Betz, Gregor (2016) The Veritistic Merit of Doxastic Conservatism in Belief Revision. [Preprint]

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Abstract

There are different varieties of conservatism concerning belief formation and revision. We assesses the veritistic effects of a particular kind of conservatism commonly attributed to Quine: the so-called maxim of minimum mutiliation, which states that agents should give up as few beliefs as possible when facing recalcitrant evidence. Based on a formal bounded rationality model of belief revision, which parametrizes degree of conservatism, and corresponding multi-agent simulations, we eventually argue against doxastic conservatism from the vantage point of veritistic social epistemology.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Betz, Gregor gregor.betz@kit.edu 0000-0001-5802-5030
Keywords:	Doxastic conservatism; Epistemic conservatism; Verificationism; Maxim of minimum mutilation; Degree of justification; Belief revision; Bounded rationality; Veritistic value; Argumentation; Dialectical structure
Subjects:	General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Gregor Betz
Date Deposited:	15 Jan 2022 14:14
Last Modified:	15 Jan 2022 14:14
Item ID:	20111
Subjects:	General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	May 2016
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20111

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