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On Explaining the Success of Induction

Sterkenburg, Tom F. (2021) On Explaining the Success of Induction. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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Abstract

Douven (in press) observes that Schurz's meta-inductive justification of induction cannot explain the great empirical success of induction, and offers an explanation based on computer simulations of the social and evolutionary development of our inductive practices. In this paper, I argue that Douven's account does not address the explanatory question that Schurz's argument leaves open, and that the assumption of the environment's induction-friendliness that is inherent to Douven's simulations is not justified by Schurz's argument.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Sterkenburg, Tom F.tom.sterkenburg@lmu.de0000-0002-4860-727X
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User: Mr Tom Sterkenburg
Date Deposited: 02 Dec 2021 05:29
Last Modified: 02 Dec 2021 05:29
Item ID: 19926
Journal or Publication Title: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1086/717068
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date: 2021
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19926

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