2024-03-29T13:17:41Z
http:///cgi/oai2
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:879
2015-09-13T15:22:50Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
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7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/879/
On the Significance of the Absolute Margin
List, Christian
Confirmation/Induction
Decision Theory
Economics
Probability/Statistics
Consider the hypothesis H that a defendant is guilty (a patient has condition C), and the evidence E that a majority of h out of n independent jurors (diagnostic tests) have voted for H and a minority of k:=n-h against H. How likely is the majority verdict to be correct? By a formula of Condorcet, the probability that H is true given E depends only on each juror's competence and on the absolute margin between the majority and the minority h-k, but neither on the number n, nor on the proportion h/n. This paper reassesses that result and explores its implications. First, using the classical Condorcet jury model, I derive a more general version of Condorcet's formula, confirming the significance of the absolute margin, but showing that the probability that H is true given E depends also on an additional parameter: the prior probability that H is true. Second, I show that a related result holds when we consider not the degree of belief we attach to H given E, but the degree of support E gives to H. Third, I address the implications for the definition of special majority voting, a procedure used to capture the asymmetry between false positive and false negative decisions. I argue that the standard definition of special majority voting in terms of a required proportion of the jury is epistemically questionable, and that the classical Condorcet jury model leads to an alternative definition in terms of a required absolute margin between the majority and the minority. Finally, I show that the results on the significance of the absolute margin can be resisted if the so-called assumption of symmetrical juror competence is relaxed.
2002-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/879/1/absolutemargin071102.pdf
List, Christian (2002) On the Significance of the Absolute Margin. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2365
2010-10-07T15:13:27Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2365/
Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate
Guala, Francesco
Economics
Biology
Sociology
Strong Reciprocity theorists claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms that eliminate incentives to free ride, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. There is little doubt that costly punishment raises cooperation in laboratory conditions. Its efficacy in the field however is controversial. I distinguish two interpretations of experimental results, and show that the wide interpretation endorsed by Strong Reciprocity theorists is unsupported by ethnographic evidence on decentralised punishment and by historical evidence on common pool institutions. The institutions that spontaneously evolve to solve dilemmas of cooperation typically exploit low-cost mechanisms, turning finite games into indefinitely repeated ones and eliminating the cost of sanctioning.
2010-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2365/1/DEAS-2010_23wp.pdf
Guala, Francesco (2010) Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2366
2010-10-07T15:13:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2366/
Has Game Theory Been Refuted?
Guala, Francesco
Economics
The answer in a nutshell is: Yes, five years ago, but nobody has noticed. Nobody noticed because the majority of social scientists subscribe to one of the following views: (1) the ‘anomalous’ behaviour observed in standard prisoner’s dilemma or ultimatum game experiments has refuted standard game theory a long time ago; (2) game theory is flexible enough to accommodate any observed choices by ‘refining’ players’ preferences; or (3) it is just a piece of pure mathematics (a tautology). None of these views is correct. This paper defends the view that GT as commonly understood is not a tautology, that it suffers from important (albeit very recently discovered) empirical anomalies, and that it is not flexible enough to accommodate all the anomalies in its theoretical framework. It also discusses the experiments that finally refuted game theory, and concludes trying to explain why it took so long for experimental game theorists to design experiments that could adequately test the theory.
2005-08
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2366/1/Game_Theory_Refuted_2.pdf
Guala, Francesco (2005) Has Game Theory Been Refuted? UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2412
2010-10-07T15:13:33Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2412/
The World as a Process: Simulations in the Natural and Social Sciences
Hartmann, Stephan
Models and Idealization
Economics
Simulation techniques, especially those implemented on a computer, are frequently employed in natural as well as in social sciences with considerable success. There is mounting evidence that the "model-building era" (J. Niehans) that dominated the theoretical activities of the sciences for a long time is about to be succeeded or at least lastingly supplemented by the "simulation era". But what exactly are models? What is a simulation and what is the difference and the relation between a model and a simulation? These are some of the questions addressed in this article. I maintain that the most significant feature of a simulation is that it allows scientists to imitate one process by another process. "Process" here refers solely to a temporal sequence of states of a system. Given the observation that processes are dealt with by all sorts of scientists, it is apparent that simulations prove to be a powerful interdisciplinarily acknowledged tool. Accordingly, simulations are best suited to investigate the various research strategies in different sciences more carefully. To this end, I focus on the function of simulations in the research process. Finally, a somewhat detailed case-study from nuclear physics is presented which, in my view, illustrates elements of a typical simulation in physics.
2005-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2412/1/Simulations.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan (2005) The World as a Process: Simulations in the Natural and Social Sciences. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2784
2010-10-07T15:21:13Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2788
2010-10-07T15:14:09Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2788/
How Do Microscopic Models of Financial Markets Explain?
Kuhlmann, Meinard
Models and Idealization
Economics
Explanation
Complex Systems
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Financial theory is in trouble. Market crashes and high volatility are only too familiar to everyone, although the standard theories predict that they hardly ever occur. According to the well-known and (partly due to its simplicity) still widely used random-walk model, the probabilities for price changes of, say, stocks should result in a Gaussian distribution. However, experience tells us that large changes occur far more often than ‘allowed’ by a Gaussian distribution. New models are needed which lead to realistic probability distributions. ‘Econophysicists’ are particularly active in this field by constructing microscopic models of financial markets on the basis of various ideas and tools from physics. But in which sense do these models contribute scientific explanations? In this paper I will investigate what and how one exemplary econophysics model explains.
2006
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2788/1/ParisPaper.pdf
Kuhlmann, Meinard (2006) How Do Microscopic Models of Financial Markets Explain? In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2806
2010-10-07T15:14:10Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2806/
Welfare, Voting and the Constitution of a Federal Assembly
Bovens, Luc
Hartmann, Stephan
Probability/Statistics
Decision Theory
Sociology
Economics
Equal and proportional representation are two poles of a continuum of models of representation for the assembly of a federation of states. The choice of a model has repercussions on the welfare distribution in the federation. We determine, first by means of Monte Carlo simulations, what welfare distributions result after assemblies that were constituted on the basis of different models of representation have considered a large number of motions. We assess what model of representation is favored by a Rawlsian maximin measure and by the utilitarian measure and present matching analytical results for the utilitarian measure for a slightly idealized case. Our results show that degressive proportionality can be justified as a compromise between maximin and utilitarian considerations. There is little surprise in this result. What is more surprising, however, is that, within certain contexts of evaluation, degressive proportionality can also be justified on strictly utilitarian grounds.
2006-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2806/1/EUUtility.pdf
Bovens, Luc and Hartmann, Stephan (2006) Welfare, Voting and the Constitution of a Federal Assembly. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2866
2010-10-07T15:14:16Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D70757465722D736369656E63652D6172746966696369616C2D696E74656C6C6967656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2866/
Two aggregation paradoxes in social decision making: the Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma
Pigozzi, Gabriella
Decision Theory
Artificial Intelligence
Economics
The Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma are seemingly unrelated paradoxes of aggregation. The former is discussed in traditional social choice theory, while the latter is at the core of the new literature on judgment aggregation. Both paradoxes arise when, in a group, each individual consistently makes a judgment, or expresses a preference, (in the form of yes or no) over specific propositions, and the collective outcome is in some respect inconsistent. While the result is logically inconsistent in the case of the discursive paradox, it is not stable with respect to the level of aggregation in the case of the Ostrogorski paradox. In the following I argue that, despite these differences, the two problems have a similar structure. My conclusion will be twofold: on the one hand, the similarities between the paradoxes support the claim that these problems should be tackled using the same aggregation procedure; on the other hand, applying the same procedure to these paradoxes will help clarifying the strength and weakness of the aggregation method itself. More specifically, I will show that an operator defined in artificial intelligence to merge belief bases can deal with both paradoxes.
2005-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2866/1/Pigozzi_TwoAggregationParadoxes.pdf
Pigozzi, Gabriella (2005) Two aggregation paradoxes in social decision making: the Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2882
2010-10-07T15:14:19Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D70757465722D736369656E63652D6172746966696369616C2D696E74656C6C6967656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2882/
Belief Merging and the Discursive Dilemma: An Argument-Based Account to Paradoxes of Judgment Aggregation
Pigozzi, Gabriella
Decision Theory
Artificial Intelligence
Economics
The aggregation of individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions is called judgment aggregation. Literature in social choice and political theory has claimed that judgment aggregation raises serious concerns. For example, consider a set of premises and a conclusion where the latter is logically equivalent to the former. When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (the conclusion). This problem is known as the discursive dilemma (or paradox). The discursive dilemma is a serious problem since it is not clear whether a collective outcome exists in these cases, and if it does, what it is like. Moreover, the two suggested escape-routes from the paradox --- the so-called premise-based procedure and the conclusion-based procedure --- are not, as I will show, satisfactory methods for group decision-making. In this paper I introduce a new aggregation procedure inspired by an operator defined in artificial intelligence in order to merge belief bases. The result is that we do not need to worry about paradoxical outcomes, since these arise only when inconsistent collective judgments are not ruled out from the set of possible solutions.
2006-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2882/1/Pigozzi_Judgment_Aggregation.pdf
Pigozzi, Gabriella (2006) Belief Merging and the Discursive Dilemma: An Argument-Based Account to Paradoxes of Judgment Aggregation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3045
2010-10-07T15:14:38Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3045/
Ontic Structural REalism and Economics
Ross, Don
Economics
Ontic structural realism (OSR) as defended in the philosophy of science literature to date is crucially motivated by premises citing empirical discoveries of fundamental physics. To this extent its potential to furnish a general metaphysics for science will appear limited. However, this paper argues that OSR also provides a good account of the progress that has been achieved over the decades in a highly formalized special science, economics. Furthermore, it is claimed, this has a basis in the ontology presupposed by economic theory, and is not just an artifact of the fact that economic theory is formalized.
2006-11
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3045/1/PSA_06.doc
Ross, Don (2006) Ontic Structural REalism and Economics. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3429
2010-10-07T15:15:21Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3429/
A farewell to IIA
Lehtinen, Aki
Decision Theory
Economics
Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) has been under criticism for decades for not taking account of preference intensities. Computer-simulation results by Aki Lehtinen concerning strategic voting under various voting rules show that this intensity argument does not need to rest on mere intuition. Voters may express intensities by voting strategically, and that this has beneficial aggregate-level consequences: utilitarian efficiency is higher if voters engage in strategic behaviour than if they always vote sincerely. Strategic voting is thus unambiguously beneficial under a utilitarian evaluation of outcomes. What has been considered the main argument for IIA turns out to be one against it. This paper assesses the implications of these results for interpretations of Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in a discussion on the methodological and philosophical arguments concerning preference intensities and IIA.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3429/1/fiia.pdf
Lehtinen, Aki (2007) A farewell to IIA. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3433
2010-10-07T15:15:22Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6E6575726F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3433/
Decision-Making: A Neuroeconomic Perspective
Hardy-Vallée, Benoit
Neuroscience
Psychology
Economics
Explanation
This article introduces and discusses from a philosophical point of view the nascent field of neuroeconomics, which is the study of neural mechanisms involved in decision-making and their economic significance. Following a survey of the ways in which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology, I review many important findings in neuroeconomics to show that they suggest a revised picture of decision-making and ourselves as choosing agents. Finally, I outline a neuroeconomic account of irrationality.
2007-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3433/1/hardy2007compass_neuroeconomics.pdf
Hardy-Vallée, Benoit (2007) Decision-Making: A Neuroeconomic Perspective. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3525
2010-10-07T15:15:34Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3525/
Concretization, Explanation, and Mechanisms
Hindriks, Frank
Models and Idealization
Economics
Explanation
Traditional accounts of explanation fail to illuminate the explanatory relevance of “models that are descriptively false” in the sense that the regularities they entail fail to obtain. In this paper, I propose an account of explanation, which I call ‘explanation by concretization’, that serves to explicate the explanatory relevance of such models. Starting from a highly abstract and idealized model, causal explanations of the absence of regularities are sought by adding complexity to the model or by concretizing it. Whether this process is successful depends on whether the abstractions and idealizations in the basic model succeed in isolating a mechanism, i.e. in representing how it operates when interfering factors are absent. This account is developed in the context of economics and contrasted to those of Daniel Hausman and Nancy Cartwright. I go on to provide an account of how unrealistic models can be used for providing understanding of the way mechanisms work.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3525/1/Concretization_Explanation_and_Mechanisms.pdf
Hindriks, Frank (2007) Concretization, Explanation, and Mechanisms. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3550
2010-10-07T15:15:37Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3550/
Economics as robustness analysis
Kuorikoski, Jaakko
Lehtinen, Aki
Marchionni, Caterina
Models and Idealization
Economics
All economic models involve abstractions and idealisations. Economic theory itself does not tell which idealizations are truly fatal or harmful for the result and which are not. This is why much of what is seen as theoretical contribution in economics is constituted by deriving familiar results from different modelling assumptions. If a modelling result is robust with respect to particular modelling assumptions, the empirical falsity of these particular assumptions does not provide grounds for criticizing the result. In this paper we demonstrate how derivational robustness analysis does carry epistemic weight and answer criticism concerning its non-empirical nature and the problematic form of the required independence of the ways of derivation. The epistemic rationale and importance of robustness analysis also challenge some common conceptions of the role of theory in economics.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3550/1/econrobu.pdf
Kuorikoski, Jaakko and Lehtinen, Aki and Marchionni, Caterina (2007) Economics as robustness analysis. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3593
2010-10-07T15:15:43Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3593/
Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation
Hartmann, Stephan
Pigozzi, Gabriella
Sprenger, Jan
Probability/Statistics
Decision Theory
Confirmation/Induction
Economics
The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such a problem as the discursive dilemma. In this paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is factually right or wrong. Hence, the question we address in this paper is how good the various approaches are at selecting the right conclusion. We focus on two approaches: distance-based procedures and Bayesian analysis. Under the former we also subsume the conclusion- and premise-based procedures discussed in the literature. Whereas we believe the Bayesian analysis to be theoretically optimal, the distance-based approaches have more parsimonious presuppositions and are therefore easier to apply.
2007-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3593/1/RMJA.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Pigozzi, Gabriella and Sprenger, Jan (2007) Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3638
2010-10-07T15:15:47Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3638/
Science As a Market Process
Walstad, Allan
Science and Society
Models and Idealization
Economics
Values In Science
Science and Policy
Abstract: Scientific inquiry is amenable to economic interpretation and analysis because scientists, like other people, pursue their individual goals through purposeful action. They make choices on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks as they perceive them. Their interaction with other scientists involves both cooperation and competition in a market that bears many similarities to the traditional economic market. The Austrian school of economics offers a particularly apt basis for an economic perspective on scientific inquiry. Economic concepts remain highly underutilized and ripe for exploitation.
2002-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3638/1/MarketSci10-07PhilSciArch.DOC
Walstad, Allan (2002) Science As a Market Process. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3808
2010-10-07T15:21:31Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3851
2010-10-07T15:16:11Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6177732D6F662D6E6174757265
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F6E64656E7365642D6D6174746572
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3851/
Econophysics and Financial Market Complexity
Rickles, Dean
Probability/Statistics
Models and Idealization
Laws of Nature
Condensed Matter
Economics
Complex Systems
In this chapter we consider economic systems, and in particular financial systems, from the perspective of the physics of complex systems (i.e. statistical physics, the theory of critical phenomena, and their cognates). This field of research is known as econophysics—alternative names are ‘financial physics’ and ‘statistical phynance.’ This title was coined in 1995 by Eugene Stanley, and since then its researchers have attempted to forge it as an independent and important field, one that stands in opposition to standard (‘Neo-Classical’) economic theory. Econophysicists argue that the empirical data is best explained in terms flowing out of statistical physics, according to which the (stylized) facts of economics are best understood as emergent properties of a complex system. However, some economists argue that the methods used by econophysics are not sufficient to prove the existence of underlying complexity in economic systems. The complexity claim can nonetheless be defended as a good example of an inference to the best explanation rather than a definitive deduction.
2008-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3851/1/EconoCompFinal.pdf
Rickles, Dean (2008) Econophysics and Financial Market Complexity. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3939
2010-10-07T15:16:23Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3939/
The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified
Dietrich, Franz
Probability/Statistics
Decision Theory
Confirmation/Induction
Causation
Economics
Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they should be competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of uncertainty or probability employed; (ii) no such notion renders both premises simultaneously justified. Especially the independence assumption should be weakened.
2008-03
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3939/1/Dietrich-CondorcetJuryTheorem.pdf
Dietrich, Franz (2008) The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3946
2010-10-07T15:16:23Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3946/
Reconsidering Gilbert’s Account of Norm-Guided Behaviour
Baumann, Caroline M.
Sociology
Economics
Gilbert’s understanding of social norms is considered by some as a promising alternative proposal to standard rational choice accounts of norm-guided behaviour. In this paper, I evaluate her position on social norms. Focusing on the social rationality of individuals, Gilbert tries to explain norm-based behaviour in terms of the normativity of norms and grounds that normativity in the ways individuals are part of a social setting. More precisely, Gilbert argues that rational agents are motivated to act according to social norms irrespective of their individual preferences. This is so because rational agents can be motivated by the normativity of social norm, that is, their understanding that they ought to act accordingly. Gilbert defends this view in two steps. She argues that (1) the ‘ought’ of a social norm is grounded in a joint commitment; and (2) it is rational to act according to the dictates of a joint commitment. In this paper, I argue that although Gilbert’s account on norm-based behaviour advances interesting intuitions, she fails on both levels. First, the normativity of social norms can be seen as grounded in joint commitments; and second, Gilbert does not provide sufficient reason to believe that it is indeed rational to act according to one’s joint commitments.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3946/1/gilbert_on_norms3_confpaper0711.doc
Baumann, Caroline M. (2007) Reconsidering Gilbert’s Account of Norm-Guided Behaviour. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4021
2010-10-07T15:16:35Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4021/
MICRO-FOUNDATIONS IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: SQUARING COLEMAN’S DIAGRAM
Vromen, Jack, J.
Economics
Explanation
In a series of joint papers, Teppo Felin and Nicolai J. Foss recently launched a microfoundations project in the field of strategic management. Felin and Foss observe that extant explanations in strategic management are predominantly collectivist or macro. Routines and organizational capabilities, which are supposed to be properties of firms, loom large in the field of strategic management. Routines figure as explanantia in explanations of firm behavior and firm performance, for example. Felin and Foss plead for a replacement of such macro-explanations by micro-explanations (viz. explanations in terms of individual action and interaction). Such a replacement is needed, Felin and Foss argue, because macro-explanations are necessarily incomplete: they miss out on crucial links in the causal chain that connect macro phenomena with each other. I argue that this argument is flawed. It is based on a doubtful if not outright incorrect understanding and use of Coleman’s diagram. In a sense to be explained below, only if Coleman’s diagram is squared it can accurately account for the relations between individual action and interaction, routines and firm behavior and firm performance. Once Coleman’s diagram is squared, one can see why and how macro-explanations need not miss out on any link in the causal chains that connect macro phenomena. Micro-analyses are still needed, not to highlight and specify causal links that macro-explanations miss out on, but to check whether the many properties that are ascribed to routines in macro-explanations of firm behavior are warranted.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4021/1/Jack_J._Vromen_-_Micro-foundations_in_strategic_management.doc
Vromen, Jack, J. (2008) MICRO-FOUNDATIONS IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: SQUARING COLEMAN’S DIAGRAM. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4042
2010-10-07T15:16:38Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4042/
Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth
Hartmann, Stephan
Sprenger, Jan
Decision Theory
Confirmation/Induction
Economics
The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to that problem as the discursive dilemma. In this paper, we motivate that many groups do not only want to reach a factually right conclusion, but also want to correctly evaluate the reasons for that conclusion. In other words, we address the problem of tracking the true situation instead of merely selecting the right outcome. We set up a probabilistic model analogous to Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and compare several aggregation procedures by means of theoretical results, numerical simulations and practical considerations. Among them are the premise-based, the situation-based and the distance-based procedure. Our findings confirm the conjecture in Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2008) that the premise-based procedure is a crude, but reliable and sometimes even optimal form of judgment aggregation.
2008-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4042/1/JA_TT.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan (2008) Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4120
2010-10-07T15:16:52Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4120/
Why do People Cooperate as Much as They Do?
Woodward, Jim
Economics
This paper makes use of recent empirical results, mainly from experimental economics, to expore the conditions under which people will cooperate and to assess competing explantions of this cooperation. It is argued that the evidence supports the claim that people differ in type, with some being conditional cooperators and others being motivated by more or less sophisticated forms of self-interest. Stable cooperation requires, among other things, rules and institutions that protect conditional cooperators from myopically self-interested types. Additional empirical features of the behavior of conditional cooperators also imply that rules and institutions are required to produce stable cooperation.
2008-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4120/1/Why_Cooperation_with_inserts_7.7.doc
Woodward, Jim (2008) Why do People Cooperate as Much as They Do? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4168
2010-10-07T15:16:58Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4168/
Social Preferences in Experimental Economics
Woodward, James
Economics
This paper explores some issues having to do with the use of experimental results from one shot games to reach conclusions about the existence of social preferences which are taken to figure in the explanation of co-operation in repeated interactions in real life.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4168/1/PSA_06_paper.final.9.22.doc
Woodward, James (2008) Social Preferences in Experimental Economics. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4171
2010-10-07T15:16:58Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4171/
Experimental Investigations of Social Preferences
Woodward, James
Economics
This article surveys some of the philosophical issues raised by recent experimental work in economics on so-called social preferences. This work raises a number of fascinating methodological and interpretive issues that are of central importance both to economics and to social and political philosophy.
2007-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4171/1/OUP_Soc_Prefs__Final_12.26%282%29.07.doc
Woodward, James (2007) Experimental Investigations of Social Preferences. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4319
2010-10-07T15:17:24Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4319/
Judgment aggregation: a short introduction
List, Christian
Decision Theory
Economics
The aim of this article is to introduce the theory of judgment aggregation, a growing interdisciplinary research area. The theory addresses the following question: How can a group of individuals make consistent collective judgments on a given set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgments on them? I begin by explaining the observation that initially sparked the interest in judgment aggregation, the so-called "doctinal" and "discursive paradoxes". I then introduce the basic formal model of judgment aggregation, which allows me to present some illustrative variants of a generic impossibility result. I subsequently turn to the question of how this impossibility result can be avoided, going through several possible escape routes. Finally, I relate the theory of judgment aggregation to other branches of aggregation theory. Rather than offering a comprehensive survey of the theory of judgment aggregation, I hope to introduce the theory in a succinct and pedagogical way, providing an illustrative rather than exhaustive coverage of some of its key ideas and results.
2008-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4319/1/ja-intro.pdf
List, Christian (2008) Judgment aggregation: a short introduction. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4320
2010-10-07T15:17:24Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4320/
Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result
List, Christian
Decision Theory
Ethical Issues
Theory Change
Economics
While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggregation of individual judgments into collective ones, there is much less formal work on the transformation of judgments in group communication. I develop a model of judgment transformation and prove a baseline impossibility theorem: Any judgment transformation function satisfying some initially plausible conditions is the identity function, under which no opinion change occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossibility and argue that the kind of group communication envisaged by deliberative democats must be "holistic": It must focus on webs of connected propositions, not on one proposition at a time, which echoes the Duhem-Quine "holism thesis" on scientific theory testing. My approach provides a map of the logical space in which different possible group communication processes are located.
2008-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4320/1/JudgmentTransformation.pdf
List, Christian (2008) Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4321
2010-10-07T15:17:24Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4321/
The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory
Dietrich, Franz
List, Christian
Probability/Statistics
Decision Theory
Economics
How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. Our first theorem simultaneously characterizes some prominent aggregation rules in the cases of probability, judgment and preference aggregation, including linear opinion pooling and Arrovian dictatorships. Our second theorem abstracts even further from the specific kinds of attitudes in question and describes the properties of a large class of aggregation rules applicable to a variety of belief-like attitudes. Our approach integrates some previously disconnected areas of investigation.
2008-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4321/1/AttitudeAggregation.pdf
Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2008) The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4491
2010-10-07T15:17:41Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4491/
Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers
Hartmann, Stephan
Martini, Carlo
Sprenger, Jan
Probability/Statistics
Decision Theory
Confirmation/Induction
Sociology
Economics
This paper focuses on the question of how to resolve disagreement, and uses the Lehrer-Wagner model as a formal tool for investigating consensual decision-making. The main result consists in a general definition of when agents treat each other as epistemic peers (Kelly 2005; Elga 2007), and a theorem vindicating the "equal weight view" to resolve disagreement among epistemic peers. We apply our findings to an analysis of the impact of social network structures on group deliberation processes, and we demonstrate their stability with the help of numerical simulations.
2009-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4491/1/Consensus_Epistemic_Peers.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Martini, Carlo and Sprenger, Jan (2009) Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4591
2010-10-07T15:17:56Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4591/
Causal Arrows in Econometric Models
Russo, Federica
Economics
Econometrics applies statistical methods to study economic phenomena. Roughly, by means of equations, econometricians typically account for the response variable in terms of a number of explanatory variables. The question arises under what conditions econometric models can be given a causal interpretation. By drawing the distinction between associational models and causal models, the paper argues that a proper use of background knowledge, three distinct types of assumptions (statistical, extra-statistical, and causal), and the hypothetico-deductive methodology provide sufficient conditions for a causal interpretation of econometric models.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4591/1/CausalArrows-EconometricModels.doc
Russo, Federica (2009) Causal Arrows in Econometric Models. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4610
2010-10-07T15:17:57Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4610/
Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation
Hartmann, Stephan
Pigozzi, Gabriella
Sprenger, Jan
Probability/Statistics
Decision Theory
Confirmation/Induction
Economics
The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such a problem as the discursive dilemma. In this paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is factually right or wrong. Hence, we address the question of how good the various approaches are at selecting the right conclusion. We focus on two approaches: distance-based procedures and a Bayesian analysis. They correspond to group-internal and group-external decision-making, respectively. We compare those methods in a probabilistic model, demonstrate the robustness of our results over various generalizations and discuss their applicability in different situations. The findings vindicate (i) that in judgment aggregation problems, reasons should carry higher weight than conclusions and (ii) that considering members of an advisory board to be highly competent is a better strategy than to underestimate their advice.
2009-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4610/1/RMJA_v2.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Pigozzi, Gabriella and Sprenger, Jan (2009) Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4765
2011-09-29T11:26:06Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4765/
Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth
Hartmann, Stephan
Sprenger, Jan
Probability/Statistics
Decision Theory
Economics
The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. In this paper, we motivate that quite often, we do not only want to make a factually right decision, but also to correctly evaluate the reasons for that decision. In other words, we address the problem of tracking the truth. We set up a probabilistic model that generalizes the analysis of Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and use it to compare several aggregation procedures. Demanding some reasonable adequacy constraints, we demonstrate that a reasons- or premise-based aggregation procedure tracks the truth better than any other procedure. However, we also illuminate that such a procedure is not in all circumstances easy to implement, leaving actual decision-makers with a tradeoff problem.
2009-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4765/1/JA_TT.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan (2009) Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5297
2010-10-07T15:19:30Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5297/
The Surprising Weberian Roots to Milton Friedman’s Methodology
Schliesser, Eric
Models and Idealization
History of Philosophy of Science
Sociology
Economics
History of Science Case Studies
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
The main point of this paper is to contribute to understanding Milton Friedman’s (1953) “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (hereafter F1953), one of the most influential statements of economic methodology of the twentieth century, and, in doing so, help discern the non trivial but complex role of philosophic ideas in the shaping of economic theorizing and economists’ self-conception. It also aims to contribute to a better understanding of the theoretical origins of the so-called ‘Chicago’ school of economics. In this paper, I first present detailed textual evidence of the familiarity of George Stigler with the early work of Talcott Parsons, the most important American translator and disseminator of Max Weber’s ideas, who also helped create sociology as a distinct discipline in the United States. The Chicago-Parsons link is no surprise because historians have known that Frank Knight and Parsons corresponded, first about translating Weber and then about matters of mutual interest. Knight, who was a doctoral advisor to Stigler and teacher of Milton Friedman, was not merely the first American translator of Weber, but remained keenly and, perhaps, increasingly interested in Weber throughout his life. I am unfamiliar with any investigation of the Weberian influence on Knight’s students. I show that Stigler praises Parsons’ treatment of Alfred Marshall, who plays an outsized role in Friedman’s self-conception of economics and economic theory. I also show that Stigler calls attention to the methodological similarity between Friedman and Parsons. Finally, I turn to F1953, and I show, first, that some of its most distinctive and philosophically interesting claims echo Parsons’ treatment of methodological matters; second that once alerted one can note Weberian terminology in F1953.
2010-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5297/1/f1953weberes5april2010.doc
Schliesser, Eric (2010) The Surprising Weberian Roots to Milton Friedman’s Methodology. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5398
2010-10-07T15:19:45Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5398/
Are There Lewis Conventions?
Guala, Francesco
Economics
David Lewis famously proposed to model conventions as solutions to coordination games, where equilibrium selection is driven by precedence, or the history of play. A characteristic feature of Lewis Conventions is that they are intrinsically nonnormative. Some philosophers have argued that for this reason they miss a crucial aspect of our folk notion of convention. It is doubtful however that Lewis was merely analysing a folk concept. I illustrate how his theory can (and must) be assessed using empirical data, and argue that it does indeed miss some important aspects of real-world conventions. I conclude that whether Lewis Conventions exist or not depends on how closely they approximate real-world behaviour, and whether we have any alternative theory that does a better job at explaining the phenomena.
2008-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5398/1/Lewis%20conventions%203.pdf
Guala, Francesco (2008) Are There Lewis Conventions? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5423
2010-10-07T15:19:49Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5423/
Inventing Paradigms, Monopoly, Methodology, and Mythology at 'Chicago': Nutter and Stigler
Schliesser, Eric
Economics
This paper focuses on Warren Nutter’s The Extent of Enterprise Monopoly in the United States, 1899-1939. This started out as a (1949) doctoral dissertation at The University of Chicago, part of Aaron Director’s Free Market Study. Besides Director, O.H. Brownlee and Milton Friedman were closely involved with supervising it. It was published by The University of Chicago Press in 1951. In the 1950s the book was explicitly understood as belonging to the “Chicago School” (Dow and Abernathy 1963). By articulating the content, context, and reception of Nutter’s monograph, this paper discusses four larger themes. First, I introduce the importance of Kuhnian conceptions of science to the methodological and institutional understanding of economics in the development of a ‘Chicago’ school of economics. I do this in context of previously unpublished Stigler-Kuhn exchange. While Thomas Kuhn was widely read and adopted in the social sciences and humanities in the 1960s and 70s (and thereafter), I argue that at ‘Chicago,’ proto-Kuhnian language can be found going back to the 1940s; in those early days it is partly used to disparage the achievements of economic theorizing as promoted by others. A more self-congratulatory Kuhnian self-understanding of economics as a mature paradigm starts to get adopted around 1955 by George Stigler. One important new claim is that the later Kuhnian language gets adopted in part to divest ‘Chicago’ from its shared roots with Institutionalist economics. So, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the formation of a shared narrative at ‘Chicago.’ Second, I introduce contextual themes from Milton Friedman’s writings in the late 40s and 50s to help us understand the nature of realism at Chicago. Nutter’s dissertation helps in reading and illuminating Milton Friedman’s famous 1953 methodology paper in historical and intellectual context. Third, while this chapter notes some of the political ramifications of Chicago economics, my main aim is to help explain the manner in which Chicago attempted to chart a distinctive methodological course. This methodology has often been described as Marshallian with debts to the large-scale NBER studies. Rather than going over familiar territory, I call attention to the importance of proxies in Nutter’s empirical methodology. It is an unappreciated feature of the inductive, quantitative method that focused on the component structures of the economy that characterizes Chicago’s methodological outlook in this period. I show this by comparing Nutter’s dissertation to work done by Stigler, then at Columbia. We know from Stigler’s correspondence with Friedman that in this period they discussed methodological matters. What is less well known is that Friedman is explicitly credited for Stigler’s methodological insights in Stigler's Five Lectures at LSE. The fifth lecture, “Competition in the United States,” covers similar territory as Nutter’s project. Comparing the work by Stigler and Nutter sheds light on the nature of Chicago methodology as it was being developed away from foundations laid by Frank Knight and Henry Simons in the late 1940s and 1950s and opening up the door to (right wing) social engineering as exemplified by Harberger. I present my analysis through the published critical reception of both works among economists. A fourth reason to focus on Nutter’s dissertation is that it was featured in a Fortune magazine article in January 1952. So, it provides a useful entry into how politically important ‘Chicago’ research was marketed to a wider audience. This connects to issues explored by Phil Mirowski and his students, Rob van Horn and Eddie Nik-kah. So, Nutter’s dissertation can help us see how ‘sponsored’ research looks at ‘Chicago at the time. This is especially important because it has been claimed that Director’s Free Market Study group promoted a change from classically liberal views on monopoly, which condemned labor and employer monopolies, to a more pro-business stance.
2010-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5423/1/WarrenNutterstigler16june2010.pdf
Schliesser, Eric (2010) Inventing Paradigms, Monopoly, Methodology, and Mythology at 'Chicago': Nutter and Stigler. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8442
2011-01-03T15:57:34Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D65646963696E65
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8442/
Mechanisms in Dynamically Complex Systems
Kuhlmann, Meinard
Biology
Causation
Complex Systems
Economics
Explanation
Medicine
Physics
In recent debates mechanisms are often discussed in the context of ‘complex systems’ which are understood as having a complicated compositional structure. I want to draw the attention to another, radically different kind of complex system, in fact one that many scientists regard as the only genuine kind of complex system. Instead of being compositionally complex these systems rather exhibit highly non-trivial dynamical patterns on the basis of structurally simple arrangements of large numbers of non-linearly interacting constituents. The characteristic dynamical patterns in what I call “dynamically complex systems” arise from the interaction of the system’s parts largely irrespective of many properties of these parts. Dynamically complex systems can exhibit surprising statistical characteristics, the robustness of which calls for an explanation in terms of underlying generating mechanisms. However, I want to argue, dynamically complex systems are not sufficiently covered by the available conceptions of mechanisms. I will explore how the notion of a mechanism has to be modified to accommodate this case. Moreover, I will show under which conditions the widespread, if not inflationary talk about mechanisms in (dynamically) complex systems stretches the notion of mechanisms beyond its reasonable limits and is no longer legitimate.
2011-01-02
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8442/1/Kuhlmann2011-FINAL.pdf
Kuhlmann, Meinard (2011) Mechanisms in Dynamically Complex Systems. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8652
2011-06-05T13:23:37Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8652/
Justice and the Structure of Reciprocity: How Empirical Results Can Inform Normative Theory
Woodward, James
Anthropology
Economics
Ethical Issues
Over the past two decades a rich empirical literature has developed, reflecting work in economics, psychology, neurobiology, evolutionary biology and other disciplines, concerning human cooperation, and the distribution of the benefits and burdens that it generates. These issues are also a focus of a great deal of normative theorizing, much of it falling within the subject matter of theories of justice. It is a natural thought that the empirical literature must have some bearing on the normative theories, but it is no easy matter to spell out what these connections might be. This paper explores this question, by focusing on empirical literature relevant to one particular notion that plays a role in many normative theories of justice —the notion of reciprocity
2011-06-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/msword
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8652/1/Justice_and_Reciprocity.PPA.docx
Woodward, James (2011) Justice and the Structure of Reciprocity: How Empirical Results Can Inform Normative Theory. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8693
2011-07-03T04:58:47Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8693/
Four Species of Reflexivity and History of Economics in Economic Policy Science
Schliesser, Eric
Economics
History of Philosophy of Science
Science and Society
Values In Science
This paper argues that history of economics has a fruitful, underappreciated role to play in the development of economics, especially when understood as a policy science. This goes against the grain of the last half century during which economics, which has undergone a formal revolution, has distanced itself from its ‘literary’ past and practices precisely with the aim to be a more successful policy science.
The paper will motivate the thesis by identifying and distinguishing four kinds of reflexivity in economics. The main thesis of this paper is that because these forms of reflexivity are not eliminable, the history of economics must play a constitutive role in economics (and graduate education within economics). An assumption that I clarify in this paper is that the history of economics ought to be part of the subject matter studied by economics when they are interested in policy science. Even if one does not accept the conclusion, the fourfold classification of reflexivity might hold independent interest.
The paper is divided in two parts. First, I offer a stylized historical introduction to and conceptualization of the themes of this paper. In particular, I identify various historically influential arguments and strategies that reduced the role of history of economics within the economics discipline. I will focus on arguments by Paul Samuelson, George Stigler, and Milton Friedman. I also canvass six arguments that try to capture the cost to economics (understood as a science) for sidelining the history of economics from within the discipline. A sub-text of the introduction is that for contingent reasons, post World War II economics evolved into a policy science. Second, I distinguish between four species of reflexivity. These are used to then strengthen the argument for the constitutive role of the history of economics within the economics profession.
2011-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8693/1/fourkindsofreflexivityhistoryofeconomics.pdf
Schliesser, Eric (2011) Four Species of Reflexivity and History of Economics in Economic Policy Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8748
2011-08-10T11:09:28Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D7075746174696F6E2D696E666F726D6174696F6E:436C6173736963616C
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D7075746174696F6E2D696E666F726D6174696F6E:636F6D7075746174696F6E2D696E666F726D6174696F6E2D7175616E74756D
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D70757465722D736369656E63652D6172746966696369616C2D696E74656C6C6967656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:666F726D616C2D6C6561726E696E672D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8748/
Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity
Aaronson, Scott
Classical
Evolutionary Theory
Quantum
Artificial Intelligence
Confirmation/Induction
Economics
Formal Learning Theory
Mathematics
Quantum Mechanics
One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory---the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems---leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction and Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.
2011-08-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8748/1/philos.pdf
Aaronson, Scott (2011) Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8815
2011-09-29T11:26:06Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8815/
Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth
Hartmann, Stephan
Sprenger, Jan
Probability/Statistics
Decision Theory
Economics
The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. In this paper, we motivate that quite often, we do not only want to make a factually right decision, but also to correctly evaluate the reasons for that decision. In other words, we address the problem of tracking the truth. We set up a probabilistic model that generalizes the analysis of Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and use it to compare several aggregation procedures. Demanding some reasonable adequacy constraints, we demonstrate that a reasons- or premise-based aggregation procedure tracks the truth better than any other procedure. However, we also illuminate that such a procedure is not in all circumstances easy to implement, leaving actual decision-makers with a tradeoff problem.
2009-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8815/1/JA_TT.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan (2009) Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8996
2012-10-16T12:41:19Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8996/
How Beliefs Make A Difference (PhD dissertation)
Sterrett, Susan G
Causation
Cognitive Science
Economics
Philosophers of Science
How are beliefs efficacious? One answer is: via rational intentional action. But there are other ways that beliefs are efficacious. This dissertation examines these other ways, and sketches an answer to the question of how beliefs are efficacious that takes into account how beliefs are involved in the full range of behavioral disciplines, from psychophysiology and cognition to social and economic phenomena.
The account of how beliefs are efficacious I propose draws on work on active accounts of perception. I develop an account based on a proposal sketched by the cognitive scientist Ulrich Neisser. Neisser sketched an active account of perception, on which dynamic anticipatory schemata direct an organism's exploration and action, and are in turn revised as a result of exploration and action. This notion of schema has roots in nineteenth century neurophysiology and in Frederick Bartlett's subsequent work on memory. Neisser appealed to it to unite what he thought was right about information-processing accounts of perception with what he thought was right about ecological accounts of perception. The point that we must anticipate in order to perceive has been recognized by philosophers in the form of the "theory-ladenness of observation." I extend the concept of anticipatory schema to include its role in social perception and social interaction; the concept of anticipatory schema provides a more interactive account of the role of expectations in the maintenance and existence of social institutions, and can be used to enrich the account of convention David Lewis provided. I also show that the concept of rational expectations, which explains the neutrality of money in terms of the efficacy of anticipatory expectations, is compatible with the proposed account of how beliefs are efficacious.
I discuss how the proposal accounts for the three main modes by which beliefs can be efficacious: (i) via their role in causing intentional action, (ii) via their role in causing economic phenomena and the existence and maintenance of social institutions, and (iii) via their role in causing unintentional physiological responses, including anticipatory physiological responses that can enable perception, cause involuntary actions and give rise to the placebo effect.
University of Pittsburgh
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8996/1/Sterrett1999UMIDissertationHowBeliefsMakeADifference.pdf
Sterrett, Susan G How Beliefs Make A Difference (PhD dissertation). University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9372
2019-05-28T17:46:01Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9372/
How Beliefs Make A Difference (PhD dissertation) SEARCHABLE pdf
Sterrett, Susan G.
Causation
Cognitive Science
Economics
Philosophers of Science
How are beliefs efficacious? One answer is: via rational intentional action. But there are other ways that beliefs are efficacious. This dissertation examines these other ways, and sketches an answer to the question of how beliefs are efficacious that takes into account how beliefs are involved in the full range of behavioral disciplines, from psychophysiology and cognition to social and economic phenomena.
The account of how beliefs are efficacious I propose draws on work on active accounts of perception. I develop an account based on a proposal sketched by the cognitive scientist Ulrich Neisser. Neisser sketched an active account of perception, on which dynamic anticipatory schemata direct an organism's exploration and action, and are in turn revised as a result of exploration and action. This notion of schema has roots in nineteenth century neurophysiology and in Frederick Bartlett's subsequent work on memory. Neisser appealed to it to unite what he thought was right about information-processing accounts of perception with what he thought was right about ecological accounts of perception. The point that we must anticipate in order to perceive has been recognized by philosophers in the form of the "theory-ladenness of observation." I extend the concept of anticipatory schema to include its role in social perception and social interaction; the concept of anticipatory schema provides a more interactive account of the role of expectations in the maintenance and existence of social institutions, and can be used to enrich the account of convention David Lewis provided. I also show that the concept of rational expectations, which explains the neutrality of money in terms of the efficacy of anticipatory expectations, is compatible with the proposed account of how beliefs are efficacious.
I discuss how the proposal accounts for the three main modes by which beliefs can be efficacious: (i) via their role in causing intentional action, (ii) via their role in causing economic phenomena and the existence and maintenance of social institutions, and (iii) via their role in causing unintentional physiological responses, including anticipatory physiological responses that can enable perception, cause involuntary actions and give rise to the placebo effect.
University of Pittsburgh
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9372/1/Sterrett1999UMIDissertationHowBeliefsMakeADifference.pdf
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9372/3/SterrettHowBeliefsMakeADifferenceSEARCHABLE.pdf
Sterrett, Susan G. How Beliefs Make A Difference (PhD dissertation) SEARCHABLE pdf. University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9382
2012-11-04T22:26:58Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9382/
An impossibility theorem for allocation aggregation
Wagner, Carl
Shattuck, Mark
Economics
In axiomatic approaches to expert opinion aggregation, so-called independence conditions have been ubiquitous. Such conditions dictate that the group value assigned to each decision variable should depend only on the values assigned by individuals to that variable, taking no account of values that they assign to other variables. This radically anti-holistic stricture on the synthesis of expert opinion severely limits the set of allowable aggregation methods. As we show, the limitations are particularly acute in the case of three or more variables which must be assigned nonnegative real values summing to a fixed positive real number s. For if the subset V of [0,s] comprising the allowable values of the variables satisfies the closure conditions (i)0 is an element of V ; (ii) if x is an element of V, then s-x is an element of V ; and (iii) if x and y are elements of V and x+y is an element of [0,s], then x+y is an element of V, then, if V is finite, which is always the case in practice, subjecting the aggregation of such s-allocations to an independence condition allows only for dictatorial or imposed (i.e., constant) aggregation.
2012-10-24
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/msword
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9382/1/PS_Arch_-An_impossibility_theorem_for_alllocation_aggregation.docx_with_authors.docx
Wagner, Carl and Shattuck, Mark (2012) An impossibility theorem for allocation aggregation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9402
2012-11-04T15:29:10Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9402/
Is race a cause?
Marcellesi, Alexandre
Causation
Economics
Advocates of the counterfactual approach to causal inference argue that race isn’t a cause. I object that their argument is invalid and that its key premise is unwarranted. I also criticize the criterion, which I call ‘Holland’s rule’, the counterfactual approach relies on to distinguish causes from non-causes. Finally, I argue that racial discrimination cannot be causally explained unless one assumes race to be a cause. I conclude that the view that race is not a cause lacks
support and that there are good reasons to adopt the opposite view that race is a cause.
2012-11-03
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9402/1/race_psa.pdf
Marcellesi, Alexandre (2012) Is race a cause? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9508
2013-01-07T02:26:17Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9508/
Is race a cause?
Marcellesi, Alexandre
Causation
Economics
Sociology
Advocates of the counterfactual approach to causal inference argue that race is not a cause, and this despite the fact that it is commonly treated as such by scientists in many disciplines. I object that their argument is unsound because two of its premises are false. I also sketch an argument to the effect that racial discrimination cannot be explained unless one assumes race to be a cause.
2012-11-03
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9508/4/psa_final.pdf
Marcellesi, Alexandre (2012) Is race a cause? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9805
2013-05-31T12:39:20Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D646576656C6F706D656E74616C
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65636F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9805/
Eco-phenotypic physiologies: a new kind of modeling for unifying evolution, ecology and cultural transmission
Panebianco, Fabrizio
Serrelli, Emanuele
Anthropology
Developmental Biology
Ecology/Conservation
Evolutionary Theory
Economics
Models and Idealization
Mathematical modeling can ground communication and reciprocal enrichment among fields of knowledge whose domains are very different. We propose a new mathematical model applicable in biology, specified into ecology and evolutionary biology, and in cultural transmission studies, considered as a branch of economics. Main inspiration for the model are some biological concepts we call “eco-phenotypic” such as development, plasticity, reaction norm, phenotypic heritability, epigenetics, and niche construction. “Physiology” is a core concept we introduce and translate differently in the biological and cultural domains. The model is ecological in that it aims at describing and studying organisms and populations that perform living, intended as a thermodynamic, matter-energy process concerning resources gathering, usage, and depletion in a spatiotemporal context with given characteristics, as well as with multiplication and space occupation. The model also supports evolution, intended as a dynamics including cumulative change in the features of unique organisms that are connected into breeding populations. The model is then applicable to the economics of cultural transmission in which individuals form their attitudes and patterns of behavior under a complex system of influences derived from their “cultural parents”, other members of the society, and the environment. On the side of biology, an innovative goal is to integrate in a single model all the eco-phenotypic concepts as well as both evolution and ecology. On the side of cultural transmission, eco-phenotypic modeling seems more appropriate in capturing some aspects of cultural systems which are modeled away in the earlier framework based on Mendelian population genetics.
2013-05-28
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9805/1/Panebianco_Serrelli_-_Eco-phenotypic_physiologies_-_Evolutionary_Patterns_2013.pdf
Panebianco, Fabrizio and Serrelli, Emanuele (2013) Eco-phenotypic physiologies: a new kind of modeling for unifying evolution, ecology and cultural transmission. In: UNSPECIFIED.
http://evolutionarypatterns.fc.ul.pt
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9848
2014-03-04T12:14:42Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:6E6575726F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9848/
Confessions of a Complexity Skeptic
Scholl, Raphael
Economics
History of Science Case Studies
Neuroscience
Science and Society
Three objections to Max Urchs's paper on complexity are discussed. First, Urchs's macroeconomic illustrations of the benefits of complexity thinking are open to more conventional interpretations. Second, Urchs formulates a thesis concerning the relationship between science and society which is untenable if taken as a historical claim and insufficiently developed if taken as a metaphor. Third, methodological problems in history and philosophy of science plague Urchs's discussion of neuroscience.
2013
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9848/1/scholl-complexity-preprint.pdf
Scholl, Raphael (2013) Confessions of a Complexity Skeptic. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9873
2013-07-11T07:32:14Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9873/
Representation as a Process of Model-Building: A Case from Economics
Chen, Szu-Ting
Economics
Models and Idealization
What does it mean to say that a theory represents the targeted phenomenon that it aims to explain? Our interpretation of “representation” is closely related to the methodological position that we would adopt in answering the question of realism in science. As is pointed out by Nancy Cartwright, according to the traditional syntactic approach of explaining scientific theorization, the question of realism is about how accurately the sciences can represent the world; in the semantic approach, however, the focus of the question shifts to a concern about the range of science—i.e., how much of the world the sciences can represent. This shift in the methodological concern is by no means trivial; it indicates that there is a change of content in the concept of representation from a static idea to a dynamic one. The static idea of representation concerns how reliably the formal structure of a class of sentences—i.e., the formal structure of a theory—can stand for the targeted phenomenon. The dynamic idea, however, perceives a theory as a class of models and explores the development of these models; that is, the dynamic idea of representation investigates how a theorizer uses these models to stand for reality. As a consequence of this shift from a static to a dynamic mode of thinking, it seems that model-building constitutes the main content of the concept of representation. By comparing two differing contemporary accounts of the nature of economic models and presenting a case study in economic theorizing, this paper argues that representation is a process of economists’ repeatedly using “realistic representation of the isolated unrealistic world” at each step of their theorizing to build up a class of “unrealistic constructed credible worlds.”
2013-07-11
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9873/1/Representation_as_a_Process_of_Model-Building.pdf
Chen, Szu-Ting (2013) Representation as a Process of Model-Building: A Case from Economics. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10042
2013-10-11T14:28:11Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:666F726D616C2D6C6561726E696E672D7468656F7279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10042/
Prediction Games
Barrett, Jeffrey A.
Dickson, Michael
Purves, Gordon
Economics
Formal Learning Theory
We consider an extension of signaling games to the case of prediction, where one agent (‘sender’) perceives the current state of the world and sends a signal. The second agent (‘receiver’) perceives this signal, and makes a prediction about the next state of the world (which evolves according to stochastic but not entirely random ‘laws’). We suggest that such games may be the basis of a model for the evolution of successful theorizing about the world.
2013
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10042/1/prediction_games.pdf
other
en
cc_gnu_gpl
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10042/2/simple_prediction2.nlogo
Barrett, Jeffrey A. and Dickson, Michael and Purves, Gordon (2013) Prediction Games. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10214
2014-01-11T15:53:15Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10214/
On Property Theory
Ellerman, David
Economics
Ethical Issues
A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole life-cycle of a property right: how it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and has almost completely neglected the question of the initiation and termination of property in normal production and consumption (not in some original state or in the transition from common to private property). The institutional mechanism for the normal initiation and termination of property is an invisible-hand function of the market, the market mechanism of appropriation. Does this mechanism satisfy an appropriate normative principle? The standard normative juridical principle is to assign or impute legal responsibility according to de facto responsibility. It is given a historical tag of being "Lockean" but the basis is contemporary jurisprudence, not historical exegesis. Then the fundamental theorem of the property mechanism is proven which shows that if "Hume's conditions" (no transfers without consent and all contracts fulfilled) are satisfied, then the market automatically satisfies the Lockean responsibility principle, i.e., "Hume implies Locke." As a major application, the results in their contrapositive form, "Not Locke implies Not Hume," are applied to a market economy based on the employment contract. It is shown the production based on the employment contract violates the Lockean principle (all who work in an employment enterprise are de facto responsible for the positive and negative results) and thus Hume's conditions must also be violated in the marketplace (de facto responsible human action cannot be transferred from one person to another—as is readily recognized when and employer and employee together commit a crime).
2014-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10214/1/OnPropertyTheory.pdf
Ellerman, David (2014) On Property Theory. [Preprint]
http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?acr=jei
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10548
2014-03-04T12:14:42Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:6E6575726F736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10548/
Confessions of a Complexity Skeptic
Scholl, Raphael
Economics
History of Science Case Studies
Neuroscience
Science and Society
Three objections to Max Urchs's paper on complexity are discussed. First, Urchs's macroeconomic illustrations of the benefits of complexity thinking are open to more conventional interpretations. Second, Urchs formulates a thesis concerning the relationship between science and society which is untenable if taken as a historical claim and insufficiently developed if taken as a metaphor. Third, methodological problems in history and philosophy of science plague Urchs's discussion of neuroscience.
2013
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10548/1/scholl-complexity-preprint.pdf
Scholl, Raphael (2013) Confessions of a Complexity Skeptic.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10576
2014-06-12T15:58:24Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10576/
Can one-shot experimental games measure social norms and preferences?
Nagatsu, Michiru
Economics
Experimentation
People do not behave strictly so as to maximize monetary payoffs in ex- perimental games such as Public Goods and Ultimatum games. To explain this ‘anomaly’, behavioural economists have proposed so-called social pref- erence models that try to capture other-regarding preferences (altruism, in- equity aversion, reciprocity, etc.) as additional arguments of players’ util- ity functions. However, none of the proposed model has successfully ex- plained data across different games. I give a proper diagnosis to this situa- tion by examining Woodward’s (2008) methodological critique of the social preference approach. I argue that the problem lies not in external validity as Woodward argues, but internal validity of those experiments. Specifically, I defend the one-shot design as a useful paradigm as long as it is internally valid.
2014-03-24
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
Nagatsu, Michiru (2014) Can one-shot experimental games measure social norms and preferences? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10594
2014-04-03T19:51:40Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D70737963686F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10594/
How cooperation became the norm
Birch, Jonathan
Anthropology
Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary Theory
Cognitive Science
Economics
Most of the contributions to Cooperation and Its Evolution grapple with the distinctive challenges presented by the project of explaining human sociality. Many of these puzzles have a ‘chicken and egg’ character: our virtually unparalleled capacity for large-scale cooperation is the product of psychological, behavioural, and demographic changes in our recent evolutionary history, and these changes are linked by complex patterns of reciprocal dependence. There is much we do not yet understand about the timing of these changes, and about the order in which different aspects of human social psychology (co-)evolved. In this review essay, I discuss four such puzzles the volume raises. These concern punishment and norm-psychology, moral judgement and the moral emotions, hierarchy and top-down coercion, and property rights and legal systems.
2014-04-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10594/1/Sterelny_et_al._review_%282014%29.pdf
Birch, Jonathan (2014) How cooperation became the norm. [Preprint]
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10539-013-9409-8
10.1007/s10539-013-9409-8
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10871
2014-07-12T12:30:09Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10871/
I. JARVIE & J.ZAMORA BONILLA, eds. 2011. The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences
Thoma, Johanna
Anthropology
Economics
Sociology
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2014-05-01
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10871/1/11406-44137-1-PB.pdf
Thoma, Johanna (2014) I. JARVIE & J.ZAMORA BONILLA, eds. 2011. The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29 (2). pp. 311-315. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/11406/10731
10.1387/theoria.11406
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10873
2014-07-12T12:32:13Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10873/
Opinion polling and election predictions
Northcott, Robert
Causation
Economics
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
Models and Idealization
Sociology
Election prediction by means of opinion polling is a rare empirical success story for social science, but one not previously considered by philosophers. I examine the details of a prominent case, namely the 2012 US presidential election, and draw two lessons of more general interest:
1) Methodology over metaphysics. Traditional metaphysical criteria were not a useful guide to whether successful prediction would be possible; instead, the crucial thing was selecting an effective methodology.
2) Which methodology? Success required sophisticated use of case-specific evidence from opinion polling. The pursuit of explanations via general theory or causal mechanisms, by contrast, turned out to be precisely the wrong path – contrary to much recent philosophy of social science
2014-07-11
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/msword
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10873/1/Polling-PSA.214.docx
Northcott, Robert (2014) Opinion polling and election predictions. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10874
2014-07-20T19:32:54Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10874/
Armchair Science
Northcott, Robert
Alexandrova, Anna
Biology
Confirmation/Induction
Economics
History of Science Case Studies
Models and Idealization
We define the notion of armchair science – roughly, a concentration on the development of idealized theory with only a loose relation to possible empirical application, and in particular with no specific real-world target in mind. Work in this style is both very influential and very widespread in contemporary social and biological science. We propose that it be subjected to what we call efficiency analysis. To this end, we examine in detail the role of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in explaining the live-and-let-live system in World War One trenches. It yields, together with other considerations, a strong prima facie case that armchair science fails the efficiency analysis, in other words that it absorbs too many scientific resources that would be better spent elsewhere. Philosophy of science should be at the forefront of highlighting this important issue. Yet for several reasons, which we explain, existing philosophical work on modeling has fallen short in this critical role
2014-07-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
Northcott, Robert and Alexandrova, Anna (2014) Armchair Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10888
2014-07-20T19:31:14Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10888/
Armchair Science
Northcott, Robert
Alexandrova, Anna
Biology
Confirmation/Induction
Economics
History of Science Case Studies
Models and Idealization
We define the notion of armchair science – roughly, a concentration on the development of idealized theory with only a loose relation to possible empirical application, and in particular with no specific real-world target in mind. Work in this style is both very influential and very widespread in contemporary social and biological science. We propose that it be subjected to what we call efficiency analysis. To this end, we examine in detail the role of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in explaining the live-and-let-live system in World War One trenches. It yields, together with other considerations, a strong prima facie case that armchair science fails the efficiency analysis, in other words that it absorbs too many scientific resources that would be better spent elsewhere. Philosophy of science should be at the forefront of highlighting this important issue. Yet for several reasons, which we explain, existing philosophical work on modeling has fallen short in this critical role
2014-07-11
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10888/1/Armchair10.pdf
Northcott, Robert and Alexandrova, Anna (2014) Armchair Science. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10921
2014-08-03T14:45:45Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10921/
Why are there descriptive norms? Because we looked for them
Muldoon, Ryan
Lisciandra, Chiara
Hartmann, Stephan
Complex Systems
Economics
Sociology
In this work, we present a mathematical model for the emergence of descriptive norms, where the individual decision problem is formalized with the standard Bayesian belief revision machinery. Previous work on the emergence of descriptive norms has relied on heuristic modeling. In this paper we show that with a Bayesian model we can provide a more general picture of the emergence of norms, which helps to motivate the assumptions made in heuristic models.
In our model, the priors formalize the belief that a certain behavior is a regularity. The evidence is provided by other group members' behavior and the likelihood by their reliability. We implement the model in a series of computer simulations and examine the group-level outcomes. We claim that domain-general belief revision helps explain why we look for regularities in social life in the first place. We argue that it is the disposition to look for regularities and react to them that generates descriptive norms. In our search for rules, we create them.
2014-07-31
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10921/1/Because_we_looked_for_them_-_accepted.pdf
Muldoon, Ryan and Lisciandra, Chiara and Hartmann, Stephan (2014) Why are there descriptive norms? Because we looked for them. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11009
2014-09-05T12:37:55Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11009/
A New Interpretation of the Representational Theory of Measurement
Heilmann, Conrad
Decision Theory
Economics
History of Philosophy of Science
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Psychology
On the received view, the Representational Theory of Measurement reduces measurement to the numerical representation of empirical relations. This account of measurement has been widely criticised. In this paper, I provide a new interpretation of the Representational Theory of Measurement that sidesteps these debates. I propose to view the Representational Theory of Measurement as a library of theorems that investigate the numerical representability of qualitative relations. Such theorems are useful tools for concept formation which, in turn, is one crucial aspect of measurement for a broad range of cases in linguistics, rational choice, metaphysics, and the social sciences.
2014
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11009/1/RTM-Heilmann-PSA.pdf
Heilmann, Conrad (2014) A New Interpretation of the Representational Theory of Measurement. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11135
2014-11-10T16:17:22Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11135/
Open Empirical and Methodological Issues in the Individualism-Holism Debate
Kincaid, Harold
Economics
Reductionism/Holism
I briefly argue that some issues in the individualism-holism debate have been fairly clearly settled and other issues still plagued by unclarity. The main argument of the paper is that there are a set of clear empirical issues around the holism-individualism debate that are central problems in current social science research. Those include questions about when we can be holist and how individualist we can be in social explanation.
2014-11-08
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/msword
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11135/1/kincaid_psa_2014.doc
Kincaid, Harold (2014) Open Empirical and Methodological Issues in the Individualism-Holism Debate. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11158
2014-11-19T21:55:43Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11158/
Vindicating Methodological Triangulation
Heesen, Remco
Bright, Liam Kofi
Zucker, Andrew
Anthropology
Confirmation/Induction
Decision Theory
Economics
Sociology
Social scientists use many different methods, and there are often substantial disagreements about which method is appropriate for a given research question. A proponent of methodological triangulation believes that if multiple methods yield the same answer that answer is confirmed more strongly than it could have been by any single method. Methodological purists, on the other hand, believe that one should choose a single appropriate method and stick with it. Using formal tools from voting theory, we show that triangulation is more likely to lead to the correct answer than purism, assuming the scientist is subject to some degree of diffidence about the relative merits of the various methods. This is true even when in fact only one of the methods is appropriate for the given research question.
2014-11-18
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11158/1/Vindicating_Methodological_Triangulation.pdf
Heesen, Remco and Bright, Liam Kofi and Zucker, Andrew (2014) Vindicating Methodological Triangulation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11161
2015-02-08T20:40:03Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11306
2015-04-16T20:48:47Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11306/
Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests
Karpus, Jurgis
Radzvilas, Mantas
Decision Theory
Economics
Sociology
Orthodox game theory is sometimes criticized for its failure to single out intuitively compelling solutions in certain types of interpersonal interactions. The theory of team reasoning provides a resolution in some such cases by suggesting a shift in decision-makers’ mode of reasoning from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team. The existing literature in this field discusses a number of properties for a formalized representation of team’s interests to satisfy: Pareto efficiency, successful coordination of individuals’ actions and the notion of mutual advantage among the members of a team. For an explicit function of team’s goals a reference is sometimes made to the maximization of the average of individuals’ personal payoffs, which meets the Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria, but at times fails with respect to the notion of mutual advantage. It also relies on making interpersonal comparisons of payoffs which goes beyond the standard assumptions of the expected utility theory that make numerical representations of individuals’ preferences possible. In this paper we propose an alternative, rank-based function of team’s interests that does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of payoffs, incorporates the notion of mutual advantage and satisfies the weak Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria. We discuss its predictions using a number of examples and suggest a few possibilities for further research in this field.
2015-02-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11306/5/Team_Reasoning_and_a_Rank-Based_Function_of_Team%27s_Interests.pdf
Karpus, Jurgis and Radzvilas, Mantas (2015) Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11323
2015-02-15T22:26:53Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11323/
Epistemological Depth in a GM Crops Controversy
Hicks, Daniel
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Confirmation/Induction
Economics
Science and Society
Values In Science
This paper examines the scientific controversy over the yields of genetically modified [GM] crops as a case study in *epistemologically deep* disagreements. Appeals to ''the evidence'' are inadequate to resolve such disagreements; not because the interlocutors have radically different metaphysical views (as in cases of incommensurability), but instead because they assume rival epistemological frameworks and so have incompatible views about what kinds of research methods and claims *count as* evidence. Specifically, I show that, in the yield debate, proponents and opponents of GM crops cite two different sets of claims as evidence, which correspond to two rival epistemological frameworks, classical experimental epistemology and Nancy Cartwright's evidence for use. I go on to argue that, even if both sides of the debate accepted Cartwright's view, they might still disagree over what counts as evidence, because evidence for use ties standards of evidence to what is sometimes called the ''context of application.''
2015
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11323/1/yields.pdf
Hicks, Daniel (2015) Epistemological Depth in a GM Crops Controversy. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11343
2015-02-26T18:26:51Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11343/
Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation
List, Christian
Spiekermann, Kai
Economics
Explanation
Reductionism/Holism
Sociology
Political science is divided between methodological individualists, who seek to explain political phenomena by reference to individuals and their interactions, and holists (or nonreductionists), who consider some higher-level social entities or properties such as states, institutions, or cultures ontologically or causally significant. We propose a reconciliation between these two perspectives, building on related work in philosophy. After laying out a taxonomy of different variants of each view, we observe that (i) although political phenomena result from underlying individual attitudes and behavior, individual-level descriptions do not always capture all explanatorily salient properties, and (ii) nonreductionistic explanations are mandated when social regularities are robust to changes in their individual-level realization. We characterize the dividing line between phenomena requiring nonreductionistic explanation and phenomena permitting individualistic explanation and give examples from the study of ethnic conflicts, social-network theory, and international-relations theory.
2013-11
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11343/1/IndividualismHolism.pdf
List, Christian and Spiekermann, Kai (2013) Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation. American Political Science Review, 107 (4). pp. 629-643.
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9076604&fileId=S0003055413000373
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000373
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11349
2015-03-01T01:21:16Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11349/
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling
Dietrich, Franz
List, Christian
Decision Theory
Economics
Probability/Statistics
Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of pooling functions (most of them classic, but one new) and argue that linear pooling can be justified "procedurally" but not "epistemically", while the other two pooling methods can be justified "epistemically". The choice between them, in turn, depends on whether the individuals' probability assignments are based on shared information or on private information. We conclude by mentioning a number of other pooling methods.
2014-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11349/1/OpinionPoolingReview.pdf
Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2014) Probabilistic Opinion Pooling. [Preprint]
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list/PDF-files/OpinionPoolingReview.pdf
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list/PDF-files/OpinionPoolingReview.pdf
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11421
2015-04-16T20:48:47Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11421/
Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests
Karpus, Jurgis
Radzvilas, Mantas
Decision Theory
Economics
Sociology
Orthodox game theory is sometimes criticized for its failure to single out intuitively compelling solutions in certain types of interpersonal interactions. The theory of team reasoning provides a resolution in some such cases by suggesting a shift in decision-makers’ mode of reasoning from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team. The existing literature in this field discusses a number of properties for a formalized representation of team’s interests to satisfy: Pareto efficiency, successful coordination of individuals’ actions and the notion of mutual advantage among the members of a team. For an explicit function of team’s goals a reference is sometimes made to the maximization of the average of individuals’ personal payoffs, which meets the Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria, but at times fails with respect to the notion of mutual advantage. It also relies on making interpersonal comparisons of payoffs which goes beyond the standard assumptions of the expected utility theory that make numerical representations of individuals’ preferences possible. In this paper we propose an alternative, rank-based function of team’s interests that does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of payoffs, incorporates the notion of mutual advantage and satisfies the weak Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria. We discuss its predictions using a number of examples and suggest a few possibilities for further research in this field.
2015-02-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11421/6/Team_Reasoning_and_a_Rank-Based_Function_of_Team%27s_Interests.pdf
Karpus, Jurgis and Radzvilas, Mantas (2015) Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11486
2015-05-28T13:28:50Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11486/
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective
Dietrich, Franz
List, Christian
Decision Theory
Economics
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Realism/Anti-realism
Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states.
2015-05-17
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11486/1/MentalismRevised.pdf
Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2015) Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective. [Preprint]
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list/PDF-files/MentalismRevised.pdf
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11624
2015-12-21T03:24:43Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11624/
Modelling Inequality
Thebault, Karim P Y
Bradley, Seamus
Reutlinger, Alexander
Economics
Models and Idealization
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Econophysics is a new and exciting cross-disciplinary research field that applies models and modelling techniques from statistical physics to economic systems. It is not, however, without its critics: prominent figures in more mainstream economic theory have criticised some elements of the methodology of econophysics. One of the main lines of criticism concerns the nature of the modelling assumptions and idealisations involved, and a particular target are `kinetic exchange' approaches used to model the emergence of inequality within the distribution of individual monetary income. This paper will consider such models in detail, and assess the warrant of the criticisms drawing upon the philosophical literature on modelling and idealisation. Our aim is to provide the first steps towards informed mediation of this important and interesting interdisciplinary debate, and our hope is to offer guidance with regard to both the practice of modelling inequality, and the inequality of modelling practice.
2015-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11624/1/Modelling_Inequality_%5Bpre-print%5D.pdf
Thebault, Karim P Y and Bradley, Seamus and Reutlinger, Alexander (2015) Modelling Inequality. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11664
2015-12-10T13:29:23Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11664/
Communication Without the Cooperative Principle: A Signaling Experiment
Rubin, Hannah
Bruner, Justin
O'Connor, Cailin
Huttegger, Simon
Evolutionary Theory
Economics
Experimentation
According to Grice's `Cooperative Principle', human communicators are involved in a cooperative endeavor. The speaker attempts to make herself understood and the listener, in turn, assumes that the speaker is trying to maximize the ease and effectiveness of communication. While pragmatists recognize that people do not always behave in such a way, the Cooperative Principle is generally assumed to hold. However, it is often the case that the interests of speakers and listeners diverge, at least to some degree.
Communication can arise in such situations when the cost of signaling is high enough that it aligns the interests of speaker and listener, but what happens when the cost of signaling is not sufficient to align the interests of those communicating? In these cases the theoretical prediction is that they will reach a partially informative system of communication. Using methods from experimental economics, we test whether theoretical predictions are borne out. We find that subjects do learn to communicate without the cooperative principle.
2015-09
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11664/1/Hybrid_Equilibrium_PS_0902HR.pdf
Rubin, Hannah and Bruner, Justin and O'Connor, Cailin and Huttegger, Simon (2015) Communication Without the Cooperative Principle: A Signaling Experiment. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11800
2015-12-10T13:27:19Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11800/
The Evolution of Vagueness
O'Connor, Cailin
Biology
Cognitive Science
Economics
Vague predicates, those that exhibit borderline cases, pose a persistent problem for philosophers and logicians. Although they are ubiquitous in natural language, when used in a logical context, vague predicates lead to contradiction. This paper will address a question that is intimately related to this problem. Given their inherent imprecision, why do vague predicates arise in the first place?
I discuss a variation of the signaling game where the state space is treated as contiguous, i.e., endowed with a metric that captures a similarity relation over states. This added structure is manifested in payoffs that reward approximate coordination between sender and receiver as well as perfect coordination. I evolve these games using a variation of Herrnstein reinforcement learning that better reflects the generalizing learning strategies real-world actors use in situations where states of the world are similar. In these simulations, signaling can develop very quickly, and the signals are vague in much the way ordinary language predicates are vague --- they each exclusively apply to certain items, but for some transition period both signals apply to varying degrees. Moreover, I show that under certain parameter values, in particular when state spaces are large and time is limited, learning generalization of this sort yield strategies with higher payoffs than standard Herrnstein reinforcement learning.
These models may then help explain why the phenomenon of vagueness arises in natural language: the learning strategies that allow actors to quickly and effectively develop signaling conventions in contiguous state spaces make it unavoidable.
Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
2014
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11800/1/The_Evolution_of_Vagueness_Revision.pdf
O'Connor, Cailin (2014) The Evolution of Vagueness. Erkenntnis, 79 (4). pp. 707-727. ISSN 0165-0106
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-013-9463-2
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11805
2016-05-03T17:30:15Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11805/
Evolving Perceptual Categories
O'Connor, Cailin
Biology
Cognitive Science
Economics
This paper uses sim-max games to model perceptual categorization with the goal of answering the following question: to what degree should we expect the perceptual categories of biological actors to track properties of the world around them? I will argue that an analysis of these games suggests that the relationship between real-world structure and evolved perceptual categories is mediated by successful action in the sense that organisms evolve to categorize together states of nature for which similar actions lead to similar results. This conclusion indicates that both strongly realist and strongly anti-realist views about perceptual categories are too simple.
University of Chicago Press
2015
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11805/1/Evolving_Perceptual_Categories_Preprint.pdf
O'Connor, Cailin (2015) Evolving Perceptual Categories. Philosophy of Science, 81 (5). pp. 110-121.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/677885
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11823
2015-12-21T03:24:43Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:737461746973746963616C2D6D656368616E6963732D746865726D6F64796E616D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11823/
Modelling Inequality
Thebault, Karim P Y
Bradley, Seamus
Reutlinger, Alexander
Economics
Models and Idealization
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Econophysics is a new and exciting cross-disciplinary research field that applies models and modelling techniques from statistical physics to economic systems. It is not, however, without its critics: prominent figures in more mainstream economic theory have criticised some elements of the methodology of econophysics. One of the main lines of criticism concerns the nature of the modelling assumptions and idealisations involved, and a particular target are `kinetic exchange' approaches used to model the emergence of inequality within the distribution of individual monetary income. This paper will consider such models in detail, and assess the warrant of the criticisms drawing upon the philosophical literature on modelling and idealisation. Our aim is to provide the first steps towards informed mediation of this important and interesting interdisciplinary debate, and our hope is to offer guidance with regard to both the practice of modelling inequality, and the inequality of modelling practice.
2015-12-20
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11823/1/modelling-inequality-%5Baccepted%5D.pdf
Thebault, Karim P Y and Bradley, Seamus and Reutlinger, Alexander (2015) Modelling Inequality. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11905
2016-03-09T14:43:52Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11905/
Climate Economics and Normative Expertise
Mintz-Woo, Kian
Economics
Ethical Issues
Models and Idealization
Science and Policy
Values In Science
I discuss three families of methodologies that could be used to assign values to the normative parameters relevant to social discounting in welfare economics generally, and climate economics more specifically. First, I argue that in particular circumstances, there cannot be philosophical argumentation for normative questions; specifically, this occurs when the particular values being sought are both non-critical and from a quantitative range. Second, I argue that social preferences are insufficient if we take the problem to be normative and that proposals for informed social preferences face significant challenges in implementation. Finally, I argue in favour of expert elicitation for experts in welfare economics, construed as those who understand the theoretical implications of adopting particular judgments. Those who understand the theoretical implications of adopting particular judgments will be better placed to develop coherent social plans while integrating relevant empirical data.
2016-03-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11905/1/ExpertiseDiscounting.pdf
Mintz-Woo, Kian (2016) Climate Economics and Normative Expertise. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11935
2016-03-01T16:03:02Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11935/
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework
Dietrich, Franz
List, Christian
Decision Theory
Economics
Explanation
Psychology
We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual choices. The key idea is that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all properties of the options and chooses an option whose “motivationally salient” properties he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations can capture two kinds of context-dependent choice: (i) the motivationally salient properties may vary across choice contexts (as in framing effects); and (ii) they may include context-related properties (such as whether an option conforms to a context-specific social norm). By contrast, classical choice theory admits neither of these two kinds of context-dependence. Our framework allows us to explain boundedly rational and sophisticated choice behaviours, such as those discussed in psychology and behavioural economics. Since motivationally salient properties can be recombined in new ways, the framework offers resources for predicting choices in unobserved contexts, a somewhat neglected issue in standard choice theory. The paper also compares our reason-based approach with the more traditional revealed-preference approach.
Cambridge University Press
2016
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11935/1/RBC-DL.pdf
Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2016) Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework. Economics and Philosophy.
http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_EAP
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267115000474
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12033
2016-04-13T02:14:16Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12033/
The Evolution of Guilt
O'Connor, Cailin
Evolutionary Theory
Economics
Psychology
Using evolutionary game theory, I consider how guilt can provide individual fitness benefits to actors both before and after bad behavior. This supplements recent work by philosophers on the evolution of guilt with a more complete picture of the relevant selection pressures.
2016-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12033/1/GuiltPreprintPoS.pdf
O'Connor, Cailin (2016) The Evolution of Guilt. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12034
2016-04-13T02:18:27Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:66656D696E6973742D617070726F6163686573
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12034/
Power, Bargaining, and Collaboration
Bruner, Justin
O'Connor, Cailin
Evolutionary Theory
Economics
Feminist Approaches
Values In Science
Collaboration is increasingly popular across academia. Collaborative work raises certain ethical questions, however. How will the fruits of collaboration be divided? How will the work for the collaborative project be split? In this paper, we consider the following question in particular. Are there ways in which these divisions systematically disadvantage certain groups?
We use evolutionary game theoretic models to address this question. First, we discuss results from O'Connor and Bruner (2016) showing that underrepresented groups in academia can be disadvantaged in collaboration and bargaining by dint of their small numbers. Second, we present novel results exploring how the hierarchical structure of academia can lead to bargaining disadvantage. We investigate models where one actor has a higher baseline of academic success, less to lose if collaboration goes south, or greater rewards for non-collaborative work. We show that in these situations, the less powerful partner can be disadvantaged in bargaining over collaboration.
2016-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12034/1/collabFinal.pdf
Bruner, Justin and O'Connor, Cailin (2016) Power, Bargaining, and Collaboration. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12035
2017-11-13T20:54:00Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:66656D696E6973742D617070726F6163686573
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12035/
Dynamics and Diversity in Epistemic Communities
O'Connor, Cailin
Bruner, Justin
Evolutionary Theory
Economics
Feminist Approaches
Values In Science
Bruner (2017) shows that in cultural interactions, members of minority groups will learn to interact with members of majority groups more quickly---minorities tend to meet majorities more often as a brute fact of their respective numbers---and, as a result, may come to be disadvantaged in situations where they divide resources. In this paper, we discuss the implications of this effect for epistemic communities. We use evolutionary game theoretic methods to show that minority groups can end up disadvantaged in academic interactions like bargaining and collaboration as a result of this effect. These outcomes are more likely, in our models, the smaller the minority group. They occur despite assumptions that majority and minority groups do not differ with respect to skill level, personality, preference, or competence of any sort. Furthermore, as we will argue, these disadvantaged outcomes for minority groups may negatively impact the progress of epistemic communities.
2017-11-13
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12035/3/FemPaper170419CO.pdf
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12035/1/FemPaper151006CO.pdf
O'Connor, Cailin and Bruner, Justin (2017) Dynamics and Diversity in Epistemic Communities. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12037
2016-04-12T22:48:30Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12037/
Ambiguity is Kinda Good, Sometimes
O'Connor, Cailin
Evolutionary Theory
Economics
Psychology
Santana (2014) shows that in common interest signaling games when signals are costly and when receivers can observe contextual environmental cues, ambiguous signaling strategies outperform precise ones and can, as a result, evolve. In this note, I show that if one assumes realistic structure on the state space of a common interest signaling game, ambiguous strategies can be explained without appeal to contextual cues. I conclude by arguing that there are multiple types of cases of payoff beneficial ambiguity, some of which are better explained by Santana's models and some of which are better explained by the models presented here.
2014
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12037/1/AmbiguityPreprint.pdf
O'Connor, Cailin (2014) Ambiguity is Kinda Good, Sometimes. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12038
2016-04-12T22:55:25Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12038/
David Lewis in the Lab: an Experimental Study of Signaling Convention
Bruner, Justin
O'Connor, Cailin
Rubin, Hannah
Huttegger, Simon
Evolutionary Theory
Economics
Experimentation
In this paper we use an experimental approach to investigate how linguistic conventions can emerge in a society without explicit agreement. As a starting point we consider the signaling game introduced by Lewis (1969). We find that in experimental settings, small groups can quickly develop conventions of signal meaning in these games. We also investigate versions of the game where the theoretical literature indicates that meaning will be less likely to arise---when there are more than two states for actors to transfer meaning about and when some states are more likely than others. In these cases, we find that actors are less likely to arrive at strategies where signals have clear conventional meaning. We conclude with a proposal for extending the use of the methodology of experimental economics in experimental philosophy.
2014
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12038/1/LewisLabSynth.pdf
Bruner, Justin and O'Connor, Cailin and Rubin, Hannah and Huttegger, Simon (2014) David Lewis in the Lab: an Experimental Study of Signaling Convention. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12364
2016-08-15T15:20:24Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12364/
Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games
Karpus, Jurgis
Radzvilas, Mantas
Decision Theory
Economics
Sociology
The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interact- ing players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team—a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers’ goals to satisfy, but a few formal representations have been discussed. In this paper we suggest a possible representation of these goals based on the notion of mutual advantage. We propose a method for measuring extents of individual and mutual advantage to the interacting decision-makers, and define team interests as the attainment of outcomes associated with maximal mutual advantage in the games they play.
0201-08-14
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12364/1/Team%20Reasoning%20and%20a%20Measure%20of%20Mutual%20Advantage%20in%20Games.pdf
Karpus, Jurgis and Radzvilas, Mantas (0201) Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12562
2016-10-31T12:51:58Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12562/
Trade-offs between Epistemic and Moral Values in Evidence-Based Policy
Khosrowi, Donal
Economics
Ethical Issues
Experimentation
Science and Society
Values In Science
I examine the role and relationship of epistemic and moral values in the Evidence-Based Policy (EBP) paradigm. I argue that several epistemic values that play a crucial role in shaping standard EBP methodology stand in a trade-off relation with certain kinds of moral and political values. This is because the outputs afforded by standard EBP methods are insufficient for the pursuit of moral and political values that require information about the distribution of individual treatment-effects among agents in a population. I examine a potential reply to this standard concern, and argue that the changes to standard EBP methodology required for rendering research outputs informative about the distributive consequences of policy typically involve the sacrifice of several key EBP epistemic values at once. I expand on the implications of this trade-off for value-freedom and -neutrality in EBP.
2016-10-30
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12562/1/Khosrowi_Tradeoffs%20between%20Epistemic%20and%20Moral%20Values%20in%20EBP_PSA.pdf
Khosrowi, Donal (2016) Trade-offs between Epistemic and Moral Values in Evidence-Based Policy. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12628
2016-11-14T17:05:43Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12628/
Voting, Deliberation and Truth
Hartmann, Stephan
Rafiee Rad, Soroush
Confirmation/Induction
Decision Theory
Economics
Probability/Statistics
There are various ways to reach a group decision on a factual yes-no question. One way is to vote and decide what the majority votes for. This procedure receives some epistemological support from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Alternatively, the group members may prefer to deliberate and will eventually reach a decision that everybody endorses - a consensus. While the latter procedure has the advantage that it makes everybody happy (as everybody endorses the consensus), it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to implement, especially for larger groups. Besides, the resulting consensus may be far away from the truth. And so we ask: Is deliberation truth-conducive in the sense that majority voting is? To address this question, we construct a highly idealized model of a particular deliberation process, inspired by the movie Twelve Angry Men, and show that the answer is "yes". Deliberation procedures can be truth-conducive just as the voting procedure is. We then explore, again on the basis of our model and using agent-based simulations, under which conditions it is better epistemically to deliberate than to vote. Our analysis shows that there are contexts in which deliberation is epistemically preferable and we will provide reasons for why this is so.
2016-11-13
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12628/1/VDT.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Rafiee Rad, Soroush (2016) Voting, Deliberation and Truth. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12713
2016-12-21T15:36:26Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12713/
Hypothetical Bargaining and Equilibrium Refinement in Non-Cooperative Games
Radzvilas, Mantas
Decision Theory
Economics
Virtual bargaining theory suggests that social agents aim to resolve non-cooperative games by identifying the strategy profile(s) which they would agree to play if they could openly bargain. The theory thus offers an explanation of how social agents resolve games with multiple Nash equilibria. One of the main questions pertaining to this theory is how the principles of the bargaining theory could be applied in the analysis of hypothetical bargaining in non-cooperative games. I propose a bargaining model based on the benefit-equilibrating bargaining solution (BES) concept for non-cooperative games, broadly in line with the principles underlying Conley and Wilkie's (2012) ordinal egalitarian solution for Pareto optimal point selection problems with finite choice sets. I provide formal characterizations of the ordinal and the cardinal versions of BES, discuss their application to n-player games, and compare model's theoretical predictions with the data available from several experiments involving `pie games'.
2016-12-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12713/2/Hypothetical_Bargaining_Equilibrium_Refinement_Mantas_Radzvilas%20.pdf
Radzvilas, Mantas (2016) Hypothetical Bargaining and Equilibrium Refinement in Non-Cooperative Games. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12723
2016-12-31T16:46:42Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12723/
Vindicating Methodological Triangulation
Heesen, Remco
Bright, Liam Kofi
Zucker, Andrew
Anthropology
Confirmation/Induction
Decision Theory
Economics
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Sociology
Social scientists use many different methods, and there are often substantial disagreements about which method is appropriate for a given research question. In response to this uncertainty about the relative merits of different methods, W. E. B. Du Bois advocated for and applied "methodological triangulation". This is to use multiple methods simultaneously in the belief that, where one is uncertain about the reliability of any given method, if multiple methods yield the same answer that answer is confirmed more strongly than it could have been by any single method. Against this, methodological purists believe that one should choose a single appropriate method and stick with it. Using tools from voting theory, we show Du Boisian methodological triangulation to be more likely to yield the correct answer than purism, assuming the scientist is subject to some degree of diffidence about the relative merits of the various methods. This holds even when in fact only one of the methods is appropriate for the given research question.
Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
2016-12-30
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12723/1/Vindicating%20Methodological%20Triangulation.pdf
Heesen, Remco and Bright, Liam Kofi and Zucker, Andrew (2016) Vindicating Methodological Triangulation. Synthese. ISSN 1573-0964
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1294-7
10.1007/s11229-016-1294-7
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12776
2017-01-26T15:36:07Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:726865746F7269632D6F662D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12776/
On the Labor Theory of Property:
Is The Problem Distribution or Predistribution?
Ellerman, David
Economics
Rhetoric of Science
Much of the recent discussion in progressive circles [e.g., Stiglitz; Galbraith; Piketty] has focused the obscene mal-distribution of wealth and income as if that was "the" problem in our economic system. And the proposed redistributive reforms (e.g., changes in income, wealth, and estate taxes, increased minimum wages, income caps, and universal basic incomes) have all stuck to that framing of the question.
To put the question in historical perspective, one might note that there was a similar, if not more extreme, mal-distribution of wealth, income, and political power in the Antebellum system of slavery. Yet, it should be obvious to modern eyes that redistributions in favor of the slaves (surely a good thing), while leaving the institution of owning workers intact, would not address the root of the problem.
The system of slavery was eventually abolished in favor of the system we have today which differs in two important respects: (1) the workers are only rented, hired, or employed (i.e., the employer/master only buys some, but not all, of employee's labor); and (2) the rental relationship between employer and employee is voluntary.
Today, the root of the problem is the whole institution for the voluntary renting of human beings, the employment system itself, not the terms of the contract or the accumulated consequences in the form of the mal-distribution of income and wealth.
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12776/1/Challenge-LTP4.pdf
Ellerman, David (2017) On the Labor Theory of Property: Is The Problem Distribution or Predistribution? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12932
2023-05-22T18:03:16Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12932/
Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games
Karpus, Jurgis
Radzvilas, Mantas
Decision Theory
Economics
Sociology
The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interact- ing players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team—a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers’ goals to satisfy, but a few formal representations have been discussed. In this paper we suggest a possible representation of these goals based on the notion of mutual advantage. We propose a method for measuring extents of individual and mutual advantage to the interacting decision-makers, and define team interests as the attainment of outcomes associated with maximal mutual advantage in the games they play.
2017-08-14
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12932/7/Team_Reasoning_and_a_Measure_of_Mutual_Advantage_in_Games.pdf
Karpus, Jurgis and Radzvilas, Mantas (2017) Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12976
2017-04-08T13:24:42Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
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74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12976/
Market Crashes as Critical Phenomena? Explanation, Idealization, and Universality in Econophysics
Jhun, Jennifer
Palacios, Patricia
Weatherall, James Owen
Causation
Economics
Explanation
Models and Idealization
Physics
Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
We study the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model of financial market crashes (Johansen, Ledoit, and Sornette [2000,]. "Crashes as Critical Points." Int. J. Theor. Appl. Finan 3(2) 219-255). On our view, the JLS model is a curious case from the perspective of the recent philosophy of science literature, as it is naturally construed as a “minimal model” in the sense of Batterman and Rice (Batterman and Rice [2014] “Minimal Model Explanations.” Phil. Sci. 81(3): 349–376. ) that nonetheless provides a causal explanation of market crashes, in the sense of Woodward’s interventionist account of causation (Woodward [2003]. Making Things Happen. Oxford: Oxford University Press).
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12976/1/Market%20crashes%20as%20critical%20phenomena%20_%20FINAL.pdf
Jhun, Jennifer and Palacios, Patricia and Weatherall, James Owen (2017) Market Crashes as Critical Phenomena? Explanation, Idealization, and Universality in Econophysics. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12982
2017-04-11T13:12:34Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12982/
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalised. Part one: general agendas
Dietrich, Franz
List, Christian
Decision Theory
Economics
Probability/Statistics
How can several individuals’ probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this problem assume that the set of relevant events—the agenda—is a σ-algebra and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction (intersection). We drop this demanding assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. One might be interested in the probability of rain and that of an interest-rate increase, but not in the probability of rain or an interest-rate increase. We characterize linear pooling and neutral pooling for general agendas, with classic results as special cases for agendas that are σ-algebras. As an illustrative application, we also consider probabilistic preference aggregation. Finally, we unify our results with existing results on binary judgment aggregation and Arrovian preference aggregation. We show that the same kinds of axioms (independence and consensus preservation) have radically different implications for different aggregation problems: linearity for probability aggregation and dictatorship for binary judgment or preference aggregation.
2017
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12982/1/OpinionPoolingPart1.pdf
Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2017) Probabilistic opinion pooling generalised. Part one: general agendas. Social Choice and Welfare.
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-017-1034-z
10.1007/s00355-017-1034-z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12983
2017-04-11T13:14:00Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12983/
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalised. Part two: the premise-based approach
Dietrich, Franz
List, Christian
Decision Theory
Economics
Probability/Statistics
How can several individuals’ probability functions on a given σ-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem usually require ‘event-wise independence’: the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals’ probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be ‘basic’ and others ‘derivative’, so that it makes sense first to aggregate the probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities for the latter. We formalize this idea by introducing a ‘premise-based’ approach to probabilistic opinion pooling, and show that, under a variety of assumptions, it leads to linear or neutral opinion pooling on the ‘premises’.
2017
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12983/1/OpinionPoolingPart2.pdf
Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2017) Probabilistic opinion pooling generalised. Part two: the premise-based approach. Social Choice and Welfare.
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-017-1035-y
10.1007/s00355-017-1035-y
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13031
2017-05-11T17:56:22Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13031/
Anchoring in Deliberations
Hartmann, Stephan
Rafiee Rad, Soroush
Cognitive Science
Decision Theory
Economics
Psychology
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Sociology
Deliberation is a standard procedure to make decisions in not too large groups. It has the advantage that the group members can learn from each other and that, at the end, often a consensus emerges that everybody endorses. But a deliberation procedure also has a number of disadvantages. E.g., what consensus is reached usually depends on the order in which the different group members speak. More specifically, the group member who speaks first often has an unproportionally high impact on the final decision: She anchors the deliberation process. While the anchoring effect undoubtably appears in real deliberating groups, we ask whether it also appears in groups whose members are truth-seeking and rational in the sense that they take the information provided by their fellow group members properly into account by updating their beliefs according to plausible rules. To answer this question and to make some progress towards explaining the anchoring effect, a formal model is constructed and analyzed. Using this model, we study the anchoring effect in homogenous groups (i.e. groups whose members consider each other as equally reliable), for which we provide analytical results, and in inhomogeneous groups, for which we provide simulation results.
2017-05-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13031/1/Anchoring.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Rafiee Rad, Soroush (2017) Anchoring in Deliberations. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13078
2017-05-30T20:17:52Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13078/
The Peculiar Logic of the Black-Scholes Model
Weatherall, James Owen
Economics
Models and Idealization
The Black-Scholes(-Merton) model of options pricing establishes a theoretical relationship between the "fair" price of an option and other parameters characterizing the option and prevailing market conditions. Here I discuss a common application of the model with the following striking feature: the (expected) output of analysis apparently contradicts one of the core assumptions of the model on which the analysis is based. I will present several attitudes one might take towards this situation, and argue that it reveals ways in which a "broken" model can nonetheless provide useful (and tradeable) information.
2017-05
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13078/1/Black-Scholes.pdf
Weatherall, James Owen (2017) The Peculiar Logic of the Black-Scholes Model. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13108
2017-06-08T14:24:04Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13108/
Market Epistemology
Thicke, Michael
Economics
According to Margaret Gilbert's collective epistemology, we should take attributions of beliefs to groups seriously, rather than metaphorically or as reducible to individual belief. I argue that, similarly, attributions of belief to markets ought to be taken seriously and not merely as reports of the average beliefs of market participants. While many of Gilbert's purported examples of group belief are better thought of as instances of acceptance, some collectives, such as courts and markets, genuinely believe. Such collectives enact truth-aimed processes that are beyond the control of any single individual. These processes produce beliefs that are distinct from any individual belief and do not merely report the "average" or "majority" view of the group. In the case of markets, beliefs are indicated by prices, though it is often difficult to infer beliefs from prices and those inferences are almost always uncertain. Market beliefs are justified when traders collectively possess sufficient evidence, there are sufficient incentives for participants to trade based upon the evidence they possess, sophisticated traders have enough power to counter common cognitive biases, and there is no manipulation of prices. Thus, in some cases markets can know.
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13108/1/Thicke%20-%20Market%20Epistemology.pdf
Thicke, Michael (2017) Market Epistemology. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13134
2017-06-20T14:17:47Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13134/
Socioeconomic processes as open-ended results. Beyond invariance knowledge for interventionist purposes
Ivarola, Leonardo
Economics
Models and Idealization
Science and Policy
Sociology
In this paper a critique to philosophical approaches that presuppose invariant knowledge for policy purposes is carried out. It is shown that socioeconomic processes do not fit to the logic of stable causal factors, but they are more suited to the logic of "open-ended results". On the basis of this ontological variation it is argued that ex-ante interventions are not appropriate in the socioeconomic realm. On the contrary, they must be understood in a “dynamic” sense. Finally, derivational robustness analysis is proposed as a useful tool for overcoming the problem of “overconstraint”, a typical problem of economic models.
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2017-05
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13134/1/Ivarola.pdf
Ivarola, Leonardo (2017) Socioeconomic processes as open-ended results. Beyond invariance knowledge for interventionist purposes. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 32 (2). pp. 211-229. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/16184
10.1387/theoria.16184
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13154
2017-06-25T16:00:02Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
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7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13154/
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Jeffrey's rules
Dietrich, Franz
List, Christian
Bradley, Richard
Decision Theory
Economics
Formal Learning Theory
Probability/Statistics
We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterise Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same two axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs incorporate what has been learnt, and "conservativeness", which requires that beliefs on which the learnt input is "silent" do not change. (We give a precise technical definition of "silence".) To illustrate the use of non-Bayesian belief revision in economic theory, we sketch a simple decision-theoretic application.
2016-03
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13154/1/BeliefRevision.pdf
Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian and Bradley, Richard (2016) Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Jeffrey's rules. Journal of Economic Theory, 162. pp. 352-371.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.006
10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.006
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13217
2017-07-16T18:23:43Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D7075746174696F6E2D696E666F726D6174696F6E
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74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13217/
Role of information and its processing in statistical analysis
Kim, Bryce
Computation/Information
Computer Science
Economics
Probability/Statistics
This paper discusses how real-life statistical analysis/inference deviates from ideal environments. More specifically, there often exist models that have equal statistical power as the actual data-generating model, given only limited information and information processing/computation capacity. This means that misspecification actually has two problems: first with misspecification around the model we wish to find, and that an actual data-generating model may never be discovered. Thus the role information - this includes data - plays on statistical inference needs to be considered more heavily than often done. A game defining pseudo-equivalent models is presented in this light. This limited information nature effectively casts a statistical analyst as a decider in decision theory facing an identical problem: trying best to form credence/belief of some events, even if it may end up not being close to objective probability. The sleeping beauty problem is used as a study case to highlight some properties of real-life statistical inference. Bayesian inference of prior updates can lead to wrong credence analysis when prior is assigned to variables/events that are not (statistical identification-wise) identifiable. A controversial idea that Bayesianism can go around identification problems in frequentist analysis is brought to more doubts. This necessitates re-defining how Kolmogorov probability theory is applied in real-life statistical inference, and what concepts need to be fundamental.
2017-07-15
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13217/1/role_of_information_processing.pdf
Kim, Bryce (2017) Role of information and its processing in statistical analysis. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13232
2017-07-20T14:52:22Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D7075746174696F6E2D696E666F726D6174696F6E
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7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13232/
Role of information and its processing in statistical analysis
Kim, Bryce
Computation/Information
Computer Science
Economics
Probability/Statistics
This paper discusses how real-life statistical analysis/inference deviates from ideal environments. More specifically, there often exist models that have equal statistical power as the actual data-generating model, given only limited information and information processing/computation capacity. This means that misspecification actually has two problems: first with misspecification around the model we wish to find, and that an actual data-generating model may never be discovered. Thus the role information - this includes data - plays on statistical inference needs to be considered more heavily than often done. A game defining pseudo-equivalent models is presented in this light. This limited information nature effectively casts a statistical analyst as a decider in decision theory facing an identical problem: trying best to form credence/belief of some events, even if it may end up not being close to objective probability. The sleeping beauty problem is used as a study case to highlight some properties of real-life statistical inference. Bayesian inference of prior updates can lead to wrong credence analysis when prior is assigned to variables/events that are not (statistical identification-wise) identifiable. A controversial idea that Bayesianism can go around identification problems in frequentist analysis is brought to more doubts. This necessitates re-defining how Kolmogorov probability theory is applied in real-life statistical inference, and what concepts need to be fundamental.
2017-07-15
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13232/1/role_of_information_processing.pdf
Kim, Bryce (2017) Role of information and its processing in statistical analysis. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13244
2017-07-21T14:00:36Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13244/
Role of information and its processing in statistical analysis
Kim, Bryce
Computation/Information
Computer Science
Economics
Probability/Statistics
This paper discusses how real-life statistical analysis/inference deviates from ideal environments. More specifically, there often exist models that have equal statistical power as the actual data-generating model, given only limited information and information processing/computation capacity. This means that misspecification actually has two problems: first with misspecification around the model we wish to find, and that an actual data-generating model may never be discovered. Thus the role information - this includes data - plays on statistical inference needs to be considered more heavily than often done. A game defining pseudo-equivalent models is presented in this light. This limited information nature effectively casts a statistical analyst as a decider in decision theory facing an identical problem: trying best to form credence/belief of some events, even if it may end up not being close to objective probability. The sleeping beauty problem is used as a study case to highlight some properties of real-life statistical inference. Bayesian inference of prior updates can lead to wrong credence analysis when prior is assigned to variables/events that are not (statistical identification-wise) identifiable. A controversial idea that Bayesianism can go around identification problems in frequentist analysis is brought to more doubts. This necessitates re-defining how Kolmogorov probability theory is applied in real-life statistical inference, and what concepts need to be fundamental.
2017-07-15
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13244/1/role_of_information_processing.pdf
Kim, Bryce (2017) Role of information and its processing in statistical analysis. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13250
2017-07-23T16:28:53Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
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74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13250/
Prospect Theory and the Wisdom of the Inner Crowd
Hartmann, Stephan
Cognitive Science
Decision Theory
Economics
Probability/Statistics
Psychology
We give a probabilistic justification of the shape of one of the probability weighting functions used in Prospect Theory. To do so, we use an idea recently introduced by Herzog and Hertwig (2014). Along the way we also suggest a new method for the aggregation of probabilities using statistical distances.
2017-07-23
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13250/1/ProspectTheory.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan (2017) Prospect Theory and the Wisdom of the Inner Crowd. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13308
2017-08-05T15:39:56Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13308/
Relative Benefit Equilibrating Bargaining Solution and the Ordinal Interpretation of Gauthier's Arbitration Scheme
Radzvilas, Mantas
Decision Theory
Economics
In 1986 David Gauthier proposed an arbitration scheme for two player
cardinal bargaining games based on interpersonal comparisons of players’ relative concessions. In Gauthier’s original arbitration scheme, players’ relative concessions are defined in terms of Raiffa-normalized cardinal utility gains, and so it cannot be directly applied to ordinal bargaining problems.
In this paper I propose a relative benefit equilibrating bargaining solution (RBEBS) for two and n-player ordinal and quasiconvex
ordinal bargaining problems with finite sets of feasible basic agreements
based on the measure of players’ ordinal relative individual advantage
gains. I provide an axiomatic characterization of this bargaining solution and discuss the conceptual relationship between RBEBS and ordinal
egalitarian bargaining solution (OEBS) proposed by Conley and Wilkie
(2012). I show the relationship between the measurement procedure for
ordinal relative individual advantage gains and the measurement procedure for players’ ordinal relative concessions, and argue that the proposed arbitration scheme for ordinal games can be interpreted as an ordinal version of Gauthier’s arbitration scheme.
2017-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13308/1/Ordinal_RBEBS_Radzvilas.pdf
Radzvilas, Mantas (2017) Relative Benefit Equilibrating Bargaining Solution and the Ordinal Interpretation of Gauthier's Arbitration Scheme. [Preprint]
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