2024-03-29T07:49:53Z
http:///cgi/oai2
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:442
2010-10-07T15:20:20Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:446
2015-09-13T14:58:49Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D646576656C6F706D656E74616C
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D70737963686F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/446/
Beyond the Baldwin Effect: James Mark Baldwin's 'social heredity', epigenetic inheritance and niche construction
Griffiths, Paul E
Developmental Biology
Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary Theory
Psychology
Sociology
I argue that too much attention has been paid to the Baldwin effect. George Gaylord Simpson was probably right when he said that the effect is theoretically possible and may have actually occurred but that this has no major implications for evolutionary theory. The Baldwin effect is not even central to Baldwin's own account of social heredity and biology-culture co-evolution, an account that in important respects resembles the modern ideas of epigenetic inheritance and niche-construction.
2001-10
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/446/1/Beyond_the_Baldwin_Effect.PDF
Griffiths, Paul E (2001) Beyond the Baldwin Effect: James Mark Baldwin's 'social heredity', epigenetic inheritance and niche construction. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1250
2010-10-07T15:11:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D646576656C6F706D656E74616C
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D70737963686F6C6F6779
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1250/
Will the real James Mark Baldwin stand up?: A comment on Griffiths (2001)
Green, Christopher D.
Evolutionary Theory
Psychology
Sociology
Developmental Biology
Evolutionary Psychology
Griffiths (2001) make a number of comments about James Mark Baldwin's motivations and character at the time that he was developing what later became known as the "Baldwin effect." Some of these comments I found to be misleading. I attempt to correct the historical record concerning the origins of the "Baldwin effect."
2003
Other
NonPeerReviewed
text/html
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1250/1/Griffiths-reply.htm
Green, Christopher D. (2003) Will the real James Mark Baldwin stand up?: A comment on Griffiths (2001). UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1621
2010-10-07T15:12:19Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:7374727563747572652D6F662D7468656F72696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6F62736572766174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:64657465726D696E69736D2D696E64657465726D696E69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1621/
Science as a Self-Organizing Meta-Information System
Fuchs, Christian
Structure of Theories
Causation
Theory/Observation
Complex Systems
Determinism/Indeterminism
Ethical Issues
Theory Change
Sociology
Reductionism/Holism
Four basic problems that a theory of science has to deal with concern epistemology, structure, causality, and dynamics of science. These problems deal with the relationship of induction/deduction, actors/structures, internal/external factors, and continuity/discontinuity. Traditionally they have been solved one-sidedly. Considering science as a self-organizing system allows a more integrative approach. Science is a complex, nonlinear system that is made up of two moments: scientific actors and scientific structures. Scientific self-organization operates synchronously and diachronically. Synchronous scientific self-organization is a mutual production process between scientific actors and structures. Scientific systems are self-organizing units that perform the production of theories and truths by the way of a productive, circular causal duality of scientific actors and scientific structures. Science is a dynamic system where research practices produce and reproduce structures that produce and reproduce research practices. Scientific structures are medium and outcome of scientific actions. At the action level one can find a systemic hierarchy that is made up of individual researchers, research groups, scientific communities, and the overall scientific community. Scientific structures include theories, research institutions, technologies, journals, publications, science funds; norms, values, and rules of scientific conduct. The main scientific practices can be categorized as genuinely scientific practices (innovation, dissemination, scientific interchange, funding-related activities, teaching), cultural practices (public discourse), political practices (science policy), and economic practices (action related to scientific knowledge as commodities, patents, science-industry-partnerships, sponsorship). Science is an open system that is structurally coupled to other subsystems of society, it is neither internally, nor externally determined, its development is caused by a complex interplay of internal and external factors, it is a relatively autonomous system. Systems in nature and society act as a sort of data for the scientific system, research processes establish an informational relationship between the scientific system and its environment in the sense that theories are complex, non-linear reflections of environmental processes. Due to the fact that all complex systems are informational, one can say that science produces information about information systems. Science is a 2nd order information system, it produces meta-information. Philosophy of science is a science of science, it produces information about information about information, it is a 3rd order information system. The metaphor of science as a grand hypertext refers to the self-referential character of scientific texts. A scientific text by the way of citation refers to other scientific texts, it incorporates part of the history of science, and methodologically discusses other texts. The formation of scientific knowledge can be described as a double-process of induction and deduction, abstraction and concretization, where scientific knowledge consists of both empirical knowledge and theoretical knowledge and is formed in loop that consists of two self-organization processes. The self-organization of scientific knowledge is a mutually productive relationship between experience and theory. Scientific knowledge is a unity of experience and theory. The self-organization of scientific knowledge is a dialectical cycle where signals from material reality are transformed into experienced data that is interpreted and results in hypotheses and theories which are transformed into methods and technologies that are employed in order to cause effects in material reality that can again be observed as data. In this self-organization process there is the bottom-up-emergence of theoretical knowledge and the top-down-emergence of experiences and material effects. Each scientific theory is a truth claim, but one that is based on a systematic methodology, permanent evaluation and correction, and conflict-based discourse. Hence scientific truths are not absolute truths, they are truths-in-question, truths-in-discourse, and truths-in-conflict, and truths-in-development. One can distinguish formal, adequate, discursive, and practical truth of a theory. Due to the fact that the knowledge-based society is a high risk society, practical truth of science in the form of an ethically responsible science is of central importance. Diachronic self-organization of science means that dominant scientific paradigms at some point of time loose their effectiveness, paradoxes and instabilities show up, science enters crisis, a new dominant paradigm emerges. If a large gap between scientific theory and the problems posed for science by itself and by society emerges, the dominant structural patterns are increasingly questioned. This can have scientific or wider societal causes, or a combination of both. The resulting crisis is a process of creation and destruction. The whole process is one of the emergence of scientific order from noise. Variation is a permanent phenomenon of scientific evolution, but in phases of instability where the self-organization of science shifts from self-reproduction to order from noise the degree of variation and development by chance is much larger.
2004-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1621/1/science.pdf
Fuchs, Christian (2004) Science as a Self-Organizing Meta-Information System. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:1709
2010-10-07T15:12:26Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1709/
Can Humanity Learn to become Civilized? The Crisis of Science without Civilization
Maxwell, Nicholas
Science and Society
Sociology
Science and Policy
Two great problems of learning confront humanity: learning about the nature of the universe and our place in it, and learning how to become civilized. The first problem was solved, in essence, in the 17th century, with the creation of modern science. But the second problem has not yet been solved. Solving the first problem without also solving the second puts us in a situation of great danger. All our current global problems have arisen as a result. What we need to do, in response to this unprecedented crisis, is learn from our solution to the first problem how to solve the second. This was the basic idea of the 18th century Enlightenment. Unfortunately, in carrying out this programme, the Enlightenment made three blunders, and it is this defective version of the Enlightenment programme that we have institutionalized in 20th century academic inquiry. In order to solve the second great problem of learning we need to correct the three blunders of the traditional Enlightenment. This involves changing the nature of social inquiry, so that social science becomes social methodology or social philosophy, concerned to help us build into social life the progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented rationality, arrived at by generalizing the progress-achieving methods of science. It also involves, more generally, bringing about a revolution in the nature of academic inquiry as a whole, so that it takes up its proper task of helping humanity learn how to become wiser by increasingly cooperatively rational means. The scientific task of improving knowledge and understanding of nature becomes a part of the broader task of improving global wisdom.
2000
Other
PeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1709/1/Can_Humanity_Learn_to_become_Civilized.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2000) Can Humanity Learn to become Civilized? The Crisis of Science without Civilization. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2215
2010-10-07T15:13:16Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2215/
The Enlightenment, Popper and Einstein
Maxwell, Nicholas
Science and Society
Sociology
Physics
The Enlightenment, Popper and Einstein Abstract Nicholas Maxwell Email: nicholas.maxwell@ucl.ac.uk In this paper I discuss four versions of the basic idea of the French Enlightenment of the 18th century, namely: To learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world. These four versions are: 1. The Traditional Enlightenment Programme. 2. The Popperian Version of the Enlightenment Programme. 3. The Improved Popperian Enlightenment Programme. 4. The New Enlightenment Programme. The Traditional Enlightenment Programme is the version of the idea upheld by the philosophes of the French Enlightenment. It was developed throughout the 19th century and put into practice in the early 20th century with the creation of departments of social science in universities all over the world. It is however damagingly defective. The Popperian Version of the Enlightenment Programme is an improvement, but still defective. As we go down the list, from 1 and 2 to 3 and 4, each Programme improves on its predecessor, until with The New Enlightenment, which can in some respects be associated with Einstein, we arrive at a version of the idea which can genuinely help humanity make social progress towards an enlightened world.
2005-02
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2215/1/The_Enlightenment%2C_Popper_and_Einstein.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2005) The Enlightenment, Popper and Einstein. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2365
2010-10-07T15:13:27Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2365/
Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate
Guala, Francesco
Economics
Biology
Sociology
Strong Reciprocity theorists claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms that eliminate incentives to free ride, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. There is little doubt that costly punishment raises cooperation in laboratory conditions. Its efficacy in the field however is controversial. I distinguish two interpretations of experimental results, and show that the wide interpretation endorsed by Strong Reciprocity theorists is unsupported by ethnographic evidence on decentralised punishment and by historical evidence on common pool institutions. The institutions that spontaneously evolve to solve dilemmas of cooperation typically exploit low-cost mechanisms, turning finite games into indefinitely repeated ones and eliminating the cost of sanctioning.
2010-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2365/1/DEAS-2010_23wp.pdf
Guala, Francesco (2010) Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2495
2010-10-07T15:21:09Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2785
2010-10-07T15:21:14Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2806
2010-10-07T15:14:10Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2806/
Welfare, Voting and the Constitution of a Federal Assembly
Bovens, Luc
Hartmann, Stephan
Probability/Statistics
Decision Theory
Sociology
Economics
Equal and proportional representation are two poles of a continuum of models of representation for the assembly of a federation of states. The choice of a model has repercussions on the welfare distribution in the federation. We determine, first by means of Monte Carlo simulations, what welfare distributions result after assemblies that were constituted on the basis of different models of representation have considered a large number of motions. We assess what model of representation is favored by a Rawlsian maximin measure and by the utilitarian measure and present matching analytical results for the utilitarian measure for a slightly idealized case. Our results show that degressive proportionality can be justified as a compromise between maximin and utilitarian considerations. There is little surprise in this result. What is more surprising, however, is that, within certain contexts of evaluation, degressive proportionality can also be justified on strictly utilitarian grounds.
2006-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2806/1/EUUtility.pdf
Bovens, Luc and Hartmann, Stephan (2006) Welfare, Voting and the Constitution of a Federal Assembly. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:2879
2010-10-07T15:14:18Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2879/
Inferring Causal Complexity
Baumgartner, Michael
Causation
Sociology
In "The Comparative Method" Ragin (1987) has outlined a procedure of Boolean causal reasoning operating on pure coincidence data that has meanwhile become widely known as QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) among social scientists. QCA -- also in its recent form as presented in Ragin (2000) -- is designed to analyze causal structures featuring one effect and a possibly complex configuration of mutually independent direct causes of that effect. The paper at hand presents a procedure of causal reasoning that operates on the same type of empirical data as QCA and that implements Boolean techniques related to the ones resorted to by QCA, yet, in contrast to QCA, the procedure introduced here successfully identifies causal structures involving both mutually dependent causes, i.e. causal chains, and multiple effects, i.e. epiphenomena. In this sense, the paper at hand generalizes QCA.
2006-08
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2879/1/infer_c.pdf
Baumgartner, Michael (2006) Inferring Causal Complexity. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:3946
2010-10-07T15:16:23Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3946/
Reconsidering Gilbert’s Account of Norm-Guided Behaviour
Baumann, Caroline M.
Sociology
Economics
Gilbert’s understanding of social norms is considered by some as a promising alternative proposal to standard rational choice accounts of norm-guided behaviour. In this paper, I evaluate her position on social norms. Focusing on the social rationality of individuals, Gilbert tries to explain norm-based behaviour in terms of the normativity of norms and grounds that normativity in the ways individuals are part of a social setting. More precisely, Gilbert argues that rational agents are motivated to act according to social norms irrespective of their individual preferences. This is so because rational agents can be motivated by the normativity of social norm, that is, their understanding that they ought to act accordingly. Gilbert defends this view in two steps. She argues that (1) the ‘ought’ of a social norm is grounded in a joint commitment; and (2) it is rational to act according to the dictates of a joint commitment. In this paper, I argue that although Gilbert’s account on norm-based behaviour advances interesting intuitions, she fails on both levels. First, the normativity of social norms can be seen as grounded in joint commitments; and second, Gilbert does not provide sufficient reason to believe that it is indeed rational to act according to one’s joint commitments.
2007
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3946/1/gilbert_on_norms3_confpaper0711.doc
Baumann, Caroline M. (2007) Reconsidering Gilbert’s Account of Norm-Guided Behaviour. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4056
2010-10-07T15:16:40Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D70737963686F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4056/
Acoustic adaptation in bird songs: A case study in cultural selection
Crozier, Gillian
Evolutionary Theory
Sociology
Evolutionary Psychology
The greatest challenge for Cultural Selection Theory, which holds that Darwinian natural selection contributes to cultural evolution, lies is the paucity of evidence for structural mechanisms in cultural systems that are sufficient for adaptation by natural selection. In part, clarification is required with respect to the interaction between cultural systems and their purported selective environments. Edmonds, Hull, and others have argued that Cultural Selection Theory requires simple, conclusive, unambiguous case studies in order to meet this challenge. To this end, I am employing the songs of the Rufous-collared Sparrow, which seem to exhibit cultural adaptations that minimize signal degradation relative to local environments (Handford, et al.). Specifically, the more forested the habitat, the more the tail end of the song resembles a whistle rather than a trill; yet, variation in song is uncorrelated with genetic variation. I explore the mechanisms responsible for these putative acoustic adaptations through a series of computer simulations. I modify the framework of Alexander and Skyrms’ ‘Bargaining with Neighbours’: this dynamic evolutionary game theoretic framework is well-suited for my investigation because the local interactions between agents provide a basis for modeling song transmission from adults to fledglings. In the simplest version of the model, each bird adopts one of two song types – trill or whistle – and sings that song type for the duration of its life. These song strategies are communicated to other birds in neighboring territories, which are arranged as a grid composed of two acoustic habitats (forest and field). Birds have a set probability of dying in each year, and deceased birds are succeeded by fledglings. The likelihood that a fledgling adopts a particular song type depends on (i) the popularity of a particular song-type among neighboring birds and (ii) the relative ‘audibility’ of each signal, which is a joint function of the habitat and song type of the signaling bird. The main point of this research is not to test this model, but to demonstrate that models of this type have the resources to meet the outstanding challenges in Cultural Selection Theory. The benefits of this research are threefold. First, it will lend much needed empirical support to Cultural Selection Theory by clarifying the nature of the interaction between culture and environment. Second, it will support Alexander and Skyrms’ work by providing a set of empirically testable consequences for their model. Finally, it will contribute to evolutionary theory by clarifying the scope and limits of adaptation by natural selection.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4056/1/Crozier%2C_Acoustic_Adaptation_in_Bird_Songs.doc
Crozier, Gillian (2008) Acoustic adaptation in bird songs: A case study in cultural selection. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4117
2010-10-07T15:16:51Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:64657465726D696E69736D2D696E64657465726D696E69736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4117/
Determinism and the Antiquated Deontology of the Social Sciences
Ballinger, Clint
Ethical Issues
Sociology
Determinism/Indeterminism
Please follow the link below for the most recent version of this paper: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004152/
2008-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text/html
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4117/1/replaced.html
Ballinger, Clint (2008) Determinism and the Antiquated Deontology of the Social Sciences. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4152
2010-10-07T15:16:55Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:64657465726D696E69736D2D696E64657465726D696E69736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4152/
Determinism and the Antiquated Deontology of the Social Sciences
Ballinger, Clint
Ethical Issues
Sociology
Determinism/Indeterminism
This article shows how the social sciences, particularly human geography, rejected hard determinism by the mid-twentieth century largely on the deontological basis that it is irreconcilable with social justice, yet this rejection came just before a burst of creative development in consequentialist theories of social justice that problematize a facile rejection of determinism on moral grounds, a development that has seldom been recognized in the social sciences. Thus many current social science and human geography views on determinism and social justice are antiquated, ignoring numerous common and well-respected arguments within philosophy that hard determinism can be reconciled with a just society. We support this argument by briefly tracing the parallel development of stances on determinism in the social sciences and the deontological-consequentialist debate in philosophy. The purpose of the article is to resituate social science and human geography debates on determinism and social justice within a modern ethical framework.
2008-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4152/1/Determinism_and_the_Antiquated_Deontology_of_the_Social_Sciences.pdf
Ballinger, Clint (2008) Determinism and the Antiquated Deontology of the Social Sciences. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4175
2010-10-07T15:16:58Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4175/
Do We Need a Scientific Revolution?
Maxwell, Nicholas
Science and Society
Sociology
Physics
Values In Science
Science and Policy
Do We Need a Scientific Revolution? (Published in the Journal of Biological Physics and Chemistry, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2008) Nicholas Maxwell (Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science at University College London) www.nick-maxwell.demon.co.uk Abstract Many see modern science as having serious defects, intellectual, social, moral. Few see this as having anything to do with the philosophy of science. I argue that many diverse ills of modern science are a consequence of the fact that the scientific community has long accepted, and sought to implement, a bad philosophy of science, which I call standard empiricism. This holds that the basic intellectual aim is truth, the basic method being impartial assessment of claims to knowledge with respect to evidence. Standard empiricism is, however, untenable. Furthermore, the attempt to put it into scientific practice has many damaging consequences for science. The scientific community urgently needs to bring about a revolution in both the conception of science, and science itself. It needs to be acknowledged that the actual aims of science make metaphysical, value and political assumptions and are, as a result, deeply problematic. Science needs to try to improve its aims and methods as it proceeds. Standard empiricism needs to be rejected, and the more rigorous philosophy of science of aim-oriented empiricism needs to be adopted and explicitly implemented in scientific practice instead. The outcome would be the emergence of a new kind of science, of greater value in both intellectual and humanitarian terms.
2008-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4175/1/Do_We_Need_a_Scientific_Revolution.doc
Maxwell, Nicholas (2008) Do We Need a Scientific Revolution? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4285
2010-10-07T15:17:17Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:66656D696E6973742D617070726F6163686573
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4285/
Two Concepts of Social Situatedness in Science
Schmaus, Warren
Science and Society
Sociology
Feminist Approaches
Values In Science
Although standpoint theorists tend to characterize a scientist’s social situation in terms of her position in a hierarchy of power within the larger society, her social situation could also be characterized in terms of the degree to which she is integrated into the scientific community. The latter concept of social location may prove helpful in explaining a scientist’s potential for contributing to the growth of knowledge. It may also provide an independent measure of marginalization that makes it possible to ascertain the extent to which those who are marginalized in the larger society are also marginalized in science.
2008
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4285/1/talk.doc
Schmaus, Warren (2008) Two Concepts of Social Situatedness in Science. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4369
2010-10-07T15:17:30Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4369/
Sociology of Modern Cosmology
López Corredoira, Martín
Science and Society
Sociology
Cosmology
Certain results of observational cosmology cast critical doubt on the foundations of standard cosmology but leave most cosmologists untroubled. Alternative cosmological models that differ from the Big Bang have been published and defended by heterodox scientists; however, most cosmologists do not heed these. This may be because standard theory is correct and all other ideas and criticisms are incorrect, but it is also to a great extent due to sociological phenomena such as the "snowball effect" or "groupthink". We might wonder whether cosmology, the study of the Universe as a whole, is a science like other branches of physics or just a dominant ideology.
2008-01
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4369/1/soc_cosmo.pdf
López Corredoira, Martín (2008) Sociology of Modern Cosmology. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:4491
2010-10-07T15:17:41Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70726F626162696C6974792D73746174697374696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4491/
Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers
Hartmann, Stephan
Martini, Carlo
Sprenger, Jan
Probability/Statistics
Decision Theory
Confirmation/Induction
Sociology
Economics
This paper focuses on the question of how to resolve disagreement, and uses the Lehrer-Wagner model as a formal tool for investigating consensual decision-making. The main result consists in a general definition of when agents treat each other as epistemic peers (Kelly 2005; Elga 2007), and a theorem vindicating the "equal weight view" to resolve disagreement among epistemic peers. We apply our findings to an analysis of the impact of social network structures on group deliberation processes, and we demonstrate their stability with the help of numerical simulations.
2009-03
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4491/1/Consensus_Epistemic_Peers.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Martini, Carlo and Sprenger, Jan (2009) Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5112
2010-10-07T15:19:07Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D70737963686F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5112/
SENSORY EXPLOITATION: UNDERESTIMATED IN THE EVOLUTION OF ART AS ONCE IN SEXUAL SELECTION THEORY?
verpooten, jan
nelissen, mark
Evolutionary Theory
Sociology
Cognitive Science
Evolutionary Psychology
In this paper we argue that sensory exploitation, a model from sexual selection theory, deserves more attention in evolutionary thinking about art than it has up until now. We base our argument on the observation that in the past sensory exploitation may have been underestimated in sexual selection theory but that it is now winning field. Likewise, we expect sensory exploitation can play a more substantial role in modeling the evolution of art behavior. Darwin's theory of sexual selection provides a mechanistic basis to explain the evolution of male display traits. This mechanistic approach has proven useful to developing hypotheses about the evolution of human art. Both Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Miller (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001) have applied an indirect-benefit model from sexual selection to the evolution of art behavior. We argue that the mechanistic possibilities sensory exploitation has to offer as a model have remained underexplored so far, so we propose a concept based upon it. From the sensory exploitation perspective it follows that exaptive exploitation of psychosensory biases is a primary force in the evolution of art production (notice that the use of a model from sexual selection does not imply art evolved as a sexual display - we only use it for its mechanism) and that the indirect-benefit model only provides secondary forces. Thus, sensory exploitation may operate alone under some conditions but usually secondary processes as a result of indirect benefits are expected to kick in. The concept of sensory exploitation will need to play a central role in articulating all of the existing hypotheses about art.
2009
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5112/1/manuscript_jan_verpooten_Boston_studies_2009.pdf
verpooten, jan and nelissen, mark (2009) SENSORY EXPLOITATION: UNDERESTIMATED IN THE EVOLUTION OF ART AS ONCE IN SEXUAL SELECTION THEORY? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5297
2010-10-07T15:19:30Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5297/
The Surprising Weberian Roots to Milton Friedman’s Methodology
Schliesser, Eric
Models and Idealization
History of Philosophy of Science
Sociology
Economics
History of Science Case Studies
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
The main point of this paper is to contribute to understanding Milton Friedman’s (1953) “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (hereafter F1953), one of the most influential statements of economic methodology of the twentieth century, and, in doing so, help discern the non trivial but complex role of philosophic ideas in the shaping of economic theorizing and economists’ self-conception. It also aims to contribute to a better understanding of the theoretical origins of the so-called ‘Chicago’ school of economics. In this paper, I first present detailed textual evidence of the familiarity of George Stigler with the early work of Talcott Parsons, the most important American translator and disseminator of Max Weber’s ideas, who also helped create sociology as a distinct discipline in the United States. The Chicago-Parsons link is no surprise because historians have known that Frank Knight and Parsons corresponded, first about translating Weber and then about matters of mutual interest. Knight, who was a doctoral advisor to Stigler and teacher of Milton Friedman, was not merely the first American translator of Weber, but remained keenly and, perhaps, increasingly interested in Weber throughout his life. I am unfamiliar with any investigation of the Weberian influence on Knight’s students. I show that Stigler praises Parsons’ treatment of Alfred Marshall, who plays an outsized role in Friedman’s self-conception of economics and economic theory. I also show that Stigler calls attention to the methodological similarity between Friedman and Parsons. Finally, I turn to F1953, and I show, first, that some of its most distinctive and philosophically interesting claims echo Parsons’ treatment of methodological matters; second that once alerted one can note Weberian terminology in F1953.
2010-04
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
doc
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5297/1/f1953weberes5april2010.doc
Schliesser, Eric (2010) The Surprising Weberian Roots to Milton Friedman’s Methodology. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:5424
2010-10-07T15:19:49Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368656D6973747279
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5424/
Tools of Toys? On Specific Challenges for Modeling and the Epistemology of Models and Computer Simulations in the Social Sciences
Arnold, Eckhart
Models and Idealization
Sociology
Chemistry
Mathematical models are a well established tool in most natural sciences. Although models have been neglected by the philosophy of science for a long time, their epistemological status as a link between theory and reality is now fairly well understood. However, regarding the epistemological status of mathematical models in the social sciences, there still exists a considerable unclarity. In my paper I argue that this results from specific challenges that mathematical models and especially computer simulations face in the social sciences. The most important difference between the social sciences and the natural sciences with respect to modeling is that in the social sciences powerful and well confirmed background theories (like Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics or the theory of relativity in physics) do not exist in the social sciences. Therefore, an epistemology of models that is formed on the role model of physics may not be appropriate for the social sciences. I discuss the challenges that modeling faces in the social sciences and point out their epistemological consequences. The most important consequences are that greater emphasis must be placed on empirical validation than on theoretical validation and that the relevance of purely theoretical simulations is strongly limited.
2010
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5424/1/tools_or_toys.pdf
Arnold, Eckhart (2010) Tools of Toys? On Specific Challenges for Modeling and the Epistemology of Models and Computer Simulations in the Social Sciences. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8493
2012-12-18T18:13:41Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D70737963686F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:64657465726D696E69736D2D696E64657465726D696E69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:65617274682D736369656E636573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8493/
Determinism and the Antiquated Deontology of the
Social Sciences
Ballinger, Clint
Evolutionary Psychology
Determinism/Indeterminism
Earth Sciences
Ethical Issues
History of Philosophy of Science
Science and Society
Sociology
This article shows how the social sciences, particularly human geography, rejected
hard determinism by the mid-twentieth century partly on the deontological basis that
it is irreconcilable with social justice, yet this rejection came just before a burst of
creative development in consequentialist theories of social justice that problematize a
facile rejection of determinism on moral grounds, a development that has seldom
been recognized in the social sciences. Thus many current social science and human
geography views on determinism and social justice are antiquated, ignoring
numerous common and well-respected arguments within philosophy that hard
determinism can be reconciled with a just society. We support this argument by
briefly tracing the parallel development of stances on determinism in the social
sciences and the deontological-consequentialist debate in philosophy. The purpose of
the article is to resituate social science and human geography debates on
determinism and social justice within a modern ethical framework.
Working paper
Other
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8493/1/Determinism_and_the_Antiquated_Deontology_of_the_Social_Sciences.pdf
Ballinger, Clint Determinism and the Antiquated Deontology of the Social Sciences. Working paper.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8873
2011-11-03T18:32:01Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8873/
Does Gender Matter in the United States Far-Right?
Blee, Kathleen M.
Science and Society
Sociology
This article seeks to explain why it is difficult to understand how gender matters in the right, and suggest an analytic agenda for scholars who seek to do so.
2011
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8873/1/does_gender_matter%5B1%5D.pdf
Blee, Kathleen M. (2011) Does Gender Matter in the United States Far-Right? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:8875
2011-11-04T13:38:14Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8875/
Location, location, location: contextualizing organizational research
Rousseau, Denise M.
Fried, Yitzhak
Sociology
Our goals in writing this editorial are to encourage more contextualization in organizational research and to signal that the Journal of Organizational Behavior gives a sympathetic reception to submissions incorporating context into their research methods and reporting.
Wiley
2001
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
Rousseau, Denise M. and Fried, Yitzhak (2001) Location, location, location: contextualizing organizational research. In: UNSPECIFIED.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/job.78
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9051
2012-04-08T14:19:25Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D7075746174696F6E2D696E666F726D6174696F6E:436C6173736963616C
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D70757465722D736369656E63652D6172746966696369616C2D696E74656C6C6967656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:64657465726D696E69736D2D696E64657465726D696E69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9051/
Bringing Up Turing's 'Child-Machine'
Sterrett, S. G.
Classical
Artificial Intelligence
Determinism/Indeterminism
Sociology
Thought Experiments
Turing wrote that the "guiding principle" of his investigation into the possibility of intelligent machinery was "The analogy [of machinery that might be made to show intelligent behavior] with the human brain." (Turing 1948)
In his discussion of the investigations that Turing said were guided by this analogy, however, he employs a more far-reaching analogy: he eventually expands the analogy from the human brain out to "the human community as a whole." Along the way, he takes note of an obvious fact in the bigger scheme of things regarding human intelligence: grownups were once children. So, he says, it might be useful to consider a machine analogue of childhood. In both his 1948 paper "Intelligent Machinery" and his 1950 "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", Turing speaks of a "child-machine." In this paper, I'll discuss Turing's child-machine, what he said about different ways of educating it, and what impact the "bringing up" of a child-machine has on its ability to behave in ways that might be taken for intelligent. I'll also discuss how some of the various games he suggested humans might play with machines are related to this approach.
2012-03-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9051/1/cie2012_submission_241.pdf
Sterrett, S. G. (2012) Bringing Up Turing's 'Child-Machine'. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9209
2012-07-10T19:37:44Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
7375626A656374733D67656E:66656D696E6973742D617070726F6163686573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9209/
Is our ordinary way of choosing to have children rational?
Paul, L. A.
Decision Theory
Ethical Issues
Feminist Approaches
Psychology
Sociology
Thought Experiments
This paper argues that if you choose to have a child by consulting your preferences, where your preferences are based upon projections about what it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. The problem is not a problem for decision theory, for decision theory has the resources to handle the problem if we change the mode of decision-making. The problem is rather a problem for our ordinary conception of major life-changing decisions as rational decisions. The argument combines three independently plausible premises. The first premise is derived from the widely adopted cultural practice of deciding whether or not to have a child by making a careful assessment of what it would be like. The second premise is that this assessment is performed in order for you to compare what it would be like for you to become a parent to what it would be like for you to remain childless, so that you can choose the best outcome. The third premise is that the experience of having a child is a unique, radically transformative experience. Having one’s first child is psychologically life-changing; an experience like no other. After defending these three premises, I use them to argue that if one wants to choose rationally, one cannot apply our ordinary decision-making procedure when choosing whether to become a parent.
2012-07-06
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9209/1/Is_our_ordinary_way_of_choosing_to_have_children_rational.pdf
Paul, L. A. (2012) Is our ordinary way of choosing to have children rational? [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9449
2012-12-05T23:45:26Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706572696D656E746174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9449/
Conformorality. A Study on Group Conditioning of Normative Judgment.
Lisciandra, Chiara
Colombo, Matteo
Nilsenova, Marie
Cognitive Science
Ethical Issues
Experimentation
Psychology
Sociology
How does other people’s opinion affect judgments of norm transgressions? In our study, we used a modification of the famous Asch paradigm (1951, 1955) to examine conformity in the moral domain. The question we addressed was how peer group opinion alters normative judgments of scenarios involving violations of moral, social, and decency norms. The results indicate that even moral norms are subject to conformity, especially in situations with a high degree of social presence. Interestingly, the degree of conformity can distinguish between different types of norms.
2012
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9449/1/Conform_NEW.pdf
Lisciandra, Chiara and Colombo, Matteo and Nilsenova, Marie (2012) Conformorality. A Study on Group Conditioning of Normative Judgment. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9508
2013-01-07T02:26:17Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9508/
Is race a cause?
Marcellesi, Alexandre
Causation
Economics
Sociology
Advocates of the counterfactual approach to causal inference argue that race is not a cause, and this despite the fact that it is commonly treated as such by scientists in many disciplines. I object that their argument is unsound because two of its premises are false. I also sketch an argument to the effect that racial discrimination cannot be explained unless one assumes race to be a cause.
2012-11-03
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9508/4/psa_final.pdf
Marcellesi, Alexandre (2012) Is race a cause? In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9696
2013-04-22T19:10:14Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368656D6973747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:6669656C64732D616E642D7061727469636C6573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:7175616E74756D2D6D656368616E696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9696/
Is an electron a charge cloud? A reexamination of Schrödinger's charge density hypothesis
Gao, Shan
Chemistry
Fields and Particles
Quantum Mechanics
Sociology
This article re-examines Schrödinger's charge density hypothesis, according to which the charge of an electron is distributed in the whole space, and the charge density in each position is proportional to the modulus squared of the wave function of the electron there. It is demonstrated that the charge distribution of a quantum system can be measured by protective measurements as expectation values of certain observables, and the results as predicted by quantum mechanics confirm Schrödinger's original hypothesis. Moreover, the physical origin of the charge distribution is also investigated. It is argued that the charge distribution of a quantum system is effective, that is, it is formed by the ergodic motion of a localized particle with the charge of the system.
2013-03-21
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9696/1/electroncloud_v9.pdf
Gao, Shan (2013) Is an electron a charge cloud? A reexamination of Schrödinger's charge density hypothesis. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:9721
2013-05-03T14:32:36Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:66656D696E6973742D617070726F6163686573
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:726865746F7269632D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:746563686E6F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9721/
Bodies in a Zone of Indistinction: A History of the Biomedicalization of Pregnancy in Prison
Fletcher, Erica H.
Anthropology
Feminist Approaches
Psychology
Rhetoric of Science
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Sociology
Technology
The United States’ prison systems house more inmates than any other country in the Global North. Since Nixon’s proclamation of a War on Drugs in the 1960s and Ronald Regan’s push to create stricter penalties for drug crimes in the 1980s, prisons have seen an influx of women inmates, with the rate of incarceration increasing six times after this public policy was enacted. To meet the demand, prison systems expanded dramatically and now quarter over 110,000 women prisoners every year—5,000 to 6,000 of whom are pregnant or become pregnant during their incarceration.
In prison, pregnant women lack the autonomy to choose their healthcare provider, to decide the time they are taken to the prison hospital for delivery, and to raise their infant. Still, because federal law states that prisons must provide medical care to all inmates, pregnant prisoners can expect at least some form of regular checkups and other prenatal care throughout the duration of their pregnancy. In some states across the nation, pregnant prisoners may even be able to take labor and delivery classes, deliver their babies without being shackled to the hospital bed, and-- depending on their “good” behavior-- have the option to stay with their children for a short period in either prison nurseries or residency programs. Through these initiatives, the medical establishment’s encroachment in penitentiaries can be seen as an “advancement” that institutes policy reformations for a more “humane” approach to ushering life into prison space.
Regardless, throughout this “progress” narrative, women’s bodies remain a space for political control and domination in both the spheres of law and medicine. As both spheres fuse and become co-constitutive of each other, Giorgio Agamben writes, “The novelty of modern biopolitics lies in the fact that the biological given is as such immediately political, and the political is as such immediately the biological given.” Likewise, in prison, bodies of pregnant women become zones of indistinction in which both biological and political spheres coalesce and the very material effects of their engagement are made visible. To that end, analysis of selected scientific studies will illuminate the ways in which the authority of science (including medicine and psychology) is co-opted by the medical establishment to make an appeal for more extensive accommodations of pregnant prisoners. Moreover, this paper will argue that the biomedicalization of female criminality in the last three decades has created a space in which certain “liberties” are increasingly afforded to expecting mothers in prison, yet paradoxically this movement also advances the agenda to moralize, discipline, and control pregnant bodies.
2012
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/msword
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9721/1/FinalPaper_Prison.docx
Fletcher, Erica H. (2012) Bodies in a Zone of Indistinction: A History of the Biomedicalization of Pregnancy in Prison. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10871
2014-07-12T12:30:09Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10871/
I. JARVIE & J.ZAMORA BONILLA, eds. 2011. The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences
Thoma, Johanna
Anthropology
Economics
Sociology
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2014-05-01
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10871/1/11406-44137-1-PB.pdf
Thoma, Johanna (2014) I. JARVIE & J.ZAMORA BONILLA, eds. 2011. The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29 (2). pp. 311-315. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/11406/10731
10.1387/theoria.11406
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10873
2014-07-12T12:32:13Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10873/
Opinion polling and election predictions
Northcott, Robert
Causation
Economics
Explanation
History of Science Case Studies
Models and Idealization
Sociology
Election prediction by means of opinion polling is a rare empirical success story for social science, but one not previously considered by philosophers. I examine the details of a prominent case, namely the 2012 US presidential election, and draw two lessons of more general interest:
1) Methodology over metaphysics. Traditional metaphysical criteria were not a useful guide to whether successful prediction would be possible; instead, the crucial thing was selecting an effective methodology.
2) Which methodology? Success required sophisticated use of case-specific evidence from opinion polling. The pursuit of explanations via general theory or causal mechanisms, by contrast, turned out to be precisely the wrong path – contrary to much recent philosophy of social science
2014-07-11
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
application/msword
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10873/1/Polling-PSA.214.docx
Northcott, Robert (2014) Opinion polling and election predictions. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:10921
2014-08-03T14:45:45Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10921/
Why are there descriptive norms? Because we looked for them
Muldoon, Ryan
Lisciandra, Chiara
Hartmann, Stephan
Complex Systems
Economics
Sociology
In this work, we present a mathematical model for the emergence of descriptive norms, where the individual decision problem is formalized with the standard Bayesian belief revision machinery. Previous work on the emergence of descriptive norms has relied on heuristic modeling. In this paper we show that with a Bayesian model we can provide a more general picture of the emergence of norms, which helps to motivate the assumptions made in heuristic models.
In our model, the priors formalize the belief that a certain behavior is a regularity. The evidence is provided by other group members' behavior and the likelihood by their reliability. We implement the model in a series of computer simulations and examine the group-level outcomes. We claim that domain-general belief revision helps explain why we look for regularities in social life in the first place. We argue that it is the disposition to look for regularities and react to them that generates descriptive norms. In our search for rules, we create them.
2014-07-31
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10921/1/Because_we_looked_for_them_-_accepted.pdf
Muldoon, Ryan and Lisciandra, Chiara and Hartmann, Stephan (2014) Why are there descriptive norms? Because we looked for them. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11158
2014-11-19T21:55:43Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11158/
Vindicating Methodological Triangulation
Heesen, Remco
Bright, Liam Kofi
Zucker, Andrew
Anthropology
Confirmation/Induction
Decision Theory
Economics
Sociology
Social scientists use many different methods, and there are often substantial disagreements about which method is appropriate for a given research question. A proponent of methodological triangulation believes that if multiple methods yield the same answer that answer is confirmed more strongly than it could have been by any single method. Methodological purists, on the other hand, believe that one should choose a single appropriate method and stick with it. Using formal tools from voting theory, we show that triangulation is more likely to lead to the correct answer than purism, assuming the scientist is subject to some degree of diffidence about the relative merits of the various methods. This is true even when in fact only one of the methods is appropriate for the given research question.
2014-11-18
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11158/1/Vindicating_Methodological_Triangulation.pdf
Heesen, Remco and Bright, Liam Kofi and Zucker, Andrew (2014) Vindicating Methodological Triangulation. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11161
2015-02-08T20:40:03Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11306
2015-04-16T20:48:47Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11306/
Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests
Karpus, Jurgis
Radzvilas, Mantas
Decision Theory
Economics
Sociology
Orthodox game theory is sometimes criticized for its failure to single out intuitively compelling solutions in certain types of interpersonal interactions. The theory of team reasoning provides a resolution in some such cases by suggesting a shift in decision-makers’ mode of reasoning from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team. The existing literature in this field discusses a number of properties for a formalized representation of team’s interests to satisfy: Pareto efficiency, successful coordination of individuals’ actions and the notion of mutual advantage among the members of a team. For an explicit function of team’s goals a reference is sometimes made to the maximization of the average of individuals’ personal payoffs, which meets the Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria, but at times fails with respect to the notion of mutual advantage. It also relies on making interpersonal comparisons of payoffs which goes beyond the standard assumptions of the expected utility theory that make numerical representations of individuals’ preferences possible. In this paper we propose an alternative, rank-based function of team’s interests that does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of payoffs, incorporates the notion of mutual advantage and satisfies the weak Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria. We discuss its predictions using a number of examples and suggest a few possibilities for further research in this field.
2015-02-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11306/5/Team_Reasoning_and_a_Rank-Based_Function_of_Team%27s_Interests.pdf
Karpus, Jurgis and Radzvilas, Mantas (2015) Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11343
2015-02-26T18:26:51Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:726564756374696F6E69736D2D686F6C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11343/
Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation
List, Christian
Spiekermann, Kai
Economics
Explanation
Reductionism/Holism
Sociology
Political science is divided between methodological individualists, who seek to explain political phenomena by reference to individuals and their interactions, and holists (or nonreductionists), who consider some higher-level social entities or properties such as states, institutions, or cultures ontologically or causally significant. We propose a reconciliation between these two perspectives, building on related work in philosophy. After laying out a taxonomy of different variants of each view, we observe that (i) although political phenomena result from underlying individual attitudes and behavior, individual-level descriptions do not always capture all explanatorily salient properties, and (ii) nonreductionistic explanations are mandated when social regularities are robust to changes in their individual-level realization. We characterize the dividing line between phenomena requiring nonreductionistic explanation and phenomena permitting individualistic explanation and give examples from the study of ethnic conflicts, social-network theory, and international-relations theory.
2013-11
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11343/1/IndividualismHolism.pdf
List, Christian and Spiekermann, Kai (2013) Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation. American Political Science Review, 107 (4). pp. 629-643.
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9076604&fileId=S0003055413000373
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000373
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:11421
2015-04-16T20:48:47Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11421/
Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests
Karpus, Jurgis
Radzvilas, Mantas
Decision Theory
Economics
Sociology
Orthodox game theory is sometimes criticized for its failure to single out intuitively compelling solutions in certain types of interpersonal interactions. The theory of team reasoning provides a resolution in some such cases by suggesting a shift in decision-makers’ mode of reasoning from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team. The existing literature in this field discusses a number of properties for a formalized representation of team’s interests to satisfy: Pareto efficiency, successful coordination of individuals’ actions and the notion of mutual advantage among the members of a team. For an explicit function of team’s goals a reference is sometimes made to the maximization of the average of individuals’ personal payoffs, which meets the Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria, but at times fails with respect to the notion of mutual advantage. It also relies on making interpersonal comparisons of payoffs which goes beyond the standard assumptions of the expected utility theory that make numerical representations of individuals’ preferences possible. In this paper we propose an alternative, rank-based function of team’s interests that does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of payoffs, incorporates the notion of mutual advantage and satisfies the weak Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria. We discuss its predictions using a number of examples and suggest a few possibilities for further research in this field.
2015-02-07
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11421/6/Team_Reasoning_and_a_Rank-Based_Function_of_Team%27s_Interests.pdf
Karpus, Jurgis and Radzvilas, Mantas (2015) Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12364
2016-08-15T15:20:24Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12364/
Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games
Karpus, Jurgis
Radzvilas, Mantas
Decision Theory
Economics
Sociology
The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interact- ing players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team—a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers’ goals to satisfy, but a few formal representations have been discussed. In this paper we suggest a possible representation of these goals based on the notion of mutual advantage. We propose a method for measuring extents of individual and mutual advantage to the interacting decision-makers, and define team interests as the attainment of outcomes associated with maximal mutual advantage in the games they play.
0201-08-14
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12364/1/Team%20Reasoning%20and%20a%20Measure%20of%20Mutual%20Advantage%20in%20Games.pdf
Karpus, Jurgis and Radzvilas, Mantas (0201) Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12584
2016-11-02T00:13:15Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D6D6F6C6563756C61722D62696F6C6F67792D67656E6574696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6574686963616C2D697373756573
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12584/
Genetically Modified Crops, Inclusion, and Democracy
Hicks, Daniel
Molecular Biology/Genetics
Ethical Issues
Science and Policy
Sociology
The public controversy over genetically modified [GM] crops is predominantly framed in terms of health and safety risks to humans and the environment. However, opponents of GM crops are motivated by a wide variety of other social, political, and economic concerns. In this paper, I critically assess the predominance of the health and safety framing in terms of Iris Young's model of communicative democracy. I argue that the health and safety framing leads to the marginalization of the social, political, and economic concerns of GM opponents, within both public discourse and government, and is therefore democratically illegitimate.
2017
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12584/1/Young.pdf
Hicks, Daniel (2017) Genetically Modified Crops, Inclusion, and Democracy. Perspectives on Science.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12632
2016-11-16T23:26:21Z
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74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12632/
Editor’s Introduction
Vicente, Agustín
Rhetoric of Science
Sociology
Values In Science
Editor's introduction to the special issue on Jason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works.
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2016-09-01
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12632/1/Vicente.pdf
Vicente, Agustín (2016) Editor’s Introduction. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 31 (3). pp. 285-286. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/17125/
10.1387/theoria.17125
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12633
2016-11-18T19:46:02Z
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74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12633/
Precis of How Propaganda Works
Stanley, Jason
Rhetoric of Science
Science and Society
Sociology
Values In Science
The overarching goal of How Propaganda Works is to provide an argument that democracy requires material equality. My aim was to forge an argument for this view without premises about morality or justice. I do so by arguing that material inequality, like other forms of inequality, has pernicious epistemic effects. Inequality results in anti-democratic flawed ideologies, such as the ideology of meritocracy, and the ideology underlying the division of labor, the subjects of the last two chapters. Propaganda plays crucial roles both in preventing us from recognizing these epistemic harms, in the form of demagoguery, and in repairing them, in the form of civic rhetoric.
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2016-09-01
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12633/1/Stanley.pdf
Stanley, Jason (2016) Precis of How Propaganda Works. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 31 (3). pp. 287-294. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/16512
10.1387/theoria.16512
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12636
2016-11-18T23:32:21Z
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74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12636/
Propaganda and the Authority of Pornography
McGlynn, Aidan N.
Rhetoric of Science
Sociology
Values In Science
Jason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works characterises and explores one democratically problematic kind of propaganda, ‘undermining propaganda’, which involves ‘[a] contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals’. Stanley’s model for how undermining propaganda functions is Rae Langton and Caroline West’s treatment of moves in pornographic language games. However, Stanley doesn’t consider whether his theory of propaganda might in turn illuminate the harmful nature of pornography, in light of the familiar contention that some pornography acts as a kind of misogynistic propaganda. Drawing on Catharine MacKinnon's writings on pornography, this paper will explore one way of developing the claim thatpornography sometimes functions as undermining propaganda, in something close to Stanley’s sense. Moreover, I will suggest that the discussion points to a new response to the so-called authority problem for Rae Langton’s silencing argument against the protected status of pornography.
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2016-09-01
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12636/1/McGlynn.pdf
McGlynn, Aidan N. (2016) Propaganda and the Authority of Pornography. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 31 (3). pp. 329-343. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/16376
10.1387/theoria.16376
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12637
2016-11-18T23:33:07Z
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74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12637/
Propaganda, Inequality, and Epistemic Movement
Pohlhaus, Jr., Gaile
Ethical Issues
Science and Society
Sociology
I analyze Jason Stanley’s model for how propaganda works, paying close attention to Stanley’s own rhetoric. I argue that Stanley’s language be supplemented with a vocabulary that helps us to attend to what sorts of things move democratic knowers (epistemically speaking), what sorts of things do not, and why. In addition, I argue that the reasonableness necessary for considering the views of others within democratic deliberation ought to be understood, not as an empathic, but as an interactive capacity. Finally, I critique some of the ways in which Stanley speaks about the marginalized populations he aims to support.
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2016-09-01
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12637/1/Pohlhaus.pdf
Pohlhaus, Jr., Gaile (2016) Propaganda, Inequality, and Epistemic Movement. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 31 (3). pp. 345-356. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/16450
10.1387/theoria.16450
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12638
2016-11-18T23:33:36Z
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74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12638/
Stanley on Ideology
Protevi, John
Ethical Issues
Rhetoric of Science
Science and Society
Sociology
I explore Jason Stanley's notion of ideology. After preliminary remarks on ideology and coercion in social reproduction, I offer a restatement of Stanley's position on ideology, examining his notion of epistemic harm. I then examine the role of emotion in his thinking as that which binds beliefs to agents, and conclude with an argument for a notion I call "affective ideology” that enables us to connect ideology with the use of force in “coercive social reproduction.”
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2016-09-01
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12638/1/Protevi.pdf
Protevi, John (2016) Stanley on Ideology. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 31 (3). pp. 357-369. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/16326
10.1387/theoria.16326
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12640
2016-11-18T23:35:33Z
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74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12640/
Propaganda and Democracy
Wood, Allen
Rhetoric of Science
Science and Society
Sociology
Values In Science
We are surrounded by communication of many kinds whose aim is to persuade rather to convince, to ma- nipulate rather than to reason. Advertising and much public discourse is like this. How should we react to this fact? Perhaps even more importantly: What does this fact mean about modern society? Not all persuasion is re- grettable or to be disapproved. Not all persuasion is propaganda. And perhaps not even all propaganda is neces- sarily bad. This last point was the focus of a controversy between W. E. B. Du Bois, who held that propaganda could be used for good, and Alain Locke, who held that all propaganda corrupts our thinking. My own view is that propaganda can be used for good, but Locke was perfectly right to be worried about it.
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2016-09-01
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12640/1/Wood.pdf
Wood, Allen (2016) Propaganda and Democracy. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 31 (3). pp. 381-394. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/16384
10.1387/theoria.16384
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12723
2016-12-31T16:46:42Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12723/
Vindicating Methodological Triangulation
Heesen, Remco
Bright, Liam Kofi
Zucker, Andrew
Anthropology
Confirmation/Induction
Decision Theory
Economics
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Sociology
Social scientists use many different methods, and there are often substantial disagreements about which method is appropriate for a given research question. In response to this uncertainty about the relative merits of different methods, W. E. B. Du Bois advocated for and applied "methodological triangulation". This is to use multiple methods simultaneously in the belief that, where one is uncertain about the reliability of any given method, if multiple methods yield the same answer that answer is confirmed more strongly than it could have been by any single method. Against this, methodological purists believe that one should choose a single appropriate method and stick with it. Using tools from voting theory, we show Du Boisian methodological triangulation to be more likely to yield the correct answer than purism, assuming the scientist is subject to some degree of diffidence about the relative merits of the various methods. This holds even when in fact only one of the methods is appropriate for the given research question.
Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
2016-12-30
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12723/1/Vindicating%20Methodological%20Triangulation.pdf
Heesen, Remco and Bright, Liam Kofi and Zucker, Andrew (2016) Vindicating Methodological Triangulation. Synthese. ISSN 1573-0964
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1294-7
10.1007/s11229-016-1294-7
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12932
2023-05-22T18:03:16Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12932/
Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games
Karpus, Jurgis
Radzvilas, Mantas
Decision Theory
Economics
Sociology
The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interact- ing players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team—a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers’ goals to satisfy, but a few formal representations have been discussed. In this paper we suggest a possible representation of these goals based on the notion of mutual advantage. We propose a method for measuring extents of individual and mutual advantage to the interacting decision-makers, and define team interests as the attainment of outcomes associated with maximal mutual advantage in the games they play.
2017-08-14
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12932/7/Team_Reasoning_and_a_Measure_of_Mutual_Advantage_in_Games.pdf
Karpus, Jurgis and Radzvilas, Mantas (2017) Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:12968
2017-04-06T14:24:14Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368656D6973747279
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12968/
Tools of Toys? On Specific Challenges for Modeling and the Epistemology of Models and Computer Simulations in the Social Sciences
Arnold, Eckhart
Models and Idealization
Sociology
Chemistry
Mathematical models are a well established tool in most natural sciences. Although models have been neglected by the philosophy of science for a long time, their epistemological status as a link between theory and reality is now fairly well understood. However, regarding the epistemological status of mathematical models in the social sciences, there still exists a considerable unclarity. In my paper I argue that this results from specific challenges that mathematical models and especially computer simulations face in the social sciences. The most important difference between the social sciences and the natural sciences with respect to modeling is that in the social sciences powerful and well confirmed background theories (like Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics or the theory of relativity in physics) do not exist in the social sciences. Therefore, an epistemology of models that is formed on the role model of physics may not be appropriate for the social sciences. I discuss the challenges that modeling faces in the social sciences and point out their epistemological consequences. The most important consequences are that greater emphasis must be placed on empirical validation than on theoretical validation and that the relevance of purely theoretical simulations is strongly limited.
2010
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12968/1/Arnold_2010_Tools_or_Toys.pdf
Arnold, Eckhart (2010) Tools of Toys? On Specific Challenges for Modeling and the Epistemology of Models and Computer Simulations in the Social Sciences. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13031
2017-05-11T17:56:22Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13031/
Anchoring in Deliberations
Hartmann, Stephan
Rafiee Rad, Soroush
Cognitive Science
Decision Theory
Economics
Psychology
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Sociology
Deliberation is a standard procedure to make decisions in not too large groups. It has the advantage that the group members can learn from each other and that, at the end, often a consensus emerges that everybody endorses. But a deliberation procedure also has a number of disadvantages. E.g., what consensus is reached usually depends on the order in which the different group members speak. More specifically, the group member who speaks first often has an unproportionally high impact on the final decision: She anchors the deliberation process. While the anchoring effect undoubtably appears in real deliberating groups, we ask whether it also appears in groups whose members are truth-seeking and rational in the sense that they take the information provided by their fellow group members properly into account by updating their beliefs according to plausible rules. To answer this question and to make some progress towards explaining the anchoring effect, a formal model is constructed and analyzed. Using this model, we study the anchoring effect in homogenous groups (i.e. groups whose members consider each other as equally reliable), for which we provide analytical results, and in inhomogeneous groups, for which we provide simulation results.
2017-05-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13031/1/Anchoring.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Rafiee Rad, Soroush (2017) Anchoring in Deliberations. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13037
2017-05-12T22:54:07Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6570697374656D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D666F756E646174696F6E73
7375626A656374733D73706563:6D617468656D6174696373:504D6869737068696C
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:726865746F7269632D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13037/
The Art of Memory and the Growth of the Scientific Method
Sarma, Gopal P.
Epistemology
Foundations
History of Philosophy
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Philosophers of Science
Rhetoric of Science
Science and Society
Sociology
I argue that European schools of thought on memory and memorization were critical in enabling growth of the scientific method. After giving a historical overview of the development of the memory arts from ancient Greece through 17th century Europe, I describe how the Baconian viewpoint on the scientific method was fundamentally part of a culture and a broader dialogue that conceived of memorization as a foundational methodology for structuring knowledge and for developing symbolic means for representing scientific concepts. The principal figures of this intense and rapidly evolving intellectual milieu included some of the leading thinkers traditionally associated with the scientific revolution; among others, Francis Bacon, Renes Descartes, and Gottfried Leibniz. I close by examining the acceleration of mathematical thought in light of the art of memory and its role in 17th century philosophy, and in particular, Leibniz’s project to develop a universal calculus.
2015-06-23
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13037/1/indecs2015-pp373-396.pdf
Sarma, Gopal P. (2015) The Art of Memory and the Growth of the Scientific Method. Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 13 (3). pp. 373-396.
http://indecs.eu/2015/indecs2015-pp373-396.pdf
10.7906/indecs.13.3.4
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13038
2017-05-15T13:44:21Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13038/
Reconsidering Written Language
Sarma, Gopal P.
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Philosophers of Science
Science and Society
Sociology
Thought Experiments
A number of elite thinkers in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries pursued an agenda which historian Paolo Rossi calls the “quest for a universal language,” a quest which was deeply interwoven with the emergence of the scientific method. From a modern perspective, one of the many surprising aspects of these efforts is that they relied on a diverse array of memorization techniques as foundational elements. In the case of Leibniz’s universal calculus, the ultimate vision was to create a pictorial language that could be learned by anyone in a matter of weeks and which would contain within it a symbolic representation of all domains of contemporary thought, ranging from the natural sciences, to theology, to law. In this brief article, I explore why this agenda might have been appealing to thinkers of this era by examining ancient and modern memory feats. As a thought experiment, I suggest that a society built entirely upon memorization might be less limited than we might otherwise imagine, and furthermore, that cultural norms discouraging the use of written language might have had implications for the development of scientific methodology. Viewed in this light, the efforts of Leibniz and others seem significantly less surprising. I close with some general observations about cross-cultural origins of scientific thought.
2015-06-23
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13038/1/indecs2015-pp397-404.pdf
Sarma, Gopal P. (2015) Reconsidering Written Language. Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 13 (3). pp. 397-404.
http://indecs.eu/2015/indecs2015-pp397-404.pdf
10.7906/indecs.13.3.5
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13134
2017-06-20T14:17:47Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13134/
Socioeconomic processes as open-ended results. Beyond invariance knowledge for interventionist purposes
Ivarola, Leonardo
Economics
Models and Idealization
Science and Policy
Sociology
In this paper a critique to philosophical approaches that presuppose invariant knowledge for policy purposes is carried out. It is shown that socioeconomic processes do not fit to the logic of stable causal factors, but they are more suited to the logic of "open-ended results". On the basis of this ontological variation it is argued that ex-ante interventions are not appropriate in the socioeconomic realm. On the contrary, they must be understood in a “dynamic” sense. Finally, derivational robustness analysis is proposed as a useful tool for overcoming the problem of “overconstraint”, a typical problem of economic models.
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2017-05
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13134/1/Ivarola.pdf
Ivarola, Leonardo (2017) Socioeconomic processes as open-ended results. Beyond invariance knowledge for interventionist purposes. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 32 (2). pp. 211-229. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/16184
10.1387/theoria.16184
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13233
2017-07-20T14:50:07Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:66656D696E6973742D617070726F6163686573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13233/
The Cultural Red King Effect
O'Connor, Cailin
Evolutionary Theory
Feminist Approaches
Models and Idealization
Sociology
Why do minority groups tend to be discriminated against when it comes to situations of bargaining and resource division? In this paper, I explore an explanation for this disadvantage that appeals solely to the dynamics of social interaction between minority and majority groups---the cultural Red King effect (Bruner, 2017). As I show, in agent-based models of bargaining between groups, the minority group will tend to get less as a direct result of the fact that they frequently interact with majority group members, while majority group members meet them only rarely. This effect is strengthened by certain psychological phenomenon---risk aversion and in-group preference---is robust on network models, and is strengthened in cases where pre-existing norms are discriminatory. I will also discuss how this effect unifies previous results on the impacts of institutional memory on bargaining between groups.
Journal of Mathematical Sociology
2017-06-21
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13233/1/CRKE.pdf
O'Connor, Cailin (2017) The Cultural Red King Effect. The Cultural Red King Effect.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0022250X.2017.1335723
10.1080/0022250X.2017.1335723
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13473
2017-09-24T02:05:59Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:66656D696E6973742D617070726F6163686573
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D6F74686572
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13473/
Modeling Minimal Conditions for Inequity
O'Connor, Cailin
Explanation
Feminist Approaches
Models and Idealization
Sociology
This paper describes a class of idealized models that illuminate minimal conditions for inequity. Some such models will track the actual causal factors that generate real world inequity. Others may not. Whether or not these models do track these real-world factors is irrelevant to the epistemic role they play in showing that minimal commonplace factors are enough to generate inequity. In such cases, it is the fact that the model does not fit the world that makes it a particularly powerful
argumentative tool. As I will argue, this epistemic role is a particularly important one when it comes to modeling inequity, because such models are often also aimed at interventions to stop it. Given this, it is crucial to know if we intervene on the current causes of inequity, what other, common social factors might continue to contribute to it.
2017-09-21
Other
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13473/1/Modeling%20Minimal%20Conditions%20for%20Inequitysept2017.pdf
O'Connor, Cailin (2017) Modeling Minimal Conditions for Inequity. UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:13474
2018-09-27T21:53:42Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:66656D696E6973742D617070726F6163686573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13474/
The Emergence of Intersectional Disadvantage
O'Connor, Cailin
Bright, Liam Kofi
Bruner, Justin
Decision Theory
Feminist Approaches
Models and Idealization
Sociology
Intersectionality theory explores the peculiar disadvantages that arise as the result of occupying multiple disadvantaged demographic categories. Addressing intersectionality theory through quantitative methods has proven di�fficult. Concerns have been raised about the sample size one would need in order to responsibly tease out evidence for the claims of intersectionality theorists. What is more, theorists have expressed concern about our ability to formulate novel intersectional hypotheses in a non-ad-hoc manner. We argue that simulation methods can help address these, and other, methodological problems, because they can generate novel hypotheses about causal dependencies in a relatively cheap way, and can thus guide future empirical work. We illustrate this point using models which show that intersectional oppression
can arise under conditions where social groups are disadvantaged in the emergence of bargaining norms. As we show, intersectional disadvantage can arise even when actors from all social categories are completely identical in terms of preferences and abilities. And when actors behave in ways that reflect stronger intersectional identities, the potential for disadvantage increases. As we note, this exploration illustrates the usefulness of idealized models to real world inquiry.
2018-09-28
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13474/1/emergence-intersectional-disadvantage%20%281%29.pdf
O'Connor, Cailin and Bright, Liam Kofi and Bruner, Justin (2018) The Emergence of Intersectional Disadvantage. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14121
2017-11-14T15:55:21Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:66656D696E6973742D617070726F6163686573
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14121/
Discrimination and Collaboration in Science
Rubin, Hannah
O'Connor, Cailin
Economics
Feminist Approaches
Models and Idealization
Sociology
We use game theoretic models to take an in-depth look at the dynamics of discrimination and academic collaboration. We find that in collaboration networks, small minority groups may be more likely to end up being discriminated against while collaborating. We also find that discrimination can lead members of different social groups to mostly collaborate with in-group members, decreasing the effective diversity of the social network. Drawing on previous work, we discuss how decreases in the diversity of scientific collaborations might negatively impact the progress of epistemic communities.
2017-11-13
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14121/1/discrimination-collaboration-science%20phos.pdf
Rubin, Hannah and O'Connor, Cailin (2017) Discrimination and Collaboration in Science. Philosophy of Science.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14129
2017-11-20T16:12:42Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14129/
Capricious kinds
Laimann, Jessica
Biology
Psychology
Sociology
According to Ian Hacking, some human kinds are subject to a peculiar type of classificatory instability: individuals change in reaction to being classified, which in turn leads to a revision of our understanding of the kind. Hacking’s claim that these ‘human interactive kinds’ cannot be natural kinds has been vehemently criticised on the grounds that similar patterns of instability occur in paradigmatic examples of natural kinds. I argue that the dialectic of the extant debate misses the core conceptual problem of human interactive kinds. The problem is not that these kinds are particularly unstable but ‘capricious’—their members behave in wayward, unexpected manners which defeats existing theoretical understanding. The reason for that, I argue, is that human interactive kinds are often ‘hybrid kinds’ consisting of a base kind and an associated status, which makes mechanisms that support patterns of change and stability systematically difficult to understand and predict.
2017-11-18
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14129/1/Laimann_capricious%20kinds%20Final.pdf
Laimann, Jessica (2017) Capricious kinds. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14131
2017-11-21T21:50:09Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14131/
Capricious kinds
Laimann, Jessica
Biology
Psychology
Sociology
According to Ian Hacking, some human kinds are subject to a peculiar type of classificatory instability: individuals change in reaction to being classified, which in turn leads to a revision of our understanding of the kind. Hacking’s claim that these ‘human interactive kinds’ cannot be natural kinds has been vehemently criticised on the grounds that similar patterns of instability occur in paradigmatic examples of natural kinds. I argue that the dialectic of the extant debate misses the core conceptual problem of human interactive kinds. The problem is not that these kinds are particularly unstable but ‘capricious’—their members behave in wayward, unexpected manners which defeats existing theoretical understanding. The reason for that, I argue, is that human interactive kinds are often ‘hybrid kinds’ consisting of a base kind and an associated status, which makes mechanisms that support patterns of change and stability systematically difficult to understand and predict.
2017-11-18
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14131/1/Laimann_capricious%20kinds%20Final.pdf
Laimann, Jessica (2017) Capricious kinds. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14213
2017-12-17T19:41:19Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14228
2017-12-17T19:39:14Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14228/
The Diffusion of Scientific Innovations: A Role Typology
Herfeld, Catherine
Doehne, Malte
Economics
History of Science Case Studies
Philosophers of Science
Sociology
Theory Change
2017-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14228/1/Herfeld%20and%20Doehne%20Diffusion%20of%20Scientific%20Innovations%20-%20A%20Role%20Typology.pdf
Herfeld, Catherine and Doehne, Malte (2017) The Diffusion of Scientific Innovations: A Role Typology. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14229
2018-01-26T17:11:21Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D736369656E63652D636173652D73747564696573
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:7468656F72792D6368616E6765
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14229/
The Diffusion of Scientific Innovations: A Role Typology
Herfeld, Catherine
Doehne, Malte
Decision Theory
Economics
History of Science Case Studies
Philosophers of Science
Sociology
Theory Change
How do scientific innovations spread within and across scientific communities? In this paper, we propose a general account of the diffusion of scientific innovations. This account acknowledges that novel ideas must be elaborated on and conceptually translated before they can be adopted and applied to field-specific problems. We motivate our account by examining an exemplary case of knowledge diffusion, namely, the early spread of theories of rational decision-making. These theories were grounded in a set of novel mathematical tools and concepts that originated in John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944, 1947) and subsequently spread widely across the social and behavioral sciences. Introducing a network-based diffusion measure, we trace the spread of those tools and concepts into distinct research areas. We furthermore present an analytically tractable typology for classifying publications according to their roles in the diffusion process. The proposed framework allows for a systematic examination of the conditions under which scientific innovations spread within and across both preexisting and newly emerging scientific communities.
2017-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14229/1/Herfeld%20and%20Doehne%20Diffusion%20of%20Scientific%20Innovations%20-%20A%20Role%20Typology.pdf
Herfeld, Catherine and Doehne, Malte (2017) The Diffusion of Scientific Innovations: A Role Typology. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14241
2019-05-25T17:40:21Z
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74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14241/
Is an archaeological contribution to the theory of social science possible? Archaeological data and concepts in the dispute between Jean-Claude Gardin and Jean-Claude Passeron
Plutniak, Sébastien
Anthropology
Archaeology
Computation/Information
Artificial Intelligence
History of Science Case Studies
Philosophers of Science
Sociology
The issue of the definition and position of archaeology as a discipline is examined in relation to the dispute which took place from 1980 to 2009 between the archaeologist Jean-Claude Gardin and the sociologist Jean-Claude Passeron. This case study enables us to explore the actual conceptual relationships between archaeology and the other sciences (as opposed to those wished for or prescribed). The contrasts between the positions declared by the two researchers and the rooting of their arguments in their disciplines are examined: where the sociologist makes use of his philosophical training, the archaeologist relies mainly on his work on semiology and informatics. Archaeology ultimately plays a minor role in the arguments proposed. This dispute therefore cannot be considered as evidence for the movement of concepts between archaeology and the social sciences. A blind spot in the debate, relating to the ontological specificities of archaeological objects, nevertheless presents itself as a possible way of implementing this movement.
2017-12
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14241/1/Plutniak_2017_Is-an-archaeological-contribution.pdf
Plutniak, Sébastien (2017) Is an archaeological contribution to the theory of social science possible? Archaeological data and concepts in the dispute between Jean-Claude Gardin and Jean-Claude Passeron. Palethnologie, 9. pp. 7-21.
http://blogs.univ-tlse2.fr/palethnologie/en/2017-02-Plutniak/
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14265
2018-01-08T16:46:46Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14265/
Pragmatism, Ontology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice
Lohse, Simon
Scientific Metaphysics
Explanation
Sociology
In this article, I will discuss two prominent views on the relevance and irrelevance of ontological investigations for the social sciences, namely, ontological foundationalism and anti-ontological pragmatism. I will argue that both views are unsatisfactory. The subsequent part of the article will introduce an alternative role for ontological projects in the philosophy of the social sciences that fares better in this respect by paying attention to the ontological assumptions of actual social scientific theories, models, and related explanatory practices. I will illustrate and support this alternative through discussion of three concrete cases.
SAGE
2017-01
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14265/1/pragmatism__ontology_and_philsci_in_practice_preprint_.pdf
Lohse, Simon (2017) Pragmatism, Ontology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 47 (1). pp. 3-27.
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0048393116654869
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14318
2020-12-18T05:00:50Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14318/
Power by Association
Lacroix, Travis
O'Connor, Cailin
Evolutionary Theory
Feminist Approaches
Game Theory
Models and Idealization
Sociology
We use tools from evolutionary game theory to examine how power might influence the cultural evolution of inequitable norms between discernible groups (such as gender or racial groups) in a population of otherwise identical individuals. Similar extant models always assume that power is homogeneous across a social group. As such, these models fail to capture situations where individuals who are not themselves disempowered nonetheless end up disadvantaged in bargaining scenarios by dint of their social group membership. Thus, we assume that there is heterogeneity in the groups in that some individuals are more powerful than others.
Our model shows that even when most individuals in two discernible sub-groups are relevantly identical, powerful individuals can affect the social outcomes for their entire group; this results in power by association for their in-group and a bargaining disadvantage for their out-group. In addition, we observe scenarios like those described where individuals who are more powerful will get less in a bargaining scenario because a convention has emerged disadvantaging their social group.
Michigan Publishing
2020-12
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14318/7/Power_by_Association__Ergo___Final%2C%20Final%2C%20real%20final%20version_.pdf
Lacroix, Travis and O'Connor, Cailin (2020) Power by Association. Ergo. ISSN 2330-4014
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14340
2019-01-11T20:30:45Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
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7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14340/
Inequity and Inequality in the Emergence of Conventions
Cochran, Calvin
O'Connor, Cailin
Economics
Ethical Issues
Feminist Approaches
Models and Idealization
Sociology
Many societies have state norms of equity---that those who make symmetric social contributions deserve symmetric rewards. Despite this, there are widespread patterns of social inequity, especially along gender and racial lines. It is often the case that members of certain social groups receive greater rewards per contribution than others. In this paper, we draw on evolutionary game theory to show that the emergence of this sort of inequitable convention is far from surprising. In simple cultural evolutionary models, inequity is much more likely to emerge than equity, despite the presence of stable, equitable outcomes that groups might instead learn. As we outline, social groups provide a way to break symmetry between actors in determining both contributions and rewards in joint projects.
2019-01-30
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14340/1/Inequality_and_Inequity_in_the_Emergence_of_Conventions%20FINAL.pdf
Cochran, Calvin and O'Connor, Cailin (2019) Inequity and Inequality in the Emergence of Conventions. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14460
2018-03-14T21:18:55Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636175736174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14460/
Causal Powers and Social Ontology
Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias
Causation
Sociology
Over the last few decades, philosophers and social scientists have applied the so-called powers ontology to the social domain. I argue that this application is highly problematic: many of the alleged powers in the social realm violate the intrinsicality condition, and those that can be coherently taken to be intrinsic to their bearers are arguably causally redundant. I end the paper by offering a diagnosis of why philosophers and social scientists have been tempted to think that there are powers in social realm.
2018
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14460/1/pre-print%20Causal%20Powers%20and%20Social%20Ontology%20Synthese.pdf
Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias (2018) Causal Powers and Social Ontology. [Preprint]
SYNT-D-17-00782R2
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14465
2018-03-14T21:23:46Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14465/
Implicit Bias: from social structure to representational format
Toribio, Josefa
Cognitive Science
Ethical Issues
Science and Society
Sociology
In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional—as opposed to associationist. The proposal under criticism moves from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations to the view that the structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for such biased behaviour is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational structure of implicit attitudes. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by the structural social injustice that implicit attitudes reflect, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue in favour of an associationist view.
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
2018-01
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14465/1/Toribio.pdf
Toribio, Josefa (2018) Implicit Bias: from social structure to representational format. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 33 (1). pp. 41-60. ISSN 2171-679X
http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/17751
10.1387/theoria.17751
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14472
2018-03-15T15:43:13Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14472/
Why the Social Sciences are Irreducible
Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias
Economics
Reductionism/Holism
Sociology
It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lower-level individualistic science. The standard argument for this position (usually labelled explanatory holism) is the Fodorian multiple realizability argument. Its defenders endorse token-token(s) identities between “higher-level” social objects and pluralities/sums of “lower-level” individuals (a position traditionally called ontological individualism), but they maintain that the properties expressed by social science predicates are often multiply realizable, entailing that type-type identities between social and individualistic properties are ruled out. In this paper I argue that the multiple realizability argument for explanatory holism is unsound. The social sciences are indeed irreducible, but the principled reason for this is that the required token-token(s) identifications cannot in general be carried through. In consequence, paradigmatic social science predicates cannot be taken to apply to the objects quantified over in the lower-level sciences. The result is that typical social science predicates cannot even be held to be co-extensive with individualistic predicates, which means type-type identifications are ruled out too. Multiple realizability has nothing to do with this failure of co-extensiveness, because the relevant social science predicates are not multiply realized in the sense intended by the explanatory holists, a sense which presupposes reductive token-token(s) identifications.
2017
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14472/1/Why%20the%20social%20sciences%20are%20irreducible%20pre-print.pdf
Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias (2017) Why the Social Sciences are Irreducible. [Preprint]
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1472-2
DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1472-2
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14495
2018-03-28T13:05:44Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14500
2018-04-02T18:09:04Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14500/
Anchoring in Deliberations
Hartmann, Stephan
Rafiee Rad, Soroush
Cognitive Science
Decision Theory
Economics
Psychology
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Sociology
Deliberation is a standard procedure for making decisions in not too large groups. It has the advantage that group members can learn from each other and that, at the end, often a consensus emerges that everybody endorses. Unfortunately, however, implementing a deliberation procedure also has a number of disadvantages due to the cognitive limitations of the individual group members. What is more, the very process of deliberation introduces an additional bias which we investigate in this article. We demonstrate that even in a group of (boundedly) rational agents the resulting consensus (if there is one) depends on the order in which the group members speak. More specifically, the group member who speaks first has an unproportionally high impact on the final decision, which we interpret as a new instance of the well-known anchoring effect.To show this, we construct and analyze an agent-based model -- inspired by the disagreement debate in social epistemology -- and obtain analytical results for homogenous groups (i.e. for groups whose members consider each other as epistemic peers) as well as simulation results for inhomogeneous groups.
2018-03-28
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14500/7/AnchoringArchive.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Rafiee Rad, Soroush (2018) Anchoring in Deliberations. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14675
2018-05-17T18:57:16Z
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74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14675/
The Natural Selection of Conservative Science
O'Connor, Cailin
Evolutionary Theory
Models and Idealization
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Sociology
Social epistemologists have argued that high risk, high reward science has an important role to play in scientific communities. Recently, though, it has also been argued that various scientific fields seem to be trending towards conservatism---the increasing production of what Kuhn (1970) might have called `normal science'. This paper will explore a possible explanation for this sort of trend: that the process by which scientific research groups form, grow, and dissolve might be inherently hostile to such science. In particular, I employ a paradigm developed by Smaldino and McElreath (2016) that treats a scientific community as a population undergoing selection. As will become clear, perhaps counter-intuitively this sort of process in some ways promotes high risk, high reward science. But, as I will point out, risky science is, in general, the sort of thing that is hard to repeat. While more conservative scientists will be able to train students capable of continuing their successful projects, and so create thriving lineages, successful risky science may not be the sort of thing one can easily pass on. In such cases, the structure of scientific communities selects against high risk, high rewards projects. More generally, this project makes clear that there are at least two processes to consider in thinking about how incentives shape scientific communities---the process by which individual scientists make choices about their careers and research, and the selective process governing the formation of new research groups.
2018-05-16
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14675/1/natural-selection-conservative%20%286%29.pdf
O'Connor, Cailin (2018) The Natural Selection of Conservative Science. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14846
2018-07-04T12:50:13Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14846/
Intellectual Humility in Mathematics
Rittberg, Colin Jakob
History of Science Case Studies
Mathematics
Philosophers of Science
Sociology
Values In Science
2018-06
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14846/1/Intellectual%20Humility%20in%20Mathematics.docx
Rittberg, Colin Jakob (2018) Intellectual Humility in Mathematics. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14894
2018-07-23T17:40:51Z
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https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14894/
Postulating the theory of experience and chance
as a theory of co~events (co~beings)
Vorobyev, Oleg Yu
Applicability
Epistemology
Explanation
Foundations
Methodology
Ontology
Cognitive Science
Computation/Information
Quantum
Computer Science
Artificial Intelligence
Economics
Probability/Statistics
Sociology
The aim of the paper is the axiomatic justification of the theory of experience and chance,
one of the dual halves of which is the Kolmogorov probability theory. The author’s main idea was the
natural inclusion of Kolmogorov’s axiomatics of probability theory in a number of general concepts of
the theory of experience and chance. The analogy between the measure of a set and the probability of an
event has become clear for a long time. This analogy also allows further evolution: the measure of a set is
completely analogous to the believability of an event. In order to postulate the theory of experience and
chance on the basis of this analogy, you just need to add to the Kolmogorov probability theory its dual
reflection — the believability theory, so that the theory of experience and chance could be postulated as
the certainty (believability-probability) theory on the Cartesian product of the probability and believability
spaces, and the central concept of the theory is the new notion of co~event as a measurable binary relation
on the Cartesian product of sets of elementary incomes and elementary outcomes. Attempts to build the
foundations of the theory of experience and chance from this general point of view are unknown to me,
and the whole range of ideas presented here has not yet acquired popularity even in a narrow circle of
specialists; in addition, there was still no complete system of the postulates of the theory of experience
and chance free from unnecessary complications. Postulating the theory of experience and chance can be
carried out in different ways, both in the choice of axioms and in the choice of basic concepts and relations.
If one tries to achieve the possible simplicity of both the system of axioms and the theory constructed
from it, then it is hardly possible to suggest anything other than axiomatization of concepts co~event and
its certainty (believability-probability). The main result of this work is the axiom of co~event, intended
for the sake of constructing a theory formed by dual theories of believabilities and probabilities, each of
which itself is postulated by its own Kolmogorov system of axioms. Of course, other systems of postulating
the theory of experience and chance can be imagined, however, in this work, a preference is given to
a system of postulates that is able to describe in the most simple manner the results of what I call an
experienced-random experiment.
2016-09-30
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14894/1/XV-famems2016-ISBN-978-5-9903358-6-8-VorobyevOYu-25-43.pdf
Vorobyev, Oleg Yu (2016) Postulating the theory of experience and chance as a theory of co~events (co~beings). [Preprint]
https://www.academia.edu/34417203/Proceedings_of_the_XV_FAMEMS-2016_Conference_on_Financial_and_Actuarial_Math_and_Eventology_of_Multivariate_Statistics_and_the_EEC-H_s6P_Workshop_on_Hilberts_Sixth_Problem_Oleg_Vorobyev_ed._-_Krasnoyarsk_SFU_2016._-_261p
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14907
2018-07-29T14:18:04Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14907/
How Race Travels. Relating Local and Global Ontologies of Race. Philosophical Studies
Ludwig, David
Anthropology
Science and Society
Sociology
Values In Science
This article develops a framework for addressing racial ontologies in transnational perspective. In contrast to simple contextualist accounts, it is argued that a globally engaged metaphysics of race needs to address transnational continuities of racial ontologies. In contrast to unificationist accounts that aim for one globally unified ontology, it is argued that questions about the nature and reality of race do not always have the same answers across national contexts. In order address racial ontologies in global perspective, the article develops a framework that accounts for both continuities and discontinuities by looking beyond the referents of narrowly defined core concepts. By shifting the focus from narrow concepts to richer conceptions of race, racial ontologies become comparable through globally related but nonetheless distinct mappings between conceptions and property relations. The article concludes by showing how this framework can generate novel insights in case studies from Asia, Europe, and Latin America.
2018
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14907/1/2018%20How%20Race%20Travels.%20%20Philosophical%20Studies.pdf
Ludwig, David (2018) How Race Travels. Relating Local and Global Ontologies of Race. Philosophical Studies. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:14913
2018-08-02T17:18:14Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:536369656E74696669635F4D65746170687973696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:616E7468726F706F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14913/
How to Power Encultured Minds
Joseph, Vukov
Charles, Lassiter
Scientific Metaphysics
Anthropology
Psychology
Sociology
Cultural psychologists often describe the relationship between mind and culture as ‘dynamic.’ In light of this, we provide two desiderata that a theory about encultured minds ought to meet: the theory ought to reflect how cultural psychologists describe their own findings and it ought to be thoroughly naturalistic. We show that a realist theory of causal powers — which holds that powers are causally-efficacious and empirically-discoverable — fits the bill. After an introduction to the major concepts in cultural psychology and describing causal power realism, we use a case study — the effects of pathogen prevalence on culture and cognition — to show the explanatory capacities of the powers framework
2018-07-18
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14913/1/Vukov%20and%20Lassiter%2C%20final.docx
Joseph, Vukov and Charles, Lassiter (2018) How to Power Encultured Minds. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15015
2018-09-09T13:40:58Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F676E69746976652D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:70737963686F6C6F67792D70737963686961747279
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15015/
Anchoring in Deliberations
Hartmann, Stephan
Rafiee Rad, Soroush
Cognitive Science
Decision Theory
Economics
Psychology
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Sociology
Deliberation is a standard procedure for making decisions in not too large groups. It has the advantage that group members can learn from each other and that, at the end, often a consensus emerges that everybody endorses. Unfortunately, however, implementing a deliberation procedure also has a number of disadvantages due to the cognitive limitations of the individual group members. What is more, the very process of deliberation introduces an additional bias, which we investigate in this article. We demonstrate that even in a group of (boundedly) rational agents the resulting consensus (if there is one) depends on the order in which the group members speak. More specifically, the group member who speaks first has an unproportionally high impact on the final decision, which we interpret as a new instance of the well-known anchoring effect. To show this, we construct and analyze an agent-based model -- inspired by the disagreement debate in social epistemology -- and obtain analytical results for homogeneous groups (i.e., for groups whose members consider each other as epistemic peers) as well as simulation results for inhomogeneous groups.
2018-09-09
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15015/14/Anchoring_Final_Archive.pdf
Hartmann, Stephan and Rafiee Rad, Soroush (2018) Anchoring in Deliberations. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15147
2018-10-13T21:57:26Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:536369656E74696669635F4D65746170687973696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6C6F676963616C2D706F736974697669736D2D656D706972696369736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/
Against Fundamentalism
Leifer, Matthew
Scientific Metaphysics
Complex Systems
History of Philosophy of Science
Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Physics
Realism/Anti-realism
Sociology
In this essay, I argue that the idea that there is a most fundamental discipline, or level of reality, is mistaken.
My argument is a result of my experiences with the "science wars", a debate that raged between scientists and sociologists in the 1990's over whether science can lay claim to objective truth. These debates shook my faith in physicalism, i.e. the idea that everything boils down to physics. I outline a theory of knowledge that I first proposed in my 2015 FQXi essay on which knowledge has the structure of a scale-free network. In this theory, although some disciplines are in a sense "more fundamental" than others, we never get to a "most fundamental" discipline. Instead, we get hubs of knowledge that have equal importance. This structure can explain why many physicists believe that physics is fundamental, while some sociologists believe that sociology is fundamental.
This updated version of the essay includes and appendix with my responses to the discussion of this essay on the FQXi website.
2018-10-11
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15147/1/FQXi2017Updated.pdf
Leifer, Matthew (2018) Against Fundamentalism. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15171
2018-10-20T15:20:35Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:636F6D70757465722D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15171/
Explaining Scientific Collaboration: a General Functional Account
Boyer-Kassem, Thomas
Imbert, Cyrille
Complex Systems
Computer Science
Explanation
Models and Idealization
Sociology
For two centuries, collaborative research has become increasingly widespread. Various explanations of this trend have been proposed. Here, we offer a novel functional explanation of it. It differs from ac- counts like that of Wray (2002) by the precise socio-epistemic mech- anism that grounds the beneficialness of collaboration. Boyer-Kassem and Imbert (2015) show how minor differences in the step-efficiency of collaborative groups can make them much more successful in particular configurations. We investigate this model further, derive robust social patterns concerning the general successfulness of collaborative groups, and argue that these patterns can be used to defend a general functional account.
2018-10
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15171/1/2018_03_01_Explaining_collaboration%3DPSA%3DV91_online%3DPhilsci_Archiv.pdf
Boyer-Kassem, Thomas and Imbert, Cyrille (2018) Explaining Scientific Collaboration: a General Functional Account. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15343
2018-11-16T05:20:00Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:7068696C6F736F70686572732D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D706F6C696379
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:74686F756768742D6578706572696D656E7473
7375626A656374733D67656E:76616C7565732D696E2D736369656E6365
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15343/
Exploration and Exploitation in Scientific Inquiry: Towards a Society of Explorers
Kaaronen, Roope Oskari
Complex Systems
History of Philosophy of Science
Philosophers of Science
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Sociology
Thought Experiments
Values In Science
This essay argues that scientific systems have two main functions typical to self-organising adaptive and complex systems: Exploration for and exploitation of information. The self-organising nature, or spontaneous order, of scientific systems was prominently conceived by polymath Michael Polanyi. Revisiting Polanyi’s philosophy of science reveals why scientific freedom is still today as important a value as ever, even though the notion of “freedom” itself must be revised. Namely, freedom of inquiry should serve to maintain a diverse and adaptive balance between exploration (for knowledge) and exploitation (of knowledge). This essay argues that current trends within science policy and scientific communities, from impact assessments to targeted research funding, are often inherently biased towards advancing exploitative functions over explorative activities. Concerns are raised over whether these exploitative biases suppress the explorative nature of scientific inquiry, and thus disturb the self-organisation of scientific systems by favouring hasty and sometimes negligent exploitation. Further concerns are raised as to whether these impaired adaptive capacities of scientific systems lead to reduced resilience of broader society. Finally, Polanyi’s vision of a Society of Explorers, where free exploration is vindicated and safeguarded, is revived in a 21st century context.
2018-11-15
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15343/1/Exploration-Exploitation.pdf
Kaaronen, Roope Oskari (2018) Exploration and Exploitation in Scientific Inquiry: Towards a Society of Explorers. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15374
2018-11-27T16:29:02Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:686973746F72792D6F662D7068696C6F736F7068792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15374/
A Use / Disuse Paradigm for CRISPR-Cas Systems
Veigl, Sophie Juliane
Evolutionary Theory
History of Philosophy of Science
Sociology
In his insightful review, Eugene V. Koonin discusses various aspects of CRISPR-Cas systems with a strong focus on their qualities as "adaptive (acquired) immune systems"(Koonin 2018, 3). The CRISPR-Cas system is most famous for its application as a gene-editing tool. Koonin provides a deeper insight into its biological function in bacteria, which is to immunize the cell against parasite DNA. I shall comment on one issue discussed in the text, in two steps. First, I shall elaborate on CRISPR-Cas systems and their supposed Lamarckian character. Criteria for calling biological
phenomena genuinely Lamarckian will be narrowed down and then applied to the CRISPR-Cas system, considering interference-driven spacer acquisition (IDSA) as an
instantiation of a truly Lamarckian paradigm. Second, I shall consider whether Lamarckian and "canonical" instances of inheritance are a case of theoretical pluralism, being two non-reducible, yet interconnected paradigms.
2018-12
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15374/1/Preprint_BiologyandPhilosophy.docx
Veigl, Sophie Juliane (2018) A Use / Disuse Paradigm for CRISPR-Cas Systems. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15383
2018-11-27T16:45:19Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:6368616F732D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15383/
When are purely predictive models best?
Northcott, Robert
Complex Systems
Explanation
Models and Idealization
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Sociology
Can purely predictive models be useful in investigating causal systems? I argue “yes”. Moreover, in many cases not only are they useful, they are essential. The alternative is to stick to models or mechanisms drawn from well-understood theory. But a necessary condition for explanation is empirical success, and in many cases in social and field sciences such success can only be achieved by purely predictive models, not by ones drawn from theory. Alas, the attempt to use theory to achieve explanation or insight without empirical success therefore fails, leaving us with the worst of both worlds—neither prediction nor explanation. Best go with empirical success by any means necessary. I support these methodological claims via case studies of two impressive feats of predictive modelling: opinion polling of political elections, and weather forecasting.
2017-12
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15383/1/Disputatio2017.pdf
Northcott, Robert (2017) When are purely predictive models best? Disputatio. pp. 631-656.
https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/disp.2017.9.issue-47/disp-2017-0021/disp-2017-0021.pdf
10.1515/disp-2017-0021
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15388
2018-11-29T15:33:44Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:636F6E6669726D6174696F6E2D696E64756374696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15388/
Opinion polling and election predictions
Northcott, Robert
Confirmation/Induction
Explanation
Models and Idealization
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Sociology
Election prediction by means of opinion polling is a rare empirical success story for social science. I examine the details of a prominent case, drawing two lessons of more general interest:
1) Methodology over metaphysics. Traditional metaphysical criteria were not a useful guide to whether successful prediction would be possible; instead, the crucial thing was selecting an effective methodology.
2) Which methodology? Success required sophisticated use of case-specific evidence from opinion polling. The pursuit of explanations via general theory or causal mechanisms, by contrast, turned out to be precisely the wrong path – contrary to much recent philosophy of social science.
2015-12
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15388/1/PhilSci%202015%2C%20polling.pdf
Northcott, Robert (2015) Opinion polling and election predictions. Philosophy of Science, 82. pp. 1260-1271.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15389
2018-11-29T17:04:34Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779:62696F6C6F67792D65766F6C7574696F6E6172792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:6465636973696F6E2D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
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7375626A656374733D67656E:6D6F64656C732D616E642D696465616C697A6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15389/
Prisoner's Dilemma doesn't explain much
Northcott, Robert
Alexandrova, Anna
Evolutionary Theory
Decision Theory
Economics
Explanation
Models and Idealization
Sociology
We make the case that the Prisoner’s Dilemma, notwithstanding its fame and the quantity of intellectual resources devoted to it, has largely failed to explain any phenomena of social scientific or biological interest. In the heart of the paper we examine in detail a famous purported example of Prisoner’s Dilemma empirical success, namely Axelrod’s analysis of WWI trench warfare, and argue that this success is greatly overstated. Further, we explain why this negative verdict is likely true generally and not just in our case study. We also address some possible defenses of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Cambridge University Press
2015
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15389/1/PD2014-bookfinal.pdf
Northcott, Robert and Alexandrova, Anna (2015) Prisoner's Dilemma doesn't explain much. The Prisoner's Dilemma. pp. 64-84.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15394
2018-11-29T17:07:34Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15394/
Partial explanations in social science
Northcott, Robert
Explanation
Sociology
How much was the increased murder rate explained by higher unemployment? What was the main cause of the American Civil War? Was it the penetrating offense or the stout defense that was most responsible for the football team’s victory? It is ubiquitous in social science and indeed everyday life that the causes we have identified explain some but not all of an outcome. In such cases, the question of critical interest is to quantify each cause’s contribution to the outcome. The focus is not on how general or deep or transportable a particular explanation or mechanism is, important though those concerns may also be, but rather is narrowly on how much a cause explains an effect in a particular one-off case. This is relevant historically to determine which factors explained an outcome most. It is also relevant as a guide to future intervention—which factors would influence an outcome most?
Oxford University Press
2012
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15394/1/SShdbook2012.pdf
Northcott, Robert (2012) Partial explanations in social science. Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. pp. 130-153.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15408
2018-11-30T21:26:54Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:6578706C616E6174696F6E
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15408/
Weighted explanations in history
Northcott, Robert
Explanation
Sociology
Weighted explanations, whereby some causes are deemed more important than others, are ubiquitous in historical studies. Drawing from influential recent work on causation, I develop a definition of causal-explanatory strength. This makes clear exactly which aspects of explanatory weighting are subjective and which objective. It also sheds new light on several traditional issues, showing for instance that: underlying causes need not be more important than proximate ones; several different causes can each be responsible for most of an effect; small causes need not be less important than big ones; and non-additive interactive effects between causes present no particular difficulty.
2008-03
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15408/1/PhilSocSci%202008%2C%20%27Weighted%20explanations%20in%20history%27.doc
Northcott, Robert (2008) Weighted explanations in history. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 38 (1). pp. 76-96.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15419
2019-08-09T15:38:19Z
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15456
2021-07-29T19:41:15Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:736369656E63652D616E642D736F6369657479
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15456/
Expertise, Skepticism and Cynicism: Lessons from Science & Technology Studies
Lynch, Michael
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Sociology
The topic of expertise has become especially lively in recent years in academic discussions and debates about the politics of science. It is easy to understand why the topic holds such strong interest in Science & Technology Studies (STS) and related fields. There are at least two basic reasons for such interest. One is that experts are undoubtedly important in modern societies, and the other is that trends in STS research tend to be critical of the cognitive authority associated with the public role of the expert. Putting the two together, STS researchers often align themselves with environmentalist and other movements that question the impartiality of experts and seek to democratize decisions about science and technology. Though such alignment is in many respects laudable, it can also be a source of confusion and misplaced political criticism. Toward the end of this brief synopsis of current STS research and debates on the topic of expertise, I will suggest an alternative agenda for engaging the politics of science and technology.
The University of Toronto
2007-12-08
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15456/1/Lynch_Michael-Expertise_Skepticism_STS.pdf
Lynch, Michael (2007) Expertise, Skepticism and Cynicism: Lessons from Science & Technology Studies. Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 1 (1). pp. 17-24. ISSN 1913 0465
https://spontaneousgenerations.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/SpontaneousGenerations/article/view/2968
https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v1i1.2968
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15463
2018-12-17T17:52:21Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15463/
Managing Public Expectations of Technological Systems: A Case Study of a Problematic Government Project
Martin, Aaron K.
Whitley, Edgar A.
Science and Society
Science and Policy
Sociology
In this discussion piece we address how the UK government has attempted to manage public expectations of a proposed biometric identity scheme by focussing attention on the handheld, i.e., the ID card. We suggest that this strategy of expectations management seeks to downplay the complexity and uncertainty surrounding this high-technological initiative, necessitating the selective use of expertise for the purpose of furthering government objectives. In this process, government often relegates counterexpertise, if not dismissing it outright, thereby greatly politicizing the policy deliberation process. We argue that this manoeuvring by government spells trouble for both democratic deliberation on the issue of biometric identification in the UK and, more generally, expertise-based policy making in related technological ventures.
The University of Toronto
2007-12-08
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_nc_nd_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15463/1/Martin_Whitley-Managing_Public_Expectations.pdf
Martin, Aaron K. and Whitley, Edgar A. (2007) Managing Public Expectations of Technological Systems: A Case Study of a Problematic Government Project. Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 1 (1). pp. 67-77. ISSN 1913 0465
https://spontaneousgenerations.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/SpontaneousGenerations/article/view/2973
https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v1i1.2973
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15585
2019-05-25T17:14:28Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15585/
History and Sociology of Science
Delley, Géraldine
Plutniak, Sébastien
Anthropology
Archaeology
History of Philosophy of Science
Sociology
The relationship between archaeology and other sciences has only recently become a research topic for sociologists and historians of science. From the 1950s to the present day, different approaches have been taken and the aims of research studies have changed considerably. Besides methodological textbooks, which aim at advancing archaeological knowledge, historians of archaeology have tackled this question by exploring the development of archaeology as a scientific discipline. More recently, collaborations between archaeologists and other scientists have been examined as a general phenomenon regarding transfers of knowledge and power relationships between specialists, organizations, and scientific tools, where archaeology is considered as a scientific practice. Adopting a sociohistorical perspective, this entry examines the specificity of aims, facts, and procedures shared by archaeologists and other scientists regarding the crucial question of measuring time and computations.
Wiley-Blackwell
2018-12-05
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15585/1/Delley-Plutniak_2018_history-and-sociology-of-science_author.pdf
Delley, Géraldine and Plutniak, Sébastien (2018) History and Sociology of Science. The Encyclopedia of Archaeological Sciences.
10.1002/9781119188230.saseas0535
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15784
2019-03-02T20:07:26Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15784/
FIGURATIONAL DYNAMICS:
Attributes within a Knowledge transfer scenario.
fascia, michael
Sociology
In this short paper, we discuss a dialectic methodology surrounding the
interpretation of knowledge transfer, and the conditional elements which
can be seen to support the concept of a unity of knowledge. We discuss a
differing standpoint to knowledge and knowledge value, based on the
knowledge transfer practitioner’s perspective, but still in a business context.
We ask why, if knowledge is vital for business success and competitive
advantage, the transfer of knowledge is rarely a simple unproblematic event.
Further, that the creation of knowledge before transfer is recognised as a
significant factor in determining a starting point for analogous scrutiny, and
often under a premise of doxastic attitude. This discussion therefore aims to
synthesise current literature and research into an elemental epistemic
principal of FIGURATION DYNAMICS, and in doing so, may help focus
congruent knowledge transfer theories.
EMRI
2018-03-17
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15784/1/19-36-1-SM%20%281%29.pdf
fascia, michael (2018) FIGURATIONAL DYNAMICS: Attributes within a Knowledge transfer scenario. Journal of Strategy, Operations & Economics, 2 (1). pp. 1-9. ISSN 2396-8826
http://www.soejournal.com/index.php/soe/issue/view/32
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15803
2019-03-08T22:53:20Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D636F6E666572656E63655F6974656D
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15803/
Attributes of Knowledge a transfer scenario
fascia, michael
Sociology
The inference of causal ambiguity of the knowledge itself is of primary
importance, since the inability to map relationships between a capability and
a performance outcome is widely regarded as a commonality, thus, is a direct
effect from successful or unsuccessful knowledge transfer. Contemporary
literature identifies a perspective definition of what role these relationship
concepts play in human cognitive understanding of knowledge and any
underpinning relationship characteristics, only that they may exist to interfere
with the transfer of knowledge at some obscure point. Most literature
assumes this myopic biased view regarding actors interaction surrounding
knowledge interpretation, as a consequence, performance differences
between groups or businesses are often examined by simply using
prescriptive asymmetries linked to knowledge transfer success, but without
definition of success. With this view in mind, we will therefore examine
various literature perspectives in which both business success and
competitive advantage are linked to knowledge transfer.
2018-04-02
Conference or Workshop Item
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15803/1/PAPER_1_2019.pdf
fascia, michael (2018) Attributes of Knowledge a transfer scenario. In: UNSPECIFIED.
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15847
2019-03-25T15:46:33Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15847/
Putting races on the ontological map: a close look at Spencer’s ‘new biologism’ of race.
Winsberg, Eric
Scientific Metaphysics
Biology
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Realism/Anti-realism
Sociology
In a large and impressive body of published work, Quayshawn Spencer has meticulously articulated and defended a metaphysical project aimed at resuscitating a biological conception of race—one free from many of the pitfalls of biological essentialism. If successful, such a project would be highly rewarding, since it would provide a compelling response to philosophers who have denied the genuine existence of race while avoiding the very dangers that they sought to avoid. I argue that if a “new biologism” about race is a live and attractive possibility, it will have to employ many of the moves that Spencer employs. The aim of this paper is to subject those moves to careful scrutiny and thereby appraise the prospects for a new biologism about race.
2019-03-19
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15847/1/Winsberg%20metaphysics%20of%20race.pdf
Winsberg, Eric (2019) Putting races on the ontological map: a close look at Spencer’s ‘new biologism’ of race. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:15980
2019-05-16T13:58:05Z
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7375626A656374733D67656E:746563686E6F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15980/
Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence
List, Christian
AI and Ethics
Artificial Intelligence
Ethical Issues
Sociology
Technology
The aim of this exploratory paper is to discuss a sometimes recognized but still under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical.
2019-05-16
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15980/1/GA-AI-May2019.pdf
List, Christian (2019) Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:16052
2019-05-28T14:44:53Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:536369656E74696669635F4D65746170687973696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16052/
Putting races on the ontological map: a close look at Spencer’s ‘new biologism’ of race.
Winsberg, Eric
Scientific Metaphysics
Biology
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Realism/Anti-realism
Sociology
In a large and impressive body of published work, Quayshawn Spencer has meticulously articulated and defended a metaphysical project aimed at resuscitating a biological conception of race—one free from many of the pitfalls of biological essentialism. If successful, such a project would be highly rewarding, since it would provide a compelling response to philosophers who have denied the genuine existence of race while avoiding the very dangers that they sought to avoid. I argue that if a “new biologism” about race is a live and attractive possibility, it will have to employ many of the moves that Spencer employs. The aim of this paper is to subject those moves to careful scrutiny and thereby appraise the prospects for a new biologism about race.
2019-03-19
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16052/1/Winsberg%20metaphysics%20of%20race.pdf
Winsberg, Eric (2019) Putting races on the ontological map: a close look at Spencer’s ‘new biologism’ of race. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:16053
2019-05-29T16:25:24Z
7375626A656374733D67656E:536369656E74696669635F4D65746170687973696373
7375626A656374733D73706563:62696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D67656E:6F7065726174696F6E616C69736D2D696E7374756D656E74616C69736D
7375626A656374733D67656E:7265616C69736D2D616E74692D7265616C69736D
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16053/
Putting races on the ontological map: a close look at Spencer’s ‘new biologism’ of race.
Winsberg, Eric
Scientific Metaphysics
Biology
Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Realism/Anti-realism
Sociology
In a large and impressive body of published work, Quayshawn Spencer has meticulously articulated and defended a metaphysical project aimed at resuscitating a biological conception of race—one free from many of the pitfalls of biological essentialism. If successful, such a project would be highly rewarding, since it would provide a compelling response to philosophers who have denied the genuine existence of race while avoiding the very dangers that they sought to avoid. I argue that if a “new biologism” about race is a live and attractive possibility, it will have to employ many of the moves that Spencer employs. The aim of this paper is to subject those moves to careful scrutiny and thereby appraise the prospects for a new biologism about race.
2019-03-19
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16053/7/putting%20races%205.27.19.pdf
Winsberg, Eric (2019) Putting races on the ontological map: a close look at Spencer’s ‘new biologism’ of race. [Preprint]
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:16129
2019-06-19T13:22:03Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:65636F6E6F6D696373
7375626A656374733D67656E:6E61747572616C2D6B696E6473
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D706974747072657072696E74
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16129/
Money and Mental Contents
Vooys, Sarah
Dick, David G.
Economics
Natural Kinds
Sociology
It can be hard to see where money fits in the world. Money seems both real and imaginary, since it has obvious causal powers, but is also, just as obviously, something humans have just made up. Recent philosophical accounts of money have declared it to be real, but for very different reasons. John Searle and Francesco Guala disagree over whether money is just whatever acts like money, or just whatever people believe to be money. In developing their accounts of institutions as a part of social reality, each uses money as a paradigm institution, but they disagree on how institutions exist. Searle argues that the institution of money belongs to an ontological level separate from the physical world, held up by the collective intentions of a group, while Guala claims that money is a part of the ordinary physical world and is just whatever performs a “money-like function” in a group, regardless of what that group believes about it. Here, we argue that any purely functional account like Guala’s will be unable to capture the distinctive phenomenon of money, since monetary transactions are defined by the attitudes transactors hold toward them. Money will be obscured or misidentified if defined functionally. As we go on to show by examining recent work by Smit et al., belief in money does not require taking on all of Searle’s ontological commitments, but money and mental contents will stand or fall together.
2019-06-17
Preprint
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16129/1/Money%20and%20Mental%20Contents%2013%20June%202019.pdf
Vooys, Sarah and Dick, David G. (2019) Money and Mental Contents. [Preprint]
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-019-02288-5
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02288-5
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:16250
2023-08-09T14:13:21Z
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7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16250/
Vindicating Methodological Triangulation
Heesen, Remco
Bright, Liam Kofi
Zucker, Andrew
Anthropology
Confirmation/Induction
Decision Theory
Economics
History of Philosophy of Science
History of Science Case Studies
Sociology
Social scientists use many different methods, and there are often substantial disagreements about which method is appropriate for a given research question. In response to this uncertainty about the relative merits of different methods, W. E. B. Du Bois advocated for and applied "methodological triangulation". This is to use multiple methods simultaneously in the belief that, where one is uncertain about the reliability of any given method, if multiple methods yield the same answer that answer is confirmed more strongly than it could have been by any single method. Against this, methodological purists believe that one should choose a single appropriate method and stick with it. Using tools from voting theory, we show Du Boisian methodological triangulation to be more likely to yield the correct answer than purism, assuming the scientist is subject to some degree of diffidence about the relative merits of the various methods. This holds even when in fact only one of the methods is appropriate for the given research question.
Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
2019-08
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
cc_by_4
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16250/1/Heesen%20et%20al%202019%20Vindicating%20Methodological%20Triangulation%20%28Synthese%29.pdf
Heesen, Remco and Bright, Liam Kofi and Zucker, Andrew (2019) Vindicating Methodological Triangulation. Synthese, 196 (8). pp. 3067-3081. ISSN 1573-0964
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1294-7
10.1007/s11229-016-1294-7
oai:philsci-archive.pitt.edu:16253
2019-07-24T02:40:57Z
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:636F736D6F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:6669656C64732D616E642D7061727469636C6573
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7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:72656C617469766974792D7468656F7279
7375626A656374733D67656E:726865746F7269632D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D67656E:736F6369616C2D6570697374656D6F6C6F67792D6F662D736369656E6365
7375626A656374733D73706563:736F63696F6C6F6779
7375626A656374733D73706563:70687973696373:73796D6D6574726965732D696E76617269616E636573
74797065733D7075626C69736865645F61727469636C65
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16253/
Progress and Gravity: Overcoming Divisions between General Relativity and Particle Physics and between Physics and HPS
Pitts, J. Brian
Cosmology
Fields and Particles
History of Science Case Studies
Quantum Gravity
Quantum Field Theory
Relativity Theory
Rhetoric of Science
Social Epistemology of Science
Sociology
Symmetries/Invariances
Reflective equilibrium between physics and philosophy, and between GR and particle physics, is fruitful and rational. I consider the virtues of simplicity, conservatism, and conceptual coherence, along with perturbative expansions.
There are too many theories to consider. Simplicity supplies initial guidance, after which evidence increasingly dominates. One should start with scalar gravity; evidence required spin 2.
Good beliefs are scarce, so don't change without reason. But does conservatism prevent conceptual innovation? No: considering all serious possibilities (Feynman, Weinberg, etc.) could lead to Einstein's equations. (The rehabilitation of massive gravity shows that 'progress' isn't unidirectional.)
GR is surprisingly intelligible. Energy localization makes sense if one believes Noether mathematics: an infinity of symmetries shouldn't produce just one energy. Hamiltonian change results from Lagrangian-equivalence.
Causality poses conceptual questions. For GR, what are canonical 'equal-time' commutators? For massive spin 2, background causality exists but is violated. Both might be cured by engineering a background null cone respected by a gauge groupoid.
Perturbative expansions can enlighten. They diagnose Einstein's 1917 'mass'-Lambda analogy. Ogievetsky-Polubarinov (1965) invented an infinity of massive spin 2 gravities---including ghost-free de Rham-Gabadadze-Tolley (2010) theories!---perturbatively, and achieved the impossible (c.f. Weyl, Cartan): spinors in coordinates.
Cambridge University Press
2017
Published Article or Volume
NonPeerReviewed
text
en
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16253/1/TenerifeProgressGravity.pdf
Pitts, J. Brian (2017) Progress and Gravity: Overcoming Divisions between General Relativity and Particle Physics and between Physics and HPS. The Philosophy of Cosmology, Ch. 13. pp. 263-282.
10.1017/9781316535783.014
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