Kalpokas, Daniel (2020) Perception as a propositional attitude. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 35 (2). pp. 155-174. ISSN 2171-679X
|
Text
def_20574_Kalpokas_Theoria35-2.pdf - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives. Download (227kB) | Preview |
Abstract
It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, "Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?" (2009), Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of "the propositional-attitude thesis", it does not really follow that experience has propositional content. In this paper I shall discuss Crane's arguments against the propositional-attitude thesis and will try to show, in contrast, that they are unconvincing. My conclusion will be that, despite all that Crane claims, perceptual content could after all be propositional in nature.
| Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
| Social Networking: |
| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Creators: |
|
||||||
| Additional Information: | ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) | ||||||
| Keywords: | Crane; propositional-attitude thesis; perceptual experience; propositional content; non-propositional content; accuracy conditions. | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception |
||||||
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 26 May 2020 03:25 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 26 May 2020 03:25 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 17207 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science | ||||||
| Publisher: | Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/... | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1387/theoria.20574 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception |
||||||
| Date: | May 2020 | ||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 155-174 | ||||||
| Volume: | 35 | ||||||
| Number: | 2 | ||||||
| ISSN: | 2171-679X | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17207 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Altmetric.com
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
![[feed]](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}