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My videos on each chapter of this book:

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjOMOQyQ8WxfvEVBGW1hzLw>

Chapter 1 In Defense of the No-Miracles Argument

Chapter 2 Critiques of the Pessimistic Induction

Chapter 3 Critiques of Scientific Antirealism

Chapter 4 Six New Arguments for Scientific Realism

Chapter 5 Critiques of Five Variants of Putative Realism

Chapter 6 Formulating Scientific Realism and Antirealism

Chapter 7 Scientific Realism and Scientific Understanding

Chapter 8 Scientific Realism and Scientific Progress

Chapter 9 Scientific Realism and Mathematical Realism

Chapter 10 Scientific Realism and Scientific Practice

Chapter 11 New Topics for Future Debates

This book provides philosophers of science with new theoretical resources for making their own contributions to the scientific realism debate. Readers will encounter old and new arguments for and against scientific realism. They will also be given useful tips for how to provide influential formulations of scientific realism and antirealism. Finally, they will see how scientific realism relates to scientific progress, scientific understanding, mathematical realism, and scientific practice.



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