Facchin, Marco (2022) Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being). [Preprint]
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Abstract
Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly
suΜcient conditions identifying all and only the instances of cognition. They claim the mark is
necessary to answer diΜcult questions concerning the nature and distribution of cognition.
Here, I will argue that, as things stand, given the current landscape of cognitive science, we are
not able to identify a mark of the cognitive. I proceed as follows. First, I clarify some factors
motivating the search for the mark of the cognitive, thereby highlighting the desiderata the mark
is supposed to satisfy. Then, I highlight a tension in the literature over the mark. Given the
literature, it is not clear whether the search aims for a mark capturing the intuitive notion of
cognition or a genuine scientiΞc kind. I then consider each option in turn, claiming that,either
way, no mark satisfying the desiderata can be provided. I then deΟect a foreseeable objection and
highlight some implications of my view.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | Mark of the cognitive, Cognition wars, DeΞnition, Necessary conditions, Minimal cognition, Embodied cognition, Representation | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Natural Kinds General Issues > Theory Change |
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Depositing User: | Dr. Marco Facchin | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 20 Mar 2022 03:29 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 20 Mar 2022 03:29 | ||||||
Item ID: | 20348 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Natural Kinds General Issues > Theory Change |
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Date: | 2022 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20348 |
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- Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being). (deposited 20 Mar 2022 03:29) [Currently Displayed]
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