Miller, Michael E. (2019) Fundamental, yet imprecise? In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Many physical theories characterize their observables with unlimited precision. Non-fundamental theories do so needlessly: they are more precise than they need to be to capture the matters of fact about their observables. A natural expectation is that a truly fundamental theory would require unlimited precision in order to exhaustively capture all of the fundamental physical matters of fact. I argue against this expectation and I show that there could be a fundamental theory with limited precision.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Miller, Michael E. michael.earl.miller@gmail.com 0000-0003-1144-9711
Keywords:	Precision, accuracy, quantum mechanics, metaphysical indeterminacy, quantities
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism Specific Sciences > Physics Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Field Theory Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User:	Mr. Michael E. Miller
Date Deposited:	05 Jul 2019 03:17
Last Modified:	05 Jul 2019 03:17
Item ID:	16180
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism Specific Sciences > Physics Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Field Theory Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Date:	3 June 2019
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16180

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