2024-03-29T12:35:38Z
http:///cgi/oai2
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:584
2010-10-07T15:10:45Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/584/
Science: Freedom and Reason, Comments on Mara Beller's 'Quantum Dialogue'
Shenker, Orly R.
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Mara Beller's book Quantum Dialogue: The Making of a Revolution is a book in history and historiography, which invites a philosophical reading. The book offers a new and quite radical approach in the philosophy of science, which Beller calls dialogism, and it demonstrates the application of this approach by studying cases in the history of physics. This paper reconstructs of some of the book's theses, in a way which emphasises its philosophical insights, and goes on to shows how philosophically far dialogism can take us. The example on which the paper focuses is the demarcation between science and non-science.
2000-12
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/584/1/Shenker_Dialogism_.doc
Shenker, Orly R. (2000) Science: Freedom and Reason, Comments on Mara Beller's 'Quantum Dialogue'. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:650
2010-10-07T15:10:52Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/650/
Epistemic Divergence and the Publicity of Scientific Methods
Piccinini, Gualtiero
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Abstract. Epistemic divergence occurs when different investigators give different answers to the same question using evidence-collecting methods that are not public. Without following the principle that scientific methods must be public, scientific communities risk epistemic divergence. I explicate the notion of public method and argue that, to avoid the risk of epistemic divergence, scientific communities should (and do) apply only methods that are public.
2002
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/650/1/method_publicity_new_new_3.doc
Piccinini, Gualtiero (2002) Epistemic Divergence and the Publicity of Scientific Methods. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1313
2010-10-07T15:11:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636C6173736963616C2D70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:64657465726D696E69736D2D696E64657465726D696E69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6669656C642D7468656F7279
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1313/
A Critique of Recent Claims of a Solution to Zeno’s Paradoxes
Harokopos, Efthimios
Classical Physics
Science vs. Pseudoscience
History of Philosophy of Science
Causation
Philosophers of Science
Determinism/Indeterminism
Quantum Field Theory
In a recently published paper it is concluded that there is a necessary trade off of all precisely determined physical values at a time for their continuity in time. This conclusion was based on the premise that there is not a precise instant in time underlying a continuous dynamical physical process. Based on the conclusion stated above, it was further asserted that three of Zeno’s paradoxes were solved. In the short critique following it is demonstrated that the conclusions in the paper were due to a non sequitur fallacy made in the reasoning employed. Causality issues found in the conclusion made are also explored. Both the conclusion and alleged solutions to Zeno’s paradoxes are then termed invalid.
2003
Other
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1313/1/Harokopos_08102003.doc
Harokopos, Efthimios (2003) A Critique of Recent Claims of a Solution to Zeno’s Paradoxes. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2446
2010-10-07T15:13:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2446/
Starving the Theological Cuckoo
Price, Huw
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Science and Religion
This is a review of John Leslie's 'Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology' (OUP, 2001). It was commissioned by the London Review of Books in 2002, but rejected by the commissioning editor, apparently because he disliked its anti-theological stance. (See the Postscript to the present version for more details.)
2002-09
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2446/1/Leslie_Review.pdf
Price, Huw (2002) Starving the Theological Cuckoo. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2450
2010-10-07T15:13:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2450/
The Empirical Stance vs. The Critical Attitude
Rowbottom, Darrell Patrick
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory Change
Philosophers of Science
Van Fraassen has recently argued that empiricism can be construed as a stance, involving commitments, attitudes, values, and goals, in addition to beliefs and opinions. But this characterisation emerges from his recognition that to be an empiricist can not be to believe, or decide to commit to belief in, a foundational proposition, without removing any basis for a non-dogmatic empiricist critique of other philosophical approaches, such as materialism. However, noticeable by its absence in Van Fraassen's discussions is any mention of Bartley's ‘pancritical rationalism’, for Bartley offers a cohesive argument that genuine dogmatism lies precisely in the act of commitment to an idea. The consequence of denying this, he thinks, is an opening of the floodgates to irrationalism: if to rely on reasoned argument in decision-making is fundamentally an act of faith, then there is a tu quoque – “I simply have a different faith” – that may be employed by those who wish to shield their views from criticism. This raises the following question: why should it be any less dogmatic to adopt particular commitments, attitudes, values, and goals, rather than a particular belief or opinion, come what may? And if Bartley is right that there is only one non-dogmatic attitude – the critical attitude – then why might this not be adopted by an empiricist, a materialist, a metaphysician, or anyone else?
2005
Other
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2450/1/Rowbottom.pdf
Rowbottom, Darrell Patrick (2005) The Empirical Stance vs. The Critical Attitude. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2583
2010-10-07T15:13:50Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2583/
Is Intelligent Design Science? Dissecting the Dover Decision
Monton, Bradley
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Science and Religion
In the case of Kitzmiller et al. v. Dover Area School District, et al., Judge Jones ruled that a pro-intelligent design disclaimer cannot be read to public school students. In his decision, he gave demarcation criteria for what counts as science, ruling that intelligent design fails these criteria. I argue that these criteria are flawed, with most of my focus on the criterion of methodological naturalism. The way to refute intelligent design is not by declaring it unscientific, but by showing that the empirical evidence for design is not there.
2006-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2583/1/Methodological_Naturalism_2.pdf
Monton, Bradley (2006) Is Intelligent Design Science? Dissecting the Dover Decision. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2592
2010-10-07T15:13:51Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2592/
Is Intelligent Design Science? Dissecting the Dover Decision
Monton, Bradley
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Science and Religion
In the case of Kitzmiller et al. v. Dover Area School District, et al., Judge Jones ruled that a pro-intelligent design disclaimer cannot be read to public school students. In his decision, he gave demarcation criteria for what counts as science, ruling that intelligent design fails these criteria. I argue that these criteria are flawed, with most of my focus on the criterion of methodological naturalism. The way to refute intelligent design is not by declaring it unscientific, but by showing that the empirical evidence for design is not there.
2006-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2592/1/Methodological_Naturalism_Dover_3.doc
Monton, Bradley (2006) Is Intelligent Design Science? Dissecting the Dover Decision. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3980
2010-10-07T15:16:29Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3980/
What is Dialectic? Some remarks on Popper’s criticism
Groisman, Berry
Structure of Theories
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory Change
Laws of Nature
Philosophers of Science
Karl Popper famously opposed Marxism in general and its philosophical core – the Marxist dialectic – in particular. As a progressive thinker, Popper saw in dialectic a source of dogmatism damaging to philosophy and political theory. Popper had summarized his views on dialectic in an article that was first delivered in 1937 and subsequently republished as a chapter of his book (2002, pp. 419-451), where he accuses Marxist dialecticians of not tolerating criticism. Ironically, Popper’s view that all Marxist dialecticians dogmatically dismiss any criticism of dialectic by claiming that their opponents do not understand dialectic makes his position no less dogmatic. Indeed, any attempt to criticise Popper’s views on dialectics would be seen only as an additional example of responses by “dogmatic dialecticians”, making his theory essentially immune. This completely prevents dialecticians from being able to criticise Popper’s views. This is exactly the opposite of what the great philosopher wanted. Therefore, for the sake of “anti-dogmatic science” it is desirable and even necessary to defend dialectic. In this work I address several central points about Popper’s criticism of Marxist (materialist) dialectic. In particular, I (a) analyse Popper’s definition of dialectic as the dialectic triad (thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis) and contrast it with a notion of dialectic as a much more complex concept which occurs in dialectical materialism today, where the triad represents only one of the aspects; (b) compare dialectic with the trial and error method; (c) discuss the place of dialectic amongst valid scientific methods: Does dialectic accept logical contradictions; (e) discuss lessons dialecticians should learn from Popper’s criticism. I will test my arguments as to their constructiveness and will demonstrate explicitly the nature of my disagreement with Popper - thereby trying to avoid the “dogmatic dialecticians” response as much as possible.
2007-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3980/1/What_is_Dialectic_110408.pdf
Groisman, Berry (2007) What is Dialectic? Some remarks on Popper’s criticism. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4230
2010-10-07T15:17:08Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:726865746F7269632D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4230/
The logic of scientific debate: Epistemological quality control practices and Bayesian inference – a neoPopperian perspective
Skoyles, John
Probability/Statistics
Confirmation/Induction
Psychology
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory Change
Rhetoric of Science
Values In Science
Science is about evaluation, persuasion and logic. In scientific debate, scientists collectively evaluate theories by persuading each other in regard to epistemological qualities such as deduction and fact. There is, however, a flaw intrinsic to evaluation-by-persuasion: an individual can attempt and even succeed in persuading others by asserting that their reasoning is logical when it is not. This is a problem since, from an epistemological perspective, it is not always transparent nor obvious when a persuasive assertion is actually deductively warranted. Empirical research upon reasoning, indeed, supports the notion that assertions are often strongly persuasive for reasons other than their logic. The unreliability of the link between persuasion and logic raises an important methodological issue: how do scientists debate in a manner such that claimed but false “logical” arguments are ignored, and only warranted arguments get to determine theory preference? This need for soundness in debate is a particularly important epistemological concern in cases where the deductive qualities of persuasive argument are not overt, and so cannot be directly checked --such as when they are founded upon Bayesianism probabilistic coherence. The argument presented here is that scientists make the qualities of probabilistic and nonprobabilistic inference sound (and so warranted) through how they organize their debate. Scientists, I argue, abide by “epistemological quality control practices” that limit the persuasive power of unsound arguments upon theory evaluation. Examples of such debate quality control practices are publicness, clarity, openness to criticism, and the collective promotion of attempts at theory conjecture and refutation. Methodologically, these quality control practices are extralogical since they do not directly provide scientific inferences with additional logical warrantedness. They function instead in science to generate an epistemological evaluative environment in which persuasiveness is due, and only due, to logic (i.e. sound). Their methodological role is therefore to make what is warranted de papyri (in our principles of rationality – epistemologically competence) also what is persuasive in evaluation and debate de cognitio (in our exercise of such principles – epistemologically performance). Several limitations exist upon the soundness of Bayesian inferential coherence – surreptitious revision, logical omniscience, uncertain evidence, old evidence, and new hypotheses. Bayesianism, as a result, can only exist if it is pursued in a debate that is regulated by quality control practices over its inferences (for instance, practices that ensure there is autonomy of inference, diligence of inference, probity of evidence, auditability of inference and assiduousness of conjecture). In this context, one can reinterpret Popper’s concern with criticism, openness, refutation and conjecture, as deriving not (as he thought) directly from the needs of logic, but, indirectly, from the need of scientists to create epistemological soundness.
2008-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4230/1/Logic_of_scientific_debate.pdf
Skoyles, John (2008) The logic of scientific debate: Epistemological quality control practices and Bayesian inference – a neoPopperian perspective. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4602
2010-10-07T15:17:57Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:73796D6D6574726965732D696E76617269616E636573
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:6669656C64732D616E642D7061727469636C6573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4602/
Gauge-Invariant Localization of Infinitely Many Gravitational Energies from All Possible Auxiliary Structures
Pitts, J. Brian
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Cosmology
Mathematics
Symmetries/Invariances
Science and Religion
Relativity Theory
Fields and Particles
Physics
The problem of finding a covariant expression for the distribution and conservation of gravitational energy-momentum dates to the 1910s. A suitably covariant infinite-component localization is displayed, reflecting Bergmann's realization that there are infinitely many gravitational energy-momenta. Initially use is made of a flat background metric (or rather, all of them) or connection, because the desired gauge invariance properties are obvious. Partial gauge-fixing then yields an appropriate covariant quantity without any background metric or connection; one version is the collection of pseudotensors of a given type, such as the Einstein pseudotensor, in _every_ coordinate system. This solution to the gauge covariance problem is easily adapted to any pseudotensorial expression (Landau-Lifshitz, Goldberg, Papapetrou or the like) or to any tensorial expression built with a background metric or connection. Thus the specific functional form can be chosen on technical grounds such as relating to Noether's theorem and yielding expected values of conserved quantities in certain contexts and then rendered covariant using the procedure described here. The application to angular momentum localization is straightforward. Traditional objections to pseudotensors are based largely on the false assumption that there is only one gravitational energy rather than infinitely many.
2009-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4602/1/EnergyGravity.pdf
Pitts, J. Brian (2009) Gauge-Invariant Localization of Infinitely Many Gravitational Energies from All Possible Auxiliary Structures. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4774
2010-10-07T15:18:19Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:73796D6D6574726965732D696E76617269616E636573
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:6669656C64732D616E642D7061727469636C6573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4774/
Gauge-Invariant Localization of Infinitely Many Gravitational Energies from All Possible Auxiliary Structures
Pitts, J. Brian
Cosmology
Symmetries/Invariances
Science and Religion
Fields and Particles
Physics
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Mathematics
Relativity Theory
The problem of finding a covariant expression for the distribution and conservation of gravitational energy-momentum dates to the 1910s. A suitably covariant infinite-component localization is displayed, reflecting Bergmann's realization that there are infinitely many conserved gravitational energy-momenta. Initially use is made of a flat background metric (or rather, all of them) or connection, because the desired gauge invariance properties are obvious. Partial gauge-fixing then yields an appropriate covariant quantity without any background metric or connection; one version is the collection of pseudotensors of a given type, such as the Einstein pseudotensor, in _every_ coordinate system. This solution to the gauge covariance problem is easily adapted to any pseudotensorial expression (Landau-Lifshitz, Goldberg, Papapetrou or the like) or to any tensorial expression built with a background metric or connection. Thus the specific functional form can be chosen on technical grounds such as relating to Noether's theorem and yielding expected values of conserved quantities in certain contexts and then rendered covariant using the procedure described here. The application to angular momentum localization is straightforward. Traditional objections to pseudotensors are based largely on the false assumption that there is only one gravitational energy rather than infinitely many.
2009-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4774/1/EnergyGravityArxiv.pdf
Pitts, J. Brian (2009) Gauge-Invariant Localization of Infinitely Many Gravitational Energies from All Possible Auxiliary Structures. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5399
2010-10-07T15:19:45Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:6669656C64732D616E642D7061727469636C6573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6669656C642D7468656F7279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5399/
Mirror Symmetry and Other Miracles in Superstring Theory
Rickles, Dean
Cosmology
Theory/Observation
Explanation
Fields and Particles
Physics
Realism/Anti-realism
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Relativity Theory
Quantum Field Theory
The dominance of string theory in the research landscape of quantum gravity physics (despite any direct experimental evidence) can, I think, be justified in a variety of ways. Here I focus on an argument from mathematical fertility, broadly similar to Hilary Putnam’s ‘no miracles argument’ that, I argue, many string theorists in fact espouse. String theory leads to many surprising, useful, and well-confirmed mathematical ‘predictions’—here I focus on mirror symmetry. These predictions are made on the basis of general physical principles entering into string theory. The success of the mathematical predictions are then seen as evidence for framework that generated them. I attempt to defend this argument, but there are nonetheless some serious objections to be faced. These objections can only be evaded at a high (philosophical) price.
2010-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5399/1/mathodo.pdf
Rickles, Dean (2010) Mirror Symmetry and Other Miracles in Superstring Theory. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8423
2013-03-29T13:24:53Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8423/
Criteria of empirical significance: a success story
Lutz, Sebastian
Conventionalism
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory/Observation
The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion being explicated is too vague to be useful. I show instead that a significant number of these criteria—by Ayer, Popper, Przełęcki, Suppes, and David Lewis, among others—not only form a coherent whole, but also connect directly to the theory of definition, the notion of empirical content as explicated by Ramsey sentences, and the theory of measurement; two criteria by Carnap and Sober are trivial, but can be saved and connected to the other criteria by slight modifications. A corollary is that the ordinary language defense of Lewis, the conceptual arguments by Ayer and Popper, the theoretical considerations by Przełęcki, and the practical considerations by Suppes all apply to the same criterion or closely related criteria. Furthermore, the equivalence of some criteria allows for their individual justifications to be taken cumulatively and, together with the entailment relations between nonequivalent criteria, suggest criteria for general auxiliary assumptions, comparative criteria, and more liberal conceptions of observation.
2010-12-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8423/1/eight_kinds_significance.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2010) Criteria of empirical significance: a success story. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8424
2011-04-18T11:37:49Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8424/
On Sober's Criterion of Contrastive Testability
Lutz, Sebastian
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory/Observation
Elliott Sober has suggested his criterion of contrastive testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability. I argue that his criterion renders almost any theory empirically significant because its restrictions on auxiliary assumptions are to weak. Even when the criterion is modified to avoid this trivialization, it fails to meet other conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance that follow from Sober's position. I suggest to define empirical significance as empirical non-equivalence to a tautology, because this definition does meet the conditions of adequacy. Specifically, it is equivalent to the standard Bayesian criterion of empirical significance whenever all probabilities are defined and contains falsifiability as a special case. This latter feature is important because those conditions of adequacy that apply to criteria of deductive empirical significance single out falsifiability.
2010-12-13
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8424/1/on_sobers_testability.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2010) On Sober's Criterion of Contrastive Testability. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8574
2011-04-18T11:37:48Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8574/
On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability I: Defining Contrastive Testability
Lutz, Sebastian
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory/Observation
Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability or a suggestion within Bayesianism. I argue that Sober’s criterion entails that if one group of people is justified in believing a claim, every group is, and that it tacitly relies on an inconsistent interpretation of probabilistic inequalities. Furthermore, the criterion’s restrictions on the use of auxiliary assumptions are in part redundant and in part unjustified. Most importantly, they are so weak that almost all theories can be contrastively tested. On the basis of these results, I suggest a modification of Sober’s criterion that avoids these problems without abandoning Sober’s core idea.
2011-04-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8574/1/on_sobers_testability_a.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2011) On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability I: Defining Contrastive Testability. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8575
2011-04-18T11:37:54Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8575/
On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability II: The Material Inadequacy of Contrastive Testability
Lutz, Sebastian
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory/Observation
Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability and the standard Bayesian criterion of empirical significance. I argue that the criterion fails to meet four of the conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance that follow from Sober’s position or are presumed in his arguments. I suggest to define empirical significance as empirical non-equivalence to a tautology, because this definition does meet the conditions of adequacy. Specifically, it is equivalent to the standard Bayesian criterion of empirical significance whenever all probabilities are defined and contains falsifiability as a special case. This latter feature is important because those conditions of adequacy that apply to criteria of deductive empirical significance single out falsifiability.
2011-04-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8575/1/on_sobers_testability_b.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2011) On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability II: The Material Inadequacy of Contrastive Testability. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8608
2011-05-15T15:45:06Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8608/
On Likelihoodism and Intelligent Design
Lutz, Sebastian
Evolutionary Theory
Confirmation/Induction
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory/Observation
Two common and plausible claims in the philosophy of science are that (i) a theory that makes no predictions is not testable and (ii) one cannot confirm a theory by criticizing a competing one absent further assumptions about their relation. Elliott Sober has developed these claims within likelihoodism, which defines the testability and confirmation of a theory only in contrast to another, and has argued that the claims hold for intelligent design (ID) when contrasted with evolutionary theory (ET). I show that Sober’s arguments rely on a contentious hidden premise, and that within likelihoodism, both claims are false for ID and ET under his assumptions and one very weak further assumption about ID and ET. I then show that, given Sober’s assumptions, the claims are true for a non-contrastive criterion of testability close to the Bayesian one and the relevance criterion of confirmation.
2011-02-14
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8608/1/lutz-on_likelihoodism_and_id.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2011) On Likelihoodism and Intelligent Design. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8609
2011-07-21T15:08:27Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8609/
On an Allegedly Essential Feature of Demarcation Criteria of Science
Lutz, Sebastian
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Laudan’s argument against the possibility of a demarcation criterion for scientific theories rests on establishing that any criterion must be a necessary and sufficient condition. But Laudan’s argument at most establishes that any criterion must provide a necessary condition and a possibly different sufficient condition. His own claims suggest that such a criterion is possible.
2011-04-20
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8609/1/lutz-on_demarcation_criteria.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2011) On an Allegedly Essential Feature of Demarcation Criteria of Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8611
2011-05-13T11:41:03Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8611/
Empiricism and Intelligent Design I: Three Empiricist Challenges
Lutz, Sebastian
Evolutionary Theory
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory/Observation
Due to the logical relations between theism and intelligent design (ID), there are two challenges to theism that also apply to ID. In the falsifiability challenge, it is charged that theism is compatible with every observation statement and thus asserts nothing. I argue that the contentious assumptions of this challenge can be avoided without loss of precision by charging theism (and thus ID) directly with the lack of observational assertions. In the translatability challenge, it is charged that theism can be translated into a (non-theistic) set of observation statements without loss of cognitive content. I argue that the contentious assumptions of this challenge are avoided by the related charge that the (non-theistic) evolutionary theory makes all the observational assertions of ID, while the converse does not hold. Elliott Sober has argued that ID meets the falsifiability challenge, but, since it makes almost no observational assertions, is not testable. I point out two problems with Sober’s argument and show that ID is both deductively and probabilistically testable. Sober’s argument, I suggest, inconsistently combines the modified falsifiability challenge with the modified translatability challenge. If his claims about ID’s observational assertions are true, however, ID succumbs to the modified translatability challenge.
2011-05-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8611/1/lutz-empiricism_and_id_1.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2011) Empiricism and Intelligent Design I: Three Empiricist Challenges. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8612
2011-05-13T11:41:38Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8612/
Empiricism and Intelligent Design II: Analyzing Intelligent Design
Lutz, Sebastian
Evolutionary Theory
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory/Observation
If intelligent design (ID) is to compete with evolutionary theory (ET), it must meet the modified falsifiability challenge, that is, make some deductive or probabilistic observational assertions. It must also meet the modified translatability challenge, which it fails if ET makes all the observational assertions of ID, while ID does not make all the observational assertions of ET. I discuss four prominent and surprisingly diverse formulations of ID and show that each either fails one of the two challenges or is analytically false.
2011-03-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8612/1/lutz-empiricism_and_id_2.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2011) Empiricism and Intelligent Design II: Analyzing Intelligent Design. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8616
2011-06-08T13:27:40Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65617274682D736369656E636573
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8616/
Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism
Pitts, J. Brian
Confirmation/Induction
Earth Sciences
History of Philosophy of Science
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Realism/Anti-realism
Science and Religion
Science vs. Pseudoscience
It is widely believed that one should not become more confident that _all swans are white and all lions are brave_ simply by observing white swans. Irrelevant conjunction or "tacking" of a theory onto another is often thought problematic for Bayesianism, especially given the ratio measure of confirmation considered here. It is recalled that the irrelevant conjunct is not confirmed at all. Using the ratio measure, the irrelevant conjunction is confirmed to the same degree as the relevant conjunct, which, it is argued, is ideal: the irrelevant conjunct is irrelevant. Because the past's really having been as it now appears to have been is an irrelevant conjunct, present evidence confirms theories about past events only insofar as irrelevant conjunctions are confirmed. Hence the ideal of not confirming irrelevant conjunctions would imply that historical claims are not confirmed. Confirmation measures partially realizing that ideal make the confirmation of historical claims by present evidence depend strongly on the (presumably subjective) degree of belief in the irrelevant conjunct. The unusually good behavior of the ratio measure has a bearing on the problem of measure sensitivity. For non-statistical hypotheses, Bayes' theorem yields a fractional linear transformation in the prior probability, not a linear rescaling, so even the ratio measure arguably does not aptly measure confirmation in such cases.
2011-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8616/1/IrrelevantConjunctionRatio.pdf
Pitts, J. Brian (2011) Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8659
2011-06-08T13:27:40Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65617274682D736369656E636573
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8659/
Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism
Pitts, J. Brian
Confirmation/Induction
Earth Sciences
History of Philosophy of Science
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Realism/Anti-realism
Science and Religion
Science vs. Pseudoscience
It is widely believed that one should not become more confident that _all swans are white and all lions are brave_ simply by observing white swans. Irrelevant conjunction or "tacking" of a theory onto another is often thought problematic for Bayesianism, especially given the ratio measure of confirmation considered here. It is recalled that the irrelevant conjunct is not confirmed at all. Using the ratio measure, the irrelevant conjunction is confirmed to the same degree as the relevant conjunct, which, it is argued, is ideal: the irrelevant conjunct is irrelevant. Because the past's really having been as it now appears to have been is an irrelevant conjunct, present evidence confirms theories about past events only insofar as irrelevant conjunctions are confirmed. Hence the ideal of not confirming irrelevant conjunctions would imply that historical claims are not confirmed. Confirmation measures partially realizing that ideal make the confirmation of historical claims by present evidence depend strongly on the (presumably subjective) degree of belief in the irrelevant conjunct. The unusually good behavior of the ratio measure has a bearing on the problem of measure sensitivity. For non-statistical hypotheses, Bayes' theorem yields a fractional linear transformation in the prior probability, not a linear rescaling, so even the ratio measure arguably does not aptly measure confirmation in such cases.
2011-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8659/1/IrrelevantConjunctionRatio.pdf
Pitts, J. Brian (2011) Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8695
2011-07-03T04:59:45Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65617274682D736369656E636573
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8695/
Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism
Pitts, J. Brian
Confirmation/Induction
Earth Sciences
History of Philosophy of Science
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Realism/Anti-realism
Science and Religion
Science vs. Pseudoscience
It is widely believed that one should not become more confident that _all swans are white and all lions are brave_ simply by observing white swans. Irrelevant conjunction or "tacking" of a theory onto another is often thought problematic for Bayesianism, especially given the ratio measure of confirmation considered here. It is recalled that the irrelevant conjunct is not confirmed at all. Using the ratio measure, the irrelevant conjunction is confirmed to the same degree as the relevant conjunct, which, it is argued, is ideal: the irrelevant conjunct is irrelevant. Because the past's really having been as it now appears to have been is an irrelevant conjunct, present evidence confirms theories about past events only insofar as irrelevant conjunctions are confirmed. Hence the ideal of not confirming irrelevant conjunctions would imply that historical claims are not confirmed. Confirmation measures partially realizing that ideal make the confirmation of historical claims by present evidence depend strongly on the (presumably subjective) degree of belief in the irrelevant conjunct. The unusually good behavior of the ratio measure has a bearing on the problem of measure sensitivity. For non-statistical hypotheses, Bayes' theorem yields a fractional linear transformation in the prior probability, not a linear rescaling, so even the ratio measure arguably does not aptly measure confirmation in such cases.
2011-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8695/1/IrrelevantConjunctionRatio.pdf
Pitts, J. Brian (2011) Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8730
2011-07-21T15:08:27Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8730/
On an Allegedly Essential Feature of Criteria for the Demarcation of Science
Lutz, Sebastian
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Laudan’s argument against the possibility of a demarcation criterion for scientific theories rests on establishing that any criterion must be a necessary and sufficient condition. But Laudan’s argument at most establishes that any criterion must provide a necessary condition and a possibly different sufficient condition. His own claims suggest that such a criterion is possible.
University of Kent, Center for Reasoning
2011-07-20
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
Lutz, Sebastian (2011) On an Allegedly Essential Feature of Criteria for the Demarcation of Science. The Reasoner, 5 (8). pp. 125-126. ISSN 1757-0522
http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol5/TheReasoner-5(8).pdf
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8754
2011-08-15T11:26:40Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8754/
Auxiliary Assumptions, Unification, and Intelligent Design: A Defense of Contrastive Testability
Lutz, Sebastian
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory/Observation
Boudry and Leuridan argue that in a number of cases—and specifically in the case of intelligent design—a theory can be intuitively testable, but not contrastively testable according to Sober’s definition. I argue that their purported counterexamples rely on misunderstandings of the concept of contrastive testability and the version of intelligent design criticized by Sober. I also argue that the liberalization of contrastive testability suggested by Boudry and Leuridan is trivial.
2011-07-27
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8754/1/on_boudry_and_leuridan_on_sober.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2011) Auxiliary Assumptions, Unification, and Intelligent Design: A Defense of Contrastive Testability. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9036
2012-03-01T20:10:31Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D656475636174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9036/
Intelligent Design and the Nature of Science: Philosophical and Pedagogical Points
Brigandt, Ingo
Evolutionary Theory
Science and Religion
Science Education
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Values In Science
This chapter offers a critique of intelligent design arguments against evolution and a philosophical discussion of the nature of science, drawing several lessons for the teaching of evolution and for science education in general. I discuss why Behe’s irreducible complexity argument fails, and why his portrayal of organismal systems as machines is detrimental to biology education and any under-standing of how organismal evolution is possible. The idea that the evolution of complex organismal features is too unlikely to have occurred by random mutation and selection (as recently promoted by Dembski) is very widespread, but it is easy to show students why such small probability arguments are fallacious. While intelligent design proponents have claimed that the exclusion of supernatural causes mandated by scientific methods is dogmatically presupposed by science, scientists have an empirical justification for using such methods. This justification is instructive for my discussion of how to demarcate science from pseudoscience. I argue that there is no universal account of the nature of science, but that the criteria used to judge an intellectual approach vary across historical periods and have to be specific to the scientific domain. Moreover, intellectual approaches have to be construed as practices based on institutional factors and values, and to be evaluated in terms of the activities of their practitioners. Science educators should not just teach scientific facts, but present science as a practice and make students reflect on the nature of science, as this gives them a better appreciation of the ways in which intelligent design falls short of actual science.
2012-02-29
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9036/1/Intelligent_design_and_the_nature_of_science.pdf
Brigandt, Ingo (2012) Intelligent Design and the Nature of Science: Philosophical and Pedagogical Points. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9117
2012-05-16T13:03:17Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9117/
Criteria of Empirical Significance: Foundations, Relations, Applications
Lutz, Sebastian
Evolutionary Theory
Confirmation/Induction
Conventionalism
History of Philosophy of Science
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Mathematics
Models and Idealization
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory/Observation
This dissertation consists of three parts. Part I is a defense of an artificial language methodology in philosophy and a historical and systematic defense of the logical empiricists' application of an artificial language methodology to scientific theories. These defenses provide a justification for the presumptions of a host of criteria of empirical significance, which I analyze, compare, and develop in part II. On the basis of this analysis, in part III I use a variety of criteria to evaluate the scientific status of intelligent design, and further discuss confirmation, reduction, and concept formation.
Zeno Institute of Philosophy
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9117/1/lutz-criteria_of_empirical_significance.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian Criteria of Empirical Significance: Foundations, Relations, Applications. Zeno Institute of Philosophy, Utrecht University.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9559
2013-03-11T13:03:45Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9592
2016-10-12T14:11:16Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
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7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9592/
The Kuhnian mode of HPS
Schindler, Samuel
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Philosophers of Science
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory Change
Values In Science
In this article I argue that a methodological challenge to an integrated history and philosophy of science approach put forth by Ron Giere almost forty years ago can be met by what I call the Kuhnian mode of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). Although in the Kuhnian mode of HPS norms about science are motivated by historical facts about scientific practice, the justifiers of the constructed norms are not historical facts. The Kuhnian mode of HPS therefore evades the naturalistic fallacy which Giere’s challenge is a version of. Against the backdrop of a discussion of Laudan’s normative naturalism I argue that the Kuhnian mode of HPS is a superior form of naturalism which establishes contact to the practice of science without making itself dependent on its contingencies.
2013-02
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9592/5/The_Kuhnian_mode_final.pdf
Schindler, Samuel (2013) The Kuhnian mode of HPS. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9629
2013-03-14T13:06:23Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9629/
Carnap's Response to the Charge that Verificationism is Self-Undermining
Surovell, Jonathan
Conventionalism
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Values In Science
The classic “self-undermining objection” to the verificationist criterion of meaning states that the criterion does not meet its own standard: since verificationism is not empirically confirmable, analytic, or contradictory, verificationism implies its own meaninglessness. This essay reconstructs and motivates Carnap’s response to this objection. The interpretation presented is contrasted with those of Putnam and Ricketts. I argue that Carnap’s basic move in response to the self-undermining objection is to construe his verificationism as an analytic definition of “meaningfulness” that is meaningful by its own lights. I then discuss possible motivations for this definition. I argue, against Reichenbach, Ayer, and Hempel, that it is not an analysis of the everyday concept of meaning. Instead, I claim, the definition is motivated _pragmatically_: verificationism replaces the ordinary conception of meaning with one that purports to capture all and only the expressions that are pragmatically useful to the scientist. Finally, I consider whether pragmatism faces a self-undermining objection to of its own. I argue that pragmatism is a preference concerning formal languages, and that, since preferences need not apply to themselves, pragmatism is not self- undermining.
2013-03-14
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9629/2/Surovell_-_Carnap%27s_Response_to_the_Charge_that_Verificationism_is_Self-Undermining.pdf
Surovell, Jonathan (2013) Carnap's Response to the Charge that Verificationism is Self-Undermining. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9649
2013-03-29T13:24:52Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9649/
Criteria of Empirical Significance: A Success Story
Lutz, Sebastian
Conventionalism
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory/Observation
The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion being explicated is too vague to be useful. I show instead that a significant number of these criteria—by Ayer, Popper, Przełęcki, Suppes, and David Lewis, among others—not only form a coherent whole, but also connect directly to the theory of definition, the notion of empirical content as explicated by Ramsey sentences, and the theory of measurement; a criterion by Carnap is trivial, but can be saved and connected to the other criteria by slight modifications. A corollary is that the ordinary language defense of Lewis, the conceptual arguments by Ayer and Popper, the theoretical considerations by Przełęcki, and the practical considerations by Suppes all apply to the same criterion or closely related criteria. The equivalences of some criteria allows for their individual justifications to be taken cumulatively and suggest a variety of further lines of inquiry, for instance into analyticity and empirical equivalence. The inferential relations between the non-equivalent criteria suggest comparative notions of empirical significance. In a short case study, I discuss the debate about realism, structural realism, and antirealism.
2013-03-27
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9649/4/lutz-empirical_significance_success.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2013) Criteria of Empirical Significance: A Success Story. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10663
2014-09-27T15:21:16Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10663/
Carnap on Empirical Significance
Lutz, Sebastian
Conventionalism
History of Philosophy of Science
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Philosophers of Science
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory/Observation
Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to the empirical significance of sentences. However, his criteria for sentences—translatability, verifiability, falsifiability, confirmability—are usable, and under assumption of the Carnap sentence, verifiability, falsifiability, and translatability become equivalent. The price for the Carnap sentence approach is that metaphysics cannot always be shown to be non-significant.
2014-04-30
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10663/1/lutz-carnap_on_empirical_significance.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2014) Carnap on Empirical Significance. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11003
2017-07-25T02:01:29Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11049
2014-09-27T15:21:16Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E76656E74696F6E616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11049/
Carnap on Empirical Significance
Lutz, Sebastian
Conventionalism
History of Philosophy of Science
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Philosophers of Science
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory/Observation
Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow for definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by chains of reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to the empirical significance of sentences. However, his criteria for sentences—translatability, verifiability, falsifiability, confirmability—are usable, and under the assumptions needed for the Carnap sentence approach, verifiability, falsifiability, and translatability become equivalent. As a result of the Carnap sentence approach, metaphysics is rendered analytic.
2014-08-26
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11049/1/carnap_on_emp_sig.pdf
Lutz, Sebastian (2014) Carnap on Empirical Significance. [Preprint]
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0561-8
10.1007/s11229-014-0561-8
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11430
2015-04-20T14:24:05Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11430/
Having Science in View: General Philosophy of Science and its Significance
Psillos, Stathis
History of Philosophy of Science
Realism/Anti-realism
Science vs. Pseudoscience
The relatively recent trend seems to be to move away from General Philosophy of Science (GPoS) and towards the philosophies of the individual sciences and to relocate whatever content GPoS is supposed to have to the philosophies of the sciences. I argue that scepticism or pessimism about the prospects of GPoS is unwarranted. I also argue that there can be no philosophies of the various sciences without GPoS. Defending these two claims is the main target of this chapter. I will show, however, that there is osmosis between GPoS and the Philosphies of the Sciences and that this osmosis is grounded on what I will call‘Science in general’ and the two important functions GPoS plays vis-à-vis Science-in-general: an explicative function and a critical function.
2015-04-19
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11430/1/Having_Science_in_View-Psillos.pdf
Psillos, Stathis (2015) Having Science in View: General Philosophy of Science and its Significance. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11611
2016-04-03T18:52:59Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11611/
Science and Illusions
Scorzato, Luigi
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory Change
Values In Science
It is mostly agreed that Popper's criterion of falsifiability fails to provide a useful demarcation between science and pseudo-science, because ad-hoc assumptions are always able to save any theory that conflicts with the empirical data (a.k.a. Duhem-Quine problem), and a characterization of ad-hoc assumptions is lacking. Moreover, adding some testable predictions is not very difficult. It should be emphasized that the Duhem-Quine argument does not simply make the demarcation approximate (if it were so, all our problems would be solved!), but it makes it totally useless. Indeed, no philosophical criterion of demarcation is presently able to rule out even some of the most blatant cases of pseudo-science, not even approximatively (in any well defined sense of approximation). This is in sharp contrast with our firm belief that some theories are clearly not scientific. Where does this belief come from? In this paper I argue that it is necessary and possible to recognize the notion of syntactic simplicity that is able to tell the difference between empirically equivalent scientific and non-scientific theories, with a precision that is adequate to many important practical purposes, and it fully agrees with the judgments generally held in the scientific community.
2015-08-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11611/1/science_and_illusions.pdf
Scorzato, Luigi (2015) Science and Illusions. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11716
2016-03-25T02:10:53Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11716/
When Does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological?
Hochstein, Eric
Cognitive Science
Psychology
Science vs. Pseudoscience
It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, however, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this paper, I argue that there is no plausible way to understand the distinction between folk and scientific psychology that can support such claims. Moreover, these sorts of claims can have adverse consequences for the neuroscientific study of the brain by downplaying the value of many psychological theories that provide information neuroscientists need in order to build and test neurological models.
2014
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11716/1/Folk_Psychology.pdf
Hochstein, Eric (2014) When Does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11991
2016-03-25T02:10:53Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11991/
When Does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological?
Hochstein, Eric
Cognitive Science
Psychology
Science vs. Pseudoscience
It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, however, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this paper, I argue that there is no plausible way to understand the distinction between folk and scientific psychology that can support such claims. Moreover, these sorts of claims can have adverse consequences for the neuroscientific study of the brain by downplaying the value of many psychological theories that provide information neuroscientists need in order to build and test neurological models.
2016
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11991/1/Folk_Psychology.pdf
Hochstein, Eric (2016) When Does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/03/22/bjps.axv028.abstract?sid=f7849977-9979-4027-83c3-ac5ff3c0026b
10.1093/bjps/axv028
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12025
2016-04-03T18:52:58Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12025/
Science and Illusions
Scorzato, Luigi
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory Change
Values In Science
It is mostly agreed that Popper's criterion of falsifiability fails to provide a useful demarcation between science and pseudo-science, because ad-hoc assumptions are always able to save any theory that conflicts with the empirical data (a.k.a. Duhem-Quine problem), and a characterization of ad-hoc assumptions is lacking. Moreover, adding some testable predictions is not very difficult. It should be emphasized that the Duhem-Quine argument does not simply make the demarcation approximate (if it were so, all our problems would be solved!), but it makes it totally useless. Indeed, no philosophical criterion of demarcation is presently able to rule out even some of the most blatant cases of pseudo-science, not even approximatively (in any well defined sense of approximation). This is in sharp contrast with our firm belief that some theories are clearly not scientific. Where does this belief come from? In this paper I argue that it is necessary and possible to recognize the notion of syntactic simplicity that is able to tell the difference between empirically equivalent scientific and non-scientific theories, with a precision that is adequate to many important practical purposes, and it fully agrees with the judgments generally held in the scientific community.
2015-08-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12025/1/sci_ill.pdf
Scorzato, Luigi (2015) Science and Illusions. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12112
2016-05-27T18:57:36Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D65646963696E65:62696F6D65646963616C2D657468696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12112/
Exposing Medical Pseudo-Science May Be Unethical
Lamm, Ehud
Biomedical Ethics
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
An argument is presented according to which exposing pseudo-scientific medical claims may be ethically wrong. It is then suggested that this argument gives an interesting explanation why the successful outing of pseudo-science may lead to an increase in medical pseudo-science overall.
2016-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12112/1/pseudo.pdf
Lamm, Ehud (2016) Exposing Medical Pseudo-Science May Be Unethical. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12927
2017-03-22T14:52:27Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:44617461
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D7075746174696F6E2D696E666F726D6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D70757465722D736369656E63652D6172746966696369616C2D696E74656C6C6967656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12927/
Ad Hoc Hypotheses and the Monsters within
Votsis, Ioannis
Data
Computation/Information
Artificial Intelligence
Confirmation/Induction
Reductionism/Holism
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Values In Science
Science is increasingly becoming automated. Tasks yet to be fully
automated include the conjecturing, modifying, extending and testing of hypotheses. At present scientists have an array of methods to help them carry out those tasks. These range from the well-articulated, formal and unexceptional rules to the semi-articulated and variously understood rules-of-thumb and intuitive hunches. If we are to hand over at least some of the aforementioned tasks to machines, we need to
clarify, refine and make formal, not to mention computable, even the more obscure of the methods scientists successfully employ in their inquiries. The focus of this essay is one such less-than-transparent methodological rule. I am here referring to the rule that ad hoc hypotheses ought to be spurned. This essay begins with a brief examination of some notable conceptions of ad hoc-ness in the philosophical literature. It is pointed out that there is a general problem afflicting most such conceptions, namely the intuitive judgments that are supposed to motivate them are not universally shared. Instead of getting bogged down in what ad hoc-ness exactly means, I shift the focus of the analysis to one undesirable feature often present in alleged cases of ad hoc-ness. I call this feature the ‘monstrousness’ of a hypothesis. A fully articulated formal account of this feature is presented by specifying what it is about the internal constitution of a hypothesis that makes it monstrous. Using this account, a monstrousness measure is then proposed and somewhat sketchily
compared with the minimum description length approach.
Springer International Publishing Switzerland
2016
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12927/1/Votsis_Ad_Hoc_Hypotheses_and_the_Monsters_within%20Penultimate%20Draft.pdf
Votsis, Ioannis (2016) Ad Hoc Hypotheses and the Monsters within. Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence. pp. 299-313.
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-26485-1_18
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13410
2017-09-11T16:52:47Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13410/
Empirical Significance, Predictive Power, and Explication
Surovell, Jonathan/R
History of Philosophy of Science
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Philosophers of Science
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory/Observation
Criteria of empirical significance are supposed to state conditions under which (putative) reference to an unobservable object or property is “empirically meaningful.” The intended kind of empirical meaningfulness should be necessary for admissibility into the selective contexts of scientific inquiry. I defend Justus’s recent argument that the reasons generally given for rejecting the project of defining a significance criterion are unpersuasive. However, as I show, this project remains wedded to an overly narrow conception of its subject matter. Even the most cutting edge significance criteria identify empirical significance with predictive power, and thereby rule out vocabulary with legitimate scientific functions. In a nutshell, the problem is that there are (“shortcut”) terms that reduce the computational burden of extracting predictions from theory, and that may therefore be scientifically useful, but that do not add to the theory’s observational consequences, and so are ruled scientifically inadmissibility by existing significance criteria. I spell out this objection by specifying shortcut terms that are ruled inadmissible by Creath’s and Schurz’s criteria. Having objected in this way to extant criteria, and to the equation of empirical significance with predictive power in general, I discuss an approach to defining empirical significance that is capable of avoiding my objection and, more ambitiously, that may break the cycle of “punctures and patches” that has plagued the project from the beginning. I gloss Goldfarb and Ricketts’s idea of “case-by-case” delineations of empirically significant terms as the provision of special rather than general explications of the informal concept of empirical significance.
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13410/1/ES%2C%20PP%2C%20and%20Explication%20Synthese%20Penultimate.pdf
Surovell, Jonathan/R (2017) Empirical Significance, Predictive Power, and Explication. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14055
2017-10-23T17:58:26Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14055/
A coherentist conception of ad hoc hypotheses
Schindler, Samuel
Confirmation/Induction
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
What does it mean for a hypothesis to be ad hoc? One prominent account has it that ad hoc hypotheses have no independent empirical support. Others have viewed ad hoc judgements as subjective. Here I critically review both of these views and defend my own Coherentist Conception of Ad hocness by working out its conceptual and descriptive attractions.
2017-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14055/1/SSchindler%20CCAH%20final.pdf
Schindler, Samuel (2017) A coherentist conception of ad hoc hypotheses. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14063
2017-10-25T14:13:33Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
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74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14063/
The Parasites of Science. A Psycho-cognitive Characterization of a Pseudo-scientific Hoax
Fasce, Angelo
Cognitive Science
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Values In Science
The theoretical framework of research on pseudoscience is deficient,since it usually includes other types of beliefs lacking epistemic warranty. In this paper, I review the mechanisms of exploitation of scientific authority by pseudoscience, developing a more refined psycho-cognitive framework to characterize the phenomenon. I will analyze the psychology of pseudoscientific deception, the cognitive roots that enable the epidemiology of these ideas and their mechanisms of self-legitimation, such as dialectical superiority, false external support or false ethical and/or epistemological superiority.
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2017-09
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14063/1/Fasce.pdf
Fasce, Angelo (2017) The Parasites of Science. A Psycho-cognitive Characterization of a Pseudo-scientific Hoax. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 32 (3). pp. 347-365. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/17775
10.1387/theoria.17775
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14263
2018-01-08T16:38:04Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D656475636174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14263/
The Public Understanding of What? Laypersons' Epistemic Needs, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and the Demarcation of Science
Keren, Arnon
Science Education
Science vs. Pseudoscience
What must laypersons understand about science to allow them to make sound decisions on science-related issues? And what is the role of philosophers of science in attempts to advance this kind of understanding? Relying on recent developments in social epistemology, this paper argues, first, that scientific education should have the goal not of bringing laypersons' understanding of science closer to that of expert insiders but rather of cultivating the kind of competence characteristic of “competent outsiders” with respect to science (Feinstein 2011); and second, that philosophers of science have an important role to play in attempts to promote this kind of understanding, but that they will have to approach central questions in the field differently for them to successfully fulfill this role.
2018
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14263/1/Keren-Public-Understanding-of-What-2018-penultimate.pdf
Keren, Arnon (2018) The Public Understanding of What? Laypersons' Epistemic Needs, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and the Demarcation of Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14266
2018-01-09T14:45:24Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14266/
Introduction: Systematicity, the Nature of Science?
Bschir, Karim
Lohse, Simon
Chang, Hasok
History of Philosophy of Science
Philosophers of Science
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Introduction to Synthese SI: Systematicity: The Nature of Science?
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14266/1/bschir.lohse.chang_2017_intro.pdf
Bschir, Karim and Lohse, Simon and Chang, Hasok (2017) Introduction: Systematicity, the Nature of Science? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14810
2018-06-24T03:29:26Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
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7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14810/
A Better Foundation for Public Trust in Science
Schroeder, S. Andrew
Ethical Issues
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Values In Science
There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process involve non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this paper I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a scientist align with the values of an individual member of the public. I argue that neither of these proposals work and suggest an alternative that does better: when scientists must appeal to values in the course of their research, they should appeal to democratic values, the values of the public or its representatives.
2018-06
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14810/1/SchroederTrustScience.pdf
Schroeder, S. Andrew (2018) A Better Foundation for Public Trust in Science. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15154
2018-10-16T04:17:18Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
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7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
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74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15154/
String Theory, Non-Empirical Theory Assessment, and the Context of Pursuit
Cabrera, Frank
Confirmation/Induction
Explanation
Physics
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Values In Science
: In this paper, I offer an analysis of the radical disagreement over the adequacy of string theory. The prominence of string theory despite its notorious lack of empirical support is sometimes explained as a troubling case of science gone awry, driven largely by sociological mechanisms such as groupthink (e.g. Smolin 2006). Others, such as Dawid (2013), explain the controversy by positing a methodological revolution of sorts, according to which string theorists have quietly turned to non-empirical methods of theory assessment given the technological inability to directly test the theory. The appropriate response, according to Dawid, is to acknowledge this development and widen the canons of acceptable scientific methods. As I’ll argue, however, the current situation in fundamental physics does not require either of these responses. Rather, as I’ll suggest, much of the controversy stems from a failure to properly distinguish the “context of justification” from the “context of pursuit”. Both those who accuse string theorists of betraying the scientific method and those who advocate an enlarged conception of scientific methodology objectionably conflate epistemic justification with judgements of pursuit-worthiness. Once we get clear about this distinction and about the different norms governing the two contexts, the current situation in fundamental physics becomes much less puzzling. After defending this diagnosis of the controversy, I’ll show how the argument patterns that have been posited by Dawid as constituting an emergent methodological revolution in science are better off if reworked as arguments belonging to the context of pursuit.
Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
2018
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15154/1/String%20Theory%20%5EL0%20Context%20of%20Pursuit%20Final%20Revised%20De-Anon.pdf
Cabrera, Frank (2018) String Theory, Non-Empirical Theory Assessment, and the Context of Pursuit. Synthese. ISSN 1573-0964
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15352
2018-11-20T01:43:50Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
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7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D656475636174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15352/
Should Intelligent Design be Taught in Public School
Science Classrooms?
Plutynski, A
Evolutionary Theory
Science and Society
Science Education
Science vs. Pseudoscience
A variety of different arguments have been offered for teaching ‘‘both sides’’ of
the evolution/ID debate in public schools. This article reviews five of the most common types of arguments advanced by proponents of Intelligent Design and demonstrates how and why they are founded on confusion and misunderstanding. It argues on behalf of teaching evolution, and relegating discussion of ID to philosophy or history courses.
Springer
2010
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15352/1/SCIED.pdf
Plutynski, A (2010) Should Intelligent Design be Taught in Public School Science Classrooms? Science and Education, 19. pp. 779-795.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11191-008-9169-z
10.1007/s11191-008-9169-z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15555
2019-01-08T03:05:11Z
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74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15555/
Replicability or reproducibility? On the replication crisis in computational neuroscience and sharing only relevant detail
Miłkowski, Marcin
Hensel, Witold M.
Hohol, Mateusz
Models and Idealization
Neuroscience
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Replicability and reproducibility of computational models has been somewhat understudied by “the replication movement.” In this paper, we draw on methodological studies into the replicability of psychological experiments and on the mechanistic account of explanation to analyze the functions of model replications and model reproductions in computational neuroscience. We contend that model replicability, or independent researchers' ability to obtain the same output using original code and data, and model reproducibility, or independent researchers' ability to recreate a model without original code, serve different functions and fail for different reasons. This means that measures designed to improve model replicability may not enhance (and, in some cases, may actually damage) model reproducibility. We claim that although both are undesirable, low model reproducibility poses more of a threat to long-term scientific progress than low model replicability. In our opinion, low model reproducibility stems mostly from authors' omitting to provide crucial information in scientific papers and we stress that sharing all computer code and data is not a solution. Reports of computational studies should remain selective and include all and only relevant bits of code.
2018-12
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15555/1/10.1007%252Fs10827-018-0702-z
Miłkowski, Marcin and Hensel, Witold M. and Hohol, Mateusz (2018) Replicability or reproducibility? On the replication crisis in computational neuroscience and sharing only relevant detail. Journal of Computational Neuroscience, 45 (3). pp. 163-172. ISSN 0929-5313
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10827-018-0702-z
doi:10.1007/s10827-018-0702-z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15565
2019-01-08T02:56:24Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15565/
Corrupting Effectiveness: Utilitarianism and Moral Impartiality toward Future Persons in Pragmatic Evaluation of Altruistic Interventions.
Scheyer, Peter
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Models and Idealization
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Thought Experiments
In recent years billions of philanthropic dollars have been deployed through a movement and philosophy known as Effective Altruism, notably through the organizations Open Philanthropy, GiveWell, Good Ventures, and the over 3,200 persons taking the ‘Giving What We Can’ pledge to limit their personal income and donate the remainder to charity. Effective Altruism, or EA, explicitly aims to ‘use evidence and reasoning to determine the most effective ways to benefit others.’
Within the EA community there are competing viewpoints on how to evaluate effectiveness, which forms of evidence and reasoning are best, and several leading philosophers with their own adherents and value systems. The discussions surrounding the employment of these viewpoints can grow heated, with one commenter complaining that ‘Effective Altruism markets itself as being centered on addressing global poverty, when in fact it is centered on manipulating people into believing in the imaginary AI doomsday.’
This complaint highlights a major schism within EA. On one side is the empirical evaluation of existing altruistic interventions according to their own internal justifications - the attempts to judge the most effective way to solve current issues like global poverty, using hard data and statistics. On the other side is the a logically based rationalist effort to determine undervalued new interventions, bring them appropriate funding, and potentially solve issues which are ignored by mainstream altruism.
From within the community, these two parts of the current EA community are often considered two sides of the same coin. Extrapolations of techniques used to evaluate current interventions often provide the justification for attempting new interventions, and can highlight areas worth a closer examination or the allocation of more funding.
Over time, a single paradigm has come to dominate many of these extrapolations, leading to the complaint above. Nicholas Beckstead, a program officer at Open Philanthropy, laid out the argument underpinning this paradigm in a 2013 doctoral thesis titled ‘On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future.’ The argument in this thesis, which we will call the Far Future Trillions Argument (FFTA), is central to many of the most heated discussions in how to best employ the billions of dollars of the Effective Altruism.
After careful consideration it is our reasoned opinion that the Far Future Trillions Argument and its resulting recommendations, while internally coherent and defensible, are not within the remit of a movement characterized by the use of evidence in determining the effectiveness of altruistic interventions. This overall conclusion is based on seven separate arguments.
The first argument is based on empirical evaluation of foreign aid interventions, and concludes that characteristics of the FFTA are inimical to effective interventions. Our second and third arguments conclude that the FFTA lacks certain characteristics of pragmatic models, and requires empirically fallacious methodological assumptions to connect far future outcomes with present interventions. Fourth and fifth, we argue that the purely rationalist, philosophical nature of the FFTA divorces it from evidence in a way that inherently foils the determination of the effectiveness of interventions based upon it. Our sixth and seventh arguments take issue with the ongoing privileged employ of the version of utilitarianism and moral impartiality toward future persons used in the FFTA and its offshoot justifications, asserting that the inclusion of a full and wider scope of normative justifications is necessary for pragmatic modeling.
2019-01-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15565/1/20190103CorruptingEffectiveness.pdf
Scheyer, Peter (2019) Corrupting Effectiveness: Utilitarianism and Moral Impartiality toward Future Persons in Pragmatic Evaluation of Altruistic Interventions. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15570
2019-01-08T02:59:36Z
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74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15570/
Science and Illusions
Scorzato, Luigi
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory Change
Values In Science
It is mostly agreed that Popper's criterion of falsifiability fails to provide a useful demarcation between science and pseudo-science, because ad-hoc assumptions are always able to save any theory that conflicts with the empirical data (a.k.a. Duhem-Quine problem), and a characterization of ad-hoc assumptions is lacking. Moreover, adding some testable predictions is not very difficult. It should be emphasized that the Duhem-Quine argument does not simply make the demarcation approximate (if it were so, all our problems would be solved!), but it makes it totally useless. Indeed, no philosophical criterion of demarcation is presently able to rule out even some of the most blatant cases of pseudo-science, not even approximatively (in any well defined sense of approximation). This is in sharp contrast with our firm belief that some theories are clearly not scientific. Where does this belief come from? In this paper I argue that it is necessary and possible to recognize the notion of syntactic simplicity that is able to tell the difference between empirically equivalent scientific and non-scientific theories, with a precision that is adequate to many important practical purposes, and it fully agrees with the judgments generally held in the scientific community.
2015-08-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15570/4/sci_ill_2019.pdf
Scorzato, Luigi (2015) Science and Illusions. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15924
2019-07-23T12:30:29Z
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74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15924/
Naturalnesss in physics: just a matter of aesthetics? Book review.
Schindler, Samuel
Explanation
History of Philosophy of Science
Physics
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Book review of Sabine Hossenfelder: "Lost in Math: How Beauty Leads Physics Astray." Forthcoming in Metascience.
2019
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15924/1/Hossenfelder%20review.pdf
Schindler, Samuel (2019) Naturalnesss in physics: just a matter of aesthetics? Book review. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:16385
2019-08-28T12:00:36Z
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74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16385/
General Relativity, Mental Causation, and Energy
Conservation
Pitts, J. Brian
Astrophysics
Causation
Cosmology
Laws of Nature
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Neuroscience
Quantum Gravity
Psychology
Relativity Theory
Science and Religion
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Symmetries/Invariances
The conservation of energy and momentum have been viewed as undermining Cartesian mental causation since the 1690s. Modern discussions of the topic tend to use mid-19th century physics, neglecting both locality and Noether’s theorem and its converse. The relevance of General Relativity (GR) has rarely been considered. But a few authors have proposed that the non-localizability of gravitational energy and consequent lack of physically meaningful local conservation laws answers the conservation objection to mental causation: conservation already fails in GR, so there is nothing for
minds to violate.
This paper is motivated by two ideas. First, one might take seriously the fact that GR formally has an infinity of rigid symmetries of the action and hence, by Noether’s first theorem, an infinity of conserved energies-momenta (thus answering Schrödinger’s 1918 false-negative objection). Second, Sean Carroll has asked (rhetorically) how one should modify the Dirac-Maxwell-Einstein equations to describe mental causation. This paper uses the generalized Bianchi identities to show that General Relativity tends to exclude, not facilitate, such Cartesian mental causation. In the simplest case, Cartesian mental influence must be spatio-temporally constant, and hence 0. The difficulty may diminish for more complicated models. Its persuasiveness is also affected by larger world-view considerations.
The new general relativistic objection provides some support for realism about gravitational energy-momentum in GR (taking pseudotensor laws seriously). Such realism also answers an objection to theories of causation involving conserved quantities, because energies-momenta would be conserved even in GR.
2019-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16385/1/EnergyMentalGR.pdf
Pitts, J. Brian (2019) General Relativity, Mental Causation, and Energy Conservation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:16387
2019-09-02T19:56:17Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16387/
Four Examples of Pseudoscience
Villavicencio Sánchez, Marcos
Science vs. Pseudoscience
A relevant issue in the philosophy of science is the demarcation problem: how to distinguish science from nonscience, and, more specifically, science from pseudoscience. Sometimes, the demarcation problem is debated from a very general perspective, proposing demarcation criteria to separate science from pseudoscience, but without discussing any specific field in detail. This article aims to focus the demarcation problem on particular disciplines or theories. After considering a set of demarcation criteria, four pseudosciences are examined: psychoanalysis, speculative evolutionary psychology, universal grammar, and string theory. It is concluded that these theoretical frameworks do not meet the requirements to be considered genuinely scientific.
2019-08-29
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16387/1/Four%20Examples%20of%20Pseudoscience%20in%20PDF.pdf
Villavicencio Sánchez, Marcos (2019) Four Examples of Pseudoscience. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:16662
2019-11-27T13:08:33Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16662/
Diagnosing pseudoscience in real life: the symptomatic approach
Boudry, Maarten
Science vs. Pseudoscience
For a long time, philosophers of science have shown little interest in the so-called “demarcation problem” that occupied the pioneers of their field. However, recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in that old chestnut, and even the emergence of a ‘philosophy of pseudoscience’. In this paper, building on the work of Sven Ove Hansson, I defend a symptomatic approach for diagnosing pseudoscience. Pseudosciences are theories which mimic science: they are not epistemically warranted, but they are presented as scientific by their adherents. Because of the way the human mind works, however, all pseudosciences have to create a convincing impression of epistemic warrant. In particular, they have to evade refutations and critical scrutiny, and invite spurious confirmations. Although there are many ways in which a theory can go awry, there are comparatively few ways to create an impression of epistemic warrant. This indirect approach, I argue, provides the clue for diagnosing pseudoscience, and thus for solving the demarcation problem.
2019
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16662/1/Diagnosing%20pseudoscience%20in%20real%20life%20-%20Chapter%20for%20Festschrift%20-%20Sven%20Ove%20Hansson.docx
Boudry, Maarten (2019) Diagnosing pseudoscience in real life: the symptomatic approach. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:16777
2020-01-06T20:33:29Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16777/
Four Examples of Pseudoscience
Villavicencio, Marcos
Science vs. Pseudoscience
A relevant issue in the philosophy of science is the demarcation problem: how to distinguish science from nonscience, and, more specifically, science from pseudoscience. Sometimes, the demarcation problem is debated from a very general perspective, proposing demarcation criteria to separate science from pseudoscience, but without discussing any specific field in detail. This article aims to focus the demarcation problem on particular disciplines or theories. After considering a set of demarcation criteria, four pseudosciences are examined: psychoanalysis, speculative evolutionary psychology, universal grammar, and string theory. It is concluded that these theoretical frameworks do not meet the requirements to be considered genuinely scientific.
2020-01-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16777/1/Four%20Examples%20of%20Pseudoscience.pdf
Villavicencio, Marcos (2020) Four Examples of Pseudoscience. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:16934
2020-02-21T02:26:43Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:44617461
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D65646963696E65
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16934/
What is Epistemically Wrong with Research Affected by Sponsorship Bias? The Evidential Account
Reutlinger, Alexander
Data
Causation
Confirmation/Induction
Medicine
Probability/Statistics
Science and Society
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Values In Science
Biased research occurs frequently in the sciences. In this paper, I will focus on one particular kind of biased research: research that is subject to sponsorship bias. I will address the following epistemological question: what precisely is epistemically wrong (that is, unjustified) with biased research of this kind? I will defend the evidential account of epistemic wrongness: that is, research affected by sponsorship bias is epistemically wrong if and only if the researchers in question make false claims about the (degree of) evidential support of some hypothesis H by data E. I will argue that the evidential account captures the epistemic wrongness of three paradigmatic types of sponsorship bias.
2020
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16934/1/Reutlinger%20Bias%20Paper%20EJPS%20philsci_archive.pdf
Reutlinger, Alexander (2020) What is Epistemically Wrong with Research Affected by Sponsorship Bias? The Evidential Account. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:17041
2020-04-02T04:39:25Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:536369656E74696669635F4D65746170687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:64657465726D696E69736D2D696E64657465726D696E69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D656475636174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:73796D6D6574726965732D696E76617269616E636573
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/17041/
Conservation of Energy: Missing Features in Its Nature and Justification and Why They Matter
Pitts, J. Brian
Scientific Metaphysics
Determinism/Indeterminism
History of Science Case Studies
Laws of Nature
Psychology
Science and Religion
Science and Society
Science Education
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Symmetries/Invariances
Misconceptions about energy conservation abound due to the gap between physics and secondary school chemistry. This paper surveys this difference and its relevance to the 1690s-2010s Leibnizian argument that mind-body interaction is impossible due to conservation laws. Justifications for energy conservation are partly empirical, such as Joule's paddle wheel experiment, and partly theoretical, such as Lagrange's statement in 1811 that energy is conserved if the potential energy does not depend on time. In 1918 Noether
generalized results like Lagrange's and proved a converse: symmetries imply conservation laws and vice versa. Conservation holds if and only if nature is uniform.
The rise of field physics during the 1860s-1920s implied that energy is located in particular places and conservation is primordially local: energy cannot disappear in Cambridge and reappear in Lincoln instantaneously or later; neither can it simply disappear in Cambridge or simply appear in Lincoln. A global conservation law can be inferred in some circumstances.
Einstein's General Relativity, which stimulated Noether's work, is another source of difficulty for conservation laws. As is too rarely realized, the theory admits conserved
quantities due to symmetries of the Lagrangian, like other theories. Indeed General Relativity has _more_ symmetries and hence (at least formally) _more_ conserved energies. An argument akin to Leibniz's finally gets some force.
While the mathematics is too advanced for secondary school, the ideas that conservation is tied to uniformities of nature and that energy is in particular places, are
accessible. Improved science teaching would serve the truth and enhance the social credibility of science.
Springer
2020
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/17041/1/EnergyJoule.pdf
Pitts, J. Brian (2020) Conservation of Energy: Missing Features in Its Nature and Justification and Why They Matter. Foundations of Science. ISSN 1233-1821
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:17301
2021-11-14T01:40:26Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:17700
2020-08-08T02:17:29Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/17700/
Diagnosing Pseudoscience – by Getting Rid of The Demarcation Problem
Boudry, Maarten
Science vs. Pseudoscience
For a long time, philosophers of science have shown little interest in the so-called demarcation project that occupied the pioneers of their field, and most now concur that terms like “pseudoscience” cannot be defined in any meaningful way. However, recent years have witnessed a revival of philosophical interest in demarcation. In this paper, I argue that, though we should not resuscitate the demarcation problem of old (as philosophers have rightly concluded that such a first-principles approach leads to a dead-end) we should have a second look at the concept of pseudoscience. What is the common denominator of all theories and activities commonly regarded as “pseudosciences”? My approach proposes to naturalize and down-size the concept, anchoring it to real-life doctrines and fields of inquiry. First, I argue against the definite article “the” in “the demarcation problem”, distinguishing between territorial and normative demarcation, and between different scientific failures and shortcomings apart from pseudoscience (such as fraudulent or faulty research). Next, I develop a naturalistic analysis of pseudosciences as being simulacra of science, doctrines that are not epistemically warranted but whose proponents try to create the impression that they are. In this element of cultural mimicry, I argue, lies the clue to their common identity. Despite the huge variety of doctrines gathered under the rubric of “pseudoscience”, and the wide range of defects from which they suffer, pseudosciences all engage in similar strategies to create an impression of epistemic warrant, which follow from certain general facts about human psychology. In short, my naturalistic approach is captured by the central idea that, though there are many ways in which things can go wrong, there are comparatively fewer ways to pretend that they haven’t.
2020-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/17700/1/Diagnosing%20Pseudoscience%20%E2%80%93%20by%20Getting%20Rid%20of%20The%20Demarcation%20Problem.docx
Boudry, Maarten (2020) Diagnosing Pseudoscience – by Getting Rid of The Demarcation Problem. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:17981
2020-08-13T01:21:24Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/17981/
Telling Stories in Science: Feyerabend and Thought Experiments
Stuart, Michael T.
Confirmation/Induction
Explanation
History of Philosophy of Science
Philosophers of Science
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Thought Experiments
Values In Science
The history of the philosophy of thought experiments has touched on the work of Kuhn, Popper, Duhem, Mach, Lakatos, and other big names of the 20th century. But so far, almost nothing has been written about Paul Feyerabend. His most influential work was Against Method, 8 chapters of which concern a case study of Galileo with a significant focus on Galileo’s thought experiments. In addition, the later Feyerabend was interested in what might be called the epistemology of drama, including stories and myths. This paper brings these different aspects of Feyerabend’s work together in an attempt to present what might have been his considered views on scientific thought experiments. According to Feyerabend, TEs are a special kind of story that can help to demolish a dominant myth and instigate a new one through the use of propaganda to change our habits, by appealing to our sense of what is interesting, appealing, revealing, comprehensible, coherent and surprising. I conclude by contrasting Feyerabend’s ideas with two modern currents in the debate surrounding thought experiments: 1) the claim that the epistemology of thought experiments is just the epistemology of deductive or inductive arguments, and 2) the claim that the specifically narrative quality of thought experiments must be taken into account if we want a complete epistemology of thought experiments.
2021
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/17981/1/Stuart%202021%20-%20Telling%20Stories%20in%20Science%20-%20Feyerabend%20and%20Thought%20Experiments.pdf
Stuart, Michael T. (2021) Telling Stories in Science: Feyerabend and Thought Experiments. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:17992
2020-08-15T03:24:49Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/17992/
Telling Stories in Science: Feyerabend and Thought Experiments
Stuart, Michael T.
Confirmation/Induction
Explanation
History of Philosophy of Science
Philosophers of Science
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Thought Experiments
Values In Science
The history of the philosophy of thought experiments has touched on the work of Kuhn, Popper, Duhem, Mach, Lakatos, and other big names of the 20th century. But so far, almost nothing has been written about Paul Feyerabend. His most influential work was Against Method, 8 chapters of which concern a case study of Galileo with a significant focus on Galileo’s thought experiments. In addition, the later Feyerabend was interested in what might be called the epistemology of drama, including stories and myths. This paper brings these different aspects of Feyerabend’s work together in an attempt to present what might have been his considered views on scientific thought experiments. According to Feyerabend, TEs are a special kind of story that can help to demolish a dominant myth and instigate a new one through the use of propaganda to change our habits, by appealing to our sense of what is interesting, appealing, revealing, comprehensible, coherent and surprising. I conclude by contrasting Feyerabend’s ideas with two modern currents in the debate surrounding thought experiments: 1) the claim that the epistemology of thought experiments is just the epistemology of deductive or inductive arguments, and 2) the claim that the specifically narrative quality of thought experiments must be taken into account if we want a complete epistemology of thought experiments.
2021
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/17992/1/Stuart%202021%20-%20Telling%20Stories%20in%20Science%20-%20Feyerabend%20and%20Thought%20Experiments.pdf
Stuart, Michael T. (2021) Telling Stories in Science: Feyerabend and Thought Experiments. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:18392
2020-11-15T05:27:20Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:65766964656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18392/
The Nature of Science. A Dialogue
Mantzavinos, C.
Evidence
Explanation
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory Change
Theory/Observation
In this dialogue the view of Paul Hoyningen-Huene as defended in "Systematicity. The Nature of Science" (Oxford University Press, 2013) is presented and criticized. The approach is developed dialectically by the two interlocutors, a series of critical points are debated and an alternative view is introduced. The dialogical form is intended to honor the general philosophical approach of the author summarized in the last sentence of the book, where he states that he sees philosophy as an ongoing, open-ended dialogue.
Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
2019
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18392/1/The-Nature-of-Science.-A-Dialogue.pdf
Mantzavinos, C. (2019) The Nature of Science. A Dialogue. Synthese, 196. pp. 775-793. ISSN 1573-0964
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-016-1154-5?view=classic
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:18536
2021-01-03T14:23:29Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D65646963696E65:65706964656D696F6C6F6779
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7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18536/
Science as a Weapon of Mass Distraction.
Osimani, Barbara
Ilardo, Maria Laura
Castaldo, Pasqualina
Epidemiology
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Values In Science
With the COVID-19 pandemic the relationship between science and warfare seems to have scaled up to a new level. in the current information war, science seems to be used as the weapon itself, instrumentalized by different parties featuring diverse vested interests with the aim to advance their agendas.
In such circumstances information may be manipulated in several ways. The paper ranks different forms of “persuasion” in ascending order, from paternalism to full-blown authoritarianism, as exemplified by various episodes during the COVID-19 emergency. Finally, it advances some proposals regarding science policy approaches, in particular the development of virtuous mechanisms that reward overall public and individual health, instead of just reimbursing interventions (with the consequent spiral of increasing insurance costs). As Tallacchini (2019) underlines, authoritarianism and nudging are not the only possible routes to be explored. A third way is a new confidence pact between institutions, private sector and citizens, and a new Hippocratic oath between patients and doctors, fostered by the right mechanisms, both for the social planner and for the entrepreneur, in view of the long term wellbeing and welfare of the population.
Pacini
2020
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18536/1/Osimani%20et%20al.%202020%20Science%20as%20Weapon%20of%20Mass%20Distractionpdf.pdf
Osimani, Barbara and Ilardo, Maria Laura and Castaldo, Pasqualina (2020) Science as a Weapon of Mass Distraction. MEDIC, 28 (1). pp. 30-49. ISSN 1824-3991
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:18630
2021-01-24T15:03:21Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18630/
Diagnosing pseudoscience in real life (a tribute to Sven Ove Hansson)
Boudry, Maarten
Science vs. Pseudoscience
For a long time, philosophers of science have shown little interest in the so-called “demarcation problem” that occupied the pioneers of their field. However, recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in that old chestnut, and even the emergence of a ‘philosophy of pseudoscience’. In this paper, building on the work of Sven Ove Hansson, I defend a symptomatic approach for diagnosing pseudoscience. Pseudosciences are theories which mimic science: they are not epistemically warranted, but they are presented as scientific by their adherents. Because of the way the human mind works, however, all pseudosciences have to create a convincing impression of epistemic warrant. In particular, they have to evade refutations and critical scrutiny, and invite spurious confirmations. Although there are many ways in which a theory can go awry, there are comparatively few ways to create an impression of epistemic warrant. This indirect approach, I argue, provides the clue for diagnosing pseudoscience, and thus for solving the demarcation problem.
2019
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18630/1/Diagnosing%20pseudoscience%20in%20real%20life%20-%20Chapter%20for%20Festschrift%20-%20Sven%20Ove%20Hansson.docx
Boudry, Maarten (2019) Diagnosing pseudoscience in real life (a tribute to Sven Ove Hansson). [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:18633
2021-01-24T15:03:54Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18633/
Diagnosing Pseudoscience – by Getting Rid of The Demarcation Problem
Boudry, Maarten
Science vs. Pseudoscience
For a long time, philosophers of science have expressed little interest in the so-called demarcation project that occupied the pioneers of their field, and most now concur that terms like “pseudoscience” cannot be defined in any meaningful way. However, recent years have witnessed a revival of philosophical interest in demarcation. In this paper, I argue that, though the demarcation problem of old leads to a dead-end, the concept of pseudoscience is not going away anytime soon, and deserves a fresh look. My approach proposes to naturalize and down-size the concept, anchoring it to real-life doctrines and fields of inquiry. First, I argue against the definite article “the” in “the demarcation problem”, distinguishing between territorial and normative demarcation, and between different failures and shortcomings in science apart from pseudoscience (such as fraudulent or faulty research). Next, I argue that pseudosciences can be fruitfully regarded as simulacra of science, doctrines that are not epistemically warranted but whose proponents try to create the impression that they are. In this element of imitation of mimicry, I argue, lies the clue to their common identity. Despite the huge variety of doctrines gathered under the rubric of “pseudoscience”, and the wide range of defects from which they suffer, pseudosciences all engage in similar strategies to create an impression of epistemic warrant. The indirect, symptomatic approach defended here leads to a general characterization of pseudosciences in all domains of inquiry, and to a useful diagnostic tool.
2020-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18633/1/Diagnosing%20Pseudoscience%20-%20JGPS.docx
Boudry, Maarten (2020) Diagnosing Pseudoscience – by Getting Rid of The Demarcation Problem. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:18846
2021-03-26T13:14:43Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:536369656E74696669635F4D65746170687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
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7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6669656C642D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
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7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18846/
The Landscape and the Multiverse: What's the Problem?
Read, James
Le Bihan, Baptiste
Scientific Metaphysics
Confirmation/Induction
Cosmology
Evidence
Explanation
Quantum Gravity
Quantum Field Theory
Quantum Mechanics
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Structure of Theories
Theory/Observation
As a candidate theory of quantum gravity, the popularity of string theory has waxed and waned over the past four decades. One current source of scepticism is that the theory can be used to derive, depending upon the input geometrical assumptions that one makes, a vast range of different quantum field theories, giving rise to the so-called landscape problem. One apparent way to address the landscape problem is to posit the existence of a multiverse; this, however, has in turn drawn heightened attention to questions regarding the empirical testability and predictivity of string theory. We argue first that the landscape problem relies on dubious assumptions and does not motivate a multiverse hypothesis. Nevertheless, we then show that the multiverse hypothesis is scientifically legitimate and could be coupled to string theory for other empirical reasons. Looking at various cosmological approaches, we offer an empirical criterion to assess the scientific status of multiverse hypotheses.
2021
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18846/1/BLBJRLandscape.pdf
Read, James and Le Bihan, Baptiste (2021) The Landscape and the Multiverse: What's the Problem? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:19133
2021-06-02T03:43:52Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D656475636174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736F6369616C2D6570697374656D6F6C6F67792D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/19133/
Second Philosophy and Testimonial Reliability: Philosophy of Science for STEM Students
Cabrera, Frank
Science and Society
Science Education
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Social Epistemology of Science
In this paper, I describe some strategies for teaching an introductory philosophy of science course to Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) students, with reference to my own experience teaching a philosophy of science course in the Fall of 2020. The most important strategy that I advocate is what I call the “Second Philosophy” approach, according to which instructors ought to emphasize that the problems that concern philosophers of science are not manufactured and imposed by philosophers from the outside, but rather are ones that arise internally, during the practice of science itself. To justify this approach, I appeal to considerations from both educational research and the epistemology of testimony. In addition, I defend some distinctive learning goals that philosophy of science instructors ought to adopt when teaching STEM students, which include rectifying empirically well-documented shortcomings in students’ conceptions of the “scientific method” and the “nature of science.” Although my primary focus will be on teaching philosophy of science to STEM students, much of what I propose can be applied to non-philosophy majors generally. Ultimately, as I argue, a successful philosophy of science course for non-philosophy majors must be one that advances a student’s science education. The strategies that I describe and defend here are aimed at precisely that end
Springer
2021
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/19133/1/Second%20Philosophy%20and%20Testimonial%20Final%20Revision.pdf
Cabrera, Frank (2021) Second Philosophy and Testimonial Reliability: Philosophy of Science for STEM Students. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1879-4912
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:19186
2022-08-12T14:36:34Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6570697374656D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:65766964656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/19186/
Why We Should Be Suspicious of Conspiracy Theories. A Novel Demarcation Problem
Boudry, Maarten
Epistemology
Causation
Evidence
Science vs. Pseudoscience
What, if anything, is wrong with conspiracy theories (CTs)? A conspiracy refers to a group of people acting in secret to achieve some nefarious goal. Given that the pages of history are full of such plots, however, why are CTs often regarded with suspicion and even disdain? According “particularism”, the currently dominant view among philosophers, each CT should be evaluated on its own merits and the negative reputation of CTs as a class is wholly undeserved. In this paper, I defend a moderate version of “generalism”, the view that there is indeed something prima facie suspicious about CTs, properly defined, and that they suffer from common epistemic defects. To demarcate legitimate theorizing about real-life conspiracies from “mere conspiracy theories” (in the pejorative sense), I draw on a deep asymmetry between causes and effects in the natural world. Because of their extreme resilience to counterevidence, CTs can be seen as the epistemological equivalent of black holes, in which unwary truth-seekers are drawn, never to escape. Finally, by presenting a generic “recipe” for generating novel CTs around any given event, regardless of the circumstances and the available evidence, I rescue the intuitions beneath colloquial phrases like “That’s just a conspiracy theory.”
2021-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/19186/1/Why%20We%20Should%20Be%20Suspicious%20of%20Conspiracy%20Theories.docx
Boudry, Maarten (2021) Why We Should Be Suspicious of Conspiracy Theories. A Novel Demarcation Problem. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20058
2021-12-31T20:11:28Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:65766964656E6365
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7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736F6369616C2D6570697374656D6F6C6F67792D6F662D736369656E6365
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74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20058/
Why the Empirical Study of Non-Philosophical Expertise Does Not Undermine the Status of Philosophical Expertise
Bach, Theodore
Developmental Psychology
Evidence
Explanation
Judgment and Decision Making
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Social Epistemology of Science
Thought Experiments
In some domains (meteorology, live-stock judging, chess, etc.) experts perform better than novices, and in other domains (clinical psychiatry, long-term political forecasting, financial advising, etc.) experts do not generally perform better than novices. According to empirical studies of expert performance, this is because the former but not the latter domains make available to training practitioners a direct form of learning feedback. Several philosophers resource this empirical literature to cast doubt on the quality of philosophical expertise. They claim that philosophy is like the dubious domains in that it does not make available the good, direct kind of learning feedback, and thus there are empirical grounds for doubting the epistemic quality of philosophical expertise. I examine the empirical studies that are purportedly bad news for professional philosophers. On the basis of that examination, I provide three reasons why the empirical study of non-philosophical expertise does not undermine the status of philosophical expertise. First, the non-philosophical task-types from which the critics generalize are unrepresentative of relevant philosophical task-types. Second, empirical critiques of non-philosophical experts are often made relative to the performance of linear models – a comparison
that is inapt in a philosophical context. Third, the critics fail to discuss findings from the empirical study of non-philosophical expertise that have more favorable implications for the epistemic status of philosophical expertise. In addition to discussing implications for philosophical expertise, this article makes progress in the philosophical analysis of the science of expertise and expert development.
Springer
2019-07-01
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20058/1/Bach%2C%20Why%20the%20empirical%20study%20of%20non-philosophical%20expertise%20does%20not%20undermine%20the%20status%20of%20philosophical%20expertise%20%282%29.pdf
Bach, Theodore (2019) Why the Empirical Study of Non-Philosophical Expertise Does Not Undermine the Status of Philosophical Expertise. Erkenntnis, 86 (4). pp. 999-1023.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-019-00141-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00141-2
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20203
2022-02-09T03:21:32Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20203/
Believing Conspiracy Theories: A Bayesian Approach to Belief Protection
Poth, Nina
Dolega, Krzysztof
Cognitive Science
Confirmation/Induction
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Despite the harmful impact of conspiracy theories on the public discourse, there is little agreement about their exact nature. Rather than define conspiracy theories as such, we focus on the notion of conspiracy belief. We analyse three recent proposals that identify belief in conspiracy theories as an effect of irrational reasoning. Although these views are sometimes presented as competing alternatives, they share the main commitment that conspiracy beliefs are epistemically flawed because they resist revision given disconfirming evidence. However, the three views currently lack the formal detail necessary for an adequate comparison. In this paper, we bring these views closer together by exploring the rationality of conspiracy belief under a probabilistic framework. By utilising Michael Strevens’ Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses, we question the claim that the irrationality associated with conspiracy belief is due to a failure of belief revision given disconfirming evidence. We argue that maintaining a core conspiracy belief can be perfectly Bayes-rational when such beliefs are embedded in networks of auxiliary beliefs, which can be sacrificed to protect the more central ones. We propose that the irrationality associated with conspiracy belief lies not in a flawed updating method according to subjective standards but in a failure to converge towards well-confirmed stable belief networks in the long run. We discuss a set of initial reasoning biases as a possible reason for such a failure. Our approach reconciles previously disjointed views, while at the same time offering a formal platform for their further development.
2022
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20203/1/Believing%20Conspiracy%20Theories%20A%20Bayesian%20Approach%20to%20Belief%20Protection.pdf
Poth, Nina and Dolega, Krzysztof (2022) Believing Conspiracy Theories: A Bayesian Approach to Belief Protection. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20510
2022-04-29T03:41:48Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:65766964656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736F6369616C2D6570697374656D6F6C6F67792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20510/
Cultural Theory’s Contributions to Climate Science: Reply to Hansson
Verweij, Marco
Ney, Steven
Thompson, Michael
Evidence
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Social Epistemology of Science
Theory/Observation
In his article, ‘Social constructionism and climate science denial’, Hansson claims to present empirical evidence that the cultural theory developed by Dame Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky and ourselves (among others) leads to (climate) science denial. In this reply, we show that there is no validity to these claims. First, we show that Hansson’s empirical evidence that cultural theory has led to climate science denial falls apart under closer inspection. Contrary to Hansson’s claims, cultural theory has made significant contributions to understanding and addressing climate change. Second, we discuss various features of Douglas’ cultural theory that differentiate it from other constructivist approaches and make it compatible with the scientific method. Thus, we also demonstrate that cultural theory cannot be accused of epistemic relativism.
2022-04-25
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20510/1/Reply%20to%20Hansson_PrePrint.docx
Verweij, Marco and Ney, Steven and Thompson, Michael (2022) Cultural Theory’s Contributions to Climate Science: Reply to Hansson. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20772
2022-06-21T13:53:21Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20772/
Believing Conspiracy Theories: A Bayesian Approach to Belief Protection
Poth, Nina
Dolega, Krzysztof
Cognitive Science
Confirmation/Induction
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Despite the harmful impact of conspiracy theories on the public discourse, there is little agreement about their exact nature. Rather than define conspiracy theories as such, we focus on the notion of conspiracy belief. We analyse three recent proposals that identify belief in conspiracy theories as an effect of irrational reasoning. Although these views are sometimes presented as competing alternatives, they share the main commitment that conspiracy beliefs are epistemically flawed because they resist revision given disconfirming evidence. However, the three views currently lack the formal detail necessary for an adequate comparison. In this paper, we bring these views closer together by exploring the rationality of conspiracy belief under a probabilistic framework. By utilising Michael Strevens’ Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses, we question the claim that the irrationality associated with conspiracy belief is due to a failure of belief revision given disconfirming evidence. We argue that maintaining a core conspiracy belief can be perfectly Bayes-rational when such beliefs are embedded in networks of auxiliary beliefs, which can be sacrificed to protect the more central ones. We propose that the irrationality associated with conspiracy belief lies not in a flawed updating method according to subjective standards but in a failure to converge towards well-confirmed stable belief networks in the long run. We discuss a set of initial reasoning biases as a possible reason for such a failure. Our approach reconciles previously disjointed views, while at the same time offering a formal platform for their further development.
2022
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20772/1/Believing%20Conspiracy%20Theories%20A%20Bayesian%20Approach%20to%20Belief%20Protection.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20772/7/Bayesian%20Belief%20Protection.pdf
Poth, Nina and Dolega, Krzysztof (2022) Believing Conspiracy Theories: A Bayesian Approach to Belief Protection. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:20948
2022-07-22T22:32:01Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:617374726F70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20948/
MOND and Meta-Empirical Theory Assessment
De Baerdemaeker, Siska
Dawid, Richard
Astrophysics
Confirmation/Induction
Cosmology
Science vs. Pseudoscience
While ΛCDM has emerged as the standard model of cosmology, a small group of physicists defend Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND) as an alternative view on cosmology. Exponents of MOND have employed a broad, at times explicitly philosophical, conceptual perspective in arguing their case. This paper offers reasons why that MONDian defense has been ineffective. First, we argue that the defense is ineffective according to Popperian or Lakatosian views--ostensibly the preferred philosophical views on theory assessment of proponents of MOND. Second, we argue that the defense of MOND can instead best be reconstructed as an instance of meta-empirical theory assessment. The formal employment of meta-empirical assessment by MONDians is unconvincing, however, because it lacks a sufficient epistemic foundation. Specifically, the MONDian No Alternatives Argument relies on falsifiability or explanation conditions that lack epistemic relevance, while the argument from Unexpected Explanatory Success fails since there is a known alternative to MOND. In the last part of the paper, we draw some lessons for applications of meta-empirical assessment more generally.
2022-07-18
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/20948/1/20220719_DeBaerdemaekerDawid_MONDandMEA.pdf
De Baerdemaeker, Siska and Dawid, Richard (2022) MOND and Meta-Empirical Theory Assessment. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21038
2022-08-12T14:38:21Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:617374726F70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21038/
MOND and Meta-Empirical Theory Assessment
De Baerdemaeker, Siska
Dawid, Richard
Astrophysics
Confirmation/Induction
Cosmology
Science vs. Pseudoscience
While ΛCDM has emerged as the standard model of cosmology, a small group of physicists defend Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND) as an alternative view on cosmology. Exponents of MOND have employed a broad, at times explicitly philosophical, conceptual perspective in arguing their case. This paper offers reasons why that MONDian defense has been ineffective. First, we argue that the defense is ineffective according to Popperian or Lakatosian views--ostensibly the preferred philosophical views on theory assessment of proponents of MOND. Second, we argue that the defense of MOND can instead best be reconstructed as an instance of meta-empirical theory assessment. The formal employment of meta-empirical assessment by MONDians is unconvincing, however, because it lacks a sufficient epistemic foundation. Specifically, the MONDian No Alternatives Argument relies on falsifiability or explanation conditions that lack epistemic relevance, while the argument from Unexpected Explanatory Success fails since there is a known alternative to MOND. In the last part of the paper, we draw some lessons for applications of meta-empirical assessment more generally.
2022-07-18
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21038/1/20220810_DeBaerdemaekerDawid_MONDandMEA.pdf
De Baerdemaeker, Siska and Dawid, Richard (2022) MOND and Meta-Empirical Theory Assessment. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21062
2022-08-17T03:30:54Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21062/
The quantification of intelligence in nineteenth-century craniology: An epistemology of measurement perspective
Luchetti, Michele
Anthropology
History of Science Case Studies
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Craniology – the practice of inferring intelligence differences from the measurement of human skulls – survived the dismissal of phrenology and remained a widely popular research program until the end of the nineteenth century. From the 1970s, historians and sociologists of science extensively focused on the explicit and implicit socio-cultural biases invalidating the evidence and claims that craniology produced. Building on this literature, I reassess the history of craniological practice from a different but complementary perspective that relies on recent developments in the epistemology of measurement. More precisely, I identify two aspects of the measurement culture of nineteenth-century craniologists that are crucial to understand the lack of validity of craniological inference: their neglect of the problem of coordination for their presupposed quantification of intelligence and their narrow view of calibration. Based on my analysis, I claim that these methodological shortcomings amplified the impact of the socio-cultural biases of craniologists, which had a pervasive role in their evidential use of measurement. Finally, my argument shows how the epistemology of measurement perspective can offer useful tools in debates concerning the use of biological evidence to foster social discourse and for analyzing the relationship between theory, evidence, and measurement.
2022-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21062/1/Manuscript_blinded_revised.docx
Luchetti, Michele (2022) The quantification of intelligence in nineteenth-century craniology: An epistemology of measurement perspective. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21083
2022-08-24T12:50:59Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21083/
The quantification of intelligence in nineteenth-century craniology: An epistemology of measurement perspective
Luchetti, Michele
Anthropology
History of Science Case Studies
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Craniology – the practice of inferring intelligence differences from the measurement of human skulls – survived the dismissal of phrenology and remained a widely popular research program until the end of the nineteenth century. From the 1970s, historians and sociologists of science extensively focused on the explicit and implicit socio-cultural biases invalidating the evidence and claims that craniology produced. Building on this literature, I reassess the history of craniological practice from a different but complementary perspective that relies on recent developments in the epistemology of measurement. More precisely, I identify two aspects of the measurement culture of nineteenth-century craniologists that are crucial to understand the lack of validity of craniological inference: their neglect of the problem of coordination for their presupposed quantification of intelligence and their narrow view of calibration. Based on my analysis, I claim that these methodological shortcomings amplified the impact of the socio-cultural biases of craniologists, which had a pervasive role in their evidential use of measurement. Finally, my argument shows how the epistemology of measurement perspective can offer useful tools in debates concerning the use of biological evidence to foster social discourse and for analyzing the relationship between theory, evidence, and measurement.
2022-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21083/1/The%20quantification%20of%20intelligence%20in%20nineteenth-century%20craniology%20%28blinded%29.pdf
Luchetti, Michele (2022) The quantification of intelligence in nineteenth-century craniology: An epistemology of measurement perspective. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21097
2022-08-27T16:07:51Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6570697374656D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:65766964656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21097/
Why We Should Be Suspicious of Conspiracy Theories. A Novel Demarcation Problem
Boudry, Maarten
Epistemology
Causation
Evidence
Science vs. Pseudoscience
What, if anything, is wrong with conspiracy theories (CTs)? A conspiracy refers to a group of people acting in secret to achieve some nefarious goal. Given that the pages of history are full of such plots, however, why are CTs often regarded with suspicion and even disdain? According “particularism”, the currently dominant view among philosophers, each CT should be evaluated on its own merits and the negative reputation of CTs as a class is wholly undeserved. In this paper, I defend a moderate version of “generalism”, the view that there is indeed something prima facie suspicious about CTs, properly defined, and that they suffer from common epistemic defects. To demarcate legitimate theorizing about real-life conspiracies from “mere conspiracy theories” (in the pejorative sense), I draw on a deep asymmetry between causes and effects in the natural world. Because of their extreme resilience to counterevidence, CTs can be seen as the epistemological equivalent of black holes, in which unwary truth-seekers are drawn, never to escape. Finally, by presenting a generic “recipe” for generating novel CTs around any given event, regardless of the circumstances and the available evidence, I rescue the intuitions beneath colloquial phrases like “That’s just a conspiracy theory.”
2021-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21097/1/Why%20We%20Should%20Be%20Suspicious%20of%20Conspiracy%20Theories.docx
Boudry, Maarten (2021) Why We Should Be Suspicious of Conspiracy Theories. A Novel Demarcation Problem. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21337
2022-10-31T17:53:54Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6570697374656D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:65766964656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21337/
Why We Should Be Suspicious of Conspiracy Theories. A Novel Demarcation Problem
Boudry, Maarten
Epistemology
Causation
Evidence
Science vs. Pseudoscience
What, if anything, is wrong with conspiracy theories (CTs)? A conspiracy refers to a group of people acting in secret to achieve some nefarious goal. Given that the pages of history are full of such plots, however, why are CTs often regarded with suspicion and even disdain? According “particularism”, the currently dominant view among philosophers, each CT should be evaluated on its own merits and the negative reputation of CTs as a class is wholly undeserved. In this paper, I defend a moderate version of “generalism”, the view that there is indeed something prima facie suspicious about CTs, properly defined, and that they suffer from common epistemic defects. To demarcate legitimate theorizing about real-life conspiracies from “mere conspiracy theories” (in the pejorative sense), I draw on a deep asymmetry between causes and effects in the natural world. Because of their extreme resilience to counterevidence, CTs can be seen as the epistemological equivalent of black holes, in which unwary truth-seekers are drawn, never to escape. Finally, by presenting a generic “recipe” for generating novel CTs around any given event, regardless of the circumstances and the available evidence, I rescue the intuitions beneath colloquial phrases like “That’s just a conspiracy theory.”
2021-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21337/1/Why%20We%20Should%20Be%20Suspicious%20of%20Conspiracy%20Theories.docx
Boudry, Maarten (2021) Why We Should Be Suspicious of Conspiracy Theories. A Novel Demarcation Problem. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21375
2022-11-08T21:10:41Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736F6369616C2D6570697374656D6F6C6F67792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21375/
Are Citation Metrics a Good Thing?
Lisciandra, Chiara
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Social Epistemology of Science
Theory Change
Citation metrics are statistical measures of scientific outputs that draw on citation indexes. They purport to capture the impact of scientific articles and the journals in which they appear. As evaluative tools, citation metrics are mostly used in the natural sciences, but they are also acquiring an important role in the humanities, thereby affecting the development of research programs and institutions. While the strengths and weaknesses of citation metrics are extensively debated in a variety of fields, they have only recently started attracting attention in the philosophy of science. This paper takes a further step in this direction and presents an analysis of citation metrics from the perspective of a Kuhnian model for the development of science. To do that, it starts with an overview of citation metrics both at the general level and at the level of specific metrics, such as Impact Factor, h-index, and field-specific indicators. After that, it engages with Gillies’ argument against the use of citation metrics for scientific research. According to Gillies (2008), citation metrics tend to over-protect normal science at the expenses of revolutionary science. This paper shows that, under certain conditions, citation metrics can in fact arbitrarily hinder the development of normal science and, in light of this, it cautions against using them for evaluative purposes.
2022-10
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21375/1/CitationMetrics.pdf
Lisciandra, Chiara (2022) Are Citation Metrics a Good Thing? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:21943
2023-03-28T17:08:19Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
7375626A656374733D67656E:65766964656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D72656C6967696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21943/
Ethical Dilemmas in Natural Theology and Valid Inference in Clinical Trials
Stern, Julio Michael
Causation
Confirmation/Induction
Ethical Issues
Evidence
Experimentation
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
Science and Religion
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
This paper discusses some aspects of natural theology (theologia naturalis), following the ideas of Baruch Spinoza. Natural theology is presented as a powerful concept capable of bridging traditional theology, ethics, and natural science, enabling original and meaningful perspectives on contemporary problems, and fostering ways of ethical engagement in the modern world. General ethical problems in clinical trials, as well as particular studies on phosphoethanolamine and hydroxychloroquine for cancer and COVID-19 therapy, are used to ground the discussion into real-life applications.
2022-07-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21943/1/jmscle30.pdf
Stern, Julio Michael (2022) Ethical Dilemmas in Natural Theology and Valid Inference in Clinical Trials. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22214
2023-08-09T14:09:22Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D76732D70736575646F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736F6369616C2D6570697374656D6F6C6F67792D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22214/
To Be Scientific Is To Be Communist
Bright, Liam Kofi
Heesen, Remco
Science and Society
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Social Epistemology of Science
What differentiates scientific research from non-scientific inquiry? Philosophers addressing this question have typically been inspired by the exalted social place and intellectual achievements of science. They have hence tended to point to some epistemic virtue or methodological feature of science that sets it apart. Our discussion on the other hand is motivated by the case of commercial research, which we argue is distinct from (and often epistemically inferior to) academic research. We consider a deflationary view in which science refers to whatever is regarded as epistemically successful, but find that this does not leave room for the important notion of scientific error and fails to capture distinctive social elements of science. This leads us to the view that a demarcation criterion should be a widely upheld social norm without immediate epistemic connotations. Our tentative answer is the communist norm, which calls on scientists to share their work widely for public scrutiny and evaluation.
2023-01-23
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22214/1/Bright%20Heesen%202023%20To%20be%20Scientific%20is%20to%20be%20Communist%20%28Social%20Epistemology%29.pdf
Bright, Liam Kofi and Heesen, Remco (2023) To Be Scientific Is To Be Communist. Social Epistemology, 37 (3). pp. 249-258. ISSN 0269-1728
https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2156308
10.1080/02691728.2022.2156308
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22466
2023-12-14T21:26:44Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22483
2023-09-06T16:34:39Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22517
2023-12-14T21:27:45Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22526
2023-09-11T20:27:21Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22526/
Popper, Lakatos, NMF, and the Replication Crisis
Rubin, Mark
Philosophers of Science
Psychology
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory Change
Popper’s (1983, 2002) philosophy of science has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the wake of the replication crisis, offering a philosophical basis for the ensuing science reform movement. However, adherence to Popper’s approach may also be at least partly responsible for the sense of “crisis” that has developed following multiple unexpected replication failures. In this article, I contrast Popper’s approach with Lakatos’ (1978) approach and a related approach called naïve methodological falsificationism (NMF; Lakatos, 1978). The Popperian approach is powerful because it is based on logical refutation, but its theories are noncausal and, therefore, lacking in scientific value. In contrast, the Lakatosian approach tests causal theories, but it concedes that these theories are not logically refutable. Finally, the NMF approach subjects Lakatosian causal theories to Popperian logical refutations. However, its approach of temporarily accepting a ceteris paribus clause during theory testing may be viewed as scientifically inappropriate, epistemically inconsistent, and “completely redundant” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 40). I conclude that a replication “crisis” makes the most sense in the context of the Popperian and NMF approaches because it is only in these two approaches that replication failures represent logical refutations of theories. In contrast, replication failures are less problematic in the Lakatosian approach because they do not logically refute theories. Indeed, in the Lakatosian approach, replication failures can be legitimately ignored or used to motivate theory development.
2023-09-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22526/1/Popper%2C%20Lakatos%2C%20NMF%2C%20%26%20the%20Replication%20Crisis.pdf
Rubin, Mark (2023) Popper, Lakatos, NMF, and the Replication Crisis. [Preprint]
https://doi.org/10.31222/osf.io/2dz9s
10.31222/osf.io/2dz9s
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22570
2023-09-25T15:28:18Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22570/
Transdisciplinary Philosophy of Science: Meeting the Challenge of Indigenous Expertise
Ludwig, David
El-Hani, Charbel
Gatti, Fabio
Kendig, Catherine
Kramm, Matthias
Neco, Lucia
Nieves Delgado, Abigail
Poliseli, Luana
Renck, Vitor
Ressiore C, Adriana
Reyes-Galindo, Luis
Rickard, Thomas Loyd
De La Rosa, Gabriela
Turska, Julia J.
Vergara-Silva, Francisco
Wilson, Rob
Science and Society
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Social Epistemology of Science
Transdisciplinary research knits together knowledge from diverse epistemic communities in addressing social-environmental challenges, such as biodiversity loss, climate crises, food insecurity, and public health. This paper reflects on the roles of philosophy of science in transdisciplinary research while focusing on Indigenous and other subaltern forms of knowledge. We offer a critical assessment of demarcationist approaches in philosophy of science and outline a constructive alternative of transdisciplinary philosophy of science. While a demarcationist focus obscures the complex relations between epistemic communities, transdisciplinary philosophy of science provides resources for meeting epistemic and political challenges of collaborative knowledge production.
2023
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22570/1/Transdisciplinary%20PhilSci%20PSA22.pdf
Ludwig, David and El-Hani, Charbel and Gatti, Fabio and Kendig, Catherine and Kramm, Matthias and Neco, Lucia and Nieves Delgado, Abigail and Poliseli, Luana and Renck, Vitor and Ressiore C, Adriana and Reyes-Galindo, Luis and Rickard, Thomas Loyd and De La Rosa, Gabriela and Turska, Julia J. and Vergara-Silva, Francisco and Wilson, Rob (2023) Transdisciplinary Philosophy of Science: Meeting the Challenge of Indigenous Expertise. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22817
2023-12-06T02:48:58Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22817/
Autism and the Pseudoscience of Mind
LaCroix, Travis
Psychology
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory/Observation
Values In Science
This paper critically examines the theory-of-mind-deficit explanation of autism—a cognitive explanation of autistic behaviour that has significantly influenced empirical research and philosophical discourse surrounding autism. However, the claim that autistics lack a theory of mind is false. Part of the purpose of this paper is to describe how. First, a theory-of-mind deficit is inadequate as an explanatory model. Second, prior research has demonstrated the empirical failures of experiments intended to measure theory-of-mind abilities. These facts together suggest that the science of theory of mind in the context of autism is bad science. I argue that it is pseudoscience. This view has important consequences for philosophers who uncritically invoke autism (qua theory-of-mind deficit) as a thought experiment.
2023-12-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22817/1/LaCroix%20-%20Autism%20and%20the%20Pseudoscience%20of%20Mind%20-%20Preprint%20-%2004%20Dec%202023.pdf
LaCroix, Travis (2023) Autism and the Pseudoscience of Mind. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22890
2023-12-23T23:21:33Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22890/
The Replication Crisis is Less of a “Crisis” in Lakatos’ Philosophy of Science
Rubin, Mark
Philosophers of Science
Psychology
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Theory Change
Popper’s (1983, 2002) philosophy of science has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the wake of the replication crisis, offering a philosophical basis for the ensuing science reform movement. However, adherence to Popper’s approach may also be at least partly responsible for the sense of “crisis” that has developed following multiple unexpected replication failures. In this article, I contrast Popper’s approach with Lakatos’ (1978) approach and a related approach called naïve methodological falsificationism (NMF; Lakatos, 1978). The Popperian approach is powerful because it is based on logical refutation, but its theories are noncausal and, therefore, lacking in scientific value. In contrast, the Lakatosian approach considers causal theories, but it concedes that these theories are not logically refutable. Finally, the NMF approach subjects Lakatosian causal theories to Popperian logical refutations. However, its approach of temporarily accepting a ceteris paribus clause during theory testing may be viewed as scientifically inappropriate, epistemically inconsistent, and “completely redundant” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 40). I conclude that the replication “crisis” makes the most sense in the context of the Popperian and NMF approaches because it is only in these two approaches that replication failures represent logical refutations of theories. In contrast, replication failures are less problematic in the Lakatosian approach because they do not logically refute theories. Indeed, in the Lakatosian approach, replication failures can be legitimately ignored or used to motivate theory development.
2023-12-22
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22890/7/Rubin%20%282023%29%20-%20The%20Replication%20Crisis%20is%20Less%20of%20a%20Crisis%20in%20Lakatos%27%20Philosophy%20of%20Science.pdf
Rubin, Mark (2023) The Replication Crisis is Less of a “Crisis” in Lakatos’ Philosophy of Science. [Preprint]
https://doi.org/10.31222/osf.io/2dz9s
10.31222/osf.io/2dz9s
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22965
2024-01-15T23:49:33Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22965/
Are Citation Metrics a Good Thing?
Lisciandra, Chiara
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Social Epistemology of Science
Theory Change
Citation metrics are statistical measures of scientific outputs that draw on citation indexes. They purport to capture the impact of scientific articles and the journals in which they appear. As evaluative tools, citation metrics are mostly used in the natural sciences, but they are also acquiring an important role in the humanities, thereby affecting the development of research programs and institutions. While the strengths and weaknesses of citation metrics are extensively debated in a variety of fields, they have only recently started attracting attention in the philosophy of science. This paper takes a further step in this direction and presents an analysis of citation metrics from the perspective of a Kuhnian model for the development of science. To do that, it starts with an overview of citation metrics both at the general level and at the level of specific metrics, such as Impact Factor, h-index, and field-specific indicators. After that, it engages with Gillies’ argument against the use of citation metrics for scientific research. According to Gillies (2008), citation metrics tend to over-protect normal science at the expenses of revolutionary science. This paper shows that, under certain conditions, citation metrics can in fact arbitrarily hinder the development of normal science and, in light of this, it cautions against using them for evaluative purposes.
2022-10
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22965/1/CitationMetrics.pdf
Lisciandra, Chiara (2022) Are Citation Metrics a Good Thing? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:22966
2024-01-15T23:49:39Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22966/
Citation Metrics: A Philosophy of Science Perspective.
Lisciandra, Chiara
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Social Epistemology of Science
Theory Change
Citation metrics are statistical measures of scientific output that draw on citation indexes. They purport to capture the impact of scientific articles and the journals in which they appear. As evaluative tools they are mostly used in the natural sciences, but they are also acquiring an important role in the humanities. While the strengths and weaknesses of citation metrics are extensively debated in a variety of fields, they have only recently started attracting attention in the philosophy of science. This paper takes a further step in this direction and presents an analysis of citation metrics from the perspective of a Kuhnian model for the development of science. To do so, it assesses the argument made against the use of citation metrics for scientific research by Gillies (2008). According to Gillies, citations metrics tend to over-protect normal science at the expenses of revolutionary science–in other words, reinforce the status quo rather than supporting innovations and breakthroughs. Unlike Gillies, this paper focuses on the context of normal science and shows that citation metrics can in fact arbitrarily hinder its development when they do not take field-specific differences into account. In light of this, the paper cautions against their use for evaluative purposes. To argue for this conclusion, the paper shows that citation metrics fail to “carve science at its joints” and thus cannot be relied upon as indicators of scientific quality that can support the development of normal science.
2024-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22966/1/CitationMetrics.pdf
Lisciandra, Chiara (2024) Citation Metrics: A Philosophy of Science Perspective. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:23137
2024-02-24T17:17:23Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23137/
The epistemic status of reproducibility in political fact-checking
Fernandez-Roldan, Alejandro
Teira, David
Science and Policy
Science vs. Pseudoscience
Fact-checking agencies assess and score the truthfulness of politicians’ claims to foster their electoral accountability. Fact-checking is sometimes presented as a quasi-scientific activity, based on reproducible verification protocols that would guarantee an unbiased assessment. We will study these verification protocols and discuss under which conditions fact-checking could achieve effective reproducibility. Through an analysis of the methodological norms in verification protocols, we will argue that achieving reproducible fact-checking may not help much in rendering politicians accountable. Political fact-checkers do not deliver either reproducibility or accountability today, and there are reasons to think that traditional quality journalism may serve liberal democracies better.
Springer
2024-02-24
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23137/1/FactChecking.pdf
Fernandez-Roldan, Alejandro and Teira, David (2024) The epistemic status of reproducibility in political fact-checking. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1879-4912
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00575-8