Pruss, Alexander R.
(2022)
The Dialectics of Accuracy Arguments for Probabilism.
[Preprint]
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Abstract
Scoring rules measure the deviation between a credence assignment and reality. Probabilism holds that only
those credence assignments that satisfy the axioms of probability are rationally admissible. Accuracy-based
arguments for probabilism observe that given certain conditions on a scoring rule, the score of any
non-probability is dominated by the score of a probability. The conditions in the arguments always include
propriety: the claim that the expected accuracy of $p$ is not beaten by the expected
accuracy of any other credence $c$ by the lights of $p$ if $p$ is a probability. I argue that if we think
through how a non-probabilist is likely to respond to pragmatic arguments for probabilism, then the
non-probabilist will accept a condition stronger than propriety for the same reasons that the
probabilist gives for propriety, but this stronger condition is incompatible with the other conditions that
the probabilist needs to run the argument. This makes it unlikely for the probabilist's argument to be
compelling.
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