Park, Ilho (2019) Correcting Credences with Chances. [Preprint]

Preview

Text CCC_final.pdf Download (209kB) | Preview

Abstract

Lewis's Principal Principle is widely recognized as a rationality constraint that our credences should satisfy throughout our epistemic life. In practice, however, our credences often fail to satisfy this principle because of our various epistemic limitations. Facing such violations, we should correct our credences in accordance with this principle. In this paper, I will formulate a way of correcting our credences, which will be called the Adams Correcting Rules and then show that such a rule yields non-commutativity between conditionalizing and correcting. With the help of the notion of ‘accuracy’, then, I attempt to provide a vindication of the Adams Correcting Rule and show how we can respond to the non-commutativity in question.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Park, Ilho ipark.phil@gmail.com
Keywords:	Chances, Credences, Accuracy, the Principal Principle, Conditionalization
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Dr. Ilho Park
Date Deposited:	27 Nov 2018 16:30
Last Modified:	27 Nov 2018 16:30
Item ID:	15376
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	2019
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15376

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item