Norton, John D. (2003) Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory? [Preprint]
Microsoft Word (.doc)
norton.doc Download (102kB) |
|
RTF (.rtf)
norton.rtf Download (113kB) |
Abstract
According to the underdetermination thesis, all evidence necessarily underdetermines any scientific theory. Thus it is often argued that our agreement on the content of mature scientific theories must be due to social and other factors. Drawing on a long standing tradition of criticism, I shall argue that the underdetermination thesis is little more than speculation based on an impoverished account of induction. A more careful look at accounts of induction does not support an assured underdetermination or the holism usually associated with it. I also urge that the display of observationally equivalent theories is a self-defeating strategy for supporting the underdetermination thesis. The very fact that observational equivalence can be demonstrated by arguments brief enough to be included in a journal article means that we cannot preclude the possibility that the theories are merely variant formulations of the same theory.
Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
Social Networking: |
Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Creators: |
|
||||||
Additional Information: | Prepared for the First Notre Dame-Bielefeld Interdisciplinary Conference on Science and Values Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, July 9-12, 2003. | ||||||
Keywords: | Underdetermination evidence induction confirmation observation equivalence Duhem Quine | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Theory/Observation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Conventionalism |
||||||
Depositing User: | John Norton | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 08 Aug 2003 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:11 | ||||||
Item ID: | 1257 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Theory/Observation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Conventionalism |
||||||
Date: | July 2003 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1257 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
View Item |