2024-03-28T17:37:54Z
http:///cgi/oai2
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:102
2010-10-07T15:20:11Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:156
2010-10-07T15:10:06Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/156/
P's in a Pod: some recipes for cooking Mendel's data
Seidenfeld, Teddy
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Confirmation/Induction
History of Science Case Studies
In 1936 R.A.Fisher asked the pointed question, "Has Mendel's Work Been Rediscovered?" The query was intended to open for discussion whether someone altered the data in Gregor Mendel's classic 1866 research report on the garden pea, "Experiments in Plant-Hybridization." Fisher concluded, reluctantly, that the statistical counts in Mendel's paper were doctored in order to create a better intuitive fit between Mendelian expected values and observed frequencies. That verdict remains the received view among statisticians, so I believe. Fisher's analysis is a tour de force of so-called "Goodness of Fit" statistical tests using c2 to calculate significance levels, i.e., P-values. In this presentation I attempt a defense of Mendel's report, based on several themes. (1) Mendel's experiments include some important sequential design features that Fisher ignores. (2) Fisher uses particular statistical techniques of Meta-analysis for pooling outcomes from different experiments. These methods are subject to critical debate. and (3) I speculate on a small modification to Mendelian theory that offers some relief from Fisher's harsh conclusion that Mendel's data are too good to be true
1998
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/postscript
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/156/1/tr675.ps
Seidenfeld, Teddy (1998) P's in a Pod: some recipes for cooking Mendel's data. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:181
2010-10-07T15:20:14Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:211
2010-10-07T15:10:11Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/211/
'Two as Good as One Hundred'--Poorly Replicated Evidence is Some 19th Century Neuroscientific Research
Bogen, Jim
Confirmation/Induction
History of Science Case Studies
Psychology
Theory/Observation
According to a received doctrine, espoused, by Karl Popper and Harry Collins, and taken for granted by many others, poorly replicated evidence should be epistemically defective and incapable of persuading scientists to accept the views it is used to argue for. But John Hughlings Jackson used poorly replicated clinical and post-mortem evidence to mount rationally compelling and influential arguments for a highly progressive theory of the organization of the brain and its functions. This paper sets out a number of Jackson's arguments from his evidence and argues that they constitute a counter example against the received doctrine.
2000
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
rtf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/211/1/Two_as_Good_as_a_Hundred_rtf.rtf
Bogen, Jim (2000) 'Two as Good as One Hundred'--Poorly Replicated Evidence is Some 19th Century Neuroscientific Research. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:218
2010-10-07T15:10:12Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/218/
The origins of length contraction: I. The FitzGerald-Lorentz deformation
Brown, Harvey R
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
One of the widespread confusions concerning the history of the 1887 Michelson-Morley experiment has to do with the initial explanation of this celebrated null result due independently to FitzGerald and Lorentz. In neither case was a strict, longitudinal length contraction hypothesis invoked, as is commonly supposed. Lorentz postulated, particularly in 1895, any one of a certain family of possible deformation effects for rigid bodies in motion, including purely transverse alteration, and expansion as well as contraction; FitzGerald may well have had the same family in mind. A careful analysis of the Michelson-Morley experiment (which reveals a number of serious inadequacies in many text-book treatments) indeed shows that strict contraction is not required
2001-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/218/1/Origins_of_contraction.pdf
Brown, Harvey R (2001) The origins of length contraction: I. The FitzGerald-Lorentz deformation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:267
2010-10-07T15:10:16Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/267/
Why Did We Think We Dreamed in Black and White?
Schwitzgebel, Eric
History of Science Case Studies
Psychology
In the 1950's, dream researchers commonly thought that dreams were predominantly a black-and-white phenomenon, although both earlier and later treatments of dreaming presume or assert that dreams have color. The first half of the twentieth century saw the rise of black-and-white film media, and it is likely that the emergence of the view that dreams are black-and-white was connected with this change in media technology. If our opinions about basic features of our dreams can change with changes in technology, it seems to follow that our knowledge of the phenomenology of our own dreams is much less secure than we might at first have thought it to be.
2001-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/267/1/dreamb%26w010430.pdf
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2001) Why Did We Think We Dreamed in Black and White? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:288
2015-09-13T14:55:31Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/288/
The Most Measured Understanding of Spacetime
Catton, Philip
Classical Physics
Confirmation/Induction
Conventionalism
Experimentation
Explanation
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Physics
Realism/Anti-realism
Relativity Theory
Newton and Einstein each in his way showed us the following: an epistemologically responsible physicist adopts the most measured understanding possible of spacetime structure. The proper way to infer a doctrine of spacetime is by a kind of measuring inference -- a deduction from phenomena. Thus it was (I argue) by an out-and-out deduction from the phenomena of inertiality (as colligated by the three laws of motion) that Newton delineated the conceptual presuppositions concerning spacetime structure that are needed before we can actually think coherently about these phenomena. And Einstein (I argue) very much recapitulated this argument pattern, twice over in fact, recolligating the phenomena first so as to add something from the laws of electromagnetism, and then so as to add everything about gravitation, into what he understood by inertiality. Notably, to deduce one's theoretical conclusions from phenomena is both more cautious and more cogent than to "infer to the best explanation". And in the context of the development of a doctrine of spacetime, deductions from phenomena lay before us formal rather than causal understanding. Deductions from phenomena tell us, in this context, not what things or what causes there are, but rather what our concepts should be like. The more measured the inference is, however, the more definitively it tells us this. For these reasons the most measured understanding of spacetime lies on a line between conventionalism and realism, between relationalism and absolutism, and indeed (as I demonstrate) between empiricism and rationalism. Spacetime is understood as neither merely immanent in material goings-on, nor truly transcendent of them either. In order to explain this understanding as adequately as I can and in order to remark its excellences most fully, I consider some respects in which the tertium quid between metaphysical realism and strict empiricism about spacetime is wise in the sense of practical wisdom. The wisest understanding of spacetime illustrates, I argue, an original and fundamental connection that epistemology has with ethics.
2001-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/288/1/6MSTMEAS.DOC
Catton, Philip (2001) The Most Measured Understanding of Spacetime. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:480
2010-10-07T15:10:34Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/480/
Relativistic Thermodynamics and the Classical Model of the Electron
Lavenda, B.H.
History of Science Case Studies
Laws of Nature
Einstein's famous relation between mass and energy is interpreted in terms of the equivalence of the rate of heating of a body and the rate of increase of its inertial mass. In an adiabatic process, where the proper mass remains constant, it is the heat content, and not the energy, which is conserved because the pressure, and not the volume, is Lorentz-invariant. There are two categories of relativistic quantities: inertial and thermodynamic ones, which are transformed into one another by the work necessary to keep the inertial state in motion. In a non-adiabatic process, the rate of heating is Lorentz-invariant, which must always be greater than the power that it generates.
2001-11
Other
NonPeerReviewed
tex-latex
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/480/1/Rel-Thermo-Electron-Model
Lavenda, B.H. (2001) Relativistic Thermodynamics and the Classical Model of the Electron. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:553
2010-10-07T15:10:41Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/553/
A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding
De Regt, Henk
Dieks, Dennis
Causation
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
Achieving understanding of nature is a central aim of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding, which accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories, that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. As a preparation for our analysis we criticise standard views of scientific understanding, in particular causal-mechanical and unificationist conceptions.
2002-01
Other
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/553/1/DeRegt-Dieks.doc
De Regt, Henk and Dieks, Dennis (2002) A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:606
2010-10-07T15:10:47Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/606/
The Language of Classical Physics
MacKinnon, Edward
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
ABSTRACT. The objectivity of physics has been called into question by social theorists, Kuhnian relativists, and by anomalous aspects of quantum mechanics. Here we focus on one neglected background issue, the categorical structure of the language of classical physics. The first half is an historical overview of the formation of the language of classical physics (LCP), beginning with Aristotle's Categories and the novel idea of the quantity of a quality introduced by medieval Aristotelians. Descartes and Newton at-tempted to put the new mechanics on an ontological foundation of atomism. Euler was the pivotal figure in basing mechanics on a macroscopic concept of matter. The second scientific revolution, led by Laplace, took mechanics as foundational and attempted to fit the Baconian sciences into a framework of atomistic mechanism. This protracted effort had the unintended effect of supplying an informal unification of physics in a mixture of ordinary language and mechanistic terms. The second half treats LCP as a linguistic para-site that can attach itself to any language and effect mutations in the host without chang-ing its essential form. This puts LCP in the context of a language of discourse and sug-gests that philosophers should concentrate more on the dialog between experimenters and theoreticians and less on analyses of theories. This orientation supplies a basis for treating objectivity.
2002-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/606/1/LCP2.doc
MacKinnon, Edward (2002) The Language of Classical Physics. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:625
2010-10-07T15:10:49Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/625/
Experiments and Thought Experiments in Natural Science
Atkinson, David
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
My theme is thought experiment in natural science, and its relation to real experiment. I shall defend the thesis that thought experiments that do not lead to theorizing and to a real experiment are generally of much less value that those that do so. To illustrate this thesis I refer to three examples, from three very different periods, and with three very different kinds of status. The first is the classic thought experiment in which Galileo imagined that he had, by pure thought, demolished Aristoteles' dogma that heavier bodies fall more quickly than light ones. I will show that he was mistaken. The second is the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper purporting to show that quantum mechanics must be incomplete in its domain of application. This thought experiment is a very good one, not because its conclusions are correct, but precisely because it was fruitful, leading to theory and, above all, to a real experiment. Finally I discuss the modern string theory of everything, which, while it is regarded as a physical theory by its instigators, shares some properties of the least successful sort of thought experiment.
2001-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
rtf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/625/1/Thought.rtf
Atkinson, David (2001) Experiments and Thought Experiments in Natural Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:880
2015-09-13T15:23:26Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/880/
Idealization and formalism in Bohr's approach to quantum theory
Tanona, Scott
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
Bohr held that quantum mechanical symbols find meaning only in the context of an experimental setting. Making a measurement requires establishing a correspondence between a property of the quantum object and a property of the measuring system via the introduction of a classical quantity with which the measuring instrument, classically understood, interacts. However, this correspondence is only approximate and involves the use of certain idealizations, and it is the commutation rules that tell us the limitations to this process. In this context I examine the caution by Daumer, et. al. (1996) against taking too seriously the idea of operators as observables. I conclude that Bohr would neither ascribe to such naive realism about operators nor dismiss the formalism as unimportant to the understanding of quantum phenomena, although he would agree with the caution that the properties we can attribute to a system depend on the context of the experiment.
2002-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/880/1/psa-paper.pdf
Tanona, Scott (2002) Idealization and formalism in Bohr's approach to quantum theory. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:940
2010-10-07T15:11:19Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/940/
The Hidden Side of Wolfgang Pauli
Atmanspacher, Harald
Primas, Hans
History of Science Case Studies
Psychology
Wolfgang Pauli is well recognized as an outstanding theoretical physicist, famous for his formulation of the two-valuedness of the electron spin, for the exclusion principle, and for his prediction of the neutrino. Less well known is the fact that Pauli spent a lot of time in different avenues of human experience and scholarship, ranging over fields such as the history of ideas, philosophy, religion, alchemy, and Jung's psychology. Pauli's philosophical and particularly his psychological background is not overt in his scientific papers and was unknown even to many specialist scholars until a number of enthralling and perplexing documents of a close interaction between Wolfgang Pauli and the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung became publicly available in recent years. Both scholars stressed the inseparability of the physical and the psychical and called upon a sense of more openness toward the unconscious. Decades after his death, Pauli's innovative perspective and his vision of a wholeness of psyche and matter are more than ever before of great relevance.
1995-02
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/940/1/HiddenPauli.pdf
Atmanspacher, Harald and Primas, Hans (1995) The Hidden Side of Wolfgang Pauli. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1158
2010-10-07T17:09:59Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1158/
The Roles of One Thought Experiment in Interpreting Quantum Mechanics. Werner Heisenberg meets Thomas Kuhn.
Van Dyck, Maarten
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
Recent years saw the rise of an interest in the roles and significance of thought experiments in different areas of human thinking. Heisenberg's gamma ray microscope is no doubt one of the most famous examples of a thought experiment in physics. Nevertheless, this particular thought experiment has not received much detailed attention in the philosophical literature on thought experiments up to date, maybe because of its often claimed inadequacies. In this paper, I try to do two things: to provide an interesting interpretation of the roles played by Heisenberg's gamma ray microscope in interpreting quantum mechanics - partly based on Thomas Kuhn's views on the function of thought experiments - and to contribute to the ongoing discussions on the roles and significance of thought experiments in physics.
2003-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1158/1/heis.pdf
Van Dyck, Maarten (2003) The Roles of One Thought Experiment in Interpreting Quantum Mechanics. Werner Heisenberg meets Thomas Kuhn. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1259
2010-10-07T15:11:55Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1259/
Mach's contribution to the origin of Inertia
Gasco, Enrico
History of Science Case Studies
Mach's contribution to the origin of Inertia
2003-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1259/1/MachContributionToInertia.pdf
Gasco, Enrico (2003) Mach's contribution to the origin of Inertia. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1320
2010-10-07T15:11:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1320/
Lorentz's theory and special relativity are completely identical
Szabó, László E.
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Withdrawn by the author! The main content of this paper has been moved into "Szabó, László E., Does special relativity theory tell us anything new about space and time? (ID Code:1321)"
2003-08
Other
NonPeerReviewed
Szabó, László E. (2003) Lorentz's theory and special relativity are completely identical. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1321
2013-07-22T08:30:39Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1321/
Does special relativity theory tell us anything new about space and time?
Szabó, László E.
Theory Change
Theory/Observation
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
It will be shown that, in comparison with the pre-relativistic Galileo-invariant conceptions, special relativity tells us nothing new about the geometry of spacetime. It simply calls something else "spacetime", and this something else has different properties. All statements of special relativity about those features of reality that correspond to the original meaning of the terms "space" and "time" are identical with the corresponding traditional pre-relativistic statements. It will be also argued that special relativity and Lorentz theory are completely identical in both senses, as theories about spacetime and as theories about the behavior of moving physical objects.
2003-08
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1321/1/lesz_does_v2.pdf
Szabó, László E. (2003) Does special relativity theory tell us anything new about space and time? UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1354
2010-10-07T15:12:00Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1354/
A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding
de Regt, Henk
Dieks, Dennis
Classical Physics
Causation
Cosmology
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
Realism/Anti-realism
Reductionism/Holism
Relativity Theory
Quantum Mechanics
Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. Our analysis provides a general account of how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types. In this way, it reconciles seemingly conflicting views of explanatory understanding, such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions.
2003-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1354/1/Synthese-revision.doc
de Regt, Henk and Dieks, Dennis (2003) A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1378
2010-10-07T15:12:03Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1378/
The "Evolutionary Synthesis" of George Udny Yule
Tabery, James
Evolutionary Theory
Reductionism/Holism
History of Science Case Studies
This article discusses the work of George Udny Yule in relation to the evolutionary synthesis and the biometric-Mendelian debate. It has generally been claimed that (i.) in 1902, Yule put forth the first account showing that the competing biometric and Mendelian programs could be synthesized. Furthermore, (ii.) the scientific figures who should have been most interested in this thesis (the biometricians W. F. Raphael Weldon and Karl Pearson, and the Mendelian William Bateson) were too blinded by personal animosity towards each other to appreciate Yule’s proposal. This essay provides a detailed account of (i.), maintaining that Yule’s 1902 proposal is better understood as a reduction, not a synthesis of the two programs. The results of this analysis are then used to evaluate (ii.), where I will instead argue that Bateson and the biometricians had good reasons to avoid endorsing Yule’s account.
2003-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1378/1/Yule%27s__Synthesis_JHB.doc
Tabery, James (2003) The "Evolutionary Synthesis" of George Udny Yule. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1474
2010-10-07T15:20:54Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1739
2010-10-07T15:12:28Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1739/
Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy
P.D., Magnus
Craig, Callender
Confirmation/Induction
History of Science Case Studies
Realism/Anti-realism
The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy, one much discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we consider this accusation and use it as an explanation for why the two most prominent 'wholesale' arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists and anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then formulate a dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential objections to our criticisms, discuss what remains (if anything) of these two major arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of science freed from these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at an answer of how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling of ennui afflicting contemporary philosophy of science.
2004-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1739/1/realistennui.pdf
P.D., Magnus and Craig, Callender (2004) Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1743
2010-10-07T15:12:29Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1743/
Einstein’s Investigations of Galilean Covariant Electrodynamics prior to 1905
Norton, John D.
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
Einstein learned from the magnet and conductor thought experiments how to use field transformation laws to extend the covariance to Maxwell’s electrodynamics. If he persisted in his use of this device, he would have found that the theory cleaves into two Galilean covariant parts, each with different field transformation laws. The tension between the two parts reflects a failure not mentioned by Einstein: that the relativity of motion manifested by observables in the magnet and conductor thought experiment does not extend to all observables in electrodynamics. An examination of Ritz’s work shows that Einstein’s early view could not have coincided with Ritz’s on an emission theory of light, but only with that of a conveniently reconstructed Ritz. One Ritz-like emission theory, attributed by Pauli to Ritz, proves to be a natural extension of the Galilean covariant part of Maxwell’s theory that happens also to accommodate the magnet and conductor thought experiment. Einstein's famous chasing a light beam thought experiment fails as an objection to an ether-based, electrodynamical theory of light. However it would allow Einstein to formulate his general objections to all emission theories of light in a very sharp form. Einstein found two well known experimental results of 18th and19th century optics compelling (Fizeau’s experiment, stellar aberration), while the accomplished Michelson-Morley experiment played no memorable role. I suggest they owe their importance to their providing a direct experimental grounding for Lorentz’ local time, the precursor of Einstein’s relativity of simultaneity, and do it essentially independently of electrodynamical theory. I attribute Einstein’s success to his determination to implement a principle of relativity in electrodynamics, but I urge that we not invest this stubbornness with any mystical prescience.
2004-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1743/1/Norton.doc
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1743/2/Norton.pdf
Norton, John D. (2004) Einstein’s Investigations of Galilean Covariant Electrodynamics prior to 1905. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1784
2010-10-07T15:12:34Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1784/
Newton's Idea and Practice of Unification
Ducheyne, Steffen
Classical Physics
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper I try to capture Newton's notion and practice of unification (I will mainly focus on the Principia). I will use contemporary theories on unification in philosophy of science as analytic tools (Kitcher, Schurz and Salmon). I will argue that Salmon's later work on the topic provides a good starting point to characterize Newton's notion and practice. However, in order to fully grasp Newton's idea and practice of unification, Salmon's model needs to be fleshed out and extended.
2004-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1784/1/Unification.pdf
Ducheyne, Steffen (2004) Newton's Idea and Practice of Unification. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1795
2010-10-07T15:20:58Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1796
2010-10-07T15:20:59Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1949
2010-10-07T15:12:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1949/
Structural Distinctions. Entities, structures and changes in science.
Cei, Angelo
Structure of Theories
History of Science Case Studies
Realism/Anti-realism
Abstract. I argue that pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) seems to point an ontological priority of the relations over the objects of the scientific theories of the kind suggested by French and Ladyman (French and Ladyman 2003). My strategy will involve a critical examination of epistemic structural realism (ESR) and historical case-study: the prediction of Zeeman’s effect in Lorentz’s theory of electron.
2004
Conference or Workshop Item
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1949/1/Structural_distinctions.pdf
Cei, Angelo (2004) Structural Distinctions. Entities, structures and changes in science. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1961
2010-10-07T15:12:52Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1961/
The Paradox of Conceptual Novelty and Galileo’s Use of Experiments
Van Dyck, Maarten
History of Philosophy of Science
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Starting with a discussion of what I call Koyré’s paradox of conceptual novelty, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileo’s work. I then argue that although the view of Damerow et al. on the nature of Galileo’s conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo’s use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileo’s pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way Galileo’s experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.
2004
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1961/1/Galileo-paradox.doc
Van Dyck, Maarten (2004) The Paradox of Conceptual Novelty and Galileo’s Use of Experiments. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2149
2010-10-07T15:13:08Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2149/
How Hume and Mach Helped Einstein Find Special Relativity
Norton, John D.
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
Conventionalism
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
In recounting his discovery of special relativity, Einstein recalled a debt to the philosophical writings of Hume and Mach. I review the path Einstein took to special relativity and urge that, at a critical juncture, he was aided decisively not by any specific doctrine of space and time, but by a general account of concepts that Einstein found in Hume and Mach’s writings. That account required that concepts, used to represent the physical, must be properly grounded in experience. In so far as they extended beyond that grounding, they were fictional and to be abjured (Mach) or at best tolerated (Hume). Einstein drew a different moral. These fictional concepts revealed an arbitrariness in our physical theorizing and may still be introduced through freely chosen definitions, as long as these definitions do not commit us to false presumptions. After years of failed efforts to conform electrodynamics to the principle of relativity and with his frustration mounting, Einstein applied this account to the concept of simultaneity. The resulting definition of simultaneity provided the reconceptualization that solved the problem in electrodynamics and led directly to the special theory of relativity.
2004-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2149/1/Norton.pdf
Norton, John D. (2004) How Hume and Mach Helped Einstein Find Special Relativity. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2155
2010-10-07T15:13:09Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2155/
Mathematical Models in Newton’s Principia: A New View of the “Newtonian Style”
Ducheyne, Steffen
Classical Physics
Structure of Theories
Models and Idealization
History of Philosophy of Science
Laws of Nature
Theory/Observation
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
In this essay I argue against Bernard I. Cohen’s influential account of Newton’s methodology in the Principia: the “Newtonian Style”. The crux of Cohen’s account is the successive adaptation of “mental constructs” through comparisons with nature. In Cohen’s view there is a direct dynamics between the mental constructs and physical systems. I argue that his account is essentially hypothetical-deductive which is at odds with Newton’s rejection of the hypothetical-deductive method. An adequate account of Newton’s methodology needs to show how Newton’s method proceeds different from the hypotheticaldeductive method. In the constructive part I argue for my own account which is model-based: it focuses on how Newton constructed his models in Book I of the Principia. I will show that Newton understood Book I as an exercise in determining the mathematical consequences of certain force functions. The growing complexity of Newton’s models is a result of exploring increasingly complex force functions (intra-theoretical dynamics) rather than a successive comparison with nature (extra-theoretical dynamics). Nature did not enter the scene here. This intra-theoretical dynamics is related to the “autonomy of the models”.
2005-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2155/1/Method.pdf
Ducheyne, Steffen (2005) Mathematical Models in Newton’s Principia: A New View of the “Newtonian Style”. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2182
2010-10-07T15:13:11Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2182/
Causally Productive Activities
Bogen, Jim
Causation
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
This paper suggests and discusses an answer to the question what distinguishes causal from non-causal or coincidental co-occurrences based on Elizabeth Anscombe’s idea that causality is a highly abstract concept whose meaning derives from our understanding of specific causally productive activities (e.g., pulling, scraping, burning), and her rejection of the assumption that causality can be informatively understood in terms of general regularities of some sort.
2006-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2182/1/causally_prod_12-30-06.doc
Bogen, Jim (2006) Causally Productive Activities. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2183
2010-10-07T15:13:11Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2183/
Galileo's First Science: The Science of Matter
Biener, Zvi
History of Science Case Studies
Although Galileo’s struggle to mathematize the study of nature is well known and oft discussed, less discussed is the form this struggle takes in relation to Galileo’s first new science, the science of the second day of the Discorsi. This essay argues that Galileo’s first science ought to be understood as the science of matter—-not, as it is usually understood, the science of the strength of materials. This understanding sheds light on the convoluted structure of the Discorsi’s first day. It suggests that the day’s meandering discussions of the continuum, infinity, the vacuum, and condensation and rarefaction establish that a formal treatment of the “eternal and necessary” properties of matter is possible; i.e., that matter as such can be considered mathematically. This would have been a necessary, and indeed revolutionary, preliminary to the mathematical science of the second day because matter itself was thought in the Aristotelian tradition to be responsible for the departure of natural bodies from the unchanging and thus mathematizable character of abstract objects. In addition, the first day establishes that when considered physically, these properties account for matter’s force of cohesion and resistance to fracture. This essay closes by showing that this dual style of reasoning accords with the conceptual structure of mixed mathematics.
2004-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text/html
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2183/1/Biener%2C_Zvi_%282004%29.html
Biener, Zvi (2004) Galileo's First Science: The Science of Matter. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2397
2010-10-07T15:13:31Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2397/
Integrating research and development: the emergence of rational drug design in the pharmaceutical industry
Adam, Matthias
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Rational drug design is a method for developing new pharmaceuticals that typically involves the elucidation of fundamental physiological mechanisms. It thus combines the quest for a scientific understanding of natural phenomena with the design of useful technology and hence integrates epistemic and practical aims of research and development. Case studies of the rational design of the cardiovascular drugs propranolol, captopril and losartan provide insights into characteristics and conditions of this integration. Rational drug design became possible in the 1950s when theoretical knowledge of drug-target interaction and experimental drug testing could interlock in cycles of mutual advancement. The integration does not, however, diminish the importance of basic research for pharmaceutical development. Rather, it can be shown that still in the 1990s, linear processes of innovation and the close combination of practical and epistemic work were interdependent.
2005-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2397/1/Adam_rational_drug_design.pdf
Adam, Matthias (2005) Integrating research and development: the emergence of rational drug design in the pharmaceutical industry. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2477
2010-10-07T15:13:40Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2477/
Atoms, Entropy, Quanta: Einstein’s Miraculous Argument of 1905
Norton, John D.
History of Science Case Studies
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Quantum Mechanics
In the sixth section of his light quantum paper of 1905, Einstein presented the miraculous argument, as I shall call it. Pointing out an analogy with ideal gases and dilute solutions, he showed that the macroscopic, thermodynamic properties of high frequency heat radiation carry a distinctive signature of finitely many, spatially localized, independent components and so inferred that it consists of quanta. I describe how Einstein’s other statistical papers of 1905 had already developed and exploited the idea that the ideal gas law is another macroscopic signature of finitely many, spatially localized, independent components and that these papers in turn drew on his first two, “worthless” papers of 1901 and 1902 on intermolecular forces. However, while the ideal gas law was a secure signature of independence, it was harder to use as an indicator that there are finitely many components and that they are spatially localized. Further, since his analysis of the ideal gas law depended on the assumption that the number of components was fixed, its use was precluded for heat radiation, whose component quanta vary in number in most processes. So Einstein needed and found another, more powerful signature of discreteness applicable to heat radiation and which indicated all these properties. It used one of the few processes, volume fluctuation, in which heat radiation does not alter the number of quanta.
2005-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2477/1/Norton.pdf
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2477/2/Norton.doc
Norton, John D. (2005) Atoms, Entropy, Quanta: Einstein’s Miraculous Argument of 1905. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2579
2010-10-07T15:13:49Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2579/
Lessons From Galileo: The Pragmatic Model of Shared Characteristics of Scientific Representation
Ducheyne, Steffen
Classical Physics
Structure of Theories
Models and Idealization
History of Philosophy of Science
Laws of Nature
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper I will defend a new account of scientific representation. I will begin by looking at the benefits and drawbacks of two recent accounts on scientific representation: Hughes’ DDI account and Suárez’ inferential account. Next I use some of Galileo’s models in the Discorsi as a heuristic tool for a better account of scientific representation. Next I will present my model. The main idea of my account, which I refer to as the pragmatic model of shared characteristics (PMSC), is that a model represents, if and only if, (1) a person accepts that there is a set of shared characteristics between the model and its target; (2) this set has the inferential power to generate results which can be tested empirically; (3) and the corresponding test(s) of these results is/are in agreement with our data and the specific cognitive goals we have in mind.
2006-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2579/1/Galileo_Representation_PN.doc
Ducheyne, Steffen (2006) Lessons From Galileo: The Pragmatic Model of Shared Characteristics of Scientific Representation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2580
2010-10-07T15:13:50Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2580/
Galileo’s Interventionist Notion of “Cause”
Ducheyne, Steffen
Causation
History of Science Case Studies
In this essay, I shall take up the theme of Galileo’s notion of cause, which has already received considerable attention. I shall argue that the participants in the debate as it stands have overlooked a striking and essential feature of Galileo’s notion of cause. Galileo not only reformed natural philosophy, he also – as I shall defend – introduced a new notion of causality and integrated it in his scientific practice (hence, this new notion also has its methodological repercussions). Galileo’s conception of causality went hand in hand with his methodology. It is my claim that Galileo was trying to construct a new scientifically useful notion of causality. This new notion of causality is an interventionist notion.
2006-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2580/1/Galileo%27s_Interventionist_Notion_of_Cause_JHI.doc
Ducheyne, Steffen (2006) Galileo’s Interventionist Notion of “Cause”. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2701
2010-10-07T15:14:01Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368656D6973747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2701/
JOAN BAPTISTA VAN HELMONT AND THE QUESTION OF EXPERIMENTAL MODERNISM
Ducheyne, Steffen
Chemistry
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper, I take up the question to what extent and in which sense we can conceive of Johannes Baptista Van Helmont’s (1579-1644) style of experimenting as “modern”. Connected to this question, I shall reflect upon what Van Helmont’s precise contribution to experimental practice was. I will argue - after analysing some of Van Helmont's experiments such as his tree-experiment, ice-experiment, and thermoscope experiment - that Van Helmont had a strong preference to locate experimental designs in places wherein variables can be more easily controlled (and in the limit, in relatively closed physical systems such as paradigmatically the vessel, globe or sphere (vas, globus, sphera)). After having reviewed some alternative candidates, I shall argue that Van Helmont’s usage of relatively isolated physical systems and a moderate degree of quantification, whereby mathematical procedures mainly refer to guaranteeing that quantities are conserved by roughly determining them, are the characteristics that best captures his contributions to “modern” experimentation.
2006-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2701/1/Van_Helmont.doc
Ducheyne, Steffen (2006) JOAN BAPTISTA VAN HELMONT AND THE QUESTION OF EXPERIMENTAL MODERNISM. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2731
2010-10-07T15:14:05Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2731/
Zeno's Paradoxes. A Cardinal Problem. 1. On Zenonian Plurality
Verelst, Karin
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper the claim that Zeno's paradoxes have been solved is contested. Although "no one has ever touched Zeno without refuting him" (Whitehead), it will be our aim to show that, whatever it was that was refuted, it was certainly not Zeno. The paper is organised in two parts. In the first part we will demonstrate that upon direct analysis of the Greek sources, an underlying structure common to both the Paradoxes of Plurality and the Paradoxes of Motion can be exposed. This structure bears on a correct - Zenonian - interpretation of the concept of “division through and through”. The key feature, generally overlooked but essential to a correct understanding of all his arguments, is that they do not presuppose time. Division takes place simultaneously. This holds true for both PP and PM. In the second part a mathematical representation will be set up that catches this common structure, hence the essence of all Zeno's arguments, however without refuting them. Its central tenet is an aequivalence proof for Zeno's procedure and Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis. Some number theoretic and geometric implications will be shortly discussed. Furthermore, it will be shown how the “Received View” on the motion-arguments can easely be derived by the introduction of time as a (non-Zenonian) premiss, thus causing their collapse into arguments which can be approached and refuted by Aristotle's limit-like concept of the “potentially infinite”, which remained — though in different disguises - at the core of the refutational strategies that have been in use up to the present. Finally, an interesting link to Newtonian mechanics via Cremona geometry can be established.
2006-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2731/1/RIGAproceedings.pdf
Verelst, Karin (2006) Zeno's Paradoxes. A Cardinal Problem. 1. On Zenonian Plurality. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2734
2010-10-07T15:14:05Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2734/
Discovering the Relativity of Simultaneity How did Einstein take "The Step"?
Norton, John D.
Thought Experiments
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
It is routinely assumed that Einstein discovered the relativity of simultaneity by thinking about how clocks can be synchronized by light signals, much in accord with the analysis he gave in his 1905 special relativity paper. Yet that is just supposition. We have no real evidence that it actually happened this way. In later recollections, Einstein stressed the importance of several thought experiments in the thinking that led up to the final theory. They include his chasing a light beam thought experiment and his magnet and conductor thought experiment. They do not include thought experiments on clocks and their synchronization. My goal here is to show that other pathways to the relativity of simultaneity are quite plausible. In several places Einstein stressed the importance in his discovery of special relativity of stellar aberration and Fizeau's measurement of the speed of light in moving water. The results can be seen as direct observational expressions of the relativity of simultaneity, if one knows how to read them. I will suggest that, thanks to his knowledge of Lorentz's 1895 Versuch, Einstein did know how to read them, and that it is quite possible that these observations first led Einstein to the relativity of simultaneity.
2006-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2734/1/Norton.pdf
Norton, John D. (2006) Discovering the Relativity of Simultaneity How did Einstein take "The Step"? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3069
2010-10-07T15:14:41Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3069/
What is (not) wrong with scalar gravity?
Giulini, Domenico
Classical Physics
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
On his way to General Relativity (GR) Einstein gave several arguments as to why a special relativistic theory of gravity based on a massless scalar field could be ruled out merely on grounds of theoretical considerations. We re-investigate his two main arguments, which relate to energy conservation and some form of the principle of the universality of free fall. We find that such a theory-based a priori abandonment not to be justified. Rather, the theory seems formally perfectly viable, though in clear contradiction with (later) experiments.
2006-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3069/1/ScalarGravity.pdf
Giulini, Domenico (2006) What is (not) wrong with scalar gravity? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3078
2015-05-11T05:46:14Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3078/
ANAXIMANDER AND THE ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISM
Rescher, Nicholas
Cosmology
History of Science Case Studies
The latest computerized reconstruction of the “Antikythera mechanism” reveals a striking similarity to the model of the universe of Anaximander of Miletus.
2006-12
Other
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3078/1/Anaxmander_and_Antikythera_Mech.doc
Rescher, Nicholas (2006) ANAXIMANDER AND THE ANTIKYTHERA MECHANISM. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3167
2010-10-07T15:21:19Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3194
2010-10-07T15:21:20Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3347
2010-10-07T15:21:23Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3374
2017-05-07T16:34:07Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6869737068696C
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3374/
Frege's Mathematical Setting
Wilson, Mark
History of Philosophy
History of Science Case Studies
Mathematics
This survey article describes Frege's celebrated foundational work against the context of other late nineteenth century approaches to introducing mathematically novel "extension elements" within both algebra and geometry.
2007-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3374/1/Frege%27s_Mathematical_Setting.pdf
Wilson, Mark (2007) Frege's Mathematical Setting. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3375
2010-10-07T15:15:14Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3375/
Ghost World: A Context for Frege's Context Principle
Wilson, Mark
Mathematics
History of Science Case Studies
There is considerable likelihood that Gottlob Frege began writing his Foundations of Arithmetic with the expectation that he could introduce his numbers, not with sets, but through some algebraic techniques borrowed from earlier writers of the Gottingen school. These rewriting techniques, had they worked, would have required strong philosophical justification provided by Frege's celebrated "context principle," which otherwise serves little evident purpose in the published Foundations.
2007-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3375/1/Ghost_World.pdf
Wilson, Mark (2007) Ghost World: A Context for Frege's Context Principle. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3413
2010-10-07T15:15:19Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3413/
Distinguishing Drift and Selection Empirically: “The Great Snail Debate” of the 1950s
Millstein, Roberta L.
Evolutionary Theory
Biology
History of Science Case Studies
Biologists and philosophers have been extremely pessimistic about the possibility of demonstrating random drift in nature, particularly when it comes to distinguishing random drift from natural selection. However, examination of a historical case - Maxime Lamotte's study of natural populations of the land snail, Cepaea nemoralis in the 1950s - shows that while some pessimism is warranted, it has been overstated. Indeed, by describing a unique signature for drift and showing that this signature obtained in the populations under study, Lamotte was able to make a good case for a significant role for drift. It may be difficult to disentangle the causes of drift and selection acting in a population, but it is not (always) impossible.
2007-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3413/1/MillsteinCepaeaJHB-public.pdf
Millstein, Roberta L. (2007) Distinguishing Drift and Selection Empirically: “The Great Snail Debate” of the 1950s. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3427
2010-10-07T15:15:21Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3427/
Analyzing an aspect of the inaugural lectures of the Paris Museum of Natural History: An appropriate concept of representation.
Blanc, Floriane
Science and Society
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
This paper presents part of a scientific study focused on the social aspects of research and its impact on the process of constructing knowledge. For this, we use a corpus of hitherto unexploited texts, the inaugural lectures from the Paris Museum of Natural History. This central French teaching institution demanded that each newly appointed professor gave a formal opening lecture, resulting in the source texts. Given to an audience composed by institutional representatives, colleagues and friends, this lecture was a symbolic way to usher the professor into his new function. One might dismiss such a formal and codified exercise as being uninteresting for the epistemologist. Instead, reading these inaugural lectures (1869 - 1979) brings to light “science as it was done”. Indeed, these texts serve to reveal unknown aspects of scientific activity in contrast to the naive image of science one might expect them to present. Certain assertions in these lectures particularly caught our attention. Many words or expressions like “truth”, “coincidence”, “luck”, or the phrase the “first beings made by the hands of the Creator” reveal the personal position of the orator. These elements of the speech generally introduce more epistemologically interesting aspects. In these elements of the lecture, the orator referred to components of a more or less conscious system of thought, which constituted his “representation of the world”. The difficulty was to understand the object - i.e. the “representation of the world” – in all of its dimensions. Moreover, it was necessary to take into account the systemic relationship established between the different components of the study’s object. Thus, we began to research a conceptual construction that would enable us to do this. Either we could have tried to develop a new conceptual tool, or we could have borrowed one from a related science. The concept of “representation” is already used in many disciplines including science studies, sociology, cognitive psychology, history, and social psychology. The concept has been developed according to many different perspectives, which can differ to the point of being opposed. What we propose is neither to add a new definition to the concept, nor to build a rigid model. The aim of this research is firstly to find a suitable model drawn from the approaches developed by some related disciplines, which can be adapted to the present case study. In the first part of the paper, we will present our methodology, explaining which definition was chosen for the concept of “representation” in this study case and why. The second part will be devoted to the presentation of the results obtained by the application of this methodology, i.e. what systems of representation have been revealed. We will present their characteristics and discuss whether or not the conceptualization is valid.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3427/1/Floriane_Blanc_-_Abstract_Madrid_EPSA_2007_-_copie.pdf
Blanc, Floriane (2007) Analyzing an aspect of the inaugural lectures of the Paris Museum of Natural History: An appropriate concept of representation. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3437
2010-10-07T15:15:23Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3437/
Einstein’s Miraculous Argument of 1905: The Thermodynamic Grounding of Light Quanta
Norton, John D.
History of Science Case Studies
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Quantum Mechanics
A major part of Einstein’s 1905 light quantum paper is devoted to arguing that high frequency heat radiation bears the characteristic signature of a microscopic energy distribution of independent, spatially localized components. The content of his light quantum proposal was precarious in that it contradicted the great achievement of nineteenth century physics, the wave theory of light and its accommodation in electrodynamics. However the methods used to arrive at it were both secure and familiar to Einstein in 1905. A mainstay of Einstein’s research in statistical physics, extending to his earliest publications of 1901 and 1902, had been the inferring of the microscopic constitution of systems from their macroscopic properties. In his statistical work of 1905, Einstein dealt with several thermal systems consisting of many, independent, spatially localized components. They were the dilute sugar solutions of his doctoral dissertation and suspended particles of his Brownian motion paper.
2007-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3437/1/Miraculous_Berlin.pdf
Norton, John D. (2007) Einstein’s Miraculous Argument of 1905: The Thermodynamic Grounding of Light Quanta. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3447
2013-07-29T07:34:50Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:73796D6D6574726965732D696E76617269616E636573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3447/
A priori prejudice in Weyl's unintended unification of gravitation and electricity
Afriat, Alexander
Mathematics
Symmetries/Invariances
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
2007-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
Afriat, Alexander (2007) A priori prejudice in Weyl's unintended unification of gravitation and electricity. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3461
2010-10-07T15:15:24Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3461/
The General Scholium: Some Notes on Newton's Published and Unpublished Endeavours
Ducheyne, Steffen
Classical Physics
History of Philosophy of Science
Causation
Theory/Observation
Explanation
Science and Religion
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Newton’s immensely famous, but tersely written, General Scholium is primarily known for its reference to the argument of design and Newton’s famous dictum “hypotheses non fingo”. In the essay at hand, I shall argue that this text served a variety of goals and try to add something new to our current knowledge of how Newton tried to accomplish them. The General Scholium highlights a cornucopia of features that were central to Newton’s natural philosophy in general: matters of experimentation, methodological issues, theological matters, matters related to the instauration of prisca sapientia, epistemological claims central to Newton’s empiricism, and, finally, metaphysical issues. For Newton these matters were closely interwoven. I shall address these matters based on a thorough study of the extant manuscript material.
2007-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3461/1/PDFGeneral_Scholium%5B1%5D.pdf
Ducheyne, Steffen (2007) The General Scholium: Some Notes on Newton's Published and Unpublished Endeavours. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3463
2013-07-29T07:36:28Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:73796D6D6574726965732D696E76617269616E636573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3463/
A priori prejudice in Weyl's unintended unification of gravitation and electricity
Afriat, Alexander
Mathematics
Symmetries/Invariances
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
2007-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
Afriat, Alexander (2007) A priori prejudice in Weyl's unintended unification of gravitation and electricity. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3477
2010-10-07T15:15:26Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3477/
Was the Early Calculus an Inconsistent Theory?
Vickers, Peter
Mathematics
History of Science Case Studies
The ubiquitous assertion that the early calculus of Newton and Leibniz was an inconsistent theory is examined. Two different objects of a possible inconsistency claim are distinguished: (i) the calculus as an algorithm; (ii) proposed explanations of the moves made within the algorithm. In the first case the calculus can be interpreted as a theory in something like the logician’s sense, whereas in the second case it acts more like a scientific theory. I find no inconsistency in the first case, and an inconsistency in the second case which can only be imputed to a small minority of the relevant community.
2007-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3477/1/Early_calculus_August07.pdf
Vickers, Peter (2007) Was the Early Calculus an Inconsistent Theory? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3486
2016-10-13T13:48:55Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3486/
Model, Theory, and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure
Schindler, Samuel
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Models and Idealization
Theory/Observation
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper I discuss the discovery of the DNA structure by Francis Crick and James Watson, which has provoked a large historical literature but has yet not found entry into philosophical debates. I want to redress this imbalance. In contrast to the available historical literature a strong emphasis will be placed upon analysing the roles played by theory, model and evidence and the relationship between them. In particular, I am going to discuss not only Crick and Watson’s well-known model and Franklin’s x-ray diffraction pictures (the evidence) but also the less well-known theory of helical diffraction, which was absolutely crucial to Crick and Watson’s discovery. The insights into this ground-breaking historical episode will have consequences for the “new” received view of scientific models and their function and relationship to theory and world. The received view, dominated by works by Nancy Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison (1999), rather than trying to put forth a “theory of models”, is interested in questions to do with (i) the function of models in scientific practice and (ii) the construction of models. In regard to (i), the received view locates the model (as an idealized, simplified version of the real system under investigation) between theory and the world and sees the model as allowing the application of the former to the latter. As to (ii) Cartwright has argued for a phenomenologically-driven view and Morgan and Morrison (1999) for the “autonomy” of models in the construction process: models are neither determined by theory nor by the world. The present case study of the discovery of the DNA structure strongly challenges both (i) and (ii). In contrast to claim (i) of the received view, it was not Crick and Watson’s model but rather the helical diffraction theory, which served a mediating purpose between the model and the x-ray diffraction pictures. In particular Cartwright’s take on (ii) is refuted by comparing Franklin’s bottom-up approach with Crick and Watson’s top-down approach in constructing the model. The former led to difficulties, which only a strong confidence in the structure incorporated in the model could circumvent.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3486/1/SSchindler_DNA.pdf
Schindler, Samuel (2007) Model, Theory, and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3487
2010-10-07T15:15:28Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3487/
Length Matters (I): The Einstein-Swann Correspondence and the Constructive Approach to STR
Hagar, Amit
Structure of Theories
Theory Change
Explanation
Relativity Theory
Physics
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
In this paper and its sequel I discuss a rarely mentioned correspondence between Einstein and W.F.G. Swann on the constructive approach to the special theory of relativity, in which Einstein points out that the attempts to construct a dynamical explanation of relativistic kinematical effects require postulating a minimal length scale in the level of the dynamics. I use this correspondence to shed light on several issues under dispute in current philosophy of spacetime that were highlighted recently in Harvey Brown's monograph "Physical Relativity", namely, Einstein's view on the distinction between principle and constructive theories, and the philosophical consequences of pursuing the constructive approach to the special theory of relativity.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3487/1/Swann.pdf
Hagar, Amit (2007) Length Matters (I): The Einstein-Swann Correspondence and the Constructive Approach to STR. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3504
2010-10-07T15:15:30Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3504/
Using Representations of Space to Study Early Modern Physical Science: An Example of Philosophy in the Service of History
Miller, David Marshall
Classical Physics
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Most historians of science eagerly acknowledge that the early modern period witnessed a shift from a prevailing Aristotelian, spherical, centered conception of space to a prevailing Cartesian, rectilinear, oriented spatial framework. Indeed, this shift underlay many of the important advances for which the period is celebrated. However, historians have failed to engage the general conceptual shift, focusing instead on the particular explanatory developments that resulted. This historical lacuna can be attributed to a historiographical problem: the lack of an adequate unit of analysis by which to investigate the conceptual change. Here, a philosophical argument is made for representations of space as an appropriate category of historical investigation, and methods of textual interrogation are suggested to this end. Finally, two examples, taken from Aristotle and Newton, demonstrate the feasibility and importance of this project.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3504/1/UsingRepsOfSpace_9-10-07.doc
Miller, David Marshall (2007) Using Representations of Space to Study Early Modern Physical Science: An Example of Philosophy in the Service of History. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3530
2010-10-07T15:15:35Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3530/
Emil Rupp, Albert Einstein and the canal ray experiments on wave-particle duality: Scientific fraud and theoretical bias
van Dongen, Jeroen
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
In 1926 Emil Rupp published a number of papers on the interference properties of light emitted by canal ray sources. These articles, particularly one paper that came into being in close collaboration with Albert Einstein, drew quite some attention as they probed the wave versus particle nature of light. They also significantly propelled Rupp’s career, even though that from the outset they were highly controversial. This article will review this episode, and in particular Rupp’s collaboration with Einstein. Evidence that Rupp forged his results is presented and their critical reception in the socially and politically divided German physics community is discussed. These divisions fail to explain the full dynamic; the latter is attempted by turning to the role that theoretical bias on occasion has in assessing experiment. Einstein’s responses in particular are analysed in this context.
2007-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3530/1/Rupp-final-2.pdf
van Dongen, Jeroen (2007) Emil Rupp, Albert Einstein and the canal ray experiments on wave-particle duality: Scientific fraud and theoretical bias. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3531
2010-10-07T15:15:35Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3531/
The interpretation of the Einstein-Rupp experiments and their influence on the history of quantum mechanics
van Dongen, Jeroen
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
The Einstein-Rupp experiments were proposed in 1926 by Albert Einstein to study the wave versus particle nature of light. Einstein presented a theoretical analysis of these experiments to the Berlin Academy together with results of Emil Rupp, who claimed to have successfully carried them out. However, as the preceding paper has shown, Rupp's success was the result of scientific fraud. This paper will argue, after exploring their interpretation, that the experiments were a relevant part of the background to such celebrated contributions to quantum mechanics as Born’s statistical interpretation of the wave function and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Yet, the Einstein-Rupp experiments have hardly received attention in the history of quantum mechanics literature. In part, this is a consequence of self-censorship in the physics community, enforced in the wake of the Rupp affair. Self-censorship among historians of physics may however also have played a role.
2007-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3531/1/Qm-Rupp-final-2.pdf
van Dongen, Jeroen (2007) The interpretation of the Einstein-Rupp experiments and their influence on the history of quantum mechanics. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3553
2010-10-07T15:15:37Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3553/
The Role of Causal Processes in the Neutral and Nearly Neutral Theories
Dietrich, Michael R.
Millstein, Roberta L.
Evolutionary Theory
Molecular Biology/Genetics
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper, we will consider how the neutral and nearly neutral theories of molecular evolution differ from each other as a means for addressing causal processes associated with random drift and natural selection. These two theories are sometimes characterized as theories about drift alone, where drift is described solely as an outcome, rather than a process. Contra this characterization, we will argue that both selection and drift, as causal processes, are integral parts of both theories. However, the nearly neutral theory explicitly recognizes alleles and/or molecular substitutions that, while engaging in weakly selected causal processes, exhibit outcomes thought to be characteristic of random drift. A narrow focus on outcomes obscures the significant role of weakly selected causal processes in the nearly neutral theory. Clarifying the relative roles of selection and drift processes in both theories reveals that while their outcomes may be similar, the causal processes producing those outcomes are importantly distinct.
2007-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3553/1/DietrichMillsteinNearlyNeutral.pdf
Dietrich, Michael R. and Millstein, Roberta L. (2007) The Role of Causal Processes in the Neutral and Nearly Neutral Theories. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3558
2010-10-07T15:15:38Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3558/
Galileo Then and Now
shea, william
History of Philosophy of Science
Science and Religion
History of Science Case Studies
Abstract Galileo Then and Now (Draft of paper to be discussed at the Conference, HPD1, to be held at the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 11-14 October 2007) William R. Shea, University of Padua The aim of this paper is to stimulate discussion on how shifts in philosophical fashion and societal moods tell us not only what to read but how to go about it, and how history and philosophy of science can jointly deepen our grasp of the issues at stake. The first part highlights some of the things that have occurred in the field of Galileo studies between the monumental edition of Galileo Opere in twenty volumes, edited by Antonio Favaro between 1890 and 1909, and the new enlarged edition that will be published from 2009 onwards by a team of scholars working under Paolo Galluzzi. Part One. From Favaro to Galluzzi "Publish or perish" is an injunction that resonated as clearly in the ears of assistant professors at the end of the 19th century as it does in the first decade of the 21st. But publishing can also mean perishing when what is being edited is the work of an eminent scientist of the past. It simply does not do to offer material that is not what readers expect even if it was written by someone as famous as Galileo, and well authenticated sources were sometimes disregarded when they appeared to be of no interest. It is largely for this reason that a new national edition of Galileo's works is required. Of course, over the last hundred years, a number of letters from and to Galileo as well as a few laudatory or damning comments about his personality or his work have been uncovered, but this would not have been enough to drum up financial and scholarly support for a major editorial project. But the interesting material is Favaro had left out. Before mentioning what this material is, allow me a disclaimer. I'm not focusing on Favaro because he is a singularity, but because he illustrates how a conscientious historian can ride slipshod over evidence because of a philosophical commitment that he is only vaguely aware of, in this case naïve positivism. So what did Favaro to leave out? The answer is large chunks of three collections of manuscript notes that are bound in some of the 347 volumes of the Galilean material in the National Library in Florence. The first of these collections deals with logical treatises and related essays on Aristotelian philosophy, the second with Galileo's laboratory notes on the experiments that he carried out on the pendulum and inclined planes; and the third with astrological computations. Favaro rejected the first collection because they were "pre-Galilean" and hence could only have been trite scholastic exercises that "poor" young Galileo had to undergo in high school. He neglected the second because he had trouble making sense of them The third, astrological collection, he set aside with more trepidation since Galileo cast horoscopes for himself (at least twice), his children and his friends. But the fact that they were also, epistemologically speaking, "pre-Galilean", was enough to cast them into the outer darkness (in this case a dimly lit corridor of the National Library in Florence). The Aristotelian notes that Favaro had neglected were made available by William Wallace, who showed that Galileo culled long passages from professors at the Roman College. Galileo attacked several of Aristotle's ideas, but he never queried Aristotle's scientific realism–namely, the view that there is a uniquely true physical theory, discovered by human powers of reason and observation, and that alternative theories are consequently falls. Wallace made this the basis of his claim that Galileo created, in the heaven above and here on earth, a new science of motion by following the Aristotelian cannons laid down in the Posterior Analytics. On this view, Galileo used Aristotle's logic to subvert Aristotelian physics. It is interesting to contrast Wallace's thesis with that of philosophers of different allegiance, who offer a reconstruction of Galileo's methodology along lines that are much more modern and in which the epistemological core is no longer Aristotelian logic, but common sense instrumentalism. This is not to deny that experiments sometimes speak with a forked tongue, but to stress that methodological rules have also been known to be no more than clashing cymbals. Recent writers have also stressed that Galileo aimed his arguments at a specific audience, and that we must take cognizance of the values and whims of the society in which he operated. The sociology of science can help us understand the background against which Galileo's arguments were assessed and the reasons why he favored some rhetorical strategies over other ones. Mario Biagoli's Galileo Courtier sheds light on the Tuscan court and the Roman famiglia (as the popes styled their entourage), where Galileo found many of his readers and most of his critics. But Galileo was much more than a courtier, and I shall argue that we should use our enhanced knowledge of Galileo's education, his language, his style, and his emoluments to understand his science, not to supplant it. History and philosophy of science can combine their insights to achieve a more critical and balanced view of what actually occurred and why.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3558/1/Pittsburgh_26_Sept_073.doc
shea, william (2007) Galileo Then and Now. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3560
2010-10-07T15:15:39Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3560/
Length Matters (I) - The Einstein--Swann Correspondence and the Constructive Approach to the Special Theory of Relativity
Hagar, Amit
Structure of Theories
Explanation
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper and its sequel I discuss a rarely mentioned correspondence between Einstein and W.F.G. Swann on the constructive approach to the special theory of relativity, in which Einstein points out that the attempts to construct a dynamical explanation of relativistic kinematical effects require postulating a minimal length scale in the level of the dynamics. I use this correspondence to shed light on several issues under dispute in current philosophy of spacetime that were highlighted recently in Harvey Brown's monograph "Physical Relativity", namely, Einstein's view on the distinction between principle and constructive theories, and the philosophical consequences of pursuing the constructive approach to the special theory of relativity.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3560/1/Swann_-_Take2.pdf
Hagar, Amit (2007) Length Matters (I) - The Einstein--Swann Correspondence and the Constructive Approach to the Special Theory of Relativity. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3562
2010-10-07T15:15:39Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3562/
History of Science and the Material Theory of Induction: Einstein’s Quanta, Mercury’s Perihelion
Norton, John D.
Confirmation/Induction
Relativity Theory
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
The use of the material theory of induction to vindicate a scientist’s claims of evidential warrant is illustrated with the cases of Einstein’s thermodynamic argument for light quanta of 1905 and his recovery of the anomalous motion of Mercury from general relativity in 1915. In a survey of other accounts of inductive inference applied to these examples, I show that, if it is to succeed, each account must presume the same material facts as the material theory and, in addition, some general principle of inductive inference not invoked by the material theory. Hence these principles are superfluous and the material theory superior in being more parsimonious.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3562/1/HS%26MTI.pdf
Norton, John D. (2007) History of Science and the Material Theory of Induction: Einstein’s Quanta, Mercury’s Perihelion. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3587
2010-10-07T15:15:42Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3587/
A Case of Irrationality?
Barberousse, Anouk
History of Science Case Studies
Were Maxwell and Boltzmann irrational to develop statistical mechanics whereas it was empirically refuted by the specific heats problem? My analysis of this historical episode departs from the current proposals about belief change. I first give a detailed description of Maxwell's and Boltzmann's epistemic states in the years they were working on statistical mechanics and then make some methodological proposals in epistemology that would account for the complexity of this case.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3587/1/case_of_irrationality.pdf
Barberousse, Anouk (2007) A Case of Irrationality? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3626
2010-10-07T15:21:26Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3647
2010-10-07T15:21:27Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3653
2010-10-08T12:53:25Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3669
2010-10-07T15:15:51Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3669/
The Explanatory Potential of Artificial Societies
Grüne-Yanoff, Till
Models and Idealization
Explanation
Complex Systems
History of Science Case Studies
It is often claimed that artificial society simulations contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. At the hand of a particular example, this paper argues that artificial societies often cannot provide full explanations, because their models are not or cannot be validated. Instead, artificial societies may sometimes provide potential explanations. It is shown that these potential explanations, if they contribute to our understanding, considerably differ from the standard kind of potential causal explanations. Instead of possible causal histories, simulations offer possible functional analyses of the explanandum. The paper discusses how these two kinds of potential explanations differ, and how possible functional analyses can be appraised.
2007-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3669/1/ACEpaper070925.pdf
Grüne-Yanoff, Till (2007) The Explanatory Potential of Artificial Societies. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3680
2010-10-07T15:21:28Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3681
2010-10-07T15:21:29Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3695
2010-10-07T15:15:53Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3695/
Concepts of Drift and Selection in “The Great Snail Debate” of the 1950s and Early 1960s
Millstein, Roberta L.
Evolutionary Theory
Biology
History of Science Case Studies
Recently, much philosophical discussion has centered on the best way to characterize the concepts of random drift and natural selection, and, in particular, on the question of whether selection and drift can be conceptually distinguished (Beatty 1984; Brandon 2005; Hodge 1983, 1987; Millstein 2002, 2005; Pfeifer 2005; Shanahan 1992; Stephens 2004). These authors all contend, to a greater or lesser degree, that their concepts make sense of biological practice. So, it should be instructive to see how the concepts of drift and selection were distinguished by the disputants in a high-profile debate; debates such as these often force biologists to take a more philosophical turn, discussing the concepts at issue in greater detail than usual. A prime candidate for just such a case study is what William Provine (1986) has termed “The Great Snail Debate,” that is, the debate over the highly polymorphic land snails Cepaea nemoralis and Cepaea hortensis in the 1950s and early 1960s. This study will reveal that much of the present-day confusion over the concepts of drift and selection is rooted in confusions of the past. Nonetheless, there are lessons that can be learned about nonadaptiveness, indiscriminate sampling, and causality with respect to these two concepts. In particular, this paper will shed light on the following questions: 1) What is “drift”? Is “drift” a purely mathematical construct, a physical process analogous to the indiscriminate sampling of balls from an urn, or the outcome of a sampling process? 2) What is “nonadaptiveness,” and is a proponent of drift committed to claims that organisms’ traits are nonadaptive? 3) Can disputes concerning selection and drift be settled by statistics alone, or is causal information essential? If causal information is essential, what does that say about the concepts of “drift” and “selection” themselves?
2007-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3695/1/MillsteinCepaea_Descended.pdf
Millstein, Roberta L. (2007) Concepts of Drift and Selection in “The Great Snail Debate” of the 1950s and Early 1960s. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3705
2010-10-07T15:15:55Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3705/
Analyzing an aspect of the inaugural lectures of the Paris Museum of Natural History: An appropriate concept of representation.
Blanc, Floriane
History of Science Case Studies
This paper presents part of a scientific study focused on the social aspects of research and its impact on the process of constructing knowledge. For this, we use a corpus of hitherto unexploited texts, the inaugural lectures from the Paris Museum of Natural History. This central French teaching institution demanded that each newly appointed professor gave a formal opening lecture, resulting in the source texts. Given to an audience composed by institutional representatives, colleagues and friends, this lecture was a symbolic way to usher the professor into his new function. One might dismiss such a formal and codified exercise as being uninteresting for the epistemologist. Instead, reading these inaugural lectures (1869 - 1979) brings to light “science as it was done”. Indeed, these texts serve to reveal unknown aspects of scientific activity in contrast to the naive image of science one might expect them to present. Certain assertions in these lectures particularly caught our attention. Many words or expressions like “truth”, “coincidence”, “luck”, or the phrase the “first beings made by the hands of the Creator” reveal the personal position of the orator. These elements of the speech generally introduce more epistemologically interesting aspects. In these elements of the lecture, the orator referred to components of a more or less conscious system of thought, which constituted his “representation of the world”. The difficulty was to understand the object - i.e. the “representation of the world” – in all of its dimensions. Moreover, it was necessary to take into account the systemic relationship established between the different components of the study’s object. Thus, we began to research a conceptual construction that would enable us to do this. Either we could have tried to develop a new conceptual tool, or we could have borrowed one from a related science. The concept of “representation” is already used in many disciplines including science studies, sociology, cognitive psychology, history, and social psychology. The concept has been developed according to many different perspectives, which can differ to the point of being opposed. What we propose is neither to add a new definition to the concept, nor to build a rigid model. The aim of this research is firstly to find a suitable model drawn from the approaches developed by some related disciplines, which can be adapted to the present case study. In the first part of the paper, we will present our methodology, explaining which definition was chosen for the concept of “representation” in this study case and why. The second part will be devoted to the presentation of the results obtained by the application of this methodology, i.e. what systems of representation have been revealed. We will present their characteristics and discuss whether or not the conceptualization is valid.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3705/1/Analyzing_an_aspect_of_the_inaugural_lectures_of_the_Paris_Museum_of_Natural_History.pdf
Blanc, Floriane (2007) Analyzing an aspect of the inaugural lectures of the Paris Museum of Natural History: An appropriate concept of representation. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3706
2010-10-07T15:15:55Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3706/
Making Contact with Observations
Votsis, Ioannis
Confirmation/Induction
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Realism/Anti-realism
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
A stalwart view in the philosophy of science holds that, even when broadly construed so as to include theoretical auxiliaries, theories cannot make direct contact with observations. This view owes much to Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) influential distinction between data and phenomena. According to them, data are typically the kind of things that are observable or measurable like "bubble chamber photographs, patterns of discharge in electronic particle detectors and records of reaction times and error rates in various psychological experiments" (p. 306). Phenomena are physical processes that are typically unobservable. Examples of the latter category include "weak neutral currents, the decay of the proton, and chunking and recency effects in human memory" (ibid.). Theories, in Bogen and Woodward’s view, are utilised to systematically explain, infer and predict phenomena, not data (pp. 305-306). The relationship between theories and data is rather indirect. Data count as evidence for phenomena and the latter in turn count as evidence for theories. This view is becoming increasingly influential (e.g. Prajit K. Basu (2003), Stathis Psillos (2004) and Mauricio Suárez (2005)). In this paper I argue contrary to this view that in various significant and well-known cases theories do make direct contact with the help of suitable auxiliaries.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3706/1/EPSA_Votsis.pdf
Votsis, Ioannis (2007) Making Contact with Observations. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3716
2016-11-11T17:31:24Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
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7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3716/
Von Neumann's Entropy Does Not Correspond to Thermodynamic Entropy
Shenker, Orly R.
Hemmo, Meir
Thought Experiments
Philosophers of Science
Physics
History of Science Case Studies
Realism/Anti-realism
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Probability/Statistics
Reductionism/Holism
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Quantum Mechanics
Abstract Von Neumann (1932, Ch. 5) argued by means of a thought experiment involving measurements of spin observables that the quantum mechanical quantity is conceptually equivalent to thermodynamic entropy. We analyze Von Neumann's thought experiment and show that his argument fails. Over the past few years there has been a dispute in the literature regarding the Von Neumann entropy. It turns out that each contribution to this dispute (Shenker 1999, Henderson 2001, Hemmo 2003) addressed a different special case. In this paper we generalize the discussion and examine the full matrix of possibilities that are relevant for the evaluation and understanding of Von Neumann’s argument.
2006
Other
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3716/1/Hemmo-Shenker_on_Von_Neumann.doc
Shenker, Orly R. and Hemmo, Meir (2006) Von Neumann's Entropy Does Not Correspond to Thermodynamic Entropy. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3790
2010-10-07T15:16:05Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3790/
Jan IngenHousz, or why don't we know who discovered photosynthesis?
Geerdt, Magiels
History of Science Case Studies
Who discovered photosynthesis? Not many people know. Jan IngenHousz' name has been forgotten, his life and works have disappeared in the mists of time. Still, the tale of his scientific endeavour shows science in action. Not only does it open up an undisclosed chapter of the history of science, it is an ideal (as under researched) episode in the history of science that can help to shine some light on the ingredients and processes that shape the development of science. This paves the way for a fresh multidimensional approach in the philosophy of science: towards an "ecology of science".
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3790/1/IngenHousz_EPSA07.pdf
Geerdt, Magiels (2007) Jan IngenHousz, or why don't we know who discovered photosynthesis? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3806
2010-10-07T15:16:07Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D73797374656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3806/
Trémaux on species: A theory of allopatric speciation (and punctuated equilibrium) before Wagner
Wilkins, John S.
Nelson, Gareth J.
Evolutionary Theory
Systematics
History of Philosophy of Science
Biology
History of Science Case Studies
Pierre Trémaux’s 1865 ideas on speciation have been unjustly derided following his acceptance by Marx and rejection by Engels, and almost nobody has read his ideas in a charitable light. Here we offer an interpretation based on translating the term sol as “habitat”, in order to show that Trémaux proposed a theory of allopatric speciation before Wagner and a punctuated equilibrium theory before Gould and Eldredge, and translate the relevant discussion from the French. We believe he may have influenced Darwin’s revision to the third edition of the Origin on rates of evolution, and suggest that Gould’s dismissal of Trémaux is motivated by concern that others might think punctuated equilibrium theory was tainted by a connection with Trémaux.
2008-01
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3806/1/Tremaux-on-species.pdf
Wilkins, John S. and Nelson, Gareth J. (2008) Trémaux on species: A theory of allopatric speciation (and punctuated equilibrium) before Wagner. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3816
2010-10-07T15:16:08Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3816/
The Merli-Missiroli-Pozzi Two-Slit Electron Interference Experiment
Rosa, Rodolfo
Probability/Statistics
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
In 2002 the readers of the scientific magazine 'Physics World' voted Young's double-slit experiment applied to the interference of single electrons to be 'the most beautiful experiment in physics'; this experiment, in truth, had already been carried out 30 years beforehand. The present article aims to re-examine the latter real experiment and put it into its proper historical perspective. Even though the experiment was not afforded the importance it perhaps deserved among philosophers, its philosophical mplications add new arguments to the already far-reaching debate triggered off by the ideal experiment. Within the context of quantum mechanics in particular, the experiment revealed for the first time the importance that ought to be attributed at the empirical level to single-case probability, that is, to the probability of a single electron's reaching the screen. I investigate how the empirical significance of the experimental results comes within the framework of the debate over the propensity interpretation of probability in quantum mechanics. I argue that the experiment, when examined in all its technical details does in fact throw light on the evidence for the propensity, as a physical property, of micro-objects.
2008-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3816/1/mmp_arch.pdf
Rosa, Rodolfo (2008) The Merli-Missiroli-Pozzi Two-Slit Electron Interference Experiment. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3881
2010-10-07T15:16:14Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D73797374656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3881/
Trémaux on species: A theory of allopatric speciation (and punctuated equilibrium) before Wagner
Wilkins, John S.
Nelson, Gareth J.
Evolutionary Theory
Systematics
History of Philosophy of Science
Biology
History of Science Case Studies
Pierre Trémaux’s 1865 ideas on speciation have been unjustly derided following his acceptance by Marx and rejection by Engels, and almost nobody has read his ideas in a charitable light. Here we offer an interpretation based on translating the term sol as “habitat”, in order to show that Trémaux proposed a theory of allopatric speciation before Wagner and a punctuated equilibrium theory before Gould and Eldredge, and translate the relevant discussion from the French. We believe he may have influenced Darwin’s revision to the third edition of the Origin on rates of evolution, and suggest that Gould’s dismissal of Trémaux is motivated by concern that others might think punctuated equilibrium theory was tainted by a connection with Trémaux.
2008-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3881/1/Tremaux-on-species.pdf
Wilkins, John S. and Nelson, Gareth J. (2008) Trémaux on species: A theory of allopatric speciation (and punctuated equilibrium) before Wagner. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3962
2010-10-07T15:16:26Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3962/
Was Newtonian Cosmology Really Inconsistent?
Vickers, Peter John
Structure of Theories
Cosmology
History of Science Case Studies
This paper follows up a debate as to the consistency of Newtonian cosmology. Whereas Malament (1995) has shown that Newtonian cosmology *is* not inconsistent, to date there has been no analysis of Norton’s claim (1995) that Newtonian cosmology *was* inconsistent prior to certain advances in the 1930s, and in particular prior to Seeliger’s seminal paper of 1895. In this paper I agree that there are assumptions, Newtonian and cosmological in character, and relevant to the real history of science, which are inconsistent. But there are some important corrections to make to Norton’s account. Here I display for the first time the inconsistencies—four in total—in all their detail. Although this extra detail shows there to be several different inconsistencies, it also goes some way towards explaining why they went unnoticed for two hundred years.
2008-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3962/1/Newtonian_Cosmology.pdf
Vickers, Peter John (2008) Was Newtonian Cosmology Really Inconsistent? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3966
2017-05-07T16:41:03Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D76616C756573
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:73796D6D6574726965732D696E76617269616E636573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3966/
How Weyl stumbled across electricity while pursuing mathematical justice
Afriat, Alexander
Values
History of Science Case Studies
Mathematics
Physics
Relativity Theory
Symmetries/Invariances
It is argued that Weyl’s theory of gravitation and electricity came out of ‘mathematical justice’: out of the equal rights direction and length. Such mathematical justice was manifestly at work in the context of discovery, and is enough (together with a couple of simple and natural operations) to derive all of source-free electromagnetism. Weyl’s repeated references to coordinates and gauge are taken to express equal treatment of direction and length.
2008-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3966/1/Weyl1918.pdf
Afriat, Alexander (2008) How Weyl stumbled across electricity while pursuing mathematical justice. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3970
2010-10-07T15:16:27Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368656D6973747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3970/
Visual Representations in Science
Goodwin, William
Explanation
Chemistry
History of Science Case Studies
This paper evaluates a general argument for the conclusion that visual representations in science must play the role of truth bearers if they are to figure as legitimate contributors to scientific arguments and explanations. The argument is found to be unsound. An alternative approach to assessing the role of visual representations in science is exemplified by an examination of the role of structural formulas in organic chemistry. Structural formulas are found not to play the role of truth bearers; nonetheless, they contribute to the arguments and explanations of organic chemistry. An early success of conformational analysis is presented in order to illustrate the role of structural formulas in the discourse of organic chemistry.
2008-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3970/1/2ndSubVisRep.doc
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3970/2/Caffeine.pdf
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3970/3/ChairCyclohexane.pdf
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3970/4/1%2C3cyclo.pdf
Goodwin, William (2008) Visual Representations in Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3985
2010-10-07T15:16:30Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3985/
Exploratory experimentation and scientific practice: Metagenomics and the proteorhodopsin case
O'Malley, Maureen
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Exploratory experimentation and high-throughput molecular biology appear to have considerable affinity for each other. Included in the latter category is metagenomics, which is the DNA-based study of diverse microbial communities from a vast range of non-laboratory environments. Metagenomics has already made numerous discoveries and these have led to reinterpretations of fundamental concepts of microbial organization, evolution and ecology. The most outstanding success story of metagenomics to date involves the discovery of a rhodopsin gene, named proteorhodopsin, in marine bacteria that were never suspected to have any photobiological capacities. A discussion of this finding and its detailed investigation illuminates the relationship between exploratory experimentation and metagenomics. Specifically, the proteorhodopsin story indicates that a dichotomous interpretation of theory-driven and exploratory experimentation is insufficient, and that an interactive understanding of these two types of experimentation can be usefully supplemented by another category, ‘natural history experimentation’. Further reflection on the context of metagenomics suggests the necessity of thinking more historically about exploratory and other forms of experimentation.
2008-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3985/1/EE_proteorhodopsin_preprint.pdf
O'Malley, Maureen (2008) Exploratory experimentation and scientific practice: Metagenomics and the proteorhodopsin case. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3988
2010-10-07T15:16:31Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3988/
Varieties of Exploratory Experimentation in Nanotoxicology
Elliott, Kevin
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
There has been relatively little effort to provide a systematic overview of different forms of exploratory experimentation (EE). The present paper examines the growing subdiscipline of nanotoxicology and suggests that it illustrates at least four ways that researchers can engage in EE: searching for regularities; developing new techniques, simulation models, and instrumentation; collecting and analyzing large swaths of data using new experimental strategies (e.g., computer-based simulation and “high-throughput” instrumentation); and structuring an entire disciplinary field around exploratory research agendas. In order to distinguish these and other activities more effectively, the paper proposes a taxonomy that includes three dimensions along which types of EE vary: (1) the aim of the experimental activity, (2) the role of theory in the activity, and (3) the methods or strategies employed for varying experimental parameters.
2008-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3988/1/HPLS_2007_Preprint.pdf
Elliott, Kevin (2008) Varieties of Exploratory Experimentation in Nanotoxicology. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4005
2010-10-07T15:16:33Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4005/
Bohr's Theory of the Atom: Content, Closure and Consistency
Vickers, Peter John
Structure of Theories
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
How exactly does the much-discussed inconsistency in Bohr's theory of the atom manifest itself? A close look at the suggestions made so far in the literature suggests that the theory may not be inconsistent at all. The answer depends on (i) what exactly we take the content of 'Bohr's theory' to be, and (ii) what we take to follow from that content (how we 'close' the theory). In lieu of inconsistency, alternative characterisations of the relevant conceptual problems are possible. Looking briefly at the later Bohr theory, I conclude that the theory was only inconsistent after the introduction of the quantum adiabatic principle in 1917.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4005/1/Bohr_April_2008.pdf
Vickers, Peter John (2008) Bohr's Theory of the Atom: Content, Closure and Consistency. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4053
2010-10-07T15:16:39Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:726865746F7269632D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D70737963686F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4053/
Definitional Argument in Evolutionary Psychology and Cultural Anthropology
Jackson, John
Science and Society
Biology
Explanation
Rhetoric of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Evolutionary Psychology
Anthropology
An old aphorism claims that “The person who defines the terms of the debate can win it.” This paper argues that the debate between evolutionary psychologists and cultural anthropologists over the biological explanation of human behavior is framed by a larger definitional dispute over the question, “What is culture?” Both disciplines attempt to define “culture” to build their disciplines, but were engaged in different kinds of arguments by definition. Definitional arguments often take one of two forms. A real definition takes the form “What is X?” In this view, we should use the word “X” in a particular way because that is what X really is. The other form of definitional argument, pragmatic definition, takes the form, “How should we use the term X?” In this view, an arguer puts for reasons for using the term “X” in a particular way. Evolutionary psychologists are engaged in argument by real definition. In their “manifesto” for evolutionary psychology, Tooby and Cosmides argue that the explanations of social or cultural behavior in the social sciences are “incoherent” because they attempt to explain such behavior “psychological phenomena without describing or even mentioning the evolved mechanisms their theories would require to be complete or coherent” (p.37). Because humans are biological creatures, cultural explanations must include biology because culture really is biological. Hence, biology is a necessary part of explanations of human culture. Cultural anthropologists engaged in argument by persuasive definition. A close examination of Kroeber’s writings reveals, however, that he readily acknowledged that humans were biological and culture rested on a biological foundation. He argued that we should treat culture as autonomous in our explanatory schemes because that would bring benefits to the biological sciences as well as the human sciences. In his writings, Kroeber reveals himself as a staunch Darwinian who argues for the autonomy of cultural anthropology on pragmatic, not on ontological grounds. Hence, the historical caricature of his work by evolutionary psychology fails.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4053/1/final_jackson_definition.pdf
Jackson, John (2008) Definitional Argument in Evolutionary Psychology and Cultural Anthropology. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4161
2016-10-13T13:47:20Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4161/
How to Discern a Physical Effect from Background Noise: The Discovery of Weak Neutral Currents
Schindler, Samuel
Theory/Observation
Experimentation
Physics
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper I try to shed some light on how one discerns a physical effect or phenomenon from experimental background ‘noise’. To this end I revisit the discovery of Weak Neutral Currents (WNC), which has been right at the centre of discussion of some of the most influential available literature on this issue. Bogen and Woodward (1988) have claimed that the phenomenon of WNC was inferred from the data without higher level physical theory explaining this phenomenon (here: the Weinberg-Salam model of electroweak interactions) being involved in this process. Mayo (1994, 1996), in a similar vein, holds that the discovery of WNC was made on the basis of some piecemeal statistical techniques—again without the Salam-Weinberg model (predicting and explaining WNC) being involved in the process. Both Bogen & Woodward and Mayo have tried to back up their claims by referring to the historical work about the discovery of WNC by Galison (1983, 1987). Galison’s presentation of the historical facts, which can be described as realist, has however been challenged by Pickering (1984, 1988, 1989), who has drawn sociological-relativist conclusions from this historical case. Pickering’s conclusions, in turn, have recently come under attack by Miller and Bullock (1994), who delivered a defence of Galison’s realist account. In this paper I consider all of these historical studies in order to evaluate the philosophical claims that have been made on the basis of them. I conclude that—contrary to Bogen & Woodward (1988) and Mayo (1994)—statistical methods and other experimental inference procedures from the “bottom-up” (i.e. from the data to the phenomena) were insufficient for discerning WNC from their background noise. I also challenge Galison’s notion of the “end of experiments” and shall take the wind out of the sail of Miller and Bullock’s attack on some of Pickering’s claims, whilst rejecting Pickering’s sociological-relativist conclusions. Instead, I claim that an epistemic warrant from the ‘top down’ in the form of a theoretical postulate of the Weinberg-Salam model was necessary for “ending the experiments”, i.e. for the acceptance of WNC as a genuine phenomenon in the scientific community.
2008-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4161/1/Physical_Effect_and_Background_Noise.pdf
Schindler, Samuel (2008) How to Discern a Physical Effect from Background Noise: The Discovery of Weak Neutral Currents. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4176
2010-10-07T15:16:59Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4176/
Kant and Whewell on Bridging Principles between Metaphysics and Science
Ducheyne, Steffen
Classical Physics
Structure of Theories
History of Philosophy of Science
Philosophers of Science
History of Science Case Studies
In this essay, I call attention to Kant’s and Whewell’s attempt to provide bridging principles between a priori principles and scientific laws. Part of Kant’s aim in the Opus postumum (ca. 1796-1803) was precisely to bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of natural science (on the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) see section 1) and physics by establishing intermediary concepts or ‘Mittelbegriffe’ (henceforth this problem is referred to as ‘the bridging-problem’). I argue that the late-Kant attempted to show that the concept of ‘moving force’, an intermediary concept derived from a priori principles, could be given empirical content so that concrete scientific knowledge is arrived at. Thus, the late-Kant wished not only to show that proper scientific laws are necessary a priori (as he had shown in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science) but also that intermediary concepts could be derived from a priori principles which, when interpreted empirically, resulted in the specific forces as established by physics (see section 2). Of course, William Whewell never knew about Kant’s Opus postumum and his attempt to bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of science and physics. However, it is striking that Whewell had similar concerns about the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science as Kant himself. According to Whewell, the Kantian project was incomplete because it did not show how ‘modifications’ (in the sense of concretizations) of a priori principles could result in empirical laws (section 3). Next, it will be argued, by taking into account several of Whewell’s philosophical notebooks which have scarcely been studied systematically, that Whewell’s doctrine of Fundamental Ideas grew out of his dissatisfaction with the Kantian project with respect to the bridging problem and that his own philosophical position should be seen as an attempt to bypass the bridging-problem.
2008-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4176/1/Kant-Whewell.pdf
Ducheyne, Steffen (2008) Kant and Whewell on Bridging Principles between Metaphysics and Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4206
2010-10-07T15:17:03Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D656475636174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4206/
Looking Back on Lancelot's Laughter: The Lancelot Thomas Hogben Papers
Tabery, James
Biology
Causation
History of Science Case Studies
Science Education
An overview of the Lancelot Thomas Hogben Papers at the University of Birmingham.
2006-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4206/1/Looking_Back_on_Lancelot%27s_Laughter%2C_The_Lancelot_Thomas_Hog.doc
Tabery, James (2006) Looking Back on Lancelot's Laughter: The Lancelot Thomas Hogben Papers. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4209
2010-10-07T15:17:04Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4209/
R.A. Fisher, Lancelot Hogben, and the Origin(s) of Genotype-Environment Interaction
Tabery, James
Probability/Statistics
Biology
Causation
History of Science Case Studies
This essay examines the origin(s) of genotype-environment interaction, or G×E. “Origin(s)” and not “the origin” because the thesis is that there were actually two distinct concepts of G×E at this beginning: a biometric concept, or G×EB, and a developmental concept, or G×ED. R. A. Fisher, one of the founders of population genetics and the creator of the statistical analysis of variance, introduced the biometric concept as he attempted to resolve one of the main problems in the biometric tradition of biology—partitioning the relative contributions of nature and nurture responsible for variation in a population. Lancelot Hogben, an experimental embryologist and also a statistician, introduced the developmental concept as he attempted to resolve one of the main problems in the developmental tradition of biology—determining the role that developmental relationships between genotype and environment played in the generation of variation. To argue for this thesis, I outline Fisher and Hogben’s separate routes to their respective concepts of G×E; then these separate interpretations of G×E are drawn on to explicate a debate between Fisher and Hogben over the importance of G×E, the first installment of a persistent controversy. Finally, Fisher’s G×EB and Hogben’s G×ED are traced beyond their own work into mid-20th C. population and developmental genetics, and then into the infamous IQ Controversy of the 1970’s.
2008-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4209/1/Tabery-Fisher.Hogben.and.the.Origins.of.GxE%28April.2008%29.doc
Tabery, James (2008) R.A. Fisher, Lancelot Hogben, and the Origin(s) of Genotype-Environment Interaction. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4210
2010-10-07T15:17:04Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D646576656C6F706D656E74616C
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4210/
Behavioral Genetics and Development: Historical and Conceptual Causes of Controversy
Griffiths, Paul
Tabery, James
Probability/Statistics
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Biology
Developmental Biology
History of Science Case Studies
Traditional, quantitative behavioral geneticists and developmental psychobiologists such as Gilbert Gottlieb have long debated what it would take to create a truly developmental behavioral genetics. These disputes have proven so intractable that disputants have repeatedly suggested that the problem rests on their opponents' conceptual confusion; whilst others have argued that the intractability results from the non-scientific, political motivations of their opponents. The authors provide a different explanation of the intractability of these debates. They show that the disputants have competing interpretations of the concepts of reaction norm, genotype-environment interaction, and gene. The common thread that underlies each of these disagreements, the authors argue, is the relevance of potential variation that is not manifest in any actual population to the understanding of development.
2008-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4210/1/GriffithsandTabery-Behavioral_Genetics_and_Development.Final%28v.5%29.doc
Griffiths, Paul and Tabery, James (2008) Behavioral Genetics and Development: Historical and Conceptual Causes of Controversy. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4220
2010-10-07T15:17:06Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4220/
Are the Laws of Physics Inevitable?
Franklin, Allan
Theory Change
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Social constructionists believe that experimental evidence plays a minimal role in the production of scientific knowledge, while rationalists such as myself believe that experimental evidence is crucial in it. As one historical example in support of the rationalist position, I trace in some detail the theoretical and experimental research that led to our understanding of beta decay, from Enrico Fermi’s pioneering theory of 1934 to George Sudarshan and Robert Marshak’s and Richard Feynman and Murray Gell-Mann’s suggestion in 1957 and 1958, respectively, of the V–A theory of weak interactions. This is not a history of an unbroken string of successes, but one that includes incorrect experimental results, incorrect experiment-theory comparisons, and faulty theoretical analyses. Nevertheless, we shall see that the constraints that Nature imposed made the V–A theory an almost inevitable outcome of this theoretical and experimental research.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4220/1/Are_the_Laws_of_Physics_Inevitable%28Conference%29.doc
Franklin, Allan (2008) Are the Laws of Physics Inevitable? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4232
2010-10-07T15:17:08Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4232/
Atomic Modeling in the Early 20th Century: 1904-1913
Baily, Charles
History of Science Case Studies
The early years of the 20th century was a time when great strides were made in understanding the nature of atoms, which had been theretofore thought of as indivisible components of matter, with no internal structure. The laws of physics as they were then known were inadequate in accounting for a mounting number of mysteries, including: the periodicity of the known elements, the discrete character of atomic spectra, the origin of atomic radiation, and the large-angle scattering of radiation by matter. This talk will address the pre-eminent atomic models of that period, from J.J. Thomson’s inaptly named “plum pudding” model and Hantaro Nagaoka’s often-overlooked “Saturnian” model, both from 1904, to Ernest Rutherford’s 1911 proposal of the atomic nucleus, and the semi-classical model proposed by Niels Bohr in 1913. Through an analysis of the original publications, the merits and drawbacks of each model will be explored, and a qualitative and quantitative comparison of their theoretical predictions will be made with the available data of that time.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4232/1/Atomic_Modeling_101208.pdf
Baily, Charles (2008) Atomic Modeling in the Early 20th Century: 1904-1913. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4248
2010-10-07T15:17:11Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4248/
Without God: Gravity as a Relational Property of Matter in Newton
Schliesser, Eric
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
In this paper I interpret Newton’s speculative treatment of gravity as a relational, accidental property of matter that arises through what Newton calls “the shared action” of two bodies of matter. In doing so, I expand and extend on a hint by Howard Stein. However, in developing the details of my interpretation I end up disagreeing with Stein’s claim that for Newton a single body can generate a gravity/force field. I argue that when Newton drafted the first edition of the Principia in the mid 1680s, he thought that (at least a part of) the cause of gravity is the disposition inherent in any individual body, but that the force of gravity is the actualization of that disposition; a necessary condition for the actualization of the disposition is the actual obtaining of a relation between two bodies having the disposition. The cause of gravity is not essential to matter because God could have created matter without that disposition. Nevertheless, at least a part of the cause of gravity inheres in individual bodies and were there one body in the universe it would inhere in that body. On the other hand, the force of gravity is neither essential to matter nor inherent in matter, because (to repeat) it is the actualization of a shared disposition. A lone part-less particle would, thus, not generate a gravity field. Seeing this allows us to helpfully distinguish among a) accepting gravity as causally real; b) the cause(s) (e.g. the qualities of matter) of the properties of gravity; c) making claims about the mechanism or medium by which gravity is transmitted. This will help clarify what Newton could have meant when he insisted that gravity is a real force. I present my argument in opposition to Andrew Janiak’s influential and fine 2007 paper. Along the way, I call attention to my disagreement with Janiak on a number of secondary issues (e.g. Janiak’s attribution to Newton of a distinction between ‘local’ and ‘distant’ action; Janiak’s reading of the “Letter to Bentley,” etc).
2008
Other
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4248/1/withoutgodrelationalquality.doc
Schliesser, Eric (2008) Without God: Gravity as a Relational Property of Matter in Newton. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4276
2010-10-07T15:17:15Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4276/
Philosophical Method and Galileo's Paradox of Infinity
Parker, Matthew W.
Theory Change
Mathematics
History of Science Case Studies
Conventionalism
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
We consider an approach to some philosophical problems that I call the Method of Conceptual Articulation: to recognize that a question may lack any determinate answer, and to re-engineer concepts so that the question acquires a definite answer in such a way as to serve the epistemic motivations behind the question. As a case study we examine “Galileo’s Paradox”, that the perfect square numbers seem to be at once as numerous as the whole numbers, by one-to-one correspondence, and yet less numerous, being a proper subset. I argue that Cantor resolved this paradox by a method at least close to that proposed—not by discovering the true nature of cardinal number, but by articulating several useful and appealing extensions of number to the infinite. Galileo was right to suggest that the concept of relative size did not apply to the infinite, for the concept he possessed did not. Nor was Bolzano simply wrong to reject Hume’s Principle (that one-to-one correspondence implies equal number) in the infinitary case, in favor of Euclid’s Common Notion 5 (that the whole is greater than the part), for the concept of cardinal number (in the sense of “number of elements”) was not clearly defined for infinite collections. Order extension theorems now suggest that a theory of cardinality upholding Euclid’s principle instead of Hume’s is possible. Cantor’s refinements of number are not the only ones possible, and they appear to have been shaped by motivations and fruitfulness, for they evolved in discernible stages correlated with emerging applications and results. Galileo, Bolzano, and Cantor shared interests in the particulate analysis of the continuum and in physical applications. Cantor’s concepts proved fruitful for those pursuits. Finally, Gödel was mistaken to claim that Cantor’s concept of cardinality is forced on us; though Gödel gives an intuitively compelling argument, he ignores the fact that Euclid’s Common Notion is also intuitively compelling, and we are therefore forced to make a choice. The success of Cantor’s concept of cardinality lies not in its truth (for concepts are not true or false), nor its uniqueness (for it is not the only extension of number possible), but in its intuitive appeal, and most of all, its usefulness to the understanding.
2008-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4276/1/Galileo%27s_Paradox.pdf
Parker, Matthew W. (2008) Philosophical Method and Galileo's Paradox of Infinity. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4343
2010-10-07T15:17:27Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4343/
Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement, and the Baconian Origins of the Laws of Nature
Schliesser, Eric
History of Philosophy of Science
Laws of Nature
History of Science Case Studies
This paper investigates what Newton could have meant in a now famous passage from De Gravitatione (hereafter “DeGrav”) that “space is as it were an emanative effect of God” (21). First I offer a careful examination of the four key passages within DeGrav that bear on this. I argue that the logic of Newton’s argument permits several interpretations (section I). Second I sketch four options: i) one approach associated with the Cambridge Platonist, Thomas More, recently investigated by Dana Jalobeanu and Ed Slowik; ii) one traditional neo-Platonic approach; iii) a necessitarian approach associated with Howard Stein’s interpretation, recently reaffirmed by Andrew Janiak; iv) an approach connected with Bacon’s efforts to reformulate a useful notion of form and laws of nature. Hitherto only the first and third options have received scholarly attention. I offer arguments to treat Newtonian emanation as a species of Baconian formal causation and in this way to combine some of the most attractive elements of the first three options (section II). Finally in Section III, I suggest that the recent scholarly focus on emanation has obscured the importance of Newton’s very interesting claims about existence and measurement in the same passage(s).
2008
Other
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4343/1/Newtonian_Emanation.doc
Schliesser, Eric (2008) Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement, and the Baconian Origins of the Laws of Nature. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4396
2010-10-07T15:17:33Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4396/
Time Symmetry and the Many-Worlds Interpretation
Vaidman, Lev
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Mechanics
An attempt to solve the collapse problem in the framework of a time-symmetric quantum formalism is reviewed. Although the proposal does not look very attractive, its concept - a world defined by two quantum states, one evolving forwards and one evolving backwards in time - is found to be useful in modifying the many-worlds picture of Everett’s theory.
2009-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4396/1/vaidman_paper_jb_3rd_edit.pdf
Vaidman, Lev (2009) Time Symmetry and the Many-Worlds Interpretation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4481
2016-10-13T13:46:53Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:6669656C64732D616E642D7061727469636C6573
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4481/
Bogen and Woodward’s data-phenomena distinction, forms of theory-ladenness, and the reliability of data
Schindler, Samuel
Theory/Observation
Philosophers of Science
Fields and Particles
History of Science Case Studies
Experimentation
Some twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the received view, namely the theory-observation dichotomy and argued for the introduction of the further category of scientific phenomena. The latter, Bogen and Woodward stressed, are usually unobservable and inferred from what is indeed observable, namely scientific data. Crucially, Bogen and Woodward claim that theories, which we seek to test, predict and explain phenomena, not data. But then, of course, the thesis of theory-ladenness cannot apply. The idea that theory-ladenness does not occur in scientific practice is one of the claims I contest in this paper. More importantly, Bogen and Woodward held that the reliability of the data, which constitutes the first step towards an inference from the data to the phenomena, can be secured without the theory one seeks to test. Again, this appears not to be descriptive of actual scientific practice. In order to show this, I re-visit two case studies that have figured heavily in Bogen and Woodward’s publications and others: the discovery of weak neutral currents and the discovery of the zebra pattern of magnetic anomalies (Kaiser 1995). I show that, in the latter case, data can be ignored if they appear to be irrelevant from a particular theoretical perspective (TLI) and, in the former case, the tested theory can be critical for the assessment of the reliability of data (TLA). I argue that both TLI and TLA are much stronger senses of theory-ladenness than the classical thesis and that neither TLI nor TLA can be accommodated within Bogen and Woodward’s account.
2009-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4481/1/SSchindler_Phenomena.pdf
Schindler, Samuel (2009) Bogen and Woodward’s data-phenomena distinction, forms of theory-ladenness, and the reliability of data. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4555
2010-10-07T15:17:51Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D65646963696E65
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:746563686E6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4555/
Multi-level complexities in technological development: Competing strategies for drug discovery
Adam, Matthias
Medicine
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Technology
Complex Systems
Experimentation
History of Science Case Studies
Drug development regularly has to deal with complex circumstances on two levels: the local level of pharmacological intervention on specific target proteins, and the systems level of the effects of pharmacological intervention on the organism. Different development strategies in the recent history of early drug development can be understood as competing attempts at coming to grips with these multi-level complexities. Both rational drug design and high-throughput screening concentrate on the local level, while traditional empirical search strategies as well as recent systems biology approaches focus on the systems level. The analysis of these strategies reveals serious obstacles to integrating the study of interventive and systems complexity in a systematic, methodical way. Due to some fairly general properties of biological networks and the available options for pharmaceutical intervention, drug development is captured in an obstinate methodological dilemma. It is argued that at least in typical cases, drug development therefore remains dependent on coincidence, serendipity or plain luck to bridge the gap between (empirical and/or rational) development methodology and actual therapeutic success.
2009-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4555/1/Adam_Multilevel_Complexities_Drug_Discovery.pdf
Adam, Matthias (2009) Multi-level complexities in technological development: Competing strategies for drug discovery. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4658
2010-10-07T15:18:03Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4658/
Structural Realism versus Standard Scientific Realism: The Case of Phlogiston and Dephlogisticated Air
Ladyman, James
Theory Change
Theory/Observation
History of Science Case Studies
Realism/Anti-realism
The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the key to formulating the appropriate form of scientific realism in response to arguments from theory change, and that the case of phlogiston theory is shown to be readily accommodated by ontic structural realism.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4658/1/Ladyman.pdf
Ladyman, James (2009) Structural Realism versus Standard Scientific Realism: The Case of Phlogiston and Dephlogisticated Air. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4662
2010-10-07T15:18:04Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368656D6973747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4662/
Structural Correspondence, Indirect Reference, and Partial Truth: Phlogiston Theory and Newtonian Mechanics
Schurz, Gerhard
Classical Physics
Structure of Theories
Theory Change
Theory/Observation
Chemistry
Relativity Theory
Physics
History of Science Case Studies
Realism/Anti-realism
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
This paper elaborates on the following correspondence theorem (which has been defended and formally proved elsewhere): if theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of applications A, but was superseded later on by a different theory T* which was likewise successful in A, then under natural conditions T contains theoretical expressions f which were responsible for T's success and correspond (in A) to certain theoretical expressions f* of T*. I illustrate this theorem at hand of the phlogiston vs. oxygen theories of combustion, and the classical vs. relativistic theories of mass. The ontological consequences of the theorem are worked out in terms of the indirect reference and partial truth. The final section explains how the correspondence theorem may justify a weak version of scientific realism without presupposing the no-miracles argument.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4662/1/SchurzKorresSynth.pdf
Schurz, Gerhard (2009) Structural Correspondence, Indirect Reference, and Partial Truth: Phlogiston Theory and Newtonian Mechanics. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4663
2010-10-07T15:18:04Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4663/
Saving the Intuitions: Polylithic Reference
Votsis, Ioannis
Theory Change
Theory/Observation
Physics
History of Science Case Studies
Realism/Anti-realism
My main aim in this paper is to clarify the concepts of referential success and of referential continuity that are so crucial to the scientific realism debate. I start by considering the three dominant theories of reference and the intuitions that motivate each of them. Since several intuitions cited in support of one theory conflict with intuitions cited in support of another something has to give way. The traditional policy has been to reject all intuitions that clash with a chosen theory. A more radical policy, tied to some experimental philosophers, has called for the rejection of any evidential role for intuitions. I explore a largely ignored third alternative, i.e. saving intuitions (and their evidential role) even when they are at odds. To accommodate conflicting intuitions different sets of internally consistent (yet externally inconsistent) intuitions are taken to lend credence to different concepts of reference. In the current context, this means that the concepts of referential success and referential continuity are not monolithic. They are what I call ‘polylithic’. This paper is as much about meta-philosophical concerns with the role of intuitions as it is about reference and the scientific realism debate. Regarding the former I hope that a blueprint will emerge for similar projects in other philosophical domains. Regarding the latter, I hope that polylithicity helps disentangle claims about referential success and continuity in the scientific realism debate by making perspicuous which concepts are best equipped to evaluate the realist’s epistemic claims against the historical record of science.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4663/1/VotsisSavingTheIntuitions.pdf
Votsis, Ioannis (2009) Saving the Intuitions: Polylithic Reference. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4664
2010-10-07T15:18:04Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4664/
Underdetermination, Realism and Empirical Equivalence
Worrall, John
Confirmation/Induction
Theory Change
Theory/Observation
History of Science Case Studies
Realism/Anti-realism
Are theories ‘underdetermined by the evidence’ in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically equivalent if they share all consequences expressed in purely observational vocabulary. This is a much stronger requirement than has hitherto been recognised – two such ‘rival’ theories must in fact agree on many claims that are clearly theoretical in nature. Given this, it is unclear how much of an impact on realism a demonstration that there is always an empirically equivalent ‘rival’ to any accepted theory would have – even if such a demonstration could be produced. Certainly in the case of the version of realism that I defend – structural realism – such a demonstration would have precisely no impact: two empirically equivalent theories are, according to structural realism, cognitively indistinguishable.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4664/1/Worrall_-_Underdetermination.pdf
Worrall, John (2009) Underdetermination, Realism and Empirical Equivalence. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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