Lewis, Peter J.
(2018)
Bohmian Philosophy of Mind?
[Preprint]
Abstract
Bohm’s theory is in many ways an attractive solution to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It provides an intuitive explanation for the distinctive quantum phenomena of interference and entanglement without the need for any problematic “collapse” of the wave function. But it faces several serious difficulties. First, the dynamical law via which the wave function “pushes around” the Bohmian particles is explicitly non-local, against the spirit of
special relativity (Bell 1987, 115). Second, the Bohmian particles can be seen as redundant in the context of an Everettian solution to the measurement problem (Brown and Wallace 2005). And third, the Bohmian solution to the measurement problem apparently depends on an implausible and problematic account of mental awareness (Stone 1994; Brown and Wallace 2005). I do not wish to minimize the significance of the first two difficulties; they are serious
threats to the tenability of Bohm’s theory. But the third difficulty, I think, rests on a confusion concerning the way in which Bohmian particles encode the outcomes of measurements. In particular, my concern here is to respond to the accusations of Stone (1994) and Brown and Wallace (2005) that Bohm’s theory requires a mysterious kind of direct awareness of the positions of the Bohmian particles in our brains, and also to the claim of Brown and Wallace
(2005) that such direct awareness threatens the quantum no-signaling theorem.
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