2024-03-28T10:24:23Z
http:///cgi/oai2
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:91
2010-10-07T15:09:59Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/91/
Scientific Explanation in Quantum Theory
Clifton, Rob
Explanation
In this paper (which is, at best, a work in progress), I discuss different modes of scientific explanation identified by philosophers (Hempel, Salmon, Kitcher, Friedman, Hughes) and examine how well or badly they capture the "explanations" of phenomena that modern quantum theory provides. I tentatively conclude that quantum explanation is best seen as "structural explanation", and spell out in detail how this works in the case of explaining vacuum correlations. Problems and prospects for structural explanation in quantum theory are also discussed.
1998-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/91/1/explanation-in-QT.pdf
Clifton, Rob (1998) Scientific Explanation in Quantum Theory. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:122
2010-10-07T15:20:11Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:151
2010-10-07T15:10:05Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/151/
Interventionism in Statistical Mechanics: Some Philosophical Remarks
Shenker, Orly R.
Explanation
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Interventionism is an approach to the foundations of statistical mechanics which says that to explain and predict some of the thermodynamic phenomena we need to take into account the inescapable effect of environmental perturbations on the system of interest, in addition to the system's internal dynamics. The literature on interventionism suffers from a curious dual attitude: the approach is often mentioned as a possible framework for understanding statistical mechanics, only to be quickly and decidedly dismissed. The present paper is an attempt to understand this attraction-repulsion story. It offers a version of interventionism that appears to be defensible, and shows that this version can meet the main objections raised against it. It then investigates some of the philosophical ideas underlying interventionism, and proposes that these may be the source of the resentment interventionism encounters. This paves the way to see some features and consequences of interventionism, often taken to be shortcomings, as philosophically advantageous.
2000-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/151/1/Shenker_Interventionism.doc
Shenker, Orly R. (2000) Interventionism in Statistical Mechanics: Some Philosophical Remarks. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:161
2010-10-07T15:10:06Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/161/
Reflections on Structuralism and Scientific Explanation
Forge, John
Explanation
Theory Change
This paper is about structuralism as a form of reconstructing theories, associated with the work Sneed, Balzar and Moulines among others, and not about "structuralism" is any of its other manifold senses. The paper is a reflection in that it looks back on some earlier work of my own on the subject of structuralism and explanation, in which I argued that structuralism and my 'instance view' of explanation go well together, with structuralism providing the means to develop the idea of a theoretical instance. Bartelborth has suggested a view that has some similarity with my early ideas, so I reflect on those as well. I suggest, in opposition to both positions, that a causal account of explanation might also sit well with structuralism. This paper will appear in a special edition of Synthese edited by Moulines and devoted to structuralism themes.
2001
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/161/1/Reflections_on_Structuralism_and_scientific_explanation.doc.doc
Forge, John (2001) Reflections on Structuralism and Scientific Explanation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:196
2010-10-07T15:10:09Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/196/
The Subtleties of Entanglement and its Role in Quantum Information Theory
Clifton, Rob
Causation
Explanation
Quantum Mechanics
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
My aim in this paper is a modest one. I do not have any particular thesis to advance about the nature of entanglement, nor can I claim novelty for any of the material I shall discuss. My aim is simply to raise some questions about entanglement that spring naturally from certain developments in quantum information theory and are, I believe, worthy of serious consideration by philosophers of science. The main topics I discuss are different manifestations of quantum nonlocality, entanglement-assisted communication, and entanglement thermodynamics.
2001-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/196/1/PSAPaper2000%21.pdf
Clifton, Rob (2001) The Subtleties of Entanglement and its Role in Quantum Information Theory. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:200
2010-10-07T15:10:09Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/200/
What Kind of Explanation, If Any, Is a Connectionist Net?
Green, Christopher D.
Vervaeke, John
Causation
Cognitive Science
Explanation
Connectionist models of cognition are all the rage these days. They are said to provide better explanations than traditional symbolic computational models in a wide array of cognitive areas, from perception to memory to language to reasoning to motor action. But what does it actually mean to say that they "explain" cognition at all? In what sense do the dozens of nodes and hundreds of connections in a typical connectionist network explain anything? It is the purpose of this paper to explore this question in light of traditional accounts of what it is to be an explanation. We start with an impossibly brief review of some historically important theories of explanation. We then discuss several currently-popular approaches to the question of how connectionist models explain cognition. Third, we describe a theory of causation by philosopher Stephen Yablo that solves some of the problems on which we think many accounts of connectionist explanation founder. Finally, we apply Yablo's theory to these accounts, and show how several important issues surrounding them seem to disappear into thin air in its presence.
1996
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text/html
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/200/1/istpex.htm
Green, Christopher D. and Vervaeke, John (1996) What Kind of Explanation, If Any, Is a Connectionist Net? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:201
2010-10-07T15:10:10Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/201/
Are Connectionist Models Theories of Cognition?
Green, Christopher D.
Cognitive Science
Explanation
Models and Idealization
This paper explores the question of whether connectionist models of cognition should be considered to be scientific theories of the cognitive domain. It is argued that in traditional scientific theories, there is a fairly close connection between the theoretical (unobservable) entities postulated and the empirical observations accounted for. In connectionist models, however, hundreds of theoretical terms are postulated -- viz., nodes and connections -- that are far removed from the observable phenomena. As a result, many of the features of any given connectionist model are relatively optional. This leads to the question of what, exactly, is learned about a cognitive domain modelled by a connectionist network.
1998
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text/plain
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/201/1/psyc.98.9.04.connectionist-explanation.1.green
Green, Christopher D. (1998) Are Connectionist Models Theories of Cognition? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:207
2010-10-07T15:10:10Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/207/
On the Nonlocality of the Quantum Channel in the Standard Teleportation Protocol
Clifton, Rob
Pope, Damian
Causation
Explanation
Probability/Statistics
Quantum Mechanics
By exhibiting a violation of a novel form of the Bell-CHSH inequality, \.{Z}ukowski has recently established that the quantum correlations exploited in the standard perfect teleportation protocol cannot be recovered by any local hidden variables model. Allowing the quantum channel state in the protocol to be given by any density operator of two spin-1/2 particles, we show that a violation of a generalized form of \.{Z}ukowski's teleportation inequality can only occur if the channel state, considered by itself, violates a Bell-CHSH inequality. On the other hand, although it is sufficient for a teleportation process to have a nonclassical fidelity---defined as a fidelity exceeding $2/3$---that the channel state employed violate a Bell-CHSH inequality, we show that such a violation does \emph{not} imply a violation of \.{Z}ukowski's teleportation inequality or any of its generalizations. The implication does hold, however, if the fidelity of the teleportation exceeds $2/3(1+1/2\sqrt{2})\approx .90$, suggesting the existence of a regime of nonclassical values of the fidelity, less than $.90$, for which the standard teleportation protocol can be modelled by local hidden variables.
2001-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/207/1/0103075.pdf
Clifton, Rob and Pope, Damian (2001) On the Nonlocality of the Quantum Channel in the Standard Teleportation Protocol. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:249
2010-10-07T15:20:16Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:252
2010-10-07T15:10:15Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/252/
SIMPLICITY
Maxwell, Nicholas
Confirmation/Induction
Explanation
Physics
Structure of Theories
Theory Change
There are two problems of simplicity. What does it mean to characterize a scientific theory as simple, unified or explanatory in view of the fact that a simple theory can always be made complex (and vice versa) by a change of terminology? How is preference in science for simple theories to be justified? In this paper I put forward a proposal as to how the first problem is to be solved. The more nearly the totality of fundamental physical theory exemplifies the metaphysical thesis that the universe has a unified dynamic structure, so the simpler that totality of theory is. What matters is content, not form. This proposed solution may appear to be circular, but I argue that it is not. Towards the end of the paper I make a few remarks about the second, justificational problem of simplicity.
2000
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text/plain
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/252/1/MaxwellB.txt
Maxwell, Nicholas (2000) SIMPLICITY. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:288
2015-09-13T14:55:31Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/288/
The Most Measured Understanding of Spacetime
Catton, Philip
Classical Physics
Confirmation/Induction
Conventionalism
Experimentation
Explanation
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Physics
Realism/Anti-realism
Relativity Theory
Newton and Einstein each in his way showed us the following: an epistemologically responsible physicist adopts the most measured understanding possible of spacetime structure. The proper way to infer a doctrine of spacetime is by a kind of measuring inference -- a deduction from phenomena. Thus it was (I argue) by an out-and-out deduction from the phenomena of inertiality (as colligated by the three laws of motion) that Newton delineated the conceptual presuppositions concerning spacetime structure that are needed before we can actually think coherently about these phenomena. And Einstein (I argue) very much recapitulated this argument pattern, twice over in fact, recolligating the phenomena first so as to add something from the laws of electromagnetism, and then so as to add everything about gravitation, into what he understood by inertiality. Notably, to deduce one's theoretical conclusions from phenomena is both more cautious and more cogent than to "infer to the best explanation". And in the context of the development of a doctrine of spacetime, deductions from phenomena lay before us formal rather than causal understanding. Deductions from phenomena tell us, in this context, not what things or what causes there are, but rather what our concepts should be like. The more measured the inference is, however, the more definitively it tells us this. For these reasons the most measured understanding of spacetime lies on a line between conventionalism and realism, between relationalism and absolutism, and indeed (as I demonstrate) between empiricism and rationalism. Spacetime is understood as neither merely immanent in material goings-on, nor truly transcendent of them either. In order to explain this understanding as adequately as I can and in order to remark its excellences most fully, I consider some respects in which the tertium quid between metaphysical realism and strict empiricism about spacetime is wise in the sense of practical wisdom. The wisest understanding of spacetime illustrates, I argue, an original and fundamental connection that epistemology has with ethics.
2001-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/288/1/6MSTMEAS.DOC
Catton, Philip (2001) The Most Measured Understanding of Spacetime. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:322
2010-10-07T15:10:19Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/322/
Inference to the Best Explanation, Bayesianism, and Feminist Bank Tellers
Chart, David
Cognitive Science
Confirmation/Induction
Explanation
Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesianism have both been proposed as descriptions of the way that people make inferences. This paper argues that one result from cognitive psychology, the "feminist bank teller" experiment, suggests that people use Inference to the Best Explanation rather than Bayesian techniques.
2001-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text/html
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/322/1/ibefbt.html
Chart, David (2001) Inference to the Best Explanation, Bayesianism, and Feminist Bank Tellers. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:361
2010-10-07T15:10:22Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/361/
What We Talk About When We Talk About Causality
Bogen, Jim
Causation
Explanation
Laws of Nature
This paper compares the relative merits of two alternatives to traditional accounts of causal explanation: Jim Woodward's counterfactual invariance account, and the Mechanistic account of Machamer, Darden, and Craver. Mechanism wins (a) because we have good causal explanations for chaotic effects whose production does not exhibit the counterfactual regularities Woodward requires, and (b)because arguments suggested by Belnap's and Green's discussion of prediction (in'Facing the Future' chpt 6)show that the relevant counterfactuals about ideal interventions on non-deterministic and deterministic systems lack truth value.
2001-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/361/1/What_We_Talk_About_When_We_Talk_about_Causality.doc
Bogen, Jim (2001) What We Talk About When We Talk About Causality. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:388
2010-10-07T15:10:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/388/
Coordination of Space and Unity of Science
Liu, Chuang
Explanation
Philosophers of Science
Reductionism/Holism
In this essay, I explore a metaphor in geometry for the debate between the unity and the disunity of science, namely, the possibility of putting a global coordinate system (or a chart) on a manifold. I explain why the former is a good metaphor that shows what it means (and takes in principle) for science to be unified. I then go through some of the existing literature on the unity/disunity debate and show how the metaphor sheds light on some of the views and arguments.
2000-11
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/388/1/geo.unisci.mss.pdf
Liu, Chuang (2000) Coordination of Space and Unity of Science. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:496
2010-10-07T15:20:22Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:553
2010-10-07T15:10:41Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/553/
A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding
De Regt, Henk
Dieks, Dennis
Causation
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
Achieving understanding of nature is a central aim of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding, which accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories, that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. As a preparation for our analysis we criticise standard views of scientific understanding, in particular causal-mechanical and unificationist conceptions.
2002-01
Other
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/553/1/DeRegt-Dieks.doc
De Regt, Henk and Dieks, Dennis (2002) A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:763
2010-10-07T15:11:00Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/763/
On the Coupling Constants of the Linear Approximation of Gravity and its Generalization
koepke, william
Explanation
Abstract Recent discoveries such as the accelerated expansion of the Universe in conjunction with the distribution of gravitational lenses, the anomalous velocity curves of galaxies, and the anomalous acceleration of Pioneer 10 and 11, behests one to an explanation. Here we find a new solution to Einstein's field equations, show that because the gravitational field is not a gauge field, gravity is a continuum at all scales, and derive the conditions to uphold Galilean equivalence.
2002-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/763/1/abvesfm.doc
koepke, william (2002) On the Coupling Constants of the Linear Approximation of Gravity and its Generalization. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:797
2010-10-07T15:11:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/797/
Analyzing Causality: The opposite of Counterfactual is Factual
Bogen, Jim
Causation
Explanation
Using Jim Woodward's counterfactual dependency account of causality as an example, this paper argues that causal claims cannot be fuitfully analyzed by including the truth or falsity of counterfactuals among their truth conditions. The main reasons this derive from my understanding of Nuel Belnap's and his co-authors discussion of predictions about indeterministic systems.
2002-09
Other
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/797/1/milwaukee_current__%281%29.doc
Bogen, Jim (2002) Analyzing Causality: The opposite of Counterfactual is Factual. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:828
2010-10-07T15:20:42Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1000
2010-10-07T15:11:26Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368656D6973747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1000/
Qualitative Theory and Chemical Explanation
Weisberg, Michael
Chemistry
Explanation
Roald Hoffmann and other theorists claim that we we ought to use highly idealized chemical models (``qualitative models'') in order to increase our understanding of chemical phenomena, even though other models are available which make more highly accurate predictions. I assess this norm by examining one of the tradeoffs faced by model builders and model users --- the tradeoff between precision and generality. After arguing that this tradeoff obtains in many cases, I discuss how the existence of this tradeoff can help us defend Hoffmann's norm for modelling.
2002-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1000/1/qualtheory.pdf
Weisberg, Michael (2002) Qualitative Theory and Chemical Explanation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1160
2010-10-08T12:51:41Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1161
2010-10-07T15:11:47Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1161/
Effect of Working Ontology on Some Conceptual Puzzles
Muller, Herbert FJ
Explanation
History of Philosophy of Science
This essay examines the effects of a change from traditional to working ontology on some conceptual problems that are under discussion in the literature : the liar paradox, the announced surprise paradox, the measurement problem, and the uncertainty relation. Some aspects of these puzzles appear to be by-products of the use of traditional ontology - as it is implied, for instance, in naïve realism - where conceptual tools have a (mind-independent) life of their own. Considering (in working ontology) what people can actually do with the conceptual tools they have facilitates the access to these puzzles.
2003-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text/html
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1161/1/57-tamul.htm
Muller, Herbert FJ (2003) Effect of Working Ontology on Some Conceptual Puzzles. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1354
2010-10-07T15:12:00Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1354/
A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding
de Regt, Henk
Dieks, Dennis
Classical Physics
Causation
Cosmology
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
Realism/Anti-realism
Reductionism/Holism
Relativity Theory
Quantum Mechanics
Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. Our analysis provides a general account of how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types. In this way, it reconciles seemingly conflicting views of explanatory understanding, such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions.
2003-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1354/1/Synthese-revision.doc
de Regt, Henk and Dieks, Dennis (2003) A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1385
2010-10-07T15:12:04Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1385/
The origin of the spacetime metric: Bell's `Lorentzian pedagogy' and its significance in general relativity
Brown, Harvey R.
Pooley, Oliver
Explanation
Relativity Theory
Physics
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the `Lorentzian Pedagogy' defended by J.S. Bell in his essay ``How to teach special relativity'', and to explore its consistency with Einstein's thinking from 1905 to 1952. Some remarks are also made in this context on Weyl's philosophy of relativity and his 1918 gauge theory. Finally, it is argued that the Lorentzian pedagogy---which stresses the important connection between kinematics and dynamics---clarifies the role of rods and clocks in general relativity.
1999-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1385/1/9908048.pdf
Brown, Harvey R. and Pooley, Oliver (1999) The origin of the spacetime metric: Bell's `Lorentzian pedagogy' and its significance in general relativity. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1428
2010-10-07T15:12:06Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1428/
Synthesizing Activities and Interactions in the Concept of a Mechanism
Tabery, James
Causation
Explanation
Stuart Glennan, and the team of Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver have recently provided two accounts of the concept of a mechanism. The main difference between these two versions rests on how the behavior of the parts of the mechanism is conceptualized. Glennan considers mechanisms to be an interaction of parts, where the interaction between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations. Machamer, Darden, and Craver criticize traditional conceptualizations of mechanisms which are based solely on parts interacting and introduce a new concept—activity. This essay is an attempt at carving out a relationship between these two philosophical interpretations of a mechanism. I will claim that, rather than being in conflict, Glennan’s concept of interaction and Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s notion of activity actually complement one another, each emphasizing a missing element of the other.
2003-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1428/1/Synthesizing_Activities_and_Interactions_in_the_Concept_of_a_Mechanism.doc
Tabery, James (2003) Synthesizing Activities and Interactions in the Concept of a Mechanism. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1443
2017-05-31T00:37:15Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1443/
Anthropic Reasoning and the Contemporary Design Argument in Astrophysics: A Reply to Robert Klee
Walker, Mark
Cirkovic, Milan M.
Cosmology
Explanation
Science and Religion
In a recent study of astrophysical “fine-tunings” (or “coincidences”), Robert Klee critically assesses the support that such astrophysical evidence might be thought to lend to the design argument (i.e., the argument that our universe has been designed by some deity). Klee argues that a proper assessment indicates that the universe is not as “fine-tuned” as advertised by proponents of the design arguments. We argue (i) that Klee’s assessment of the data is, to a certain extent, problematic; and (ii) even if Klee’s assessment of the data is correct, it provides a necessary but not a sufficient response to the design argument. However, an adequate skeptical rejoinder to the design argument can be made by appealing to the anthropic principle.
2003-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1443/1/Anthropic_v3.pdf
Walker, Mark and Cirkovic, Milan M. (2003) Anthropic Reasoning and the Contemporary Design Argument in Astrophysics: A Reply to Robert Klee. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1602
2010-10-07T15:12:16Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1602/
Explaining New Phenomena in Terms of Previous Phenomena
Bod, Rens
Structure of Theories
Models and Idealization
Laws of Nature
Explanation
Physics
It has become increasingly clear that natural phenomena cannot be formally deduced from laws but that almost every phenomenon has its own particular way of being linked to higher-level generalizations, usually via approximations, normalizations and corrections. This article deals with the following problem: if there are no general principles to link laws to phenomena, and if each phenomenon has its own way of being explained, how can we -- or how can a theory -- explain any new phenomenon? I will argue that while particular explanations only apply to the specific phenomena they describe, parts of such explanations can be productively reused in explaining new phenomena. This leads to a view on theory, which I call maximalism, according to which new phenomena are understood in terms of previous phenomena. On the maximalist view, a theory is not a system of axioms or a class of models, but a dynamically updated corpus of explanations. New phenomena are explained by combining fragments of explanations of previous phenomena. I will give an instantiation of this view, based on a corpus of phenomena from classical and fluid mechanics, and show that the maximalist approach is not only used but also needed in scientific practice.
2004-02
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1602/1/maximalism10.pdf
Bod, Rens (2004) Explaining New Phenomena in Terms of Previous Phenomena. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1609
2010-10-07T15:12:17Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1609/
Anthropic Explanations in Cosmology
Mosterin, Jesus
Cosmology
Explanation
The claims of some authors to have introduced a new type of explanation in cosmology, based on the anthropic principle, are examined and found wanting. The weak anthropic principle is neither anthropic nor a principle. Either in its direct or in its Bayesian form, it is a mere tautology lacking explanatory force and unable to yield any prediction of previously unknown results. It is a pattern of inference, not of explanation. The strong anthropic principle is a gratuitous speculation with no other support than previous religious commitment or the assumption of an actual infinity of universes, for which there is no the slightest empirical hint. But even assuming so much, it does not work. In particular, the assumption of an infinity of different universes is no guarantee of finding among them one like this one. The loose anthropic way of reasoning does not stand up to the usual methodological standards of empirical science. And it does not signal any anthropocentric turn in contemporary science.
2004-02
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1609/1/Anthropic_Explanations_in_Cosmology_%282003%29.doc
Mosterin, Jesus (2004) Anthropic Explanations in Cosmology. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1623
2010-10-07T15:12:19Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1623/
Response to Belot's "Whose Devil? Which Details?"
Batterman, Robert
Models and Idealization
Explanation
Physics
I respond to Belot's argument and defend the view that sometimes "fundamental" are explanatorily inadequate and need to be supplemented with certain aspects of less fundamental "theories emeritus."
2004-02
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1623/1/wdwd.pdf
Batterman, Robert (2004) Response to Belot's "Whose Devil? Which Details?". [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1661
2010-10-07T15:12:23Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1661/
Minkowski space-time: a glorious non-entity
Brown, Harvey R.
Pooley, Oliver
Explanation
Relativity Theory
Physics
It is argued that Minkowski space-time cannot serve as the deep structure within a ``constructive'' version of the special theory of relativity, contrary to widespread opinion in the philosophical community.
2004-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1661/1/Minkowski.pdf
Brown, Harvey R. and Pooley, Oliver (2004) Minkowski space-time: a glorious non-entity. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1690
2010-10-07T15:12:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1690/
Explanations are like salted peanuts. Why you can't cut the route toward further reduction.
Cohnitz, Daniel
Explanation
This paper is a defense of an elaborated ideal explanatory text conception against criticism as put forward by Bob Batterman. It is argued that Batterman's critique of "philosophical" accounts of scientific explanation is inadequate.
Mentis
2002-01
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1690/1/6%20Wt03%20Cohnitz.pdf
Cohnitz, Daniel (2002) Explanations are like salted peanuts. Why you can't cut the route toward further reduction. Mentis.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1704
2010-10-07T15:12:26Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1704/
Does Probabilism Solve the Great Quantum Mystery?
Maxwell, Nicholas
Explanation
Realism/Anti-realism
Quantum Mechanics
What sort of entities are electrons, photons and atoms given their wave-like and particle-like properties? Is nature fundamentally deterministic or probabilistic? Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) evades answering these two basic questions by being a theory about the results of performing measurements on quantum systems. But this evasion results in OQT being a seriously defective theory. A rival, somewhat ignored strategy is to conjecture that the quantum domain is fundamentally probabilistic. This means quantum entities, interacting with one another probabilistically, must differ radically from the entities of deterministic classical physics, the classical wave or particle. It becomes possible to conceive of quantum entities as a new kind of fundamentally probabilistic entity, the “propensiton”, neither wave nor particle. A testable rival to OQT results.
2004-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1704/1/Does_Probabilism_Solve_Quantum_Mysteries_F.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2004) Does Probabilism Solve the Great Quantum Mystery? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1740
2010-10-07T15:12:29Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1740/
Measures, Explanations and the Past: Should 'Special' Initial Conditions be Explained?
Callender, Craig
Laws of Nature
Explanation
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
For the generalizations of thermodynamics to obtain, it appears that a very “special” initial condition of the universe is required. Is this initial condition itself in need of explanation? I argue that it is not. In so doing, I offer a framework in which to think about “special” initial conditions in all areas of science, though I concentrate on the case of thermodynamics. I urge the view that it is not always a serious mark against a theory that it must posit an “improbable” initial condition.
2004-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1740/1/measures_time_and_explanation.doc
Callender, Craig (2004) Measures, Explanations and the Past: Should 'Special' Initial Conditions be Explained? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1759
2010-10-07T15:12:31Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1759/
Non-Empirical Requirements Scientific Theories Must Satisfy: Simplicity, Unification, Explanation, Beauty
Maxwell, Nicholas
Structure of Theories
Explanation
Physics
A scientific theory, in order to be accepted as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, must satisfy both empirical and non-empirical requirements, the latter having to do with simplicity, unity, explanatory character, symmetry, beauty. No satisfactory, generally accepted account of such non-empirical requirements has so far been given. Here, a proposal is put forward which, it is claimed, makes a contribution towards solving the problem. This proposal concerns unity of physical theory. In order to satisfy the non-empirical requirement of unity, a physical theory must be such that the same laws govern all possible phenomena to which the theory applies. Eight increasingly demanding versions of this requirement are distinguished. Some implications for other non-empirical requirements, and for our understanding of science are indicated.
2004-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1759/1/Non-Empirical_Requirements.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2004) Non-Empirical Requirements Scientific Theories Must Satisfy: Simplicity, Unification, Explanation, Beauty. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1776
2010-10-07T15:12:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1776/
Kitcher, Correspondence, and Success
Whitcomb, Dennis
Explanation
Realism/Anti-realism
Concerned that deflationary theories of truth threaten his scientific realism, Philip Kitcher has constructed an argument that scientific success establishes not only the truth of crucial scientific beliefs but also their *correspondence* truth. This paper interprets and evaluates Kitcher’s argument, ultimately finding it to be both unsound and unmotivated.
2004
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1776/1/kitcher%2C_correspondence%2C_and_success.pdf
Whitcomb, Dennis (2004) Kitcher, Correspondence, and Success. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1778
2010-10-07T15:12:33Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6669656C642D7468656F7279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1778/
Explaining Quantum Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking
Liu, Chuang
Emch, Gerard G.
Classical Physics
Explanation
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Quantum Field Theory
Two alternative accounts of quantum spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB) are compared and one of them, the decompositional account in the algebraic approach, is argued to be superior for understanding quantum SSB. Two exactly solvable models are given as applications of our account -- the Weiss-Heisenberg model for ferromagnetism and the BCS model for superconductivity. Finally, the decompositional account is shown to be more conducive to the causal explanation of quantum SSB.
2004-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1778/1/SSBqm1.mss.le.3.04.pdf
Liu, Chuang and Emch, Gerard G. (2004) Explaining Quantum Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1784
2010-10-07T15:12:34Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1784/
Newton's Idea and Practice of Unification
Ducheyne, Steffen
Classical Physics
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper I try to capture Newton's notion and practice of unification (I will mainly focus on the Principia). I will use contemporary theories on unification in philosophy of science as analytic tools (Kitcher, Schurz and Salmon). I will argue that Salmon's later work on the topic provides a good starting point to characterize Newton's notion and practice. However, in order to fully grasp Newton's idea and practice of unification, Salmon's model needs to be fleshed out and extended.
2004-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1784/1/Unification.pdf
Ducheyne, Steffen (2004) Newton's Idea and Practice of Unification. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1795
2010-10-07T15:20:58Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1796
2010-10-07T15:20:59Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1898
2010-10-07T15:12:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1898/
Can Psychology Be A Unified Science?
Shapiro, Lawrence
Psychology
Reductionism/Holism
Explanation
Jaegwon Kim has argued that if psychological kinds are multiply realizable then no single psychological theory can describe regularities ranging over psychological states. Instead, psychology must be fractured, with human psychology covering states realized in the human way, martian psychology covering states realized in the martian way, and so on. I show that even if one accepts the principles that motivate Kim’s argument, his conclusion does not follow. I then offer a dilemma that forces Kim to concede the possibility of a unified psychology. I close with a discussion of what, according to Jerry Fodor, is “really bugging” Kim.
Lawrence Shapiro
2004
Conference or Workshop Item
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1898/1/PSAsubmission.doc
Shapiro, Lawrence (2004) Can Psychology Be A Unified Science? In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2010
2010-10-07T15:12:57Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2010/
Complementarity and Scientific Rationality
Saunders, Simon
Explanation
Realism/Anti-realism
Quantum Mechanics
Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics has been criticized as incoherent and opportunistic, and based on doubtful philosophical premises. If so Bohr's influence, in the pre-war period of 1927-1939, is the harder to explain, and the acceptance of his approach to quantum mechanics over de Broglie's had no reasonable foundation. But Bohr's interpretation changed little from the time of its first appearance, and stood independent of any philosophical presuppositions. The principle of complementarity is itself best read as a conjecture of unusually wide scope, on the nature and future course of explanations in the sciences (and not only the physical sciences). If it must be judged a failure today, it is not because of any internal inconsistency
2004-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2010/1/Cushing_final%2B.pdf
Saunders, Simon (2004) Complementarity and Scientific Rationality. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2076
2010-10-07T15:13:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:746563686E6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2076/
From Theory to Technology: Rules versus Exemplars
Bod, Rens
Technology
Models and Idealization
Explanation
How is scientific knowledge used, adapted and extended in deriving real-world systems and technological devices? This paper aims at developing a general model of "applying science" based on the Exemplar-Based Explanation (EBE) model. EBE embodies the view that a real-world system is derived not by solving theoretical laws for specific boundary conditions but by constructing the system out of previously derived systems that function as exemplars. I will discuss a number of artifacts from hydraulics and language technology, and develop an instantiation of EBE which generalizes over different disciplines. I argue that engineering practice is highly cumulative: new systems are almost literally built upon and constructed out of previous systems resulting into increasingly complex wholes.
2004
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2076/1/psarens.pdf
Bod, Rens (2004) From Theory to Technology: Rules versus Exemplars. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2116
2011-06-29T13:43:38Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2119
2010-10-07T15:13:05Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2119/
Thinking About Evolutionary Mechanisms: Natural Selection
Skipper, Robert
Millstein, Roberta
Evolutionary Theory
Biology
Causation
Explanation
This paper explores whether natural selection, a putative evolutionary mechanism, and a main one at that, can be characterized on either of the two dominant conceptions of mechanism, due to Glennan and the team of Machamer, Darden, and Craver, that constitute the “new mechanistic philosophy.” The results of the analysis are that neither of the dominant conceptions of mechanism adequately captures natural selection. Nevertheless, the new mechanistic philosophy possesses the resources for an understanding of natural selection under the rubric.
2004-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2119/1/s%26m_studies.pdf
Skipper, Robert and Millstein, Roberta (2004) Thinking About Evolutionary Mechanisms: Natural Selection. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2155
2010-10-07T15:13:09Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2155/
Mathematical Models in Newton’s Principia: A New View of the “Newtonian Style”
Ducheyne, Steffen
Classical Physics
Structure of Theories
Models and Idealization
History of Philosophy of Science
Laws of Nature
Theory/Observation
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
In this essay I argue against Bernard I. Cohen’s influential account of Newton’s methodology in the Principia: the “Newtonian Style”. The crux of Cohen’s account is the successive adaptation of “mental constructs” through comparisons with nature. In Cohen’s view there is a direct dynamics between the mental constructs and physical systems. I argue that his account is essentially hypothetical-deductive which is at odds with Newton’s rejection of the hypothetical-deductive method. An adequate account of Newton’s methodology needs to show how Newton’s method proceeds different from the hypotheticaldeductive method. In the constructive part I argue for my own account which is model-based: it focuses on how Newton constructed his models in Book I of the Principia. I will show that Newton understood Book I as an exercise in determining the mathematical consequences of certain force functions. The growing complexity of Newton’s models is a result of exploring increasingly complex force functions (intra-theoretical dynamics) rather than a successive comparison with nature (extra-theoretical dynamics). Nature did not enter the scene here. This intra-theoretical dynamics is related to the “autonomy of the models”.
2005-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2155/1/Method.pdf
Ducheyne, Steffen (2005) Mathematical Models in Newton’s Principia: A New View of the “Newtonian Style”. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2170
2010-10-07T15:21:03Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2178
2010-10-07T15:13:11Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2178/
An Answer in Search of a Question: 'Proofs' of the Tri-Dimensionality of Space
Callender, Craig
Classical Physics
Cosmology
Explanation
From Kant’s first published work to recent articles in the physics literature, philosophers and physicists have long sought an answer to the question, why does space have three dimensions. In this paper, I will flesh out Kant’s claim with a brief detour through Gauss’ law. I then describe Büchel’s version of the common argument that stable orbits are possible only if space is three-dimensional. After examining objections by Russell and van Fraassen, I develop three original criticisms of my own. These criticisms are relevant to both historical and contemporary proofs of the dimensionality of space (in particular, a recent one by Burgbacher, F. Lämmerzahl, C., and Macias). In general I argue that modern “proofs” of the dimensionality of space have gone off track.
2005-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2178/1/An_Answer_in_Search_of_a_Question_final.doc
Callender, Craig (2005) An Answer in Search of a Question: 'Proofs' of the Tri-Dimensionality of Space. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2182
2010-10-07T15:13:11Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2182/
Causally Productive Activities
Bogen, Jim
Causation
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
This paper suggests and discusses an answer to the question what distinguishes causal from non-causal or coincidental co-occurrences based on Elizabeth Anscombe’s idea that causality is a highly abstract concept whose meaning derives from our understanding of specific causally productive activities (e.g., pulling, scraping, burning), and her rejection of the assumption that causality can be informatively understood in terms of general regularities of some sort.
2006-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2182/1/causally_prod_12-30-06.doc
Bogen, Jim (2006) Causally Productive Activities. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2238
2010-10-07T15:13:17Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2238/
Three Philosophical Problems about Consciousness and their Possible Resolution
Maxwell, Nicholas
Psychology
Explanation
Cognitive Science
Abstract Three big philosophical problems about consciousness are: Why does it exist? How do we explain and understand it? How can we explain brain-consciousness correlations? If functionalism were true, all three problems would be solved. But it is false, which means all three problems remain unsolved. Here, it is argued that the first problem cannot have a solution; this is inherent in the nature of explanation. The second problem is solved by recognizing that (a) there is an explanation as to why science cannot explain consciousness, and (b) consciousness can be explained by a different kind of explanation, empathic or "personalistic" explanation, compatible with, but not reducible to, scientific explanation. The third problem is solved by exploiting David Chalmers' "principle of structural coherence", and involves postulating that sensations experienced by us visual, auditory, tactile, and so on amount to minute scattered regions in a vast, multi dimensional "space" of all possible sensations, which vary smoothly, and in a linear way, throughout the space. There is also the space of all possible sentient brain processes. There is just one, unique one-one mapping between these two spaces that preserves continuity and linearity. It is this which provides the explanation as to why brain processes and sensations are correlated as they are. I consider objections to this unique-matching theory, and consider how the theory might be empirically confirmed.
2003-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2238/1/Problems_of_Consciousness.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2003) Three Philosophical Problems about Consciousness and their Possible Resolution. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2299
2010-10-07T15:13:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2299/
On the Inherent Incompleteness of Scientific Theories
Mathen, Jolly
Theory/Observation
Explanation
Experimentation
We examine the question of whether scientific theories can ever be complete. For two closely related reasons, we will argue that they cannot. The first reason is the inability to determine what are "valid empirical observations", a result that is based on a self-reference Gödel/Tarski-like proof. The second reason is the existence of "meta-empirical" evidence of the inherent incompleteness of observations. These reasons, along with theoretical incompleteness, are intimately connected to the notion of belief and to theses within the philosophy of science: the Quine-Duhem (and underdetermination) thesis and the observational/theoretical distinction failure. Some puzzling aspects of the philosophical theses will become clearer in light of these connections. Other results that follow are: no absolute measure of the informational content of empirical data, no absolute measure of the entropy of physical systems, and no complete computer simulation of the natural world are possible. The connections with the mathematical theorems of Gödel and Tarski reveal the existence of other connections between scientific and mathematical incompleteness: computational irreducibility, complexity, infinity, arbitrariness and self-reference. Finally, suggestions will be offered of where a more rigorous (or formal) "proof" of scientific incompleteness can be found.
2005-05
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2299/1/UC586bf.pdf
Mathen, Jolly (2005) On the Inherent Incompleteness of Scientific Theories. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2402
2010-10-07T15:13:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2402/
Contracting Batterman's Asymptotic 'No-Man's Land:' Reduction Rejoins Explanation
Kallfelz, William
Models and Idealization
Explanation
Physics
The notion of emergence has received much renewed attention recently. Most of the authors I review (§ II), including most notably Robert Batterman (2002, 2003, 2004) share the common aim of providing accounts for emergence which offer fresh insights from highly articulated and nuanced views reflecting recent developments in applied physics. Moreover, the authors present such accounts to reveal what they consider as misrepresentative and oversimplified abstractions often depicted in standard philosophical accounts. With primary focus on Batterman, however, I show (in § III), that despite (or perhaps because of) such novel and compelling insights; underlying thematic tensions and ambiguities persist nevertheless, due to subtle reifications made of particular (albeit central) mathematical methods employed in asymptotic analysis. I offer a potential candidate (in § IV), for regularization advanced by the theoretical physicist David Finkelstein (1996, 2002, 2004). The richly characterized multilinear algebraic theories employed by Finkelstein would, for instance, serve the two-fold purpose of clearing up much of the inevitably “epistemological emergence” accompanying divergent limiting cases treated in the standard approaches, while at the same time characterize in relatively greater detail the “ontological emergence” of particular quantum phenomena under study. Among other things, this suggests that the some of the structures suggested by Batterman as essentially involving the superseded theory are better understood as regular algebraic contraction (Finkelstein). Because of the regularization latent in such powerful multilinear algebraic methods, among other things this calls into question Batterman’s claims that explanation and reduction should be kept separate, in instances involving singular limits. (§ V)
2005-08
Other
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2402/1/Kallfelz_cond_asymp_aug12.doc
Kallfelz, William (2005) Contracting Batterman's Asymptotic 'No-Man's Land:' Reduction Rejoins Explanation. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2449
2010-10-07T15:13:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2449/
The Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science
Maxwell, Nicholas
Theory Change
Explanation
Physics
There is a need to bring about a revolution in the philosophy of science, interpreted to be both the academic discipline, and the official view of the aims and methods of science upheld by the scientific community. At present both are dominated by the view that in science theories are chosen on the basis of empirical considerations alone, nothing being permanently accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Biasing choice of theory in the direction of simplicity, unity or explanatory power does not permanently commit science to the thesis that nature is simple or unified. This current "paradigm" is, I argue, untenable. We need a new paradigm, which acknowledges that science makes a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, theories being chosen partly on the basis of compatibility with these assumptions. Eleven arguments are given for favouring this new "paradigm" over the current one.
2002
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2449/1/Need_for_Revolution_in_Philosophy_Science.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2002) The Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2535
2010-10-07T15:13:44Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D7075746174696F6E2D696E666F726D6174696F6E:636F6D7075746174696F6E2D696E666F726D6174696F6E2D7175616E74756D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2535/
Explaining the Unobserved: Why Quantum Mechanics Is Not only About Information
Hagar, Amit
Hemmo, Meir
Quantum
Theory Change
Explanation
Quantum Mechanics
A remarkable theorem by Clifton, Bub and Halverson (2003) (CBH) characterizes quantum theory in terms of information--theoretic principles. According to Bub (2004, 2005) the philosophical significance of the theorem is that quantum theory should be regarded as a ``principle'' theory about (quantum) information rather than a ``constructive'' theory about the dynamics of quantum systems. Here we propose an alternative view according to which the philosophical significance of the CBH theorem lies in the predictions of quantum theory which remain hitherto unobserved, and in the empirical inequivalence between the constructive and the principle explanations thereof. We further challenge the principle information--theoretic view with a thought experiment that stems from this empirical inequivalence.
2005-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2535/1/OnBub-FINAL.pdf
Hagar, Amit and Hemmo, Meir (2005) Explaining the Unobserved: Why Quantum Mechanics Is Not only About Information. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2705
2016-08-18T20:07:28Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2783
2010-10-07T15:21:13Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2784
2010-10-07T15:21:13Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2785
2010-10-07T15:21:14Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2788
2010-10-07T15:14:09Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2788/
How Do Microscopic Models of Financial Markets Explain?
Kuhlmann, Meinard
Models and Idealization
Economics
Explanation
Complex Systems
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Financial theory is in trouble. Market crashes and high volatility are only too familiar to everyone, although the standard theories predict that they hardly ever occur. According to the well-known and (partly due to its simplicity) still widely used random-walk model, the probabilities for price changes of, say, stocks should result in a Gaussian distribution. However, experience tells us that large changes occur far more often than ‘allowed’ by a Gaussian distribution. New models are needed which lead to realistic probability distributions. ‘Econophysicists’ are particularly active in this field by constructing microscopic models of financial markets on the basis of various ideas and tools from physics. But in which sense do these models contribute scientific explanations? In this paper I will investigate what and how one exemplary econophysics model explains.
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2788/1/ParisPaper.pdf
Kuhlmann, Meinard (2006) How Do Microscopic Models of Financial Markets Explain? In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2819
2010-10-07T15:14:12Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D646576656C6F706D656E74616C
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D66756E6374696F6E2D74656C656F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2819/
Naturalising purpose: From comparative anatomy to the ‘adventures of reason’
hunean, philippe
Explanation
Developmental Biology
Function/Teleology
Kant’s analysis of the concept of natural purpose in the Critique of judgment captured several features of organisms that he argued warranted making them the objects of a special field of study, in need of a special regulative teleological principle. By showing that organisms have to be conceived as self-organizing wholes, epigenetically built according to the idea of a whole that we must presuppose, Kant accounted for three features of organisms conflated in the biological sciences of the period: adaptation, functionality and conservation of forms..Kant’s unitary concept of natural purpose was subsequently split in two directions: first by Cuvier’s comparative anatomy, that would draw on the idea of adaptative functions as a regulative principle for understanding in reconstituting and classifying organisms; and then by Goethe’s and Geoffroy’s morphology, a science of the general transformations of living forms. However, such general transformations in nature, objects of an alleged ‘archaeology of nature’, were thought impossible by Kant in the §80 of the Critique of judgment. Goethe made this ‘adventure of reason’ possible by changing the sense of ‘explanation’: scientific explanation was shifted from the investigation of the mechanical processes of generation of individual organisms to the unveiling of some ideal transformations of types instantiated by those organisms.
2006-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2819/1/Huneman_final.doc
hunean, philippe (2006) Naturalising purpose: From comparative anatomy to the ‘adventures of reason’. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2821
2010-10-07T15:14:13Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D646576656C6F706D656E74616C
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2821/
Evolutionary theory in philosophical focus
huneman, philippe
Evolutionary Theory
Biology
Laws of Nature
Explanation
Developmental Biology
This chapter surveys the philosophical problems raised by the two Darwinian claims of the existence of a Tree of a life, and the explanatory power of natural selection. It explores the specificity of explanations by natural selection, emphasizing the high context-dependency of any process of selection. Some consequences are drawn about the difficulty of those explanations to fit a nomological model of explanation, and the irreducibility of their historic-narrative dimension. The paper introduces to the debates about units of selection, stating the compelling force of genic selectionnism but highlighting some critiques. Then it addresses the limits of selectionist explanations : the compared status of selection, drift and phylogenetic inertia are investigated, and the debates over adaptationism are presented, with the aim of defining the varieties of adaptationisms as research programs. In order to assess the scope of natural selection, the chapter addresses weak and strong challenges to the Synthetic theory of evolution, both from paleontology (punctuated equilibria, Gould’s contingency thesis) and evolutionary theory of development. We finally sketch some consequences of evolutionary theory concerning philosophical questions about human nature, on the basis of the hypothesis of the universality of selectionist explanations: this part deals mostly with epistemology and psychology.
2006-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2821/1/Handbook_V1_K2_Hunemann_korr_IT.doc
huneman, philippe (2006) Evolutionary theory in philosophical focus. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2915
2010-10-07T15:14:22Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2915/
Comments on Sklar's ``Barbour's Relationist Metric of Time''
Pooley, Oliver
Classical Physics
Explanation
Relativity Theory
Julian Barbour's approach to dynamics is reviewed. With a particular focus on questions of explanation and confirmation, the approach is contrasted with standard formulations of dynamics. This paper expands upon my commentary on Lawrence Sklar's paper at the Philosophy of Time Society meeting at the APA's Central Division meeting in Chicago, April 2004. Although a commentary, the current paper is comprehensible without reference to Sklar's paper.
2004
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2915/1/sklar.pdf
Pooley, Oliver (2004) Comments on Sklar's ``Barbour's Relationist Metric of Time''. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2952
2010-10-07T15:14:26Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2952/
Scientific Understanding
Davies, E Brian
Models and Idealization
Laws of Nature
Mathematics
Reductionism/Holism
Explanation
Physics
Many of those actively involved in the physical sciences adopt a reductionist point of view, in which all aspects of the world are ultimately controlled by physical laws that are expressed in terms of mathematical equations. In this article we adopt a pluralistic approach to human understanding in which mathematically expressed laws of nature are merely one way among several of describing a world that is too vast and complex for our minds to be able to grasp in its entirety.
2006-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2952/1/UnderstandingBJPS.doc
Davies, E Brian (2006) Scientific Understanding. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2982
2010-10-07T15:14:30Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D66756E6374696F6E2D74656C656F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2982/
Neo-Functional Analysis: Phylogenetical Restrictions on Causal Role Functions
Sustar, Predrag
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Explanation
Function/Teleology
The most recent resurgence of philosophical attention to the so-called ‘functional talk’ in the sciences can be summarized in terms of the following questions: (Q1) What kind of restrictions, and in particular, what kind of evolutionary restrictions as well as to what extent, are involved in functional ascriptions? (Q2) How can we account for the explanatory import of function-ascribing statements? This paper addresses these questions on the basis of a modified version of Cummins’ functional analysis. The modification in question is concerned with phylogenetical restrictions on causal role functions, and it stems from an analysis of some primary areas in molecular biology. I examine how evolutionary consideration affects the so-called “function-analytical explanatory strategy” (Cummins [1975] 1998, 2002). Finally, I argue that the neo-functional analysis here proposed accounts for a certain convergence between the main rival theories of biological function.
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2982/1/nfaPSA06.doc
Sustar, Predrag (2006) Neo-Functional Analysis: Phylogenetical Restrictions on Causal Role Functions. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2992
2010-10-07T15:14:31Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2992/
Modelling Molecules: Beyond the Epistemic-Pragmatic Dichotomy
de Regt, Henk W.
Models and Idealization
Explanation
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
I argue that scientific explanation has a pragmatic dimension that is epistemically relevant. Philosophers with an objectivist approach to scientific explanation (e.g. Hempel, Trout) hold that the pragmatic aspects of explanation do not have any epistemic import. I argue against this view by focusing on the role of models in scientific explanation. Applying recent accounts of modelling (Cartwright, Morgan and Morrison) to a case-study of nineteenth-century physics, I analyse the pragmatic dimension of the process of model construction. I highlight the crucial roles that conceptual tools, skills, and commitments play in this dimension, and show how they contribute to the epistemic aim of science.
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2992/1/PSA_2006_PhilSci_version.doc
de Regt, Henk W. (2006) Modelling Molecules: Beyond the Epistemic-Pragmatic Dichotomy. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3000
2010-10-07T15:14:31Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3000/
Visual Representations in Science
Goodwin, William Mark
Explanation
This paper evaluates a general argument for the conclusion that visual representations in science must play the role of truth bearers if they are to figure as legitimate components of scientific arguments and explanations. The argument is found to be unsound. An alternative approach to assessing the role of visual representations in science is exemplified by an examination of the role of structural formulas in organic chemistry. Structural formulas are found not to play the role of truth bearers; nonetheless, they contribute to the arguments and explanations of organic chemistry.
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3000/1/VisRepWS.doc
Goodwin, William Mark (2006) Visual Representations in Science. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3001
2010-10-07T15:14:32Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3001/
Diagrams and Explanation in Organic Chemistry
Goodwin, William Mark
Explanation
Article has now been published in Foundations of Chemistry, 10, pp. 117-127, 2008.
2006-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text/html
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3001/1/removed.html
Goodwin, William Mark (2006) Diagrams and Explanation in Organic Chemistry. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3011
2010-10-07T15:14:33Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3011/
Optimality Modeling and Explanatory Generality
Potochnik, Angela
Evolutionary Theory
Explanation
The optimality approach to modeling natural selection has been criticized by many biologists and philosophers of biology. For instance, Lewontin (1979) argues that the optimality approach is a shortcut that will be replaced by models incorporating genetic information, if and when such models become available. In contrast, I think that optimality models have a permanent role in evolutionary study. I base my argument for this claim on what I think it takes to best explain an event. In certain contexts, optimality and game-theoretic models best explain some central types of evolutionary phenomena.
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3011/1/PSA_2006%2C_revised_version.pdf
Potochnik, Angela (2006) Optimality Modeling and Explanatory Generality. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3081
2010-10-07T15:14:42Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3081/
The Epistemic Value of Explanation
Páez, Andrés
Decision Theory
Explanation
In this paper I defend the idea that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize that notion it is necessary to formulate an account of explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. Using the framework for belief revision developed by Isaac Levi, I analyze the conditions that information must fulfill to be both potentially explanatory and epistemically valuable to an inquiring agent and to a scientific community. To be potentially explanatory, the information must state the relations of probabilistic relevance that the explanans bares to the explanandum. But a potential explanation con only be a bona fide explanation if it becomes part of inquiry, that is, if an agent or a group of agents can see any value in it for their cognitive purposes. I provide a way to evaluate the epistemic value of a potential explanation as a function of its credibility and its informational content.
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3081/1/The_Epistemic_Value_of_Explanation-PSA.doc
Páez, Andrés (2006) The Epistemic Value of Explanation. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3109
2010-10-07T15:14:45Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3109/
On the True Method of Induction or Investigative Induction: Real But Invisible
Hattiangadi, Jagdish
Confirmation/Induction
Explanation
Experimentation
Scientists apply Bacon’s investigative induction by first cataloguing experimental discrepancies among apparent natures of things. Induction begins by multiplying discrepancies, thus creating a puzzle with multiple clues. Solved puzzles thus give us power to produce those unusual, discrepant effects. Bacon’s experimental method, however, is not empiricist. Grasping things empirically, like receiving impressions on a wax tablet, presupposes that our senses cannot deceive us whenever we are deceived: we err in our interpretations. Empiricism thus leaves no objective discrepancies to resolve, as deception resides in our interpretation. Scientific induction, for all its success, becomes invisible to modern empiricist methodologists
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3109/1/Ont_the_True_Method_of_Induction_%28Dec._24%29.doc
Hattiangadi, Jagdish (2006) On the True Method of Induction or Investigative Induction: Real But Invisible. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3137
2012-07-25T21:35:47Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3200
2010-10-07T15:14:56Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3200/
After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science
Chemero, Tony
Silberstein, Michael
Reductionism/Holism
Explanation
Cognitive Science
We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal--environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, inter-level mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting out the debates, we discuss the ways in which they are interconnected. Finally, we make some recommendations that we hope will help philosophers interested in the cognitive and neural sciences to avoid dead ends.
2007-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3200/1/philmindisover4.doc
Chemero, Tony and Silberstein, Michael (2007) After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3217
2010-10-07T15:14:58Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3217/
A Theory of Theories
Craig, David
Confirmation/Induction
Classical Physics
Structure of Theories
Models and Idealization
Explanation
Physics
Quantum Mechanics
On the basis of examples from mathematical physics, theoretical hypotheses are distinguished from generative theories. An example of the former is Green’s claim that light is the vibrations of a certain type of elastic solid. An example of the later is the wave theory of light. Both hypotheses and theories are characterized in terms of theoretical principles and models, but unique to a theory is a language frame for generating its many models. The aim of theory is defined in terms of both accommodating nature and unifying nature through assimilation. The structure and use of generative theories closely resembles the structure of paradigms and their use in normal science [Kuhn 1970].
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3217/1/David_Craig_LSE_Conference_Paper.pdf
Craig, David (2007) A Theory of Theories. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3305
2010-10-07T15:15:06Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3305/
Le paradoxe des deux enveloppes et le choix de l'indifférence
Franceschi, Paul
Probability/Statistics
Explanation
I present in this paper a solution to the Two-Envelope Paradox. I begin with stating the paradox and describing some related experiments. I justify then the fact that choosing either envelope is indifferent. I also point out the flaw in the reasoning inherent to the two-envelope paradox.
2007-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3305/1/env2.pdf
Franceschi, Paul (2007) Le paradoxe des deux enveloppes et le choix de l'indifférence. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3402
2010-10-07T15:15:17Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3402/
Synopsis: Causality, Mechanisms, and Psychology
Conference, Synopsis
Psychology
Causation
Explanation
Synopsis of the Workshop
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3402/1/CMP_synopsis_final.doc
Conference, Synopsis (2007) Synopsis: Causality, Mechanisms, and Psychology. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3433
2010-10-07T15:15:22Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6E6575726F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3433/
Decision-Making: A Neuroeconomic Perspective
Hardy-Vallée, Benoit
Neuroscience
Psychology
Economics
Explanation
This article introduces and discusses from a philosophical point of view the nascent field of neuroeconomics, which is the study of neural mechanisms involved in decision-making and their economic significance. Following a survey of the ways in which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology, I review many important findings in neuroeconomics to show that they suggest a revised picture of decision-making and ourselves as choosing agents. Finally, I outline a neuroeconomic account of irrationality.
2007-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3433/1/hardy2007compass_neuroeconomics.pdf
Hardy-Vallée, Benoit (2007) Decision-Making: A Neuroeconomic Perspective. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3461
2010-10-07T15:15:24Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3461/
The General Scholium: Some Notes on Newton's Published and Unpublished Endeavours
Ducheyne, Steffen
Classical Physics
History of Philosophy of Science
Causation
Theory/Observation
Explanation
Science and Religion
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Newton’s immensely famous, but tersely written, General Scholium is primarily known for its reference to the argument of design and Newton’s famous dictum “hypotheses non fingo”. In the essay at hand, I shall argue that this text served a variety of goals and try to add something new to our current knowledge of how Newton tried to accomplish them. The General Scholium highlights a cornucopia of features that were central to Newton’s natural philosophy in general: matters of experimentation, methodological issues, theological matters, matters related to the instauration of prisca sapientia, epistemological claims central to Newton’s empiricism, and, finally, metaphysical issues. For Newton these matters were closely interwoven. I shall address these matters based on a thorough study of the extant manuscript material.
2007-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3461/1/PDFGeneral_Scholium%5B1%5D.pdf
Ducheyne, Steffen (2007) The General Scholium: Some Notes on Newton's Published and Unpublished Endeavours. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3481
2010-10-08T12:52:52Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3487
2010-10-07T15:15:28Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3487/
Length Matters (I): The Einstein-Swann Correspondence and the Constructive Approach to STR
Hagar, Amit
Structure of Theories
Theory Change
Explanation
Relativity Theory
Physics
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
In this paper and its sequel I discuss a rarely mentioned correspondence between Einstein and W.F.G. Swann on the constructive approach to the special theory of relativity, in which Einstein points out that the attempts to construct a dynamical explanation of relativistic kinematical effects require postulating a minimal length scale in the level of the dynamics. I use this correspondence to shed light on several issues under dispute in current philosophy of spacetime that were highlighted recently in Harvey Brown's monograph "Physical Relativity", namely, Einstein's view on the distinction between principle and constructive theories, and the philosophical consequences of pursuing the constructive approach to the special theory of relativity.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3487/1/Swann.pdf
Hagar, Amit (2007) Length Matters (I): The Einstein-Swann Correspondence and the Constructive Approach to STR. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3498
2019-09-30T13:04:45Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3498/
Gedankenexperiment und Erklärung / Thought Experiment and Scientific Explanation
Kuehne, Ulrich J.
Thought Experiments
Theory Change
Explanation
Experimentation
This essay evaluates the epistemic potential of the scientific method of 'thought experiments', i.e. how far one can progress in science by just thinking about experimental situations without doing real empirical research. The analysis of many episodes from the history of science suggests that thought experiments play an essential role in the formation of new conceptual and normative frames during phases of revolutionary theory change. Thought experiments do not tell us, how things are, but how they might be explained, thus allowing us to reflect the intentional components within scientific theories. The author later wrote a Dr.-phil.-thesis on this subject: "Die Methode des Gedankenexperiments. Untersuchung zur Rationalität naturwissenschaftlicher Theoriereformen." (Bremen University, submitted October 5th 2001, summa cum laude) an abridged version of which has been published in the book: Ulrich Kühne, Die Methode des Gedankenexperiments. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 2005. 410 pages, ISBN: 978-3-518-29342-3.
1997
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3498/1/UKuehne_1997_BremerPhilosophica.pdf
Kuehne, Ulrich J. (1997) Gedankenexperiment und Erklärung / Thought Experiment and Scientific Explanation. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3499
2019-09-30T13:04:35Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3499/
Wie erklärt man mit unsichtbaren Händen? / How Can Invisible Hands Explain?
Kuehne, Ulrich J.
Explanation
The article presents a survey of what is meant in the social sciences by an "invisible hand explanation", dealing in special with the ideas of Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith, Carl Menger, Friedrich August von Hayek, Robert Nozick and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, and evaluates whether these explanations meet the standards of sound scientific arguments. The answer is affirmative with two different kinds of invisible hand explanations (IHE), the "causal-mechanical"-IHE and the "functional-evolutionary"-IHE.
1997
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3499/1/UKuehne_1997_Unsichtbare_Hand.pdf
Kuehne, Ulrich J. (1997) Wie erklärt man mit unsichtbaren Händen? / How Can Invisible Hands Explain? UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3525
2010-10-07T15:15:34Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3525/
Concretization, Explanation, and Mechanisms
Hindriks, Frank
Models and Idealization
Economics
Explanation
Traditional accounts of explanation fail to illuminate the explanatory relevance of “models that are descriptively false” in the sense that the regularities they entail fail to obtain. In this paper, I propose an account of explanation, which I call ‘explanation by concretization’, that serves to explicate the explanatory relevance of such models. Starting from a highly abstract and idealized model, causal explanations of the absence of regularities are sought by adding complexity to the model or by concretizing it. Whether this process is successful depends on whether the abstractions and idealizations in the basic model succeed in isolating a mechanism, i.e. in representing how it operates when interfering factors are absent. This account is developed in the context of economics and contrasted to those of Daniel Hausman and Nancy Cartwright. I go on to provide an account of how unrealistic models can be used for providing understanding of the way mechanisms work.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3525/1/Concretization_Explanation_and_Mechanisms.pdf
Hindriks, Frank (2007) Concretization, Explanation, and Mechanisms. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3560
2010-10-07T15:15:39Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3560/
Length Matters (I) - The Einstein--Swann Correspondence and the Constructive Approach to the Special Theory of Relativity
Hagar, Amit
Structure of Theories
Explanation
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper and its sequel I discuss a rarely mentioned correspondence between Einstein and W.F.G. Swann on the constructive approach to the special theory of relativity, in which Einstein points out that the attempts to construct a dynamical explanation of relativistic kinematical effects require postulating a minimal length scale in the level of the dynamics. I use this correspondence to shed light on several issues under dispute in current philosophy of spacetime that were highlighted recently in Harvey Brown's monograph "Physical Relativity", namely, Einstein's view on the distinction between principle and constructive theories, and the philosophical consequences of pursuing the constructive approach to the special theory of relativity.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3560/1/Swann_-_Take2.pdf
Hagar, Amit (2007) Length Matters (I) - The Einstein--Swann Correspondence and the Constructive Approach to the Special Theory of Relativity. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3669
2010-10-07T15:15:51Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3669/
The Explanatory Potential of Artificial Societies
Grüne-Yanoff, Till
Models and Idealization
Explanation
Complex Systems
History of Science Case Studies
It is often claimed that artificial society simulations contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. At the hand of a particular example, this paper argues that artificial societies often cannot provide full explanations, because their models are not or cannot be validated. Instead, artificial societies may sometimes provide potential explanations. It is shown that these potential explanations, if they contribute to our understanding, considerably differ from the standard kind of potential causal explanations. Instead of possible causal histories, simulations offer possible functional analyses of the explanandum. The paper discusses how these two kinds of potential explanations differ, and how possible functional analyses can be appraised.
2007-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3669/1/ACEpaper070925.pdf
Grüne-Yanoff, Till (2007) The Explanatory Potential of Artificial Societies. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3679
2010-10-07T15:15:52Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3679/
Mechanism-as-activity and the threat of polygenic effects
Persson, Johannes
Causation
Explanation
Philosophers of Science
Polygenic effects have more than one cause. They testify to the fact that several causal contributors are sometimes simultaneously involved in causation. The importance of polygenic causation was noticed early on by Mill (1893). It has since been shown to be a problem for causal-law approaches to causation and accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities. However, polygenic causation needs to be examined more thoroughly in the emerging literature on causal mechanisms. In this paper I examine whether an influential theory of mechanisms proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver can accommodate polygenic effects and other forms of causal interaction. This theory is problematic, I will argue, because it ascribes a central role to activities. In it, activities are needed not only to constitute mechanisms but also to perform the causal role of mechanisms. Any such mechanism-as-activity will be incompatible with causal situations where either no or merely another kind of activity occurs. But, as I will try to illustrate in this paper, both kinds of situation may be frequent. If I am right, the view that Machamer and colleagues suggest leads to an impoverished conception of mechanism.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3679/1/activities_submission_phil_sci_archives.pdf
Persson, Johannes (2007) Mechanism-as-activity and the threat of polygenic effects. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3681
2010-10-07T15:21:29Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3685
2010-10-07T15:15:52Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3685/
Mechanisms, Causes and the Layered Model of the World
Glennan, Stuart
Causation
Reductionism/Holism
Explanation
Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and events in virtue of nomological relations between properties of these individuals and events. Such views fail to take into account the consequences of the fact that in general the properties of individuals and events will depend upon mechanisms that realize those properties. In this paper I attempt to rectify this failure, and in so doing to provide an account of the causal relevance of higher-level properties. I do this by critiquing one prominent model of higher-level properties – Kim’s functional model of reduction – and contrasting it with a mechanistic approach to higher-level properties and causation.
2007-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3685/1/MechsCausesLMW-preprint.pdf
Glennan, Stuart (2007) Mechanisms, Causes and the Layered Model of the World. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3733
2010-10-07T15:15:59Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3733/
Is the Quantum World Composed of Propensitons?
Maxwell, Nicholas
Explanation
Realism/Anti-realism
Quantum Mechanics
In this paper I outline my propensiton version of quantum theory (PQT). PQT is a fully micro-realistic version of quantum theory that provides us with a very natural possible solution to the fundamental wave/particle problem, and is free of the severe defects of orthodox quantum theory (OQT) as a result. PQT makes sense of the quantum world. PQT recovers all the empirical success of OQT and is, furthermore, empirically testable (although not as yet tested). I argue that Einstein almost put forward this version of quantum theory in 1916/17 in his papers on spontaneous and induced radiative transitions, but retreated from doing so because he disliked the probabilistic character of the idea. Subsequently, the idea was overlooked because debates about quantum theory polarised into the Bohr/Heisenberg camp, which argued for the abandonment of realism and determinism, and the Einstein/Schrödinger camp, which argued for the retention of realism and determinism, no one, as a result, pursuing the most obvious option of retaining realism but abandoning determinism. It is this third, overlooked option that leads to PQT. PQT has implications for quantum field theory, the standard model, string theory, and cosmology. The really important point, however, is that it is experimentally testable. I indicate two experiments in principle capable of deciding between PQT and OQT
2007-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3733/1/Is_the_Quantum_World_Composed_of_Propensitons.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2007) Is the Quantum World Composed of Propensitons? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3736
2010-10-07T15:15:59Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3736/
Interpretation in the Natural Sciences
Faye, Jan
Explanation
Interpretation in science has gained little attention in the past because philosophers of science believed that interpretation belongs to the context of discovery or must be associated with meaning. But scientists often speak about interpretation when they report their findings. Elsewhere I have argue in favour of a pragmatic-rhetorical theory of explanation, and it is in light of this theory that I suggest we can understand interpretation in the natural sciences.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3736/1/Interpretation_in_the_Natural_Sciences.doc
Faye, Jan (2007) Interpretation in the Natural Sciences. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3747
2010-10-07T15:16:00Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3747/
The Pragmatic-Rhetorical Theory of Explanation
Faye, Jan
Explanation
The pragmatic theory of explanation is an attempt to see explanation as a linguistic response to a cognitive problem where the content of the response depends on the context of the scientific inquiry. The present paper draws on the rhetorical situation, as it is defined by Loyld Bitzer, in order to understand how the context may influence the content as well as the acceptability of the response.
2004-02
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3747/1/The_Pragmatic-Rhetorical_Theory_of_Explanation_%283%29.doc
Faye, Jan (2004) The Pragmatic-Rhetorical Theory of Explanation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3860
2019-05-27T10:42:57Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
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7375626A656374733D73706563:6E6575726F736369656E6365
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7375626A656374733D73706563:6D65646963696E65:70737963686961747279
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7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3860/
The Type-Token Distinction and the Mind and Brain Sciences
Griesel, Carsten
Cognitive Science
Explanation
Laws of Nature
Neuroscience
Philosophers of Science
Psychiatry
Psychology
Reductionism/Holism
This paper is an analysis of scientific types – the categories of a scientific taxonomy. I argue that the philosophical view about mental types stands in contrast to the real nature of scientific types, which is in turn responsible for the mind-body problem. Since the view on the relation between psychology and neurology was broadened to the status about special sciences in general, my argument can also be applied to the general special science discussion. My picture of types being the result of categorizing tokens with respect to their micro structure is used to show how scientific practice makes multiple realizability implausible.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3860/1/The_Type-Token_Distinction_and_the_Mind_and_Brain_Sciences.pdf
Griesel, Carsten (2008) The Type-Token Distinction and the Mind and Brain Sciences. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3878
2010-10-07T15:21:31Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3891
2010-10-07T15:16:15Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3891/
Intrinsic Explanation and Field's Dispensabilist Strategy
Marcus, Russell
Mathematics
Reductionism/Holism
Explanation
Philosophy of mathematics for the last half-century has been dominated in one way or another by Quine’s indispensability argument. The argument alleges that our best scientific theory quantifies over, and thus commits us to, mathematical objects. In this paper, I present new considerations which undermine the most serious challenge to Quine’s argument, Hartry Field’s reformulation of Newtonian Gravitational Theory.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3891/1/Field_IE_RSS.pdf
Marcus, Russell (2007) Intrinsic Explanation and Field's Dispensabilist Strategy. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3921
2010-10-07T15:21:33Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3933
2010-10-08T12:53:47Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3934
2010-10-07T15:16:22Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D646576656C6F706D656E74616C
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D70737963686F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3934/
Innateness and Science
Northcott, Robert
Evolutionary Theory
Psychology
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Biology
Causation
Explanation
Cognitive Science
Developmental Biology
Evolutionary Psychology
Although a huge range of definitions has accumulated in the philosophy, biology and psychology literatures, no consensus has been reached on exactly what innateness amounts to. This has helped fuel an increasing skepticism, one that views the concept as anachronistic and actually harmful to science. Yet it remains central to many life sciences, and to several public policy issues too. So it is correspondingly urgent that its philosophical underpinnings be properly cleaned up. In this paper, I present a new approach that endorses a role in science for innateness while also accommodating many of the skeptical concerns. The key to squaring the circle is to import influential recent work on causal explanation. My thesis is that ascriptions of innateness are best seen as explanatory claims. The account that results has three main original features: 1) Innateness is a pragmatic, relational concept. Every trait may be either innate or non-innate, depending on explanatory context. 2) There is an important distinction between innate traits and innate dispositions. 3) Innateness is useful to science as a higher-level predicate that licenses interventions. It is thereby also clarified what ascriptions of innateness do not tell us.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3934/1/cmijl.doc
Northcott, Robert (2008) Innateness and Science. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3970
2010-10-07T15:16:27Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368656D6973747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3970/
Visual Representations in Science
Goodwin, William
Explanation
Chemistry
History of Science Case Studies
This paper evaluates a general argument for the conclusion that visual representations in science must play the role of truth bearers if they are to figure as legitimate contributors to scientific arguments and explanations. The argument is found to be unsound. An alternative approach to assessing the role of visual representations in science is exemplified by an examination of the role of structural formulas in organic chemistry. Structural formulas are found not to play the role of truth bearers; nonetheless, they contribute to the arguments and explanations of organic chemistry. An early success of conformational analysis is presented in order to illustrate the role of structural formulas in the discourse of organic chemistry.
2008-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3970/1/2ndSubVisRep.doc
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3970/2/Caffeine.pdf
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3970/3/ChairCyclohexane.pdf
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3970/4/1%2C3cyclo.pdf
Goodwin, William (2008) Visual Representations in Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4021
2010-10-07T15:16:35Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4021/
MICRO-FOUNDATIONS IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: SQUARING COLEMAN’S DIAGRAM
Vromen, Jack, J.
Economics
Explanation
In a series of joint papers, Teppo Felin and Nicolai J. Foss recently launched a microfoundations project in the field of strategic management. Felin and Foss observe that extant explanations in strategic management are predominantly collectivist or macro. Routines and organizational capabilities, which are supposed to be properties of firms, loom large in the field of strategic management. Routines figure as explanantia in explanations of firm behavior and firm performance, for example. Felin and Foss plead for a replacement of such macro-explanations by micro-explanations (viz. explanations in terms of individual action and interaction). Such a replacement is needed, Felin and Foss argue, because macro-explanations are necessarily incomplete: they miss out on crucial links in the causal chain that connect macro phenomena with each other. I argue that this argument is flawed. It is based on a doubtful if not outright incorrect understanding and use of Coleman’s diagram. In a sense to be explained below, only if Coleman’s diagram is squared it can accurately account for the relations between individual action and interaction, routines and firm behavior and firm performance. Once Coleman’s diagram is squared, one can see why and how macro-explanations need not miss out on any link in the causal chains that connect macro phenomena. Micro-analyses are still needed, not to highlight and specify causal links that macro-explanations miss out on, but to check whether the many properties that are ascribed to routines in macro-explanations of firm behavior are warranted.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4021/1/Jack_J._Vromen_-_Micro-foundations_in_strategic_management.doc
Vromen, Jack, J. (2008) MICRO-FOUNDATIONS IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: SQUARING COLEMAN’S DIAGRAM. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4051
2010-10-07T15:16:39Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:6E6575726F736369656E6365
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7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D646576656C6F706D656E74616C
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4051/
Difference Mechanisms
Tabery, James
Probability/Statistics
Neuroscience
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Biology
Causation
Explanation
Developmental Biology
In recent years, philosophers of science have found a renewed interest in mechanisms. The motivation is the thought that the elucidation of a mechanism generates a causal explanation for the phenomenon under investigation. For example, a question such as, How do rats form spatial memories of their environments?, is answered by elucidating the regular causal mechanisms responsible for the individual development of spatial memory in rats. But consider a slightly different question: How do some rats come to have better spatial memory than other rats? This is a question about the causes of variation responsible for variation in spatial memory. The first question demands an answer about regularity; the second question demands an answer about variation. The account of causal-mechanical explanation on offer by philosophers of science captures regularity, but it neglects variation. In this essay, I attempt to modify the mechanical program so as to incorporate both regularity and variation. The task is to explicate the relationship between the regular causal mechanisms responsible for individual development and the causes of variation responsible for variation in populations. As it turns out, this is precisely the relationship that has divided the biometric research tradition and the developmental research tradition in the long-standing debates over genotype-environment interaction, or G×E. Ultimately, the product will be an account of causal-mechanical explanation that captures both regularity and variation, and which may be utilized to resolve an aspect of the debates over G×E.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4051/1/Difference.Mechanisms.Tabery.May2008.doc
Tabery, James (2008) Difference Mechanisms. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4053
2010-10-07T15:16:39Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:726865746F7269632D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D70737963686F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4053/
Definitional Argument in Evolutionary Psychology and Cultural Anthropology
Jackson, John
Science and Society
Biology
Explanation
Rhetoric of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Evolutionary Psychology
Anthropology
An old aphorism claims that “The person who defines the terms of the debate can win it.” This paper argues that the debate between evolutionary psychologists and cultural anthropologists over the biological explanation of human behavior is framed by a larger definitional dispute over the question, “What is culture?” Both disciplines attempt to define “culture” to build their disciplines, but were engaged in different kinds of arguments by definition. Definitional arguments often take one of two forms. A real definition takes the form “What is X?” In this view, we should use the word “X” in a particular way because that is what X really is. The other form of definitional argument, pragmatic definition, takes the form, “How should we use the term X?” In this view, an arguer puts for reasons for using the term “X” in a particular way. Evolutionary psychologists are engaged in argument by real definition. In their “manifesto” for evolutionary psychology, Tooby and Cosmides argue that the explanations of social or cultural behavior in the social sciences are “incoherent” because they attempt to explain such behavior “psychological phenomena without describing or even mentioning the evolved mechanisms their theories would require to be complete or coherent” (p.37). Because humans are biological creatures, cultural explanations must include biology because culture really is biological. Hence, biology is a necessary part of explanations of human culture. Cultural anthropologists engaged in argument by persuasive definition. A close examination of Kroeber’s writings reveals, however, that he readily acknowledged that humans were biological and culture rested on a biological foundation. He argued that we should treat culture as autonomous in our explanatory schemes because that would bring benefits to the biological sciences as well as the human sciences. In his writings, Kroeber reveals himself as a staunch Darwinian who argues for the autonomy of cultural anthropology on pragmatic, not on ontological grounds. Hence, the historical caricature of his work by evolutionary psychology fails.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4053/1/final_jackson_definition.pdf
Jackson, John (2008) Definitional Argument in Evolutionary Psychology and Cultural Anthropology. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4059
2010-10-07T15:16:41Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4059/
Re-conceiving nonhuman animal knowledge through contemporary primate cognitive studies
Fenton, Andrew
Explanation
Abstract In this paper I examine two claims that support the thesis that chimpanzees are substantive epistemic subjects. First, I defend the claim that chimpanzees are evidence gatherers (broadly construed to include the capacity to gather and use evidence). In the course of showing that this claim is probably true I will also show that, in being evidence gatherers, chimpanzees engage in a recognizable epistemic activity. Second, I defend the claim that chimpanzees achieve a degree of epistemic success while engaging in epistemic activity. Typically humans qualify as substantive epistemic subjects. Again, typically, knowledge plays an integral role in intentional human behaviour. As a consequence of defending the claims that chimpanzees are evidence gatherers and achieve a degree of epistemic success while engaging in such epistemic activities, I will also have shown how knowledge plays an integral role in intentional chimpanzee behaviour. The importance of these arguments does not wholly reside in the significance of knowledge explaining some chimpanzee behaviour. Treatments of animal knowledge in the literature tend to go in one of two directions: either the treatment embraces reliabilism and so construes animal knowledge as reliably produced true beliefs (or, if not beliefs, the relevant analogue for non-linguistic animals), or it embraces an anthropocentric stance that treats animals as knowers only when they find themselves behaving in circumstances that, were it true of humans, would imply the presence of causally efficacious knowledge. What I offer here is another way of understanding non-linguistic animals, in this case chimpanzees, as knowers.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4059/1/fenton_beb_final.pdf
Fenton, Andrew (2008) Re-conceiving nonhuman animal knowledge through contemporary primate cognitive studies. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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