Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks

Kubiak, Adam and Kawalec, Pawel and Kiersztyn, Adam (2021) Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.

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Creators	Email	ORCID
Kubiak, Adam	adampkubiak@gmail.com	0000-0001-7178-3784
Kawalec, Pawel	pawel.kawalec@kul.pl	0000-0001-7618-8298
Kiersztyn, Adam	adam.kiersztyn.pl@gmail.com	0000-0001-5222-8101