Unsupervised learning and the natural origins of content

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In this paper, I evaluate the prospects and limitations of radical enactivism as recently developed by Hutto and Myin (henceforth, “H&M”) (2017). According to radical enactivism, cognition does not essentially involve content and admits explanations on a semantic level only as far as it is scaffolded with social and linguistic practices. Numerous authors argued this view to be indefensible because H&M’s objections against semantic accounts of basic minds are flawed and they fail to provide a positive research program for cognitive science. I investigate these concerns focusing on H&M’s criticism of predictive processing account of cognition (dubbed *Bootstrap Hell* argument) and their own account of the emergence of content (the *Natural Origins of Content*). My claim is that H&M fail in both of these fronts, which cast a shadow of doubt on whether radical enactivism is a philosophically and empirically interesting approach at all.

Keywords: Hard Problem of Content, radical enactivism, predictive processing, language models

1. Introduction

In this paper I evaluate the prospects and limitations of radical enactivism as recently developed by Hutto and Myin (henceforth, “H&M”) (2017). According to radical enactivism, cognition does not essentially involve content and admits explanations on a semantic level only as far as it is scaffolded with social and linguistic practices. Basic minds, i.e. phylogenetically and ontogenetically early cognition, is to be explained in terms of dynamics, sensorimotor couplings with environment and contentless goal-directedness. This is because there are, H&M claim, serious philosophical problems with applying a semantic-level vocabulary of representations, models and computations: it is troublesome to give a non-circular account of how content emerges in the natural world. This worry is known as the Hard Problem of Content (HPC).

Numerous authors argued this view to be indefensible, first because the HPC argument is flawed, and secondly, because H&M fail to provide a positive research program for cognitive science. My focus on this paper will be to review these two worries and evaluate whether H&M’s most recent account (in their 2017 book *Evolving enactivism*) does address these worries and can be defended against them. The HPC is most relevant for modern neuroscience as a voice against predictive processing approaches to cognition recently gaining momentum (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016). I will therefore focus my discussion of the Bootstrap Hell argument, a special case of HPC, putatively demonstrating the failure of predictive processing. After that, I will reconsider H&M’s own story of the emergence of content in mature, socioculturally embedded minds: the Natural Origins of Content, and how well it fares. My conclusion is that the Natural Origins of Content story itself must get out of its Bootstrap Hell, and if it does, the HPC is easily solvable and the Natural Origins of Content happen much earlier in the natural history than H&M claim. Therefore, radical enactivism, the claim that basic minds are contentless, is either false or trivial.

2. Facing backwards on the Hard Problem of Content

Hutto and Myin argue that minds are not essentially contentful, because content-involving philosophical accounts of mind fall prey of the HPC. The HPC argument can be reconstructed as follows (Korbak, 2015, p. 90):

(T1) Ontological commitments in cognitive science must respect explanatory naturalism;
(T2) Linguistic activity is out of the scope of basic minds;
(T3) Having content implies having certain satisfaction conditions, which determine intension and extension (if it exists);
(T4) Every theory of content fails to respect either (T1), or (T2), or (T3);
(T5) Having content is constitutive for being a representation.

(T1)-(T5) jointly imply that representationalism, i.e. the view that cognition essentially involves representation, is false. It would be of major importance for cognitive science, if that would be the case. To carry out their argument, H&M focus on the most controversial premise, (T4), and review several existing theories of content (including Dretske’s indicator semantics (Dretske, 1983) and Millikan’s teleosemantics (Millikan, 1984). Naturalistic accounts of content aim at reducing content to something ontologically simpler, for instance natural laws, Shannon information or biological proper function. H&M claim that the base needed for a reductive explanation of content must include language use (or, in general, a sociocultural scaffolding of shared conventions) that appears late in phylogeny and ontogeny. H&M’s dismissal for existing accounts is fairly premature (Miłkowski, 2015), but I will not explicitly pursue this line of criticism here.

An important point in H&M’s criticism is that covariance does not constitute content: growth rings of a tree may be systematically correlated with its age, but that doesn’t mean they are *about* age. Starting from this remark, they accuse most of contemporary philosophy of an equivocation fallacy: not distinguishing between Shannon information[[1]](#footnote-1) and semantic information. This is indeed an important distinction. Surely, the distinction counts for living systems: maintaining the flow of information in the body is costly and can reasonably be expected to serve some aim rather than being a by-product. If Shannon information at least sometimes “did not carry information about anything, nobody would be in the business of communicating it” (Miłkowski, forthcoming).

3. The Bootstrap Hell argument

The Bootstrap Hell is a special case of the HPC that is supposedly faced by predictive processing accounts of cognition. Predictive processing is a family of approaches in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy that seek to explain cognition in terms of hierarchical generative models and prediction error minimization. Wanja Wiese and Thomas Metzinger (2017) list seven claims that are usually shared by various flavors predictive processing. These are: (1) recognizing the role of top-down information processing in cognitive systems, (2) maintaining than cognition involves modeling distributions of random variables, deployed by (3) hierarchically organized generative models and used for (4) prediction. These generative models are (5) fine-tuned to reduce prediction error (6) in a Bayes-optimal fashion. Finally, predictive processing also claims (7) motor control to be explainable in terms of Bayesian inference.

Predictive processing offers an ambitious integrating account of cognition that has received considerable interests in many areas of cognitive science, including computational psychiatry (Adams, Huys, & Roiser, 2015), affective neuroscience (Barrett, 2018), consciousness studies (Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2012) and developmental robotics (Tani, 2017). Philosophically, predictive processing puts forth a radically new image of perception, learning, imagination and action deeply embodied in biological autonomy and intricately coupled while self-organizing around prediction errors (Clark, 2016). Radical enactivists, however, still accuse predictive processing of not being radical enough.

It is the commitment to predictions produced by generative models that bothers radical enactivists, because the notion of prediction essentially involves content: the future being predicted is predicted as being such-and-such and predictions sometimes fail to come true. In predictive processing the content is mostly produced top down rather than received from sensors and consumed by the system; prediction errors are meaningful only relative to the original predictions. H&M worry that the brain (or, the body) lacks resources to give rise to contentful predictions in the first place. “If minds are in principle forever secluded from the world how do they come by contents that refer to, or are about, inaccessible hidden causes and external topics that they putatively represent in the first place?” (Hutto, 2018). While the content of subsequent predictions may be argued to be a product of Bayes-optimal integration of prediction errors with previous predictions, there remains the problem of the first prediction in the chain.

This forms the Bootstrap Hell objection: what determined the content of the first prediction that a cognitive system produced? As Hutto vividly asks:

It is one thing to create a large fire from a smaller one, and in certain conditions that can be quite a difficult business. It is quite another thing to create a fire from scratch with only limited tools, of, say, flint and steel, especially when conditions are not favourable. (Hutto, 2018, p. 10)

The hidden premise in this objection is that it is problematic for content to emerge spontaneously in an adaptive system. This is why the Bootstrap Hell is a special case of HPC. One reason, however, why I find the bootstrapping formulation interesting is that H&M own account of the natural origins of content in human language seems to involve a bootstrapping process (see section 6).

H&M focus their efforts on showing that existing accounts fail to account for the Natural Origins of Content. Rather than defending Dretske’s or Millikan’s, I prefer to mount an argument against radical enactivism by assuming a minimalistic account of content developed by Brian Skyrms (2010).[[2]](#footnote-2) This account explains the emergence of content in terms of a game of message passing between a sender and a receiver (this formal approach was pioneered by Lewis (1969)). The sender has certain preferences about receiver’s behavior and the receiver is free to act based on the message. According to Skyrms, the content of a message consists in how it affects the probability distribution over actions the receiver may undertake (Skyrms, 2010, p. 31). The strategies of both the sender (which message to send) and the receiver (a stochastic mapping from the message to the action) are subject to evolution and/or learning, which is shaped by reward for the join performance of the sender-receiver system. This is why “[i]nformational content evolves as strategies evolve” (Skyrms, 2010, p. 35).[[3]](#footnote-3) and the gap between natural meaning (in the sense of Grice (1957) or what H&M dub “lawful covariance”) and conventional meaning dissipates: conventionality enters the picture as there are degrees of freedom in the sender-receiver system under its fitness landscape, i.e. multiple possible codes for controlling the receiver. There is no need for a social scaffolding other than the sender-receiver system itself. Therefore, H&M’s distinction between basic and content-capable minds is redundant.

H&M will be quick repeat their slogan that covariance does not constitute content. But while informational content *sensu* Skyrms is founded on Shannon information, it is something more. This is because *how* the probabilities (over receiver’s action) change is something more than *how much* they do, i.e. the quantity of Shannon information. The former has well-defined satisfaction conditions, can fail to affect the receiver and are subject to error correction and optimization (e.g. learning in a short timescale or development and evolution in a long one). Skyrms offers a proof-of-concept of an account of content solving the HPC.

The power of Skyrms’ account lies in the fact that it solves more than armchair philosophers’ problems. Both formal, (evolutionary) game-theoretic analyses (Shea, Godfrey-Smith, & Cao, 2017) as well as computational simulations (Bouchacourt & Baroni, 2018) show that a wide variety of natural phenomena can be modeled in terms of sender-receiver dynamics. This includes intra-cellular signaling, animal communication, representation learning in neural networks and brains as well as human language evolution. In the next section, we will quickly illustrate how Skyrms’ account can shed light on the training of state-of-the-art deep neural networks.

4. Unsupervised learning in artificial neural networks, brains, and societies

A language model is a generative model that assigns probabilities to sequences of words (Jelinek & Mercer, 1980). By the chain rule of probability calculus, this objective can also be reformulated as a predicting the next word in a sentence, given a few previous words. Language models are widely in natural language processing, powering technologies such as information retrieval, speech recognition or spell-checking. Language models are instances of unsupervised machine learning: they only require the words in the training set to be linearly ordered (i.e. coming from a contiguous text), assuming no labels to be assigned. A language model is trained to exploit statistical patterns found in text available on the Internet. It turns out, however, that a great deal of lexicon as well as morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatic conventions can be learned from unlabeled data, thus laying a path towards artificial general linguistic intelligence (Yogatama et al., 2019)

More importantly, language modeling is an active area of research in deep learning, because representations learnt to be useful for language modeling are surprisingly reusable for other tasks, including dependency parsing, named entity recognition, semantic role labeling, question answering and machine translation (Peters et al., 2018; Radford et al., 2019). Therefore, representations learned by a language model can be argued to have semantic content exploitable by other neural networks stacked onto language models. This can be seen quite concretely, when considering a phase space spanned by weights of a particular layer of a deep neural network. Reading each word token corresponds to a particular point in this space, known as a *word embedding*. Word embeddings curiously encode semantic and syntactic relations between words in terms of geometric relations in the phase space, for instance synonyms will be close to each other (in terms of cosine similarity, or the normalized angle between a pair of points). Simple cases of lexical inference can also be replicated by word embedding arithmetic, for instance the word embedding for “Paris” minus “France” plus “Poland” happens to be very close to “Warsaw” (Mikolov et al., 2013). It’s no surprise they make useful features for a wide array of machine learning tasks. As of 2019, word embeddings make into the standard toolbox of a natural language processing engineer. Yet according to H&M, since there is no sociocultural scaffolding allowed, deep neural networks are doomed to fall prey to the HPC. They are either (counter-intuitively) contentless or metaphysically impossible. I close this section by arguing that they actually acquire genuinely contentful representations in a process similar to unsupervised learning in the brain, which renders the HPC argument ill-posed.

Let us point out that, mathematically, the problem of language modeling is pretty much equivalent to the problem faced by the brain according to predictive processing. The goal of a language model is to predict the next word. The goal of the brain is to predict the next sensory input. In both cases the loss function to be minimized is expected surprise, i.e. average negative log probability of training data given the model[[4]](#footnote-4).

So how does a neural network learn meaning *ex nihilo*? What determines the word embedding guiding the first prediction (for the first word in the training set)? Pure noise. It is standard practice to initialize layer weights randomly (sampling from a zero-centered Gaussian with relatively low variance). The network will then most likely predict an approximately uniform probability distribution over the whole vocabulary. Now let us interpret the aforementioned layer as the sender and the following one a receiver. Note that even at this point the sender meets Skyrms’ criteria for informational content. It’s just a very boring content, being of little use for the receiver. This will of course change in the course of training: the sender messages will gradually drive the receiver to contribute to moving the probability mass over the vocabulary in the right place.

As H&M like to begin each chapter with The Beatles lyrics, I should have probably started this section with “No hell below us, above us only sky”. There is simply no deep problem with bootstrapping unsupervised learning. An unsupervised learner will obviously fail miserably at first, but all it takes to support the learning process is having degrees of freedom in the system and some feedback about its performance available for the system. That’s how learning in humans and other machines work.

5. Natural origins of content

H&M “are not content-deniers; they do not embrace global eliminativism about content” (Hutto & Myin, 2017, p. 121). They claim that while basic minds don’t usually deal with contentful representations, phylogenetically and ontogenetically mature cognition—when immersed in language and other symbolic forms of culture—does. Radical enactivism thus faces a problem similar to the HPC: how to account for the emergence of content? The problem is supposedly manageable as only sociocultural scaffoldings, arising late in evolution, are the right resources to solve the problem.

*Radicalizing enactivism* (Hutto & Myin, 2012) was widely criticized for lacking a positive story of what precisely gives rise to content in mature minds (e.g. Alksnis, 2015; Harvey, 2015; Korbak, 2015). *Evolving enactivism* was supposed to fill this gap and tell the whole story of how *basic minds meet content* (according to the subtitle). It is thus slightly dissatisfying that the relevant chapter 6 focuses mostly on finding gaps in arguments mounted by radical enactivism’s adversaries. H&M find most of these arguments accusing radical enactivism of violating the principle of evolutionary continuity by assuming a difference of kind, not degree, between basic (contentless) and mature (content-involving) minds.

Let me use this section to comment on an argument I have put forth against the story in *Radicalizing enactivism* (Korbak, 2015). According to the Scaling Down Objection (as H&M are now kind to dub it), whatever it is that makes content appear in healthy human adults should also make it appear in simpler adaptive systems, including the endocrine system, intracellular signaling pathways and gene expression regulation mechanisms in single-cell organisms. This is because the repertoire of kosher *explanantia* is so limited: H&M claim language use to span the scaffolding for content to thrive on, but they are forced to assume a very minimal concept of language—language being a tool for shared action guidance. Only then they avoid the circularity of assuming a traditional account of language as essentially contentful. There is nothing wrong with such an account of language (it is treated quite seriously in experimental semiotics, e.g. Pattee & Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2012) but on this view every bacterium also counts as a language user, hence a mature mind. The class of basic minds is then (by our understanding of life on Earth) empty, making radical enactivism a very non-interesting claim at best.

Scaling Down Objection is not about evolutionary continuity *per se*, as H&M cite it to be (Hutto & Myin, 2017, pp. 131–132). The qualitative change entailed by Natural Origins of Content story is not the worry here. The worry is that there can’t be a qualitative change, because H&M’s sociocultural scaffolding starts to apply much earlier down the tree of life. To deflect this objection is not to convince that evolutionary discontinuity is not a problem (fine, it might not be), but to come up with a set of criteria for content emergence that (i) do not circularly assume the flow of informational content, (ii) are indeed found only late in phylogeny and ontogeny. Let us see what progress have H&M made on this front:

For the sociocultural emergence of content we need to assume that our ancestors were capable of social processes of learning from other members of the species and that they established cultural practices and institutions that stabilized over time. […] The capacities in question can be understood in biological terms as mechanism through which basic minds are *set up to be set up* by other minds and *to be set off* by certain things. (Hutto & Myin, 2017, p. 139, emphasis original)

It requires a grain of good will to interpret the social as not invoking persons with contentful attitudes, thus satisfying desideratum (i). But if the social means *multi-agent*, what prevents societies of cells (also known as organisms) or societies of proteins (also called cells) agreeing upon the content of messages they pass to each other? We know they do: orchestrating the workings of a complex system requires high-throughput flow of information and content being used for this orchestration evolves like any other trait. Sometimes, when the sender misinforms the receiver, the system suffers a pathological state, as in the case of cancer, autoimmunity or diabetes. Luckily, understanding the mechanisms involved in the flow of semantic information through a complex living system, we are sometimes able to intervene and put our own message under. This is how depression or endocrine diseases are treated and how genetically modified organisms are obtained. Sometimes the sender and receiver have adversarial goals and the sender may send a dishonest message. Such cases are frequent in animal sexual behavior.

I dare to go further and argue that H&M’s Natural Origins of Content more or less equivalent to Skyrms’ account of the evolutionary dynamics of informational content. It is the receiver that is *set up to be set up* by the sender, and it is the ender to *be set off* by relevant events in their niche. One crucial difference is that Skyrms’ account is more mature and formally elegant, for instance the concept of “established cultural practices and institutions that stabilized over time” can be made less hand-wavy in terms of converging to Nash equilibrium over available communication strategies.

One could argue that I’m not being charitable enough and H&M’s story is much richer than that: it involves uniquely human aspects of language, with humans enacting or bringing forth designer environments of public symbols, shared attention and common goals. This defense could continue pointing out that Natural Origins of Content is a properly embodied, extended and enactive account, which makes it significantly more powerful than disembodied evolutionary game theory. But is it? Not according to Evan Thompson:

Beyond stating this proposal [of the Natural Origins of Content — T.K.], however, [H&M — T.K.] do not elaborate and support it with descriptions, analyses, or explanatory models of cognitive phenomena involving social learning, social cognition, and language. Instead, they switch to fending off critics [Hutto & Myin, 2017, p. 140 — T.K.] Although they claim to be doing naturalistic philosophy and deplore "the general tendency of philosophers -- especially those in some wings of the analytic tradition -- to assume that the essence of phenomena can be investigated independently of science" [Hutto & Myin, 2017, p. 276 — T.K.] -- they do not draw from the rich cognitive science literature on how sociocultural practices and public symbol systems configure cognition. (I have in mind work by Lev Vygotsky, Merlin Donald, and Edwin Hutchins.) (Thompson, 2018, citations edited for consistency)

The latter point can be extended by point out that the body of important work on the origins of language does not eschew semantic content from the repertoire of their *explanantia* (Rączaszek-Leonardi, Nomikou, Rohlfing, & Deacon, 2018). These approaches seem to be making more progress than radical enactivism that Thompson accuses of being “enactive mostly in name only” (Thompson, 2018).

6. Conclusions

There is a thread linking the two stories I considered here: the Bootstrap Hell and Natural Origins of Content. It is the idea of unsupervised learning, i.e. exploiting the statistical structure of the environment to learn a better representation for describing the environment, or harnessing it. H&M are afraid that unsupervised learning is metaphysically impossible under the pain of circularity. We are lucky this is not the case, because the possible world of Bootstrap Hell is an insufferable place indeed: it lacks modern Internet, mobile devices and other conveniences H&M must have used writing *Evolving enactivism*, because there are powered (in one way or another) by unsupervised machine learning. Luckily, no intelligent mind will evolve there to experience this hell, because adaptive behavior also requires learning.

It’s quite reassuring that a way out of the Bootstrap Hell and the solution to the HPC are out there in *Evolving enactivism*. It in their own characterization of the Natural Origins of Content as a bootstrapping process: agents are capable of sharing content in a sociocultural niche, in the presence of other content users. As I argued, this happens quite early on, possibly coinciding with the origins of life on Earth and certainly before the mechanisms for transmitting genetic information evolved. The only problem remaining is that some will disagree that speaking of the social and the cultural is admissible at this point of natural history. That it is may be the one truly radical idea of H&M, although they will probably not appreciate this commendation.

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1. H&M don’t appeal to the formal concept of Shannon information, but I believe exposition of their claims benefits in clarity from employing this concept. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Arguments based on Skyrms’ will work with other accounts of semantic information sharing the emphasis on action guidance, receiver-relativity and optimization. Numerous accounts starting from these princples emerged in recent years, including Bickhard (2009), Dennett (2017) or Kolchinsky and Wolpert (2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Arguments based on Skyrms’ will work with other accounts of semantic information sharing the emphasis on action guidance, receiver-relativity and optimization. Numerous accounts starting from these princples emerged in recent years, including Bickhard (2009), Dennett (2017) or Kolchinsky and Wolpert (2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. There are important differences in architecture and optimization procedure between (deep) neural networks and hierarchical Bayesian models in computational neuroscience. Drawing the analogy between the brain and language models also requires a few words of caution: language models are not properly embodied and situated and are not supposed to model important aspects of the brain. They can also be argued to fall short of the task human language use, because they lack a feedback loop with extra-linguistic reality. Language modeling still seems to be on the first step of Judea pearl’s ladder of causation (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018), because language models have no means of engaging in dialogue with a text. These are valid concerns for artificial intelligence researchers, but are not immediately relevant for the argument mounted here. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)