Dellsén, Finnur (2018) When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus. [Preprint]

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Abstract

It is often suggested that disagreement among scientific experts is a reason not to trust those experts, even about matters on which they are in agreement. In direct opposition to this view, I argue here that the very fact that there is disagreement among experts on a given issue provides a positive reason for non-experts to trust that the experts really are justified in their attitudes towards consensus theories. I show how this line of thought can be spelled out in three distinct frameworks for non-deductive reasoning, viz. Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Inferential Robustness Analysis.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Dellsén, Finnur finnurd@gmail.com 0000-0003-4989-4204
Additional Information:	Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Keywords:	expert disagreement, scientific consensus, epistemic diversity, trust in science
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Rhetoric of Science General Issues > Science and Society
Depositing User:	Dr. Finnur Dellsén
Date Deposited:	02 Jan 2019 00:17
Last Modified:	02 Jan 2019 00:17
Item ID:	15534
Official URL:	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1080/00048402.2017.1298636
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Rhetoric of Science General Issues > Science and Society
Date:	2018
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15534

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