09Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:746563686E6F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8766/
Technology and Knowledge
Record, Isaac
Experimentation
Technology
My aim in this paper is to give a philosophical analysis of how, precisely, technology can be a condition for gaining scientific knowledge. My concern is with what scientists can know in practice, given their particular contingent conditions, including available technology, rather than what can be known “in principle” by a hypothetical entity like Laplace’s Demon. I begin with the observation that what we know depends on what we can do. For example, in science, gaining certain knowledge depends of having certain evidence. This makes the ability to gather that evidence a necessary condition for gaining the knowledge. I’ll argue that a scientist is (under certain conditions) expected to seek evidence before making a judgment, meaning that the “epistemic possibility” of attaining scientific knowledge sometimes depends on the possibility of undertaking certain activities. In turn, the possibility of undertaking certain activities depends in part on factors like ethical constraints, economical realities, and available technology. I’ll focus on technology, and in particular on scientific instruments, and introduce a new way to analyze the set of actions made possible by changes in technology. Specifically, I’ll argue that changes in technology make certain activities “technologically possible,” and these activities can under certain circumstances extend our knowledge, for example by making new evidence available to scientists. That is, the epistemic possibility of gaining access to scientific knowledge depends (in some cases) on the technological possibility for the construction and operation of scientific instruments.
2011-06
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8766/1/Record_SPSP_Technology_and_Knowledge.pdf
Record, Isaac (2011) Technology and Knowledge. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8788
2011-09-15T11:58:40Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:746563686E6F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8788/
Calibration in everyday scientific practice: a conceptual framework
Soler , Léna
Allamel-Raffin, Catherine
Wieber, Frédéric
Gangloff, Jean-Luc
Experimentation
Technology
Calibration is analyzed from the standpoint of scientific users of instrumental devices in everyday scientific practice, that is, the standpoint of practitioners who deal with instruments that are already well-designed and whose use is already entrenched in the scientific community. In order to clarify the nature of this kind of practice and to improve our understanding of its internal logic, we have elaborated a conceptual and taxonomic framework.
2011-08-15
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/msword
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8788/1/Paper-Calibration-SOUMIS_a_SPSP-sept11.doc
Soler , Léna and Allamel-Raffin, Catherine and Wieber, Frédéric and Gangloff, Jean-Luc (2011) Calibration in everyday scientific practice: a conceptual framework. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8809
2011-09-27T12:26:22Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8809/
Using Inferential Robustness to Establish the Security of an Evidence Claim
Staley, Kent
Confirmation/Induction
Experimentation
Evidence claims depend on fallible assumptions. This paper discusses inferential robustness as a strategy for justifying evidence claims in spite of this fallibility. I argue that robustness can be understood as a means of establishing the partial security of evidence claims. An evidence claim is secure relative to an epistemic situation if it remains true in all scenarios that are epistemically possible relative to that epistemic situation.
2011-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8809/1/securing_evidence.pdf
Staley, Kent (2011) Using Inferential Robustness to Establish the Security of an Evidence Claim. [Preprint]
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