Veit, Walter (2019) Model Pluralism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper introduces and defends an account of model-based science that I dub model pluralism. I argue that despite a growing awareness in the philosophy of science literature of the multiplicity, diversity, and richness of models and modeling-practices, more radical conclusions follow from this recognition than have previously been inferred. Going against the tendency within the literature to generalize from single models, I explicate and defend the following two core theses: (i) any successful analysis of models must target sets of models, their multiplicity of functions within science, and their scientific context and history and (ii) for almost any aspect x of phenomenon y, scientists require multiple models to achieve scientific goal z.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Veit, Walter wrwveit@gmail.com 0000-0001-7701-8995
Keywords:	modeling, models, model-based science, pluralism, idealization, methodology
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Computer Simulation Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Explanation General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Physics Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Rhetoric of Science General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Dr. Walter Veit
Date Deposited:	11 Mar 2022 02:12
Last Modified:	02 Feb 2023 21:41
Item ID:	20301
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology General Issues > Computer Simulation Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Explanation General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Physics Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Rhetoric of Science General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	2019
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20301

Available Versions of this Item

• Model Pluralism. (deposited 19 Sep 2019 00:05)
  • Model Pluralism. (deposited 23 Sep 2019 01:39)
    • Model Pluralism. (deposited 11 Mar 2022 02:12) [Currently Displayed]

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