Goldberg, Sanford (2021) What Epistemologists of Testimony should learn from Philosophers of Science. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that, if it is construed individualistically, epistemic justification does not capture the conditions that philosophers of science would impose on justified belief in a scientific hypothesis. The difficulty arises from beliefs acquired through testimony. From this I derive a lesson that epistemologists generally, and epistemologists of testimony in particular, should learn from philosophers of science: we ought to repudiate epistemic individualism and move towards a more fully social epistemology.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Goldberg, Sanford s-goldberg@northwestern.edu 0000-0001-9496-6356
Keywords:	testimony, epistemology of testimony, reliance, philosophy of science, evidence, social epistemology
Subjects:	General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Sanford Goldberg
Date Deposited:	28 Jul 2021 02:55
Last Modified:	28 Jul 2021 02:55
Item ID:	19373
Subjects:	General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	2021
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19373

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