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Uptake: understanding or accepting?

Blanco Salgueiro, Antonio (2021) Uptake: understanding or accepting? THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 36 (1). pp. 63-79. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Austin introduces the idea of securing the uptake in the context of dealing with the illocution-perlocution distinction. In recent times, the notion is employed by some neoaustinian scholars to argue that the uptake is what triggers the deontic effects (rights, duties, obligations, permissions, etc.) associated to an illocution. Here, a distinction is made between two kinds of uptake: uptake-as-understanding and uptake-as-accepting, and the stance that the second is the one needed for a plausible theory of speech action inspired by Austin’s original ideas is defended. When that notion is adopted, some old problems about speech action can be clarified.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Blanco Salgueiro, Antonioablancos@ucm.es0000-0003-4079-0345
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: uptake, understanding, accepting, illocution, intention, convention, deontic effects.
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 19 Feb 2021 16:14
Last Modified: 19 Feb 2021 16:14
Item ID: 18723
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.21267
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date: January 2021
Page Range: pp. 63-79
Volume: 36
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18723

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